iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

excellent thread on the “hybrid war” discourse. Similar dynamics at play with the “shadow fleet“ - how can you crack down on individual ships and at what cost to broader interests, including the effect reshaping international order

010

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 20/09/2026

I’d say more Civ 7, but that’s out of the timeline…

010

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 20/09/2026

Golden Dome about to be rebranded as Golden Arch

010

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Joshua Tallis @doctallis.bsky.social · 15/09/2026

“Joshua Tallis, naval analyst at the US security research organisation CNA, said the request for ships to transit at specific times was likely ‘an effective means to manage the costs associated with a persistent and indefinite US defence of the southern Strait of Hormuz route’.”

ft.com

US limits air defence time slots for tankers sailing through Hormuz

Shift to two specified times daily follows increase in Iranian attacks

031

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 15/09/2026

I mean, he’s right that freedom of the seas and space are under threat, but his actual analysis ranges from blindingly obvious to blindered American

100

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 10/09/2026

Also, more bombs don’t buy more strategic effect or US security if US leaders insist on using military force for ill-defined strategic ends or highly questionable theories of change and victory.

133

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

The Diplomat @thediplomat.com · 08/09/2026

Since 2022, but particularly in 2026, hard maritime security issues on the Caspian Sea have started moving to the forefront. @lizwish.bsky.social and @cornelloverfield.bsky.social explain: buff.ly/4rFaBz4

buff.ly

Securing Navigation for Trans-Caspian Trade

Since 2022, but particularly in 2026, hard maritime security issues on the Caspian Sea have started moving to the forefront.

002

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 06/09/2026

But for NATO countries with peacetime militaries that mostly rely on relatively small professional forces, this system simply cannot be replicated—especially if you have a long border with Russia, such as Finland.

111

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 06/09/2026

Ukraine needs hundreds of mobile air defence teams with hundreds of vehicles. And for every crew and vehicle, there comes a logistical tail to ensure the crews are fed, housed, and resupplied. This is not a problem for a country like Ukraine which has hundreds of thousands of people under arms.

121

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 04/09/2026

In which my colleague @lizwish.bsky.social and I argue that the U.S. and Europe must help Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan build their hard maritime security capabilities if Central Asia and the Middle Corridor are to be a true alternative to routes through Russia

010

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Joshua Tallis @doctallis.bsky.social · 02/09/2026

I’m not inherently against the “Finland model” for shipbuilding but it strikes me that a lot of people are invoking it as a proven approach whereas I don’t know if the jury is in on its success yet, nor do we know how easily one could extrapolate from an icebreaker to, say, a foreign warship design.

131

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 02/09/2026

Great reporting on the World Nomad Games as not just a spectacle combining kok Boru and the Pussycat Dolls, but 35 years of nation building and 6 years of power consolidation

010

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Decker Eveleth @dexeve.bsky.social · 30/08/2026

The current era of warfare is defined by high speed of detection and targeting. Introducing theater nuclear forces produces different incentives than they did in the cold war becuase of these vulnerabilities, combined with conventional entanglement. Simply carrying over cold war assumptions won't do

091

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

James Cameron @jjjcameron.bsky.social · 28/08/2026

Quite. If the US is unsure if it will commit conventional forces, it sure as hell won't run nuclear risks on behalf of its allies.

2144

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Lukas Mengelkamp @lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social · 28/08/2026

The Europeans did not ‘shirk’ their obligations; rather, they had very sound strategic reasons for not spending as much on conventional armed forces as the US would have liked. This was something the Eisenhower administration understood very well. (2/2)

Quote from Trachtenberg's "A constructed peace", page 154: The U.S. government complained about the Europeans not doing their share, but it also understood why their effort was limited. The basic problem was that America and not Europe controlled what was unquestionably the dominant form of military power. Why should the Europeans embark on a major buildup of local defense forces if that effort, no matter how massive, would not give them any greater control over their own destiny—indeed, if it would make it easier for the Americans to withdraw the bulk of their ground forces and thus weaken the U.S. nuclear guarantee? The United States, in the final analysis, would be making the crucial decisions while the Europeans, with their conventional forces, would be merely “playing with marbles.”

0114

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 27/08/2026

Seit Wochen kritisiert Moritz Schularick auf allen Kanälen die Beschaffungspolitik der Bundesregierung. Für @table.media durfte ich jetzt aufschreiben, wo seine Kritik zu kurz greift, warum wir nicht zu stark auf Drohnen setzen sollten und wieso Roboter keine Lösung für den Personalengpass sind.

table.media

Aufrüstung: Industrie und Experten widersprechen Schularicks Kritik an bisheriger Beschaffung

Angesichts großer Investitionen in die Rüstungsbranche streiten Fachleute über die Prioritäten. In einem offenen Brief, der Table.Briefings exklusiv vorliegt, wirft BDSV-Präsident Atzpodien dem Kiel Institut-Präsidenten Schularick vor, sich aus einer „Generalsperspektive“ zu äußern.

02110

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 25/08/2026

While historically not an indicator, HORs awarded to officers in Russia’s war against Ukraine may be part of a way to create (alongside political exposure) a cadre of politically reliable senior officers.

110

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 25/08/2026

We were particularly interested in whether Russia’s highest awards could be an indicator of the future elite. The majority of 4-star officers with the Hero of Russia, however, received this highest of awards after attaining general rank, including after 4-star rank in many cases.

