iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Reposted by Krakek

David Teter @dtc94133.bsky.social · 12/01/2026

Hey all y'all. Somewhat of a weird announcement, but I'm going to do an "ask me anything" (AMA) on the www.reddit.com/r/preppers/ subreddit. FYI, I do not believe in "prepping" for nuclear war (absolutely for earthquakes/etc.) but the mods that I've chatted with there are well informed. (1/?)

reddit.com

/r/Preppers/ - Better safe than sorry

Learning and sharing information to aid in emergency preparedness as it relates to both natural and man-made disasters. Discussion for those preparing to weather day-to-day disasters as well as catast...

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Reposted by Krakek

Thord Are Iversen @thelookout.bsky.social · 29/10/2025

1/5 Kara Sea Activity Caveat: Preliminary findings. On October 28th, when the Poseidon test was conducted according to Putin, there were 6 unidentified ships off the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya, Kara Sea. No NOTAM, no PRIP, but well off the path for any civilian traffic.

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 03/10/2025

Such systems could greatly improve survivability of silos, while not impacting strategic stability in the same way as wide area BMD could. Here you could see a post by Pavel, with the launcher depicted: (x.com/russianforce...)

x.com

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 03/10/2025

Back in the late Soviet era there was work being done on an APS for silos (specifically R-36M2 silos). This system used "shotguns" with tungsten rods to defeat enemy RVs in lower atmosphere. It was successfully tested against RVs (Baikonur -> Kamchatka track) in late 80s.

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 03/10/2025

It is not all *that* mysterious, if one were to assume that it is still work in progress that is.

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 01/10/2025

“By dawn’s early light” is pretty good if you ignore how the war begins (Soviet false flag)

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Reposted by Krakek

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 30/09/2025

A somewhat confused piece in Politico re US plutonium by @zcolman.bsky.social. These 25 tonnes of plutonium in pits is the material identified as surplus 30 years ago, no way it "plays a central role in the US nuclear weapons stockpile" (pits are not "highly radioactive" by the way) 1/

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 30/09/2025

TBH this is more of a joke about how CENTCOM seems to hoover all available assets from other commands.

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 30/09/2025

Escalation management is mentioned in the document, but I agree that the wisdom of ICBM use seems questionable, particularly in the context of omitting other tools, such as the Navy's LYT (the prudence of LYT use is a whole other can of worms, but atleast it is a tailored instrument)

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 30/09/2025

It is from an official document, you could find it here: (www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/d...) It is unclear to me if the use would be tactical in nature, one could consider ie hypothetical ICBM use against Iranian nuclear project related sites.

doctrine.af.mil

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 30/09/2025

So, is CENTCOM going to be the first to ever use nuclear armed ICBMs in a real armed conflict?

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 29/09/2025

The joke we have is that you can’t bring your wife to the COG/COOP site… but you could bring your secretary!

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 29/09/2025

What I also find amusing is over fixation on Yamantau, where there are many other, more relevant sites available, or on the possible sites co-located with residences.

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 29/09/2025

It is amusing how instead of constructively engaging the proponents of the "Putin is in a bunker" narrative have blocked me when I challenged it. It is what it is 🤷‍♂️

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Reposted by Krakek

Dmitry Stefanovich @dvsteff.bsky.social · 17/06/2025

So, are there any plans and proposals for the new nuclear-tipped penetrators being written in the US? Or will the B61-13 be considered good enough? Or we might see B83-X? Or new fancy payloads for Sentinel and/or Dark Eagle? #NukeSky

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 29/09/2025

So, err, like ERCS/Perimeter command missiles?

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 11/09/2025

Many lessons were learned, ie about the PEOC limitations. With what appears to be a network of advanced hardened deeply buried protective structures built in the decades since.

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

To be honest Russia expertise has not been strong even under Obama, ie remember the “overload”?

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 08/08/2025

A random thought. Let’s say that you are a Russian planner, you know that a lot of your SSBNs and TELs are on in base alert in a relatively normal situation. You know that there is a LoW policy. So, what is your target set for those RVs in a LoW scenario?

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Reposted by Krakek

Stephen Schwartz @atomicanalyst.bsky.social · 31/07/2025

OTD 35 years ago, the United States assembled its last fully new nuclear warhead—a 455-kiloton W88 for the Trident II D5 SLBM—at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas. Since then, several thousand existing warheads and bombs have been significantly refurbished at Pantex, enhancing their capabilities.

A photograph of a July 19, 1991, letter from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office responding to a Freedom of Information Act request from the author regarding “the last date on which the Pantex Plant assembled bombs/warheads using the final shipment of plutonium pits from the Rocky Flats Plant, which was received at Pantex on January 3, 1990.”

The pertinent responsive paragraph reads, “… the final assembly date on which the Pantex Plant assembled bombs/warheads using the final shipment of plutonium pits from the Rocky Flats Plant was July 31, 1990 for the W-88 program.”

A rare color photograph of the Mark-5 reentry vehicle, used to carry the W88 warhead on the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. The carbon fiber-wrapped reentry vehicle is dark black and conical (its nose facing to the right).

A color photograph of a Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile breaking the surface of the ocean and igniting its first stage rocket motor at the start of a flight or shakedown test.

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 29/07/2025

@massiasthanos.bsky.social by the way, do you have any good data on the proposed USAF/SAC B-747 airborne command post, back in the early E-4 days?

