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Rural Spatial Justice @ruralspatialj.bsky.social · 04/10/2026

As Brazil votes in a knife-edge presidential election today, you might to read an early output from Rural-Spatial-Justice published last year on place and rural discontent in Jair Bolsonaro's shock 2018 election victory. periodicos.uff.br/geographia/a...

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Rural Spatial Justice @ruralspatialj.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

New paper: 'Rural Discontent and Disruptive Politics: A Spatial Justice Perspective', just published in Progress in Environmental Geography introduces the conceptual framework for the Rural-Spatial-Justice project. Open access and free to read on the link below: doi.org/10.1177/2753...

doi.org

Rural Discontent and Disruptive Politics: A Spatial Justice Perspective - Michael Woods, 2026

This thematic intervention proposes the adoption of a spatial justice framework to examine the drivers of rural support for disruptive political movements and t...

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Rural Spatial Justice @ruralspatialj.bsky.social · 09/09/2026

How is the far right taking advantage of farmers' discontent? We discuss evidence from France, Germany & UK in an extended write-up of our paper at last week's @rgs.org conference. ruralspatialjustice.substack.com/p/interstiti...

ruralspatialjustice.substack.com

Interstitial radicalisation: The far right and farmer discontent in Europe

This is an extended written version of a paper presented at the Royal Geographical Society annual conference.

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Rural Spatial Justice @ruralspatialj.bsky.social · 09/09/2026

ruralspatialjustice.substack.com

Interstitial radicalisation: The far right and farmer discontent in Europe

This is an extended written version of a paper presented at the Royal Geographical Society annual conference.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

4) As often discussed, AfD strongholds tend to be more rural and reliant on manufacturing employment, with higher levels of out-migration, fewer university graduates and migrants, a lower share of women, and lower purchasing power. Green strongholds almost display the mirror image.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

Changes in vote shares since 2021 also highlight the AfD’s growing dominance in rural areas: the smaller the municipality, the larger its gains. The SPD and Greens gain mainly in larger cities, while die Linke also records much smaller losses there.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

3) Despite these regional variations, a clear divide separates the larger cities from the rest of the state. The AfD dominates the countryside and remains strongest even in municipalities of 20,000–50,000 residents; only in the largest cities does its support drop markedly.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

This broad mobilization leaves the AfD as the largest party in all 218 municipalities. Its strongest gains are concentrated in the rural Burgenlandkreis, Mansfeld-Südharz, Salzlandkreis, and Saalekreis, while increases are more limited in urban Halle and Magdeburg.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

Larger increases in turnout are thus associated with greater rurality, reflected in lower population density and smaller population size. Turnout also rose more strongly in municipalities experiencing population loss and where the AfD had already performed above average in 2021.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

The increase is especially pronounced in rural municipalities in the Harz and Burgenlandkreis in the south of the state, where turnout often rises by more than 20 percentage points. In the two largest cities, Halle and Magdeburg, it is around 15 points, below the statewide average.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

1) As many have noted, the major game changer in this state election is the sharp increase in turnout. With nearly 250,000 additional votes cast, turnout rises by 17.5 percentage points. The increase varies considerably across municipalities and is particularly pronounced in rural areas.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

Saxony-Anhalt went to the polls, with the AfD falling just short of a majority. Here are some takeaways based on the preliminary results across all 218 municipalities and local socioeconomic characteristics. A thread 🧵(1 /n) Full analysis + write-up: juliuskoelzer.de/saxony-anhal...

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Michael Woods @woodszzp.bsky.social · 24/08/2026

Could rural Wisconsin turn against the Republicans? My new long-read on our @ruralspatialj.bsky.social Substack discusses political history, the role of rural consciousness & the 'politics of resentment', and the issues that might make a difference. ruralspatialjustice.substack.com/p/winning-in...

ruralspatialjustice.substack.com

Winning in Wisconsin: Rural Consciousness, Radical Republicans and Progressive Democrats in America’s Dairyland

Could rural Wisconsin turn against the Republicans? Some thoughts on political history and current issues

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Rural Spatial Justice @ruralspatialj.bsky.social · 24/08/2026

Could rural Wisconsin turn against the Republicans? A new long-form read on our Substack discusses the political history of the region, the role of rural consciousness and the 'politics of resentment', and the issues that might make a difference. ruralspatialjustice.substack.com/p/winning-in...

ruralspatialjustice.substack.com

Winning in Wisconsin: Rural Consciousness, Radical Republicans and Progressive Democrats in America’s Dairyland

Could rural Wisconsin turn against the Republicans? Some thoughts on political history and current issues

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Will Jennings📉🗳️ @drjennings.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

'How Place-Based Policy Could Counter Populist Discontent' Our latest essay on place and discontent is out today in @politicalquarterly.bsky.social Free to read ➡️ doi.org/10.1111/1467...

How Place-Based Policy Could Counter Populist Discontent

Gerry Stoker, Daisy Blackburn, Nick Clarke, Will Jennings

Resentment felt by people in areas that have suffered from social and economic decline is a significant driver of populist backlash—‘the revenge of the places that don't matter’. An effective place-based strategy could provide something of an antidote to populist discontent. In power, populist leaders are arch-centralisers, organising government to dance to their tune. By focusing on place, UK government can respond to people's feelings of being neglected by Westminster and give them the power and tools to tackle issues that matter to their community. Drawing on a survey conducted in England in 2025, we show that, although place-based grievance is widespread, people still express pride in place and see unfulfilled potential, while negative perceptions reflect the material condition of local areas. There is demand for state intervention, but little faith in the ability of central government to deliver. In response, a place-based strategy requires a new style of multilevel governance followed by a slower, more place-sensitive push towards devolved government.

