Sign in

Nicole Grajewski

@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
12K followers 482 following 749 posts

Assistant Professor at Sciences Po CERI | Associate with Harvard’s Managing the Atom | working on nuclear issues involving Russia and Iran | author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine (OUP/Hurst)

PostsRepliesMedia
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
ICDS Tallinn @icds-tallinn.bsky.social · 23/09/2026
Deterrence à la Carte: French, American and British Nuclear Roles in a New Security Environment - @hfayet.bsky.social - @mgmessmer.bsky.social - Zuzanna Gwadera - Michaela Dodge Moderator: @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social Night owl session hosted by @ifri.bsky.social
093
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Hurst Publishers @hurstpublishers.bsky.social · 30/04/2026
🇮🇷 🇷🇺 Happy publication day to @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and ‘Russia and Iran’, which charts the two countries’ relationship from tenuous alignment to robust partnership! ‘Deeply insightful & fascinating.’ @michaelkofman.bsky.social 25% off w/code RUSSIAIRAN25 ➡️ tinyurl.com/mtnsrhzv
A picture of a pile of 'Russia and Iran' books on an aqua background with the quotation: ‘A deeply insightful and fascinating account charting the Russian partnership with Iran, its history and role in shaping geopolitical developments in the Middle East, and beyond.’ — Michael Kofman, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
0265
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Hurst Publishers @hurstpublishers.bsky.social · 15/04/2026
🎙️🇷🇺🇮🇷 Listen to our author of 'Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine' @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social on Times Radio: 👉 tinyurl.com/58satj3t
Book cover of Russia and Iran next to ways to listen to Times radio: DAB, Smart Speaker, Online, and Times radio app.
031
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Sam Lair @slair.bsky.social · 23/04/2026
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social has a great post on her substack folks should read! (I am biased because it cites the fabulous work Carl Parkin did last summer) I think I shared some of Nicole's biases on how quickly Iran could regenerate launchers and for how long open.substack.com/pub/axesanda...
open.substack.com
Revisiting Iran's Missile and Drone Campaign
An early reflection on my writing and thinking during the war
182
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Hurst Publishers @hurstpublishers.bsky.social · 14/04/2026
🇮🇷 🇷🇺 Advance stock available: the much-anticipated ‘Russia and Iran’ by @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social is now shipping! ‘A fresh understanding of this relationship. Compelling and well supported by evidence.’ @hamidrezaaz.bsky.social 25% off w/code RUSSIAIRAN25 tinyurl.com/mtnsrhzv
Print book cover and e-reader version of 'Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine' showing text with symbols from each country including drones.
163
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Project on Managing the Atom @managingtheatom.bsky.social · 13/04/2026
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social: "Mr. Putin has spent years building a coalition of the discontented around the premise that authoritarian states can outlast Western pressure... Iran, which has absorbed the most pressure and held the longest, is his proof of concept." www.nytimes.com/2026/04/10/o...
nytimes.com
Opinion | For Putin, Iran Is Something Close to Irreplaceable
065
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Project on Managing the Atom @managingtheatom.bsky.social · 30/03/2026
In an NPR interview, @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social describes Kharg Island as the “crown jewel” of Iran’s oil infrastructure, highlighting the potential consequences of a US seizure: www.npr.org/2026/03/26/n...
npr.org
Analysts say potential US operation to seize Iran's Kharg Island would be risky
The Pentagon is considering the seizure of Iran's Kharg Island. It's a risky operation, and Iran could retaliate by targeting the biggest energy facilities in the Gulf, sending prices soaring.
032
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Ankit Panda @nktpnd.bsky.social · 27/03/2026
"The United States can only determine with certainty that it has destroyed about a third of Iran's vast missile arsenal" www.reuters.com/world/middle...
reuters.com
Exclusive: U.S. can only confirm about a third of Iran's missile arsenal destroyed, sources say
The assessment, which has not been previously reported, shows that while most of Iran's missiles are either destroyed or inaccessible, Tehran still has a significant missile inventory.
25725
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Ankit Panda @nktpnd.bsky.social · 24/03/2026
I've said this before, but part of why I continue to be bleak on prospects of prompt war termination are because Iran has *very strong incentives* to continue pain infliction (against the US/Israel/GCC and the broader world) to deter a future war by credibly communicating the magnitude of costs.
