iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Reposted by Antonio Fatas

Yuriy Gorodnichenko @ygorodnichenko.bsky.social · 10/10/2026

Russia’s energy sales help pay for $190B of its military spending in 2025, nearly triple 2021. ($200B+ budgeted for 2027; no peace plans!) Ukraine is at $84B, 40% of GDP, & short on defense $. Response? 1) More money for #Ukraine. 2) No deals with Russia. Not one more barrel of its diesel or oil.

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Adam Posen @adamposen.bsky.social · 09/10/2026

This is a really super analysis of US wage trends since 1982, all in clear English and simple charts. Well worth a read by everyone. Very solid on the facts and I largely agree with the interpretations open.substack.com/pub/agglomer...

open.substack.com

The Chart that Explains Work in America

Five eras of U.S. wage growth and the six stories that define them

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Antonio Fatas @antoniofatas.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

That is a steep climb for the French-German spread...

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Tony Yates @t0nyyates.bsky.social · 25/09/2026

IMO the priority should be achieving as much AI independence as possible given that the current leading providers in US are allied with a regime that is hostile.

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Antonio Fatas @antoniofatas.bsky.social · 19/09/2026

This is the message you get often if you use Safari. If you use Chrome you probably will not see it. I assume it has to do with privacy protection rules in Safari. This is the only time I have to (I am forced to) use Chrome.

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 09/09/2026

By: Isabel Vansteenkiste @ecb.europa.eu

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 10/09/2026

Geopolitical risk can increase the demand for gold relative to sanctionable sovereign assets. K Arvai, N Coimbra, & M Pinchetti find evidence of active portfolio adjustment consistent with this mechanism, w/ stronger adjustment in countries less aligned with the US. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

Figure: gold share of reserves, indexed to 100 in January 2013.

US Treasuries remain the world’s dominant reserve asset, but geopolitical risks can change how central banks assess the trade-off between liquidity and protection from foreign jurisdictions. This column argues that geopolitical risk can increase the demand for gold relative to sanctionable sovereign assets, putting upward pressure on the gold price and sovereign bond yields. It finds evidence of active portfolio adjustment consistent with this mechanism and shows that the adjustment is stronger in countries less aligned with the US. The results suggest that geopolitical considerations are becoming increasingly relevant alongside the traditional financial determinants of reserve allocation.

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 10/09/2026

As return-to-office mandates have intensified, occupational inflexibility has re-emerged as a significant predictor of employment declines - and only for women. By: Stefania Albanesi cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

Figure: Bars report annual averages of same-month differences in the employment rate, conditional on age, educational attainment, and two-digit SOC occupation. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. ‘With children’ denotes co-residence with a child under 12. Note the strong recovery through 2023 and the visible retrenchment in 2024–2025 for women with children.

The labour force participation of women in the US peaked in 1997 and has stagnated since. This column argues that workplace inflexibility is the common thread running through this puzzle, using COVID-19 as a natural experiment. Women were hit harder than men in the initial downturn due to both over-representation in high-contact and inflexible service occupations and school closures. When remote work relaxed flexibility constraints, mothers’ employment rebounded strongly above pre-pandemic levels. But as return-to-office mandates have intensified, occupational inflexibility has re-emerged as a significant predictor of employment declines – and only for women.

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 14/09/2026

L Kilian & K Patel use the 2026 Iran war as a natural experiment to estimate the price elasticity of US shale oil supply. The monthly & quarterly elasticities are effectively zero, providing indirect support for the view that oil prices are driven by demand shocks. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

Figure: WTI futures curve, 31 March 2026

The 2026 Iran war provides a natural experiment that allows model-free estimation of the price elasticity of US shale oil supply. This column argues that the monthly and quarterly elasticities are effectively zero. This finding is supported by data on well completion times, survey data, and economic theory. The analysis contradicts higher oil supply elasticity estimates from recently proposed non-standard panel regression specifications, which attribute the supply response to shale oil producers strategically reducing inventories of drilled but uncompleted wells. The findings provide indirect support for the view that oil prices are mainly driven by demand, rather than supply, shocks.