110

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 25/08/2026

Who will be Russia‘s next top general? CNA colleagues and I looked at this from a couple angles to understand what externally-observable variables seem to matter for making Russia’s highest ranks. Career trajectory: ✅ Age at promotions: ✅ Hero of Russia: ❌ warontherocks.com/russias-next...

warontherocks.com

Russia’s Next Top General: Promotions in Russian Military Leadership

Judged by the initial strategic goals set by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2022, Russia’s military lost its war against Ukraine some time ago. Yet

152

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 23/08/2026

Mit FPV Drohnen, CCA, und Humanoid Roboter alle Wildberries Lagern und Putin‘s Paläste zerstören. Duh.

110

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 22/08/2026

Thanks for sharing this - sounds like they did really important, quality analysis. Hopefully it’s published somewhere soon!

000

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Marcel Dirsus @marceldirsus.com · 20/08/2026

Meanwhile the Bundeswehr:

141

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 18/08/2026

Essential reading on the American military’s continued obsession with lethality and the strategic costs and failures that follow

121

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

Good! Arctic security folks can sometimes get a bit of regional tunnel vision that blows things out of perspective

000

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Joshua Tallis @doctallis.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

Two important new reports on working with allies to expand and stabilize defense manufacturing are worth your attention. A 🧵

102

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

"Online Rent-a-Sage" Bret Devereaux @bretdevereaux.bsky.social · 16/08/2026

When the public broadly believes something foolish, it isn't wrong to note that fact, but you have an obligation in so noting it *that it is foolish* - yes, actually, the collapse of American democracy will impact you more than the time you had to sit through an HR training.

243556

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Quinta Jurecic @qjurecic.bsky.social · 14/08/2026

Many people are saying substack.com/home/post/p-...

My own assertion, itself vibes-based and therefore entirely unfalsifiable, is that the “vibe shift” was the unconscious cognitive effect of hanging out on Twitter after Musk’s acquisition

15818140

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 10/08/2026

In der Süddeutschen Zeitung wirft der Ökonom Moritz Schularick, Präsident des Kieler Instituts für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), dem Bundesministerium der Verteidigung vor, in die falschen Waffensysteme zu investieren. Dabei zeigt er eindrücklich, dass seine militärische Kompetenz Lücken aufweist. 🧵

sueddeutsche.de

Ökonom kritisiert Pistorius: „Das 700-Milliarden-Programm droht zu verpuffen“

Der Ökonom Moritz Schularick hält nichts von den Plänen der Bundesregierung für die Bundeswehr. Für die Modernisierung müsse gezielt in Waffensysteme der Zukunft investiert werden – und nicht in alte ...

9387

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Henry Farrell @himself.bsky.social · 08/08/2026

Dan Wang and I have written the Weekend Essay at @financialtimes.com and if I can say so myself it's a banger as.ft.com/r/c1054499-a...

An illustration from classic Golden Age era science fiction.

2428178

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

An excellent rundown on the whys of the Pakistan-Saudi-Türkiye mutual defense agreement from @jprathbone.bsky.social et al at @financialtimes.com: 1) new regional security architecture as U.S. undermines itself 2) Iran, Israel 3) Arms sales giftarticle.ft.com/giftarticle/...

giftarticle.ft.com

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan sign defence pact in Mecca

Three allies seek to deepen regional security co-operation to deal with wars and instability

001

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Samuel Bendett @sambendett.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

My CNA colleague Julian Walker on a potential Putin succession www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/after...

foreignaffairs.com

After Putin

Russia’s coming succession crisis.

0133

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

What it means militarily depends on the treaty language, but also real time choices by attacked state and its allies. Do they invoke? What do they ask for? Do they honor? How? Notably, 🇵🇰&🇸🇦 signed a similar bilat agreement last year but Pakistan is moderator, not belligerent.

reuters.com

Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan sign mutual defence pact

Saudi Arabia and nuclear-armed Pakistan signed a mutual defence pact late on Wednesday, significantly strengthening a decades-old security partnership a week after Israel's strikes on Qatar upended th...

000

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

On mutual defense, this language is pure politics, as with NATO! The actual specific obligations will fall well short of “automatically go to war“ Look at NATO, but also other treaties, and they all usually provide parties leeway in what they’ll do in response. This isn’t a Paradox sim!

121

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

Pakistan and Saudi signed a treaty declaring the same in September 2025. The actual obligation clause (in that and this) likely provides a lot more leeway in how the ally chooses to respond to the attack, however.

183

Reposted by Cornell Overfield

Kori Schake 🎃 @kschake.bsky.social · 03/08/2026

If enacted, would overturn 250 years of American commitment to freedom of navigation.

510322

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 03/08/2026

Zum welchen Zweck? Die Straße g. Marokko offen zu halten? Um die Straße einmalig zu entminen braucht man eigentlich nur Schiffe. Gegen eine anhaltende Bedrohung durch Raketen und Drohnen wäre Ceuta ein bisschen helfen nur wenn Marokko nicht direct angreift. Sonst müsste es auch verteidigt werden.

010

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 03/08/2026

Sicherheitshalber had a conversation on these lines about the tank

120

Cornell Overfield @cornelloverfield.bsky.social · 03/08/2026

Wie würde Ceuta ein Hormuz Situation in Gibraltar vermeiden? Marokko und Spanien haben schon Küstengebiete an der Straße. Wenn Marokko die Straße schliessen wollte, braucht es Ceuta wahrscheinlich nicht.

140