iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Reposted by Dmitri Alperovitch

The Kennan Institute @kennaninstitute.bsky.social · 16/06/2026

⚪ How do historical memories shape modern security policy? @dmitri.silverado.org explains why Russian leaders have long viewed Ukraine as a critical buffer state. Listen to the full episode: open.spotify.com/episode/1D5iw7oBpj…

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Reposted by Dmitri Alperovitch

Foreign Policy Research Institute @fpri.bsky.social · 26/05/2026

"Right after I conducted a big investigation into Chinese breaches, I coined this phrase. There are two types of companies: those that know that they've been hacked and those that don't yet know" (8:54). Listen to the full conversation with Dmitri Alperovitch on #ShiftingGround.

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Episode 5 | Cyber is War

Explore the intersection of cybersecurity and international affairs in our latest episode featuring Dmitri Alperovitch discussing cyber threats.

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Foreign Policy Research Institute @fpri.bsky.social · 24/05/2026

On the latest episode of #ShiftingGround, Dmitri Alperovitch tells us that "cyber doesn't actually create deterrence—cyber is not a weapons system, it's an enabling capability" (34:55). #OrbisJournal

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Episode 5 | Cyber is War

Explore the intersection of cybersecurity and international affairs in our latest episode featuring Dmitri Alperovitch discussing cyber threats.

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 22/05/2026

I don’t think there are many applicable lessons from Iran for China

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 22/05/2026

Because 1. They are not yet ready and 2. if they think they can accomplish something without war, that’s always the preferable option

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Reposted by Dmitri Alperovitch

Foreign Policy Research Institute @fpri.bsky.social · 22/05/2026

"They started infiltrating networks that had nothing to steal: water utilities, pipelines, electric utilities. The US intelligence community believes they're preparing to cause immense disruption to our critical infrastructure (13:55). Listen to the full episode on #ShiftingGround.

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Episode 5 | Cyber is War

Explore the intersection of cybersecurity and international affairs in our latest episode featuring Dmitri Alperovitch discussing cyber threats.

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 22/05/2026

I think a lot hinges on Taiwanese elections in 28. If KMT wins, we will very likely have more time

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Reposted by Dmitri Alperovitch

Nikolas Gvosdev @fpriorbis.bsky.social · 22/05/2026

Really enjoyed this observation from @dmitri.silverado.org in his conversation with Larry Rubin and myself for #ShiftingGround … and its relevance for anticipating the next conflict … #Orbisjournal

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Foreign Policy Research Institute @fpri.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

"Cyber is a canary in a coal mine, it gives you a sense of adversary intentions. It's the first tool they'll pull out of their toolkit because it's covert, deniable, and perceived to have very little cost to it." (7:05) Listen to the latest episode of #ShiftingGround. #OrbisJournal

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Episode 5 | Cyber is War

Explore the intersection of cybersecurity and international affairs in our latest episode featuring Dmitri Alperovitch discussing cyber threats.

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 23/03/2026

How to Reopen the Strait of Hormuz New Geopolitics Decanted episode on how the US military can mitigate against the anti-ship cruise missile, drone, fast-attack boat and mine threat in the Persian Gulf. And the possible timeline for return to normalcy youtu.be/Sjz_zxKOMIk

youtu.be

How to Reopen the Strait of Hormuz

YouTube video by Dmitri Alperovitch

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 22/12/2025

"During the height of the Cold War, it was unthinkable for the U.S. to sell supercomputers to the Soviet Union, the equivalent of the GPUs today. We’ve never won technological competitions by arming our competitors—we’ve prevailed by preserving a clear advantage." www.wsj.com/opinion/the-...

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Reposted by Dmitri Alperovitch

Olga Belogolova 🌻 @olgs7.bsky.social · 19/11/2025

So far this morning, we’ve had an incredible kickoff with on attribution alphabet soup with the one and only @dmitri.silverado.org and then a fascinating meme-ful talk from @activemeasures.bsky.social and @wylienewmark.bsky.social on SVR cyber espionage and Russian analytic battlefields.