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 14/09/2026

In countries where intellectual property protections are weak, firms may instead turn to contractual exclusivity by limiting the number of manufacturers their suppliers can serve, reducing the suppliers' customer base and bargaining power. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

Figure: Each dot is a country. The weaker its legal protection for trade secrets, the higher the share of car-parts contracts in that country that are exclusive.

Modern manufacturing often requires firms to share confidential information with outside suppliers, some of whom also supply their competitors. Using more than 160,000 contracts from the global automotive industry, this column examines how manufacturers respond to this risk and the costs of doing so. The findings suggest that when legal protection is weak, firms may instead turn to contractual exclusivity by limiting the number of manufacturers their suppliers can serve, reducing the suppliers’ customer base and bargaining power and potentially weakening their incentives to invest. Stronger legal protection reduces the need for this contractual response and can therefore support broader supplier networks.

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Carl Quintanilla @carlquintanilla.bsky.social · 24/08/2026

CITADEL: “.. this amounts to financial repression at the margin. .. Preventing Treasuries from clearing at lower prices does not eliminate that pressure. It merely shifts it elsewhere.” @bloomberg.com www.bloomberg.com/news/article...

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Stephen Williamson @1954swilliamson.bsky.social · 24/08/2026

1/This article quotes 3 anonymous sources who say that a trade deal was in place last Tuesday, and all that had to be done was to write it up. Then the Americans inserted a surprise set of demands into the text of the deal, at the instigation of... www.theglobeandmail.com/world/articl...

theglobeandmail.com

Trade talks collapsed at last minute after U.S. commerce chief pressed for harsher terms, sources say

Ottawa objected to U.S. demands affecting key exports, Canadian content rules and its ability to strike trade deals with other countries

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Justin Wolfers @justinwolfers.bsky.social · 24/08/2026

Trump is promising to boost the U.S. economy by making it harder for Americans to trade with the rest of the world. He is also promising to destroy Iran's economy by making it harder for Iranians to trade with the rest of the world.

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Anna Stansbury @annastansbury.bsky.social · 24/08/2026

@zbleemer.bsky.social & @jrothstein.bsky.social : the most selective US universities spend much more per student, and this gap has massively risen over time. They call this the "Meritocratic Consensus" in US higher education...

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 24/08/2026

Bo Becker, Efraim Benmelech, & Joao Monteiro argue that the US-Europe valuation gap is driven not by differences in GDP, number of listed firms, sectoral composition, or the presence of a few superstar firms, but by European firms' inability to scale. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

Figure shows the US-Europe valuation gap. In 2008, the total value of US-listed firms exceeded that of European firms by about a third – roughly $3 trillion. By 2023 the gap had grown to $34 trillion, an amount larger than annual US GDP. Over this period the US stock market quadrupled in value, while Europe’s rose by just 70%.

In 2008, the US stock market was worth $3 trillion more than the combined European stock market; in 2023, the gap was $34 trillion. This column argues that the valuation gap is not driven by differences in GDP, number of listed firms, sectoral composition, or the presence of a few superstar firms, but by European firms’ inability to scale. European firms remain tethered to their home market. Small European firms face a much larger cost of capital and cannot substitute debt with access to equity financing, including venture capital. Therefore, even if they have profitable growth opportunities, European firms cannot grow as their US counterparts.

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Tony Yates @t0nyyates.bsky.social · 19/08/2026

I don't think you can strip quotes from Smith + Cowen about Acemoglu from their political context. It's reasonable to think that Acemoglu's liberal politics antagonise the former, who have made their brand the enthusiasm for the techno optimism of eg Musk, the owner of the platform for the yelling.

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Ben Ansell @benansell.bsky.social · 18/08/2026

The @economist.com slam on Daron Acemoglu chooses to cite Noah Smith and Tyler Cowen and Larry Summers as critics of his work and well, that tells me quite a lot of what I need to know about the merits of the piece. A very odd choice of article and weakly argued and written. Ah well...