261099266
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Ankit Panda @nktpnd.bsky.social · 24/03/2026
Much of this is also a consequence of how Iran mismanaged its post-Oct 2023 approach to deterrence, as @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and I discussed last week; the new constellation of Iranian leaders have learned: www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/stunnin...
foreignaffairs.com
The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence
And why it augurs a more dangerous world.
18610
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Carnegie Politika @ceip-politika.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
🎧 NEW EPISODE of the Carnegie Politika podcast: @alexgabuev.bsky.social, @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social, and Sergey Vakulenko discuss what the war in Iran means for Moscow. How does it affect Russian influence in the region, and its position on global energy markets?
carnegieendowment.org
How Is the Iran War Affecting Russia? With Nicole Grajewski and Sergey Vakulenko
Podcast host Alex Gabuev is joined by his colleagues Nicole Grajewski, a non-resident fellow at Carnegie Endowment and the author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine, and Se...
063
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Foreign Affairs @foreignaffairs.com · 19/03/2026
The United States’ actions in Iran are making nuclear weapons look “more attractive than ever,” warn @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and @nktpnd.bsky.social. Today, “would-be nuclear states understand the urgency of developing a weapon in secret.”
fam.ag
The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence
And why it augurs a more dangerous world.
12312
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Carnegie Endowment @carnegieendowment.org · 19/03/2026
Iran’s weakening deterrence capabilities point to a deeper strategic problem unfolding today. @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and @nktpnd.bsky.social unpack the forces behind Iran’s military expansion and the vulnerabilities now coming forward: www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/stunnin...
foreignaffairs.com
The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence
And why it augurs a more dangerous world.
052
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
In the words of the late IRGC Aerospace Force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, deterrence is like riding a bicycle: “You have to keep pedaling all the time, or else the bicycle will fall.” In the end, Iran lost its balance and its deterrent fell with it. www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/stunnin...
foreignaffairs.com
The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence
And why it augurs a more dangerous world.
1172
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
States observing Iran are unlikely to conclude that restraint or compliance enhances security. The stronger takeaway is the opposite: concealment, speed, and irreversible capability offer greater protection.
14018
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
Iran’s deterrent did not collapse because any single pillar failed, but because each pillar eroded in ways that compounded the others. Together, they produced the very outcome Iran sought to prevent: a large-scale preventive attack.
181
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
This left Iran in a structurally unstable position. Iran was close enough to a bomb to invite preventive action, but not capable enough to deter it. Its threshold status became a zone of vulnerability rather than protection.
160
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
Transparency under the JCPOA and subsequent public signaling of nuclear advances made Iran’s program legible. Adversaries had unusually high confidence in what they needed to target and where. With each step, Iran further reduced uncertainty about its capabilities and intentions.
160
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
The most consequential failure was the nuclear pillar. Iran pursued a threshold strategy—retaining the material, expertise, and infrastructure for rapid breakout without crossing the line—but did so in a way that made it more legible and exposed to preventive attack.
150
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
The Axis of Resistance, intended as a buffer, became a liability. The autonomy of these groups created escalation risks Iran could not control and helped consolidate a counter-coalition rather than deter one.
150
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
Missiles, once the most credible pillar, became a source of exposure. Starting with Operation True Promise I in 2024, Iran revealed operational patterns and limitations while providing adversaries with a vast amount of data.
260
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
The core argument is not that Iran lacked capabilities. It is that it misused them. Each pillar was revealed, degraded, or politically misaligned in ways that reduced deterrent credibility over time.
181
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
Iran spent decades building a layered deterrent architecture: missiles, the Axis of Resistance, and nuclear threshold status. It was designed to raise the cost of attack beyond what adversaries would accept. For a time, it worked. Then it unraveled.
190
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
In our new @foreignaffairs.com piece, @nktpnd.bsky.social and I examine how Iran’s deterrent unraveled and what that failure signals for future nuclear aspirants. www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/stunnin...
foreignaffairs.com
The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence
And why it augurs a more dangerous world.
26828
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Ankit Panda @nktpnd.bsky.social · 19/03/2026
I have a new piece out in @foreignaffairs.com, with @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social, on Iran’s deterrence missteps from late-2023 onward that created the conditions for this war. We reflect on the implications for nonproliferation going forward. www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/stunnin...
foreignaffairs.com
The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence
And why it augurs a more dangerous world.
