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In this video, I discuss how warships deal with asymmetric threats and why that contributed to the incident where a Russian frigate fired warning shots at a British yacht in the English Channel. Watch the video on the website or read the transcript below. Best, Anders * * * ### _Transcript:_ The other day, there was an incident in the English Channel where a Russian frigate fired warning shots at a yacht. This created quite a discussion about what this Russian frigate was up to and why they behaved so aggressively. And while some of that criticism was justified, I think this discussion also demonstrated that many people don't quite understand how warships operate in these types of situations, and that led to misinterpretations. So what I want to do in this video is just explain how warships deal with these types of situations, what considerations go into the planning of reactions, and why that can create situations where it seems that the warship behaves in an excessively aggressive manner. So let's talk about it. What I'm going to do in this video is first, I'm going to talk a bit about how warships in general defend themselves against asymmetric threats. And then I'm going to finish off with some comments about what happened in the English Channel. But first, it's necessary to discuss two important conditions that influence how warships operate. The first condition is that warships are vulnerable. This may sound very trivial, but the fact is that if a warship is hit, then it can sink. One hit can lead to the loss of the entire platform, and the entire crew can perish. And that means that there's a lot at stake for the warship and for the crew members on board. So a warship is a potent platform that can carry formidable firepower, but it's also extremely vulnerable. And that means that there's basically zero tolerance for taking a hit when you prepare the warship's reactions to threats. The second condition that it's important to be aware of is that a warship is a complex organization with a large crew that needs to work together to solve any task. You will have people on the bridge, people in the operations room, people in the radio station, people in the engine department, people on the deck to operate machine guns, people in damage control units, etc. So in total, that's a lot of people who all need to understand what's going on and what their job is in the larger system for the ship to be able to perform any task. And they need to be able to solve those tasks under time pressure where there is a lot at stake, and basically there will be no time for discussions or explanations about what's going on. The way you organize things so that this complex system is able to perform tasks is by developing standard procedures for various situations. And then you practice those procedures until every crew member understands what they're supposed to do and how the task is solved. But that also means that there is quite a bit of rigidity in how warships handle tasks. So of course, you can apply judgment in the specific situation. But as the commanding officer, you really don't want to be improvising how tasks are solved because that's just going to lead to chaos. And as the commanding officer, you also want to think through the various scenarios and dilemmas before you face them in a real situation because this allows you to free up mental bandwidth so you can stay on top of the situation when it occurs and actually follow events. You want to incorporate all these dilemmas into the standard procedures for such situations because that ensures that you have considered all the different aspects and that your crew is prepared to execute the reactions you want. So those are the two basic conditions or considerations you need to keep in mind if you want to understand how warships prepare to handle asymmetric threats. The first point is that warships are vulnerable and that avoiding taking a hit is the absolute first priority. And the second point is that warships need to operate based on standard procedures because that's the only way to ensure that the organization can perform under pressure. So what would such a procedure look like when you're talking about reactions to asymmetric threats? And by asymmetric threats, I mean something like a speedboat or a yacht that's filled with explosives that just sails up to the warship and detonates on the side. Or perhaps that the peaceful-looking crew members suddenly pick up grenade launchers and start firing at you. Or it could be something like a slow, low-flying plane that crashes into the side of the warship. So those types of threats where you're not up against enemy missiles or something similar, but rather you're up against something that's asymmetric. And I'm going to give a very simple example of how this could roughly look. Of course, these things will be specific for every type of warship. Just take this as an example to give an idea of the types of things that would be included in such a procedure. But typically, the steps you take will be determined by the distance you have to the threat or to the target. And in this type of situation, it seems reasonable that the first step would be taken at a distance of about maybe two nautical miles. So when the sailing yacht gets closer than about two nautical miles, that's when things will start happening on the warship. The first thing that happens is that the warship increases its level of readiness. You call more people on watch. The bridge crew is augmented. You have more people in the operations room, in the engine department. You start getting people ready in damage control units. You man the guns on the deck. So many things will start happening inside the warship that you can't see from the outside. And of course, that's kind of inconvenient if it's not necessary. So warships typically do everything they can to avoid the situation. As the officer of the watch, one of your primary tasks is to ensure that no yacht unnecessarily gets closer than two nautical miles. And you really don't want to be the guy who has to call the captain and wake him up in the middle of the night because you weren't paying attention. So warships try to do what they can to actually avoid getting close to the threat. And that is the first step in self-defense. But if it's not possible to avoid it, then that's what will happen. The next step in the procedure could occur at a distance of maybe one nautical mile, so that's about two kilometers. Typically, this would involve hailing the other ship on the VHF radio. In the beginning, you might be friendly and polite, but if that does not get the reaction you want, then you're typically going to be saying some pretty aggressive stuff on the radio to make sure that the other ship understands the seriousness of the situation. The VHF radio is not some bulletproof system that guarantees that you can always talk to everyone at sea. In fact, you very often find that you get no response from the other ship, especially from yachts. I'd say there is maybe a 10% to 20% chance of actually making a connection. And that's just because the physical conditions on yachts are not conducive to maintaining a constant radio watch. On a yacht, it very easily blends into the background noise and it becomes difficult to hear. If hailing on the radio does not work, then you might take the next step at, say, half a mile, which is about one kilometer. And that could typically involve actions like sounding the horn and flashing your lights to attract attention. If that does not work, then at 0.3 nautical miles, you might take the next step, which could be to fire warning shots into the air. At 0.2 nautical miles, you might escalate the situation further by firing warning shots into the water in front of the other boat. So this way, they will not only hear the gunshots, but they will also see splashes in the water. And then if that does not work, at 0.1 nautical miles or a little less than 200 meters, you might start shooting directly at the other ship. So this is an example of what a procedure to counter asymmetric threats might look like. And then you can, of course, have variations of it. For example, there might be differences in how you react to a sailing yacht compared to a speedboat because the speedboat is going to be traveling the distances much faster. So maybe you want to react sooner to that. In the case from the English Channel, the British couple on the sailing yacht explained that they were at a distance of about 400 to 500 meters from the Russian warship when it started shooting with shots going into the air. That is a distance of about a quarter of a nautical mile. So that's about the same distance at which I said it would be reasonable to have in your procedure that you would be firing warning shots. And this is when we get into the different mental states that this British couple and the Russian warship were in. Because the yachters were thinking in terms of collision danger. From their perspective, four or five hundred meters, that's a long distance. That's pretty far when you're in a yacht. In fact, very often, yachters will feel absolutely comfortable passing each other at distances of, say, 50 meters. But from the warship, four or five hundred meters, that's extremely close and it's dangerous. I don't know how fast this British yacht was sailing at the time, but if we say that it was going six knots, then that would be sailing 0.1 nautical mile per minute. This would mean that the yacht was only about two minutes away from the Russian warship. That's not a lot of reaction time, and that's why this yacht could not be allowed to get any closer from the warship's perspective. Something I've seen many people saying about this situation is that the Russian warship overreacted. The argument is that they should know that the English Channel is not a war zone, so there is no reason to be so hysterical about a sailing yacht with two British pensioners. There is some truth to that in the sense that, of course, warships can't maintain a two-mile safety zone from all yachts everywhere at all times. If you are in constrained waters, ships are going to get closer than that. And if you're not in a war zone, then typically you would be kind of okay with it. But the thing to understand is that Russia is a country at war, and the Russian Navy is vulnerable everywhere they go. Ukraine constantly targets Russian warships, and there is absolutely no reason to expect that the Ukrainian intelligence services wouldn't also try to hit a Russian frigate in the English Channel if they get the chance. So I think it's understandable that the Russian captain would operate under the assumption that every yacht or fishing boat that they see is a potential threat, and it could be a concealed Ukrainian intelligence operation. In this specific case, it's been mentioned that the Russian ship was actually drifting at the time of the incident. It's been speculated that this is because it's low on fuel and that it