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Michael Woods @woodszzp.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

Many core Reform supporters in Lincs are incomers (esp from London), so there’s a question to explore of whether movers preferring rural landscape of eastern counties over those of the south, west or north have different values/motivations/political inclinations that don’t show in demographic data.

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Michael Woods @woodszzp.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

(3) Tensions around EU migration linked to structure of agriculture (arable) & land ownership, which mark the east as different to other parts of rural England; (4) Significant military & ex-military presence.

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Michael Woods @woodszzp.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

(2) Long Conservative dominance (after decline of agricultural working class in 1950s) means that left / centre parties are weak & disaffected Tories turn right not left (contrasts with persistent LD presence in SW offering an alternative route)...

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Michael Woods @woodszzp.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

We’re researching this question in Lincolnshire at the moment in the Rural-Spatial-Justice project @ruralspatialj.bsky.social . Factors suggested by early findings include: (1) Profound sense of isolation & neglect fuelling anti-metro sentiment & feeling of spatial injustice...

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Michael Woods @woodszzp.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

There have been some previous studies but they’re not easy to get hold of, including Blamire et al published in the book ‘Reflections on Polarisation and Inequalities in Brexit Pandemic Times’ and PhD research by @willkend.bsky.social at LSE, not yet published....

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Sam Freedman @samfr.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

Has anyone read anything good on why the east coast is such fertile ground for the extreme right? (Lincolnshire, East Anglia, the Essex and Kent coasts) Demographics aren't wildly different to other areas where it's much less pronounced.

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Twan Huijsmans @twanhuijsmans.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

Very happy to see this book by @mshepruralpolitics.bsky.social arrive in the mail today. Only just got started, but it's already clear that it's an essential reading for anyone interested in rural politics or the rise of the radical right more broadly.

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Rural Spatial Justice @ruralspatialj.bsky.social · 26/04/2026

An excellent preview, but I’d question the assumption that this year’s local elections are less favourable for Reform because they’re less rural. Our analysis of the Reform vote in last year’s local elections suggests it’s more complex. A short thread…. 1/7

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Owen Winter @owenwntr.bsky.social · 12/04/2026

Lots of these Fidesz settlements have very few voters

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Owen Winter @owenwntr.bsky.social · 12/04/2026

Completed settlements

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Kim Lane Scheppele @kimlanelaw.bsky.social · 12/04/2026

Orban's system was rigged to give plurality winners with widespread support in the countryside super-majorities in the parliament - so Peter Magyar generated widespread support in the countryside and has been rewarded with 69% of the parliamentary seats. Now he can undo Orban's constitution!

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Rural Spatial Justice @ruralspatialj.bsky.social · 07/04/2026

Fidesz is an interesting case of a party that had an urban skew to its vote in the 2000s but has become more & more rural as it’s moved to the right. it’s an exemplar of rural populism/nationalism, but it’s also an outlier for ideas that link disruptive politics & rural discontent.

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Rural Spatial Justice @ruralspatialj.bsky.social · 13/03/2026

Help us build the most accurate map of Brexit. Ten years on Rural-Spatial-Justice is crowdsourcing 'boxcounts' from observers at the referendum count to go beneath the results & find out the local geography of Leave & Remain. Click below to find out more. open.substack.com/pub/ruralspa...

open.substack.com

Do you have boxcounts from the 2016 EU Referendum? Help us to build the most accurate map of Brexit.

For the tenth anniversary of Britain's EU referendum in June we're aiming to go beyond the published results to understand the local geographies of where voted Leave and Remain.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 12/03/2026

We also observe some AfD gains in municipalities with a higher share of voters with a migration background—though not in large urban centers, but rather in small and mid-sized towns with sizable Russian German and resettler communities (e.g., Bubsheim, Pforzheim, Lahr, Rastatt).

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 11/03/2026

Obviously, manufacturing in Baden-Württemberg is largely concentrated in more rural areas. However, also in a simple municipality-level regression model controlling for different spatial characteristics, a higher share of manufacturing employment remains a strong predictor of AfD gains.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 11/03/2026

The AfD performs particularly strongly in parts of rural Baden-Württemberg affected by prospects of manufacturing layoffs (especially in areas reliant on automotive & mechanical engineering industries). Constituencies with higher manufacturing employment show a very strong shift toward the AfDs.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 11/03/2026

AfD gains are also notably lower in areas with higher shares of residents with tertiary education. Conversely, this suggests stronger shifts toward the AfD in municipalities with larger shares of low- and medium-skilled workers.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 11/03/2026

A further increase in support compared to 2021 is found in municipalities with higher homeownership rates. As is typical, the party performs worse in areas where the Catholic milieu is more strongly rooted. However, this negative association is rather moderate.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 11/03/2026

4) The far-right AfD gains 9 percentage points, expanding its support primarily where it already performed strongly in the last state election 2021. As the scatterplot and the map show, these areas are, unsurprisingly, rather rural and peripheral.

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Julius Kölzer @juliusk.bsky.social · 11/03/2026

3) The SPD (what remains of it) tends to incur greater losses in the more populous parts of the state. While many accounts emphasize the Social Democrats’ weakness in manufacturing towns in the countryside (more on that later), they also seem to suffer from Green mobilization in urban centers.

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