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Reposted by Dmitri Alperovitch

Wulf Sternhammer @tarielcell.bsky.social · 23/10/2025

I found the latest episode of Geopolitics Decanted with @dmitri.silverado.org very informative on the state of the Russian economy. I don’t know whether these new sanctions are enough to be the potential game changers identified by Chris Weafer. podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/g...

podcasts.apple.com

Keeping Russian Economy Afloat: Kremlin's Economic High Wire Act

Podcast Episode · Geopolitics Decanted with Dmitri Alperovitch · 22/10/2025 · 44m

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 26/08/2025

I haven’t. What do you think has changed primarily?

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Reposted by Dmitri Alperovitch

Hidde van der Bijl @hvanderaxe.bsky.social · 15/08/2025

Very interesting podcast by @dmitri.silverado.org why drones are a useful addition to the European military but shouldn't be the main focus for investment in building our military capabilities.

open.spotify.com

Why Drones Can’t Replace Traditional Firepower

Geopolitics Decanted by Silverado · Episode

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Reposted by Dmitri Alperovitch

Joseph Britt @zathras5.bsky.social · 06/08/2025

Justin Bronk — @justin-br0nk.bsky.social — is a keen observer of military affairs. Talking with @dmitri.silverado.org, he challenges the view that Ukraine’s success with UAVs against Russia is a model for what the US and other western nations should focus on. podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/g...

podcasts.apple.com

Why Drones Can’t Replace Traditional Firepower

Podcast Episode · Geopolitics Decanted by Silverado · 08/05/2025 · 49m

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 05/08/2025

Hopefully we made it clear on the podcast!

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 05/08/2025

Why Drones Can’t Replace Traditional Firepower My @GeopolDecanted discussion with @justin-br0nk.bsky.social about his recent provocative @rusi.bsky.social piece on this topic. We also discuss efficacy of Ukrainian F-16s, Operation SpiderWeb and much more. Watch 👇 youtu.be/ykLIH2kY1U8

youtu.be

Why Drones Can’t Replace Traditional Firepower

YouTube video by Dmitri Alperovitch

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

The key is to keep the implementation as simple as possible (attestation via Intel Trust Authority or mTLS) and not include poison pills like kill switches and geofencing that would make this unworkable and too onerous for end-users and chip designers alike END

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

Through this lens, the Chip Security Act or similar solutions would help accomplish the goal of identifying export control violators with minimal overhead to AI chip companies and exporters

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

The goal here would not be to identify and stop every AI chip export violation but to collect additional data that might help identify export control violators

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

In another scenario, if you have a customer that has purchased tens of thousands of AI chips which are not reporting in every month (accounting for typical chip failure rates, etc), it is also grounds for a BIS investigation of an importer

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

A typical hop between eg Shanghai and Singapore will add 40-300ms of consistent latency which can be easily detected. This would then be a clue for BIS to investigate further

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

To mitigate against this, the exporter's webserver can measure round trip time (RTT) for packets inside the mTLS connection and then compare it to pings to the IP from which the connection is originating

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

Of course, this is not full-proof. Chinese companies can purchase AI chips through shell companies elsewhere, reship the chips to China and then proxy their mTLS connections through VPNs and proxies in countries where the shell companies are based

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

Another way to accomplish this might to be use existing Intel Trust Authority for GPU remote attestation architecture that Intel and Nvidia have partnered on but that creates a requirement to use Intel CPUs, which may not be ideal in every case docs.trustauthority.intel.com/main/article...

docs.trustauthority.intel.com

GPU Remote Attestation With Intel® Trust Authority | Intel® Tiber™ Trust Authority

Learn about the Intel® Trust Authority Python Client, CLI for Intel TDX and NVIDIA GPU, and Intel Trust Authority REST API that support GPU attestation.

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

GPU drivers can already do mTLS handshake operations like ECDSA signing, so this doesn’t even require any new code from the chip designers

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

The connection can be trivially initiated via a simple script from other parts of the environment where the AI chip is deployed, but just talk to the GPU driver for handshake initiation/client key exchange with the EXPORT_CERT. This minimizes the technical reqs for AI chips

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

The mTLS connