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Russia is paying Moldovans €50 via Telegram for hybrid tasks in Ukraine
Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service has recorded a clear rise in attempts to recruit ordinary citizens through Telegram for tasks that begin with simple photography and can escalate toward sabotage, primarily aimed at targets in Ukraine.
Alexandru Musteața, director of the SIS, disclosed the trend in an interview on 2 September with journalist Nicolae Chicu, describing a pattern in which handlers offer payments of roughly 20 to 100 euros, often around 50 euros, for actions that appear trivial at first glance. The agency is already working with Ukrainian counterparts, and joint police operations have disrupted several plots, including detentions reported by both sides.
Musteața characterized the recruits as “low-value agents” or “low-level agents.” Recruiters locate people on Telegram, assign them to photograph a building, a vehicle, an intersection, or simply to report what they see at a given location. Successful completion brings higher pay and more complex instructions. In some cases the progression has reached the point of placing a bag under a car. The SIS director stressed that these efforts are not directed at Moldova itself and do not involve recruiting fighters for combat. Instead, they serve reconnaissance and preparatory functions that can feed larger operations abroad, most often in Ukraine.
Escalating complexity and cross-border response
The volume of recruitment approaches and the number of people who accept them are both increasing, according to Musteața. Moldovan citizens have been detained in connection with such activities, with cases confirmed by Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities. Several successful counter-operations have already been conducted jointly with Ukrainian law-enforcement agencies; additional preventive actions carried out solely inside Moldova have also halted planned moves before they could advance. The SIS has not observed a parallel rise in orders for operations on Moldovan territory, yet Musteața warned that the absence of such orders does not mean the threat can be ignored. “That means we have to prepare, and we are already in the process of intensive preparations,” he said.
The tasks themselves illustrate how hybrid warfare lowers the barrier to participation. A photograph of an intersection or a parked vehicle can map routes, identify patterns of activity, or document infrastructure for later use. What begins as a quick errand for pocket money can evolve into more direct support for sabotage. Musteața noted that the intelligence service does not yet see a corresponding spike in completed actions inside Moldova, but the growing pool of willing participants creates latent risk. Authorities continue to monitor Telegram channels and coordinate closely with partners to identify both recruiters and those who respond to the offers.
Regional pattern of hybrid pressure
The Moldovan cases fit a broader pattern observed across Europe. Danish intelligence services have publicly warned that Russian agencies are preparing sabotage against military-industrial sites and are attempting to recruit ordinary citizens for that purpose. In Poland, Prime Minister Donald Tusk linked a recent fire at a drone-manufacturing plant to deliberate sabotage. In Ukraine itself, the Security Service recently detained two foreigners in Chernivtsi who, acting on Russian instructions, planned to set fire to an electrical substation. These incidents underscore a consistent method: use cheap, deniable intermediaries reached through messaging apps, start with low-risk tasks, and escalate when reliability is proven.
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Moldova’s geographic position and the presence of Russian influence networks make it a natural recruitment ground. Citizens living in the country can travel relatively easily into Ukraine or provide local knowledge useful to handlers operating at a distance. The SIS has therefore prioritised early detection and disruption. By sharing intelligence with Ukrainian services and conducting joint operations, Moldovan authorities aim to break the recruitment-to-action pipeline before photographs turn into targeting data or bags turn into explosive devices.
Musteața declined to release precise figures on the number of people identified or cases under investigation. The emphasis remains on the trend itself and on the institutional response already under way. Police and intelligence units continue to work both unilaterally and in partnership with Ukraine, focusing on prevention as much as on arrest. The message from Chisinau is straightforward: the Telegram offers may look like easy money for a photograph, but they form part of a deliberate effort to turn ordinary citizens into unwitting or semi-witting instruments of hybrid aggression. Moldova is treating the rise in such recruitment as an operational priority and is preparing for the possibility that the same methods could one day be turned inward.
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Sources: Nordnews, NewsMaker.md, Ukrainska Pravda
Caption: Screenshot of the interview with SIS Director Alexandru Musteața and journalist Nicolae Chicu, published on YouTube on 2 September.