0222
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Carnegie Endowment @carnegieendowment.org · 16/03/2026
The war in Iran, now in its third week, has had serious regional consequences. That puts Armenia and Azerbaijan “on the front line of regional instability,” writes Zaur Shiriyev. Read here: carnegieendowment.org/emissary/202...
carnegieendowment.org
Iran’s Northern Neighbors Are Facing Fallout From the War, Too
The conflict is threatening stability in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
063
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Carnegie Endowment @carnegieendowment.org · 16/03/2026
Russia and Iran have close ties, culminating in a major treaty last year. But as the war in Iran continues, Russia has largely “stood idly by” -- why? @alexgabuev.bsky.social, @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and Sergey Vakulenko explained for @foreignaffairs.com: www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/why-r...
foreignaffairs.com
Why Russia Is Watching Iran Burn
The Kremlin is in no hurry to save its closest partner in the Middle East.
0125
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 12/03/2026
New post on Iran’s targets during its initial retaliation on Feb. 28. It examines the targeting logic behind three parallel campaigns: striking U.S. C2/ISR infrastructure, imposing costs on the GCC states, and pressuring Israeli civilian centers. www.axesandatoms.com/p/irans-febr...
2229
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Carnegie Politika @ceip-politika.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
"Most of Moscow’s military resources are tied up in Ukraine, while Beijing’s foreign policy prioritizes economic ties and avoids direct conflict." Alexander Gabuev and Temur Umarov explain why neither Russia nor China has offered any tangible support to Iran.
carnegieendowment.org
Why Are China and Russia Not Rushing to Help Iran?
Most of Moscow’s military resources are tied up in Ukraine, while Beijing’s foreign policy prioritizes economic ties and avoids direct conflict.
0103
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
CNN report here edition.cnn.com/world/live-n...
edition.cnn.com
Exclusive: Russia is giving Iran specific advice on drone tactics, Western intelligence source says
Three vessels were hit by projectiles near the Strait of Hormuz, the UK’s maritime agency said. Countries have agreed to release a record 400 million barrels of oil in an effort to stem gas prices. Fo...
282
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
Given Russian-Iranian technical cooperation since 2022, reporting that Moscow is sharing UAV employment lessons from Ukraine suggests that at least some wartime operational learning and possibly incremental technical improvements may now be informing Iranian planning.
1122
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
Recent Iranian UAV strike packages appear more complex than earlier campaigns, with greater variation in altitude/routing and clearer evidence of layered raid structures. Some approaches to defended areas appear designed to complicate radar coverage and interceptor sequencing.
150
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
Whether these operational lessons and upgrades have been systematically transferred back to Tehran is difficult to demonstrate conclusively. But observable changes in Iranian drone employment suggest some degree of adaptation.
150
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
The result was incremental but meaningful upgrades: anti-jam antenna arrays (e.g., Kometa), modified navigation receivers, domestically produced variants, and evolving strike packages combining drones and missiles to complicate air defense engagement.
150
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
Over time these systems effectively became platforms for continuous operational testing. Russia expanded domestic production, modified subsystems, and employed them in thousands of strikes against a dense and adaptive Ukrainian air defense network.
162
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
When Iranian Shaheds first appeared in Russia in 2022 they were relatively simple systems—GPS-dependent, predictable in routing, and vulnerable to jamming and interceptor combinations that Ukrainian forces developed quickly.
141
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
The most consequential Russian contribution to Iran’s UAV capabilities over the past two years is likely in the real of operational learning generated through Russia’s large-scale Shahed employment in Ukraine.
141
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
The CNN report also notes Russia’s experience launching Shaheds in coordinated waves that alter routes and flight profiles to evade air defenses. If such practices are informing Iranian strikes, the significance lies less in the drone itself than in operational learning.
181
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
CNN reports Russia is now providing Iran with more specific operational guidance on UAV employment, including targeting approaches derived from its use of Shahed drones in Ukraine. This is not very surprising but good to have it confirmed.