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Peterson Institute for International Economics @piie.com · 18/08/2026

pssst hey can y'all help us get 10k followers before 1k posts so my economist bosses see a good post:follower ratio thanks

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 10/08/2026

Using a data set covering all PhD graduates from US economics programmes, M Eberhardt, @giovannifacchini.bsky.social & @valerueda.bsky.social show recent elite PhD grads are more likely to leave academia, take jobs outside the US, & take jobs in the tech sector. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

The figure shows the placement of economics PhDs, by region and sector. The left panel shows the academic placement by region with the share of placements in North America declining. The right panel shows the share of placements by sector, with placements in the tech sector having risen since 2010 and especially since 2015.

Since 2010, a growing proportion of doctoral graduates have been taking jobs outside academia. This column explores where elite early-career economists work, using a dataset covering all PhD graduates from US economics programmes. The findings revealt that recent elite PhD graduates are more likely to leave academia, to take jobs outside the US, and to be absorbed by a tech sector that draws broadly across gender, ethnicity, and programme prestige. However, East Asian candidates continue to face a substantial penalty in access to top academic positions. Within academia, elite advisor networks continue to confer advantages, reinforcing stratification at the top.

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Stephen Williamson @1954swilliamson.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

This piece is infuriating. Warsh is made out to be some sort of brave knight on a course to reform a sick institution. Uuurrrggghh. He's actually an under-qualified boob attempting to disguise a willingness to serve the executive branch as sound economics.

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Antonio Fatas @antoniofatas.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

Given the press interviews he did before getting the job, his regular change of mind about what he wants ir or his constant praises of Trump’s economic policies as the best ever, there is a reason to be suspicious of what he will do.

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Antonio Fatas @antoniofatas.bsky.social · 05/08/2026

When will we stop blaming "rogue" models and instead blame the companies who created them and put them to a test without the proper protection?

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Catherine Rampell @crampell.bsky.social · 04/08/2026

size of corp debt one rung above junk is close to record highs

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Antonio Fatas @antoniofatas.bsky.social · 31/07/2026

Not quite the same data, but should be close enough. Net worth (households) in the US trending upwards as a ratio to GDP since 1990 with accelerations happening around stocks and housing increase in prices

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John Burn-Murdoch @jburnmurdoch.ft.com · 31/07/2026

Yep, elements of all of those are visible in the data. US median wealth dipping much more deeply during the GFC was in part because the median American has much higher exposure to equities than the median European.

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Antonio Fatas @antoniofatas.bsky.social · 31/07/2026

This is useful. If it is interest rates and perception of risk, it was a one-time event. There can also be economic dynamics that make the ratio of wealth/income grow. And it can be an overvalued stock market...Each of these explanations have very different consequences.

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Antonio Fatas @antoniofatas.bsky.social · 31/07/2026

Interesting but what was the trend before 2000? And how much of this is increases in asset prices because of lower interest rates? I am missing a hypothesis of why this is happening and what it means. @jburnmurdoch.ft.com

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The Economist @economist.com · 29/07/2026

A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that covering the AI capex boom would require revenues of $2.5trn per year, more than the tech industry’s entire combined earnings today

bit.ly

AI revenues are growing fast, but not fast enough

The returns on trillions of dollars of spending are deeply uncertain

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 17/07/2026

Greater wage transparency is expected to narrow gender pay gaps with the new EU Pay Transparency Directive. Greatest gains are likely from where unequal pay among comparable workers is a key driver of the gap. S De Poli, S Maier, V Ivaškaitė-Tamošiūnė cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

Figure: The unadjusted and adjusted gender pay gap in the 27 EU member states. UGPG: Unadjusted gender pay gap (difference in average gross hourly wages between men and women, expressed as % of average men’s gross hourly wages). AGPG: Adjusted gender pay gap (difference in average gross hourly wages between men and women performing similar work, as % of average male average gross hourly wages).

Equal pay for equal work has been a core EU principle since 1957, yet women across Europe continue to earn less than men, even in very similar jobs. As EU countries begin implementing the new Pay Transparency Directive, greater wage transparency is expected to narrow these gaps. This column explores the potential effects on the 27 EU countries. Equal pay could substantially narrow gender disparities, but the gains are greater where unequal pay among comparable workers is a key driver of the gender pay gap.