doesn't really have reliable means of refueling in the English Channel. If that is the case, then it explains why the Russian warship did not simply maneuver to increase the distance from the English yacht. It also means that to a large extent, this Russian frigate is a sitting duck that is even more vulnerable to various types of asymmetric threats. So you can see why the crew would be on edge. I've also seen many people saying that this Russian frigate shouldn't be in the English Channel in the first place, that it's just there to intimidate Britain and France and to cause trouble. And since it doesn't really have any good reason to be there, it should just leave and stop behaving like a bully towards the other shipping in the area. And that is true in the sense that the presence of this Russian warship in the English Channel is obviously not benign. It is there to intimidate NATO. It is there to complicate the effort to stop Russian shadow fleet tankers from passing through the Channel. But the problem with that argument is that it's not particularly actionable. Sure, it's super annoying that this Russian frigate is doing what it's doing, just as in any war, it's super annoying that the enemy is fighting back, but that's kind of just how things are. And just because you say that you think this Russian frigate should go home, they're not going to go home. The captain has been assigned to do exactly what he's doing, so he's going to keep doing that. And that's also why I think people who are yachting in the English Channel or anywhere where Russian warships operate, such as the Danish Straits or the Baltic Sea, just don't go near them. You might trigger the actions I mentioned above without realizing it until you're pretty close. From your perspective, everything still looks fine, but I can tell you that on the other side, on the Russian warship, there will be sailors who are extremely nervous and who are manning the machine gun. And they are prepared to defend themselves against a threat that you probably haven't even considered, but that's extremely real to them. So just don't go near them.

Sweden's decision to engage with France's FDI ship program marks a significant shift in its naval capabilities, driven by the urgency for modern, mature surface combatants. While criticisms arise about prioritizing foreign investment over domestic production, the FDI's operational readiness and technological advantages in countering future threats justify its selection to enhance Sweden's maritime defense.

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Complete with quotes!

In this video, I discuss the American peace plan and ultimatum to Ukraine. Watch the video on the website or read the transcript below. Best, Anders * * * ### _Transcript:_ Donald Trump has issued a strong ultimatum to Ukraine, which must agree to a framework for a peace deal before Thanksgiving, which is on Thursday. This is dramatic, so let's talk about it. The Trump administration, together with the Russians, has developed a 28-point peace plan, which they have presented to Ukraine. They have stated that Ukraine must agree to this before Thursday, or there will be severe consequences. So this is a strong ultimatum. I think this is perhaps a good place to start by discussing the leverage that the United States actually has to force Ukraine into signing this agreement. There are two things that are typically mentioned. One is intelligence sharing and the other is weapons deliveries. The intelligence sharing means that the United States has information from various sources, most importantly spy satellites, but also other means such as spy planes and other methods that provide intelligence which Ukraine benefits from. However, I think the significance of this intelligence sharing is often overrated. The reason for this is that the Ukrainians have, in the last six months, been eager to emphasize the importance of the intelligence sharing that is happening because they want to present the United States as a stronger partner than it really is for political reasons. So they have exaggerated the significance of this. What the Ukrainians actually get from the intelligence sharing includes things like early warnings about Russian air raids. They receive a heads up when Russian long-range bombers take off from airfields inside of Russia. This way, Ukraine can prepare for a large airstrike that will be happening in a few hours. And this allows them to have the air defenses ready and to issue air raid warnings to the population. Another benefit is that they will receive more precise information about the location of Russian air defense units. This allows Ukraine to plan offensive airstrikes more effectively. Most importantly, this is significant when they aim to take out the air defense battery itself. It might be, I think, less significant for the long range strikes that Ukraine is conducting on oil refineries and other things deep inside of Russia. But it's crucial when they want to target a specific Russian air defense system. Having updated information on the location and condition of that system is very important. So those are significant benefits that Ukraine gets from this intelligence sharing. However, it's not crucial to the extent that it would jeopardize Ukraine's war efforts if they don't receive the support. Ukraine can continue fighting without U.S. intelligence sharing. The weapons deliveries are a bigger problem. I'm always careful not to refer to the United States as a supporter of Ukraine