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And, finally, given that hope is not a strategy, what's your plan to keep Iran in the NPT and to accept inspections--including of the 60% HEU that Israeli officials acknowledged survived the strikes. (12/12)

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Given the U.S. developed the uranium metal production process in the 1940s in a university lab with equipment from the 1920s, why do you suppose Iran will struggle to replicate the process outside of Isfahan? (11/n)

The U.S. did not even try to collapse the very deep tunnels at Isfahan where most of Iran's HEU was stored. Are you concerned that, in reality, the United States has clearly signaled the limits of ability to destroy underground facilities with nonnuclear weapons? (10/n)

What's Israel's plan for dealing with the HEU that Israeli officials acknowledge survived the attack? Does Israel know the location of Iran's stockpile of centrifuge components, which have not been under monitoring since 2021 following the Iran Deal's collapse? (9/n)

To close, some questions for Ignatius' source. What happens if "activities" are being conducted too far underground for Israel to destroy? Do you expect the U.S. to attack again? If yes, what happens if the activities are too deep for the U.S. to reach? (8/n)

Finally re timeframe, as Eric has observed, the claim that Iran is 1-2 years from the bomb is actually similar to pre-war estimates, including from NETANYAHU himself. (7/n)

Ignatius is also inconsistent. Back in 2015, while generally supportive of the Iran Deal, he argued its 10-year timeframe (again, misleading) meant Obama was making a "big bet." Now, an attack with much shorter-term effects is a success. (6/n) washingtonpost.com/opinions/aft...

Moreover, both Netanyahu and Ignatius are being inconsistent in defining success. Netanyahu attacked the Iran Deal on the misleading grounds that its limits only lasted 10 years. Now Israel is claiming a 1-2 year delay is a success. (5/n) bsky.app/profile/nucl...

U.S. scrambles to determine impact of strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites

In fact, the source is actually walking back earlier Israeli claims! Previously, Netanyahu said Iran's program had been set back 2-3 years. Now Israel is saying 1-2 years. (4/n) washingtonpost.com/national-sec...

washingtonpost.com

Trump says Iran’s nuclear program was obliterated, but questions remain about Iran’s capability and the location of hundreds of pounds of highly enriched uranium.

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Ignatius's oped is written as if it's a news story. The "news" in this case is that--SURPRISE!--an Israeli source backed up claims by the Israeli government! (3/n) x.com/james_acton3...

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Opinion | The 12 days that turned back the clock on Iran’s nuclear program

On Friday, I argued in @foreignpolicy.com that Trump admin claims it had set Iran back by "years" were true but disingenuous. The same day, the normally excellent David Ignatius amplified the misleading U.S. and Israeli narrative. www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/202... Let's take a look... (1/n)

washingtonpost.com

Israeli and American assessments agree Tehran’s infrastructure to finish a bomb is shattered.

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James Acton @nuclear-jim.bsky.social · 27/07/2025

🎶When you attend a funeral, It is sad to think that sooner orl… …ater, those you love will do the same for you. And you may have found it tragic, Not to mention other adjec.. …tives to think of all the weeping they will do. 🎶 RIP, Mr Lehrer.

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I know I'll be accused of war mongering by people who read just the first tweet, but to be clear, more bombing won't help. I'm not optimistic about preventing Iran from getting the bomb, but the best way forward is diplomacy. (4/n)

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Claims/implications that Iran may struggle to recover the highly enriched uranium that is probably sitting underground at Esfahan are just silly. Digging debris out of tunnel entrances really isn't hard. (3/n) Spice warning:🌶️🌶️🌶️

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Iran could build the bomb in a year or so without rebuilding its previous nuclear program. The loss of Iran's declared enrichment facilities and uranium metal production lines were simply not the crippling blows claimed by the Trump admin. (2/n) bsky.app/profile/nucl...

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There’s More Than One Way to Build a Bomb

Me in @foreignpolicy.com. The Trump administration's claim that Iran would need "years" to rebuild its previous nuclear program is like asserting that an unlocked bank vault would be impervious to a cyberattack. It’s true but misses the point. foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/25/i...

foreignpolicy.com

Iran doesn’t need to rebuild its damaged facilities to sprint for a nuclear weapon.

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Reposted by James Acton

Matthew Gault @mjgault.bsky.social · 24/07/2025

had @nuclear-jim.bsky.social on Angry Planet to explain what the current nuclear arm's race looks like. It's bad! He's got a solution that sounds radical, but is more palatable than living in a world where everyone is spending billions to construct more nukes

angryplanetpod.com

How Many Nukes Does It Take to Win a War? (Trick Question)

The world is living with a Cold War hangover.

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One final point: Some folks will assume I'm making an argument for renewed military action. I'm not. My point is that there is no military solution. Even if the odds aren't good, diplomacy remains the option most likely to succeed in preventing Iran from proliferating. (12/12)

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Opinion | JD Vance Said the Iran Strikes Set Their Nuclear Program Back ‘Substantially.’ He’s Wrong.

Bottom line: If Iran decides to build the bomb--as opposed to rebuilding destroyed facilities--it could probably do so in a year or less. To make matters worse, there are no IAEA inspections and little prospect of their resuming. (11/n) www.politico.com/news/magazin...

politico.com

The strikes probably only delayed Iran’s nuclear ambitions — and reinvigorated them.

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Guest Post: Sorry, Mr. Secretary, producing uranium metal isn’t particularly difficult

The reality is this. Converting UF6 into uranium metal is pretty easy. It doesn't need a dedicated facility. In the 1940s, the U.S. developed the technique in a university using equipment from the 1920s. (10/n) www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1220...

armscontrolwonk.com

This guest post is by Dr. James M. Acton Central to the Trump administration’s case for the effectiveness of its air strikes on Iran is the destruction of [...]

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For years, advocates of strikes essentially argued that, because weaponization was easy, diplomacy could not be trusted to prevent Iran from proliferating. Now the same folks are arguing the exact opposite point. (9/n)

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Recognizing this, U.S. officials have basically said, "we don't care if Iran has HEU. We destroyed its facility to produce uranium metal, without which its HEU is useless." lol. (8/n)

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The survival of Iran's 60% HEU is a BFD. Iran has enough, on further enrichment, for a handful on bombs. And that enrichment, to ~90%, can be done very quickly with only a tiny facility--MUCH smaller than Fordow let alone Natanz. (7/n) bsky.app/profile/nucl...

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an orange bulldozer is moving dirt in a pile

Unblocking tunnel entrances is not difficult. The technology needed is the bulldozer--which Iran has. There's a legitimate question about whether Israel and the U.S. can DETER Iranian removal, but the technical barriers to removal are essentially nonexistent. (6/n)

media.tenor.com

ALT: an orange bulldozer is moving dirt in a pile

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US’ top general tells lawmakers | CNN Politics

Satellite imagery shows that Iran has cleared at least one tunnel entrance at Isfahan per @armscontrolwonk.bsky.social. Perhaps this tunnel isn't connected to the tunnels where the HEU is stored, idk. But reporters should be *asking* about this, not assuming. (5/n) www.cnn.com/2025/06/27/p...

cnn.com

The US military did not use bunker-buster bombs on one of Iran’s largest nuclear sites last weekend because the site is so deep that the bombs likely would not have been effective, the US’ top general...

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Moreover, this material is not buried under rubble. The tunnels at Isfahan were not collapsed (too deep) so the HEU will be just fine. That said, the U.S. may have attacked the tunnel entrances, which does raise questions about the material's accessibility. (4/n)

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