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Christian Odendahl @codendahl.bsky.social · 16/07/2026

Carbon tax me but not yet. The EU is struggling to find a compromise between climate, industry and trade rules. My latest, a short piece on the ETS. www.economist.com/europe/2026/...

economist.com

Europe seems set to ease its carbon pricing

Green goals are running into fears about competitiveness

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Sam Learner @samlearner.bsky.social · 11/07/2026

wrote for the magazine about the open source software that underpins our digital lives, how it is being upended by AI code tools, and about maintainers as.ft.com/r/b7f62212-9...

ft.com

Who cleans up after the vibe-coding party?

Our obsession with AI code-writing tools is overwhelming the web’s unsung human caretakers

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Toby Nangle @tobyn.bsky.social · 12/07/2026

Humans don’t ask humans questions anymore - great piece on vibe-coding & its consequences by @samlearner.bsky.social www.ft.com/content/cec8...

Chart showing total monthly questions asked on Stack Overflow forums; collapses after the release of ChatGPT

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Daniel Knowles @dlknowles.bsky.social · 12/07/2026

Another great example of how AI is killing the incentive to actually provide any of the data AI requires to be any good at anything

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Menzie Chinn @mchinn.bsky.social · 12/07/2026

Will the US economy be as "resilient" once AI capex depends on bond markets #EconSky econbrowser.com/archives/202...

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Financial Times @financialtimes.com · 10/07/2026

The US companies said they have been supplying AI services to Singapore-based subsidiaries of Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent, which Washington has accused of working with China’s military. ft.trib.al/BrvuryA

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Centre for Economic Policy Research @cepr.org · 09/07/2026

@antoniofatas.bsky.social argues that the EU fiscal framework's principles are largely sound and the 2024 reform's shift from rigid numerical targets toward country-specific debt-sustainability analysis was the right move. What remains unresolved is execution. ow.ly/o0Lk50Zm1Sc #Europe2050 #EconSky

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 26/06/2026

Barthelemy Bonadio, Andrei Levchenko, & @nityanayar.bsky.social show that even a complete US exit from global trade cooperation has limited quantitative impact on other countries’ optimal tariffs and on the sustainability of trade cooperation. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

The large US tariffs announced in April 2025 led other countries to debate the best policy response. This column uses a multi-country model to study the implications of the US withdrawal from free trade for that cooperative equilibrium. It finds that even a complete US exit from global trade cooperation has limited quantitative impact on other countries’ optimal tariffs and on the sustainability of trade cooperation. Trade cooperation becomes harder to sustain when policymaker patience is lower and when punishment horizons are shorter. Still, conditions for continued trade cooperation remain strong.

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 03/06/2026

Stephen Cecchetti, Dirk Niepelt, Hélène Rey & Xavier Vives introduce the 8th report in the Future of Banking series: Digital Money. The crypto system is no longer a sideshow. These monies will only be reliable if sound institutions & robust technology come together. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

The crypto system is no longer a sideshow. Dollar stablecoins now put dollar claims into circulation well beyond the regulated US banking perimeter, and cryptoisation is beginning to transform the international monetary and financial system. This column argues that the changes crypto sets in motion will be shaped by institutions and technological innovation. Who issues money, who anchors it, and who bears the cost when things go wrong are central issues. But as money migrates onto programmable, cross-border rails, the resilience of the rail itself becomes part of what determines which monies are trusted. Digital money will be reliable only where sound institutions and robust technology come together.

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Yuriy Gorodnichenko @ygorodnichenko.bsky.social · 02/06/2026

Monthly losses of Russian vehicles and fuel tankers (Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of #Ukraine) A dramatic increase in recent months. Recent days were ~500/day Daily number for June 1, 2026: 517 At this rate, June will be well above 10,000

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 11/05/2026

M Rute, F Vandermeeren, & A Dumitrescu investigate the goals of a recalibrated EU industrial policy and its key components for success. Europe should rely more on directional and centrally designed strategies that enable more decisive action in strategic areas. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

Figure shows the need for Europe to increasingly rely on more directional and centrally designed strategies that enable more decisive action in strategic areas.