because since Trump came to office, the United States is no longer donating weapons or cash to Ukraine's war effort. They're selling weapons at a profit. And I think it's misleading to talk about supporters as someone who sells things at a profit. But leaving that terminology aside, the United States is still an important partner for Ukraine in the sense that it's an arms dealer that provides assets that Ukraine needs. And the way this works today is through what's called the PURL initiative, which stands for Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List. This is essentially a wish list of weapons produced in the United States that Ukraine can prioritize and request. And then European countries can contribute by donating those weapons in which Ukraine has expressed interest. This mechanism was created back in the summer. And from a European perspective, it's been seen as a win-win-win arrangement. Ukraine still has access to American weapons. The United States will receive a substantial sum of money, and the European NATO countries believed that this was a way to keep the transatlantic alliance together because it creates incentives for the Americans to stay engaged in European security. So when there is talk about stopping weapons deliveries to Ukraine, what we're really talking about is the United States withdrawing from the PURL Initiative. And this is something that Donald Trump could obviously do. But I think it's important to be aware that there are also significant downsides for the United States in doing so. It essentially means leaving money on the table in order to help Russia win the war and undermine NATO coherence. And this is something that Donald Trump might be willing to do. But I think it's also fair to assume that it's probably not a priority that most Americans would share. So, it might create some domestic political backlash in the United States. And importantly, today, Ukraine is also producing most of the weapons themselves in their own domestic defense industry. So, we are at a level now where American weapons are still significant, but they are a smaller part of the overall arsenal that Ukraine has. This obviously also means that you don't have as much leverage as you would have if you delivered most of the weapons that Ukraine was using. So overall, the leverage that the United States has in Ukraine is smaller than many people think. The intelligence sharing is not as important as it is sometimes made out to be. And the question of weapons deliveries is going to be domestically difficult for Donald Trump. It's just going to be hard to explain to the American people why it's necessary to leave money on the table to help Putin win the war. And in either case, losing American support might have consequences for Ukraine's ability to fight the war in the long term, but it's not going to lead to a short-term collapse. I want to turn to the question of how Russia would view this 28-point plan. Many people have pointed out that this plan is not actually that great for Russia either. If you look into it, even though overall the plan requires significantly more concessions from Ukraine than from Russia, there are still some aspects that are quite unfavorable for Russia too. In reality, this plan would mean that Putin would not achieve all the goals he has set out for what he calls the special military operation. For example, Putin has justified the war with a need to demilitarize Ukraine. Now, according to this plan, Ukraine's military will be capped at a size that is two and a half times bigger than before the demilitarization began. So it's not much demilitarization going on there. Ukraine will also receive something that, at least on paper, sounds like Article 5 level security guarantees from the United States. And Russia will not actually gain control of all the regions that they have annexed because there are some areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia that Russia will not be getting. So, some people will say that because of these things, it's quite possible that for Putin to actually agree to this plan, it's not only going to be Ukraine that will be demanding changes. But I think he looks at it differently. I don't think he expects this plan to realistically materialize, but he assumes that it will be more damaging for Ukraine to agree to this text than for him, and therefore, relatively speaking, it will benefit him. Because sure, inside of Russia, there would be dissatisfaction if this is actually the outcome they get after four years of war, but it's nothing compared to the resistance that Zelensky would face. And this means that for Putin, it's actually a win-win situation. Either Zelensky goes along with this, and that will throw Ukraine into a deep domestic political crisis. Or Zelensky does not agree to this, and that can fracture the relationship between Ukraine and the United States, and Ukraine can lose its most important external source of weapons. So even though there are some things in this 28-point plan that are pretty bad for Russia, I actually think Putin is okay with it. And that is also supported by the fact that many people have pointed out how the text in these 28 points in many instances sound like a translation from an original Russian text into English because it sounds quirky in English, but it's much more natural in Russian. And as someone who speaks Russian, I can confirm that that is indeed the case. I will not go through all the 28 points in this video and explain exactly why this is bad