science.org
Free inquiry depends on freedom of movement
Starting in May 2025, the US government implemented an immigration policy that targeted noncitizen researchers for visa denials, visa revocations, detention, and deportation on the basis of the topics and findings of their work (1). In response, scholars and civil society groups at the Coalition for Independent Technology Research (CITR) documented the policy’s effects on their research and sued the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Justice Department to stay the policy (2). Scholarly societies, including the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) (3) and the Association of Internet Researchers (AOIR) (4) issued public statements in support of academics’ freedom of movement. In July 2026, a federal court suspended the policy (5), marking a victory for scientific progress (6). However, threats to freedom of movement remain a powerful tool for repressive governments to force and entice scholars into submission. Scholars and administrators should continue to defend the integrity of science by defending the right to freedom of movement.
![Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act generally prohibits the willful interception, disclosure, and use of impermissibly intercepted communications. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402(a). Section 10-410 of the Act creates a civil remedy for persons whose communications were illegally intercepted, disclosed, or used. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-410. Under the Act, oral communication is defined as "any conversation or words spoken to or by any person in private conversation." Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-401(13)(i) (emphasis added). The term "private conversation" is not defined in the act. See § 10-401. However, in determining whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy, Maryland courts follow the familiar Katz standard, which asks (1) whether the individual had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy with regard to the statements and (2) whether that expectation is "one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.'" Malpas v. State, 116 Md. App. 69, 84, 695 A.2d 588, 595 (1997) (quoting Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Maryland, 342 Md. 363, 376, 676 A.2d 65, 71 (1996)).[11] See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516-17, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring). This Court has explained in the context of the related federal wiretap act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., that "[a] person's reasonable expectation of privacy is a matter to be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration its unique facts and circumstances." Benford v. Am. Broad. Co., 649 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D. Md. 1986) (quoting Benford v. ABC, 554 F. Supp. 145, 154 (D. Md. 1982)).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:xfovoxu6ygjogoxyargaxnlj/bafkreictawxwa5c72qcjzexebelkkxhhchdhilncopagfiovlnjzs3lcie)