Europe is recalibrating its industrial policy in response to external challenges including China’s state-driven overcapacities and protectionist US tariffs, but also as an opportunity to address its economic security risks while at the same time moving beyond its middle-technology trap. This column investigates the goals of this recalibrated approach and key components for success. The findings point to the need for Europe to increasingly rely on more directional and centrally designed strategies that enable more decisive action in strategic areas.

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 11/05/2026

Philip Bunn‬, @nickbloom.bsky.social, @paulmizen.bsky.social, Gregory Thwaites, & @iyotzov.bsky.social use survey data to show that UK firms now expect higher prices and lower margins, especially among energy-intensive firms, since the start of the Iran war. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

This figure is based on responses to the question: “The war in Iran has led to higher energy prices. How do you expect these increases in energy prices to affect the following aspects of your business over the next year?” The data are based on 660 responses in the April 2026 wave of the DMP survey. Results are weighted by industry and employment shares. Net balance refers to the share expecting higher minus share expecting lower. High-energy firms are defined as firms with energy costs above 5% of total costs in 2025.

The conflict in the Middle East has pushed energy prices sharply higher, but the implications for UK inflation will depend on the scale and duration of the shock as well as its propagation through firms’ costs, prices, margins, and wages. This column uses new survey data from UK firms to provide early evidence on how business expectations are responding. Firms currently expect higher prices and lower margins to be the main margins of adjustment, especially among energy-intensive firms. Consistent with this, firms’ expectations for their own prices and costs have risen since the war began. Wage and employment impacts remain more muted but could evolve over time.

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 11/05/2026

K Rogoff & Y Yang study Japan's post-real estate bubble stagnation in the 90s to find parallels with China's experience. China's window to shape the outcome of its adjustment narrows as overcapacity, weak consumption, & negative sentiment reinforce one another. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

National Bureau of Statistics of China and authors’ calculations. The price index is constructed using the National Bureau of Statistics’ monthly residential property resale price index for 70 large and medium-sized Chinese cities. For each city, the index is normalised to its historical peak (the series begins in 2011, with peaks occurring between 2017 and 2023 depending on the city). All other monthly observations are then expressed relative to this benchmark.

A growing debate has emerged over whether China risks repeating elements of Japan’s post-real estate bubble stagnation of the 1990s. This column compares China’s current real estate adjustment with Japan’s experience and uncovers striking parallels in investment dynamics and consumption responses. The key lesson from both episodes is that overinvestment during a housing boom simply cannot be unwound quickly. Excess supply hangs over the economy, discouraging new investment and weighing on activity long after volumes and prices peak. China still has room to shape the outcome of its adjustment, but the window narrows as overcapacity, weak consumption, and negative sentiment reinforce one another.

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VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org · 05/05/2026

T Takalo & O Toivanen find meaningful differences b/w R&D tax credits & subsidies. Tax credits can be more effective by ensuring sufficient uptake whereas subsidy policy would benefit from internalisation of application costs & reducing costs/uncertainty to firms. cepr.org/voxeu/column... #EconSky

$Figure shows project-level R&D subsidy rates awarded in Finland. The horizontal axis shows the percentage of an applicant’s R&D project costs subsidized by the government agency and the vertical axis shows the fraction of applications for each subsidy rate decision. R&D subsidies and tax credits are widely used around the world to encourage private sector R&D by reducing its cost for firms. This column argues that these policy tools have meaningful differences that should be considered in innovation policy and by those conducting research on the topic. R&D tax credits are a rule-based registration system whereas R&D subsidies are a discretionary examination system. R&D tax credit policy can be made more effective by ensuring sufficient uptake and removing firm-specific caps, whereas R&D subsidy policy can be made more effective by internalising the application costs and reducing its costs and uncertainty to firms.$

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Justin Wolfers @justinwolfers.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

The news out of the Middle East might have seemed less dire lately, but oil futures are now basically as pessimistic as they've ever been. This could be a concern that the current war continues, or it could be concern about a rising risk of future geopolitical shocks.

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