for Ukraine. Lawrence Friedman has made a really nice annotated version of the plan on Substack, and I will leave a link to it in the video description if you want to read it. But what I want to say is that it's really bad. It will mean that Ukraine loses a lot of territory, it loses sovereignty, it loses security. It also throws Ukraine into a deep political crisis because it demands concessions that a majority of Ukrainians don't support, and it requires Ukraine to give up any ideas of things like justice for war crimes, for example. And most importantly, it does not provide Ukraine with any sense of security from future Russian attacks. So, frankly, in Ukraine, this plan will be interpreted as Russia just getting a break for a year or two, and then they can rearm and restart the war. Everything that Russia would essentially have to do is to stage some kind of false flag attack on themselves and then claim that Ukraine did it. And this action would effectively nullify any security guarantees that Ukraine might receive from this 28-point plan, at least if Donald Trump agrees to this interpretation of this false flag attack. So, it's a really bad plan for Ukraine. There isn't public support for these things in Ukraine. And it's also beyond Zelensky's powers to make decisions of this caliber on his own. I also think it's really important to remember that militarily, there is no justification for demanding such sweeping concessions from Ukraine compared to Russia. Russia is not currently winning the war. Ukraine is not exactly winning either. But when you have a situation where militarily it's very equal, then it does not make sense to demand so many more concessions from one side than the other. Zelensky made a powerful speech in which he said that Ukraine faces difficult choices and might have to choose between losing their dignity or losing a valuable partner. I think it's important to understand that this doesn't actually imply that Zelensky is saying that there is an actual choice, because there isn't. It's not really an option for him to go along with Trump's plan and save the relationship with the United States at the expense of dignity. So, what this powerful statement was about is mobilizing public support, both domestically in Ukraine and abroad, especially in Europe and the United States. He's laying the groundwork to explain why he's going to reject this plan, even if it means Ukraine will suffer more and there will be higher casualties in the months to come. Because Ukraine will be even shorter on things like air defense systems, for example, if they don't get American weapons. It might also be necessary to make other difficult choices, such as increasing mobilization in Ukraine. But this 28-point plan is essentially a demand for Ukraine's capitulation. And they're not going to do that because, as I explained before, the United States does not actually have the leverage to make them do so. And in reality, Zelensky's only option is to try to soften the blow and persuade the Americans to change their mind. It's not an option for him to go along with the plan as it stands now. The last thing I want to say is that I think this whole situation shows that the European strategy for working with Donald Trump has failed. Essentially, the game that's been going on since Trump came into office has been that both the Ukrainian and European side and the Russian side have tried to convince him that the obstacle to peace is the other side. And therefore, the solution would be to put pressure on the others. This has been happening in many iterations, but all the while, there's been this assumption in Europe that it would be possible to convince Donald Trump in the end that the way forward is to put pressure on Russia. And so, there was this feeling in Europe that with the PURL Initiative and the latest American sanctions on Russia that they kind of made it. That all seems lost now. Just last week, I made a Q&A video where I mentioned that Ukraine's biggest achievement in 2025 perhaps might have been how they managed on the political stage to establish some new ground rules for working with the Americans. This allowed them to once again rely on weapons deliveries thanks to the PURL Initiative, which provides some certainty about future deliveries, some predictability. And then perhaps in 2026, they could focus more on how to handle the enemy instead of how to deal with Donald Trump. But now it looks like we might be back to step zero. And it turns out that once again, Donald Trump does not understand it. That you can't make a deal with Donald Trump because he's just going to change his mind the next day. So I think overall, this strategy of always pretending to be very willing to negotiate when really you don't think that negotiations are possible, but you just want the other side to appear as the obstacles to negotiations, I think this strategy has failed. And they, meaning Ukraine and the Europeans, will need to take a different approach and adopt a more assertive posture if they want to be taken seriously. Because right now, Europe and Ukraine are losing the diplomatic game. Okay, I will end it here. If you found the video helpful or informative, then please give it a like. Also remember to subscribe to the channel and click the bell icon to get notifications when I upload new videos. And if you want more videos and you want to support the channel, you can subscribe to my website at www.logicofwar.com. Thank you very much for watching and I will see you again next time.