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 28/07/2025

Normies don't, use google chrome without add block and never delete cookies they got from visiting their brainrot website of choice. Just saying that a VPN is far from being a panacea that VPN vendors present it to be.

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 28/07/2025

Normies still get tracked in a myriad of other ways as they do not use hardened browsers for one thing.

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Reposted by Krakek

Zach @thrustwr.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

Uh, the US used 150 THAAD interceptors (out of an inventory of 534) and 80 SM-3s (out of inventory of 400) in the 12 day conflict between Israel and Iran. More of these missiles have been used since the Oct attack in 2023.

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Zach @thrustwr.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

Ignoring the numbers for a sec, theres a high chance that these systems also fired on the same targets two or three times. Integration of US BMD systems has been a long term problem and so far only THAAD and PATRIOT have progressed to a level of "true integration". US-Israel integration also sucks.

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 25/07/2025

Knyaz Pozharsky, a submarine of the Borey-A/Project 955A class transferred to Russian navy russianforces.org/blog/2025/07... There was a delay, presumably to conduct a Bulava launch, which is normally part of the state acceptance trials. But it appears that the launch didn't happen.

russianforces.org

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

For example while ELINT/SIGINT would have been useful in general - it would have limited utility due to the one way propagation of information (high level CP -> Monolith/Vyuga -> low level CP -> Efir -> launcher), mobile nature and short transmission times. 13/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

At the same time, despite those issues, I do not think that US could have reliably decapitated the Soviet forces at this point, due to the redundancies and survivability measures (hardening and mobility) though this was a risk for much of the earlier times of the Cold War. 12/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

Ofcourse there was movement towards fixing this - allowing attack and flight plan generation in the DSS scenario, but such efforts (Ie "Oreshek" mobile compute center for Divisions) did not bear fruit yet during this time period. 11/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

The other was flexibility. While this NC3 allowed execution of a number of scenarios, the main leg of the triad - the SMFs had weapon systems that were tied to a limited number of pre-generated flight plans, with the flight plan generating compute remaining vulnerable. 10/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

This was compensated somewhat by presenting a rather sizable target set for decapitation, but this is one of the reasons why I believe that the decision by the SMFs to invest into a DUSC-like CP was wise, even if it was not yet operational in that time line. 9/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

The key weak points of this Soviet NC3 arrangement would be operational realities and flexibility. For example mobile CPs and relays would not be constantly held on airborne or otherwise high levels of alert, meaning that in the BoB scenario LoW was the preferred option. 8/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

Direct launch of command missiles (or missiles) was not possible from the cold war era airborne CPs, to the best of my knowledge. Post Cold War era system has developed beyond that, hence why Yarunuch's graphics are imperfect for this (ie 1987) specific time period. 7/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

RCCs can, if issued conditional authorization, launch command missiles on their own, ie if they lost communications with the main hardened command posts (of the GS and SMFs) and confirmed nuclear detonations there (via sensors, and, well, feeling the seismic effects) 6/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

The alternative (reserve) method would be for the airborne CP to communicate with the Perimeter RCC (static or mobile) and order it to launch the (silo or TEL based) command missiles. Command missiles would transmit launch commands in data over radio, to launchers. 5/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

With those Division level CPs using robust (wideband noise-like signals) LF/MF back up radio link to launch the weapons remotely, bypassing the Regiment level crews. 4/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

However, there were fall back options. For example the airborne CP of the GS (and those of services) could use the older method - EAM-like messages to communicate launch orders to the mobile Division level CPs (or the airborne VLF relays when exercising C2 over SSBNs) 3/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

First of all - there was a robust primary system, with the General Staff Central Command Post having direct C2 over the entire triad, with many redundant facilities (ie 3 hardened ones for GS alone, separate ones for services) This would allow rapid LoW, if necessary. 2/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 25/07/2025

So how would Soviet nuclear forces operate in the 1980s (say 1987)? 1/13

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 24/07/2025

Hopefully one day there would be more declassified files on this site, on both sides... ... but with the way things going FOIA seems like the more realistic path.

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Reposted by Krakek

Stephen Schwartz @atomicanalyst.bsky.social · 24/07/2025

OTD 35 yrs ago, the last continuous “Looking Glass” flight took off from Strategic Air Command HQ at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. For more than 29 years—starting on February 3, 1961—at least one EC-135 airborne command post was kept aloft, ensuring the ability to fight a nuclear war if SAC were destroyed.

An aerial color photograph looking down on a US Air Force EC-135 “Looking Glass” airborne command post in flight.

A 1960s-era black and white photograph of the inside of a “Looking Glass” aircraft showing some of the battle staff sitting at their consoles. At right in the background, an officer wearing headphones leans against a table, with a holstered revolver strapped to his belt.

A color photograph of the battle staff area inside "Looking Glass” in the 1980s. The general serving as the Airborne Emergency Action Officer is seated, center, looking at the camera. To his immediate right, an officer wears a holstered revolver strapped to a belt on his flight suit.

A close-up color photograph of the ICBM launch control panel aboard the “Looking Glass” with the launch key inserted. This panel is directly above the officer with the revolver in the previous photograph.

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Krakek @krakek.bsky.social · 24/07/2025

Old ideas that are popular again :)

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Alex Wellerstein @wellerstein.bsky.social · 23/07/2025

In other FOIA news... in 2012 I filed a FOIA request with NNSA for reports relating to their work on the GNOMON, a gigaton-range weapon concept from the 1950s. In 2015, they gave me a response where they redacted everything, including the names of the report authors, on the grounds of "privacy."