1336
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
François Diaz-Maurin @francoisdm.bsky.social · 10/03/2026
🚨 JUST IN: I wrote about Trump's self-induced dilemma of sending US troops to seize or destroy Iran's highly enriched uranium. #Iran #Isfahan #uranium #Trump #nuclearweapons #nukesky @thebulletin.org
thebulletin.org
Trump may send US troops to neutralize Iran's highly enriched uranium. There are no good options
Deploying US troops to seize or destroy Iran's highly enriched uranium would bring significant chemical, logistical, and tactical hurdles.
4249
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Ulrike Franke @rikefranke.eu · 11/03/2026
Good piece by @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social www.axesandatoms.com/p/10-days-of...
axesandatoms.com
10 Days of War and 30-something Waves of Operation True Promise 4
What I am tracking and where I remain puzzled
05312
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Project on Managing the Atom @managingtheatom.bsky.social · 11/03/2026
What are the military risks of U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran? @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social discusses the strategic implications in an interview with the Malcolm H. Kerr @carnegiemec.bsky.social. carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/...
carnegieendowment.org
The Greatest Dangers May Lie Ahead
In an interview, Nicole Grajewski discusses the military dimension of the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran.
131
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 06/03/2026
Wrote this article yesterday before the news of Russia’s support to Iran was reported www.russiamatters.org/analysis/ira...
0248
Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · 06/03/2026
For those interested in the evolution of Russia-Iran relations, my book comes out next month. DM if you’re interested in an advanced copy and I can put you in touch with my publisher. www.hurstpublishers.com/book/russia-...
16615
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
The Kennan Institute @kennaninstitute.bsky.social · 05/03/2026
💭 #Iran at War: The Russian Angle @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social explains why the Russia–Iran relationship is not an alliance. It is a partnership shaped by shared interests, regime security concerns, and significant limits rooted in historical mistrust. Full conversation linked below ⬇️
194
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Vasabjit Banerjee @vasabjit.bsky.social · 05/03/2026
I don't know anything about India-Middle East relations beyond the most cursory stuff. The authority on this topic is @nicoblar.bsky.social . For Iranian foreign policy in general, I follow @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social . If you know an expert who is here, please post in the responses. Thanks,
1154
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Association Pour l'Ukraine, pour leur liberté et la nôtre ! @pourlukraine.bsky.social · 04/03/2026
Le stock de Shahed de l’Iran peut être estimé à “entre 4000 et 6000”(…) Au début de la guerre en 🇺🇦, Téhéran avait pu en livrer plusieurs milliers à son allié russe [mais ils] sont désormais en quasi-totalité fabriqués en 🇷🇺, sous le nom de Geran-2. @nicolastenzer.bsky.social @ilasserre.bsky.social
lemonde.fr
Les voisins de l’Iran, confrontés aux attaques de drones, découvrent leur vulnérabilité
Dénués d’expérience en matière de lutte contre les engins kamikazes, notamment les Shahed, les pays du Golfe sont apparus désemparés face à la menace posée par la République islamique, déterminée de s...
11711
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
The Kennan Institute @kennaninstitute.bsky.social · 03/03/2026
💭 Iran at War: The Russian Angle @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social explains how tensions involving #Iran could affect #Russia’s broader interests in the Gulf, where Moscow’s economic ties to GCC states often exceed its ties to Tehran. Full conversation in the comments ⬇️
165
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
Project on Managing the Atom @managingtheatom.bsky.social · 03/03/2026
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social argues that New START’s expiration won’t trigger a Cold War–style arms race, but rather a quieter shift toward warhead “uploading,” nonstrategic expansion, and greater nuclear ambiguity in a trilateral U.S.–Russia–China landscape. theins.ru/en/opinion/n...
theins.ru
Nuclear breakdown: How the end of the New START treaty will affect the arms race between Russia and the U.S.
In early February, the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States and Russia (better known as New START) expired, and no new agreement has been reached to take its place. However, a Cold War-style arms race appears unlikely, as Russia does not have the necessary resources for the mass production of new strategic weapons, argues nuclear policy expert Nicole Grajewski, an assistant professor at the Center for International Studies (CERI) at Sciences Po in Paris. In her view, a more likely future scenario involves Russia increasing the number of warheads on systems already in its arsenal while expanding production of nonstrategic weapons. The end of mutual inspections provided for under New START creates new opportunities to pursue such projects, even if Russia's coffers have been depleted by the war in Ukraine. China, however, does have the resources, and its nuclear program offers new causes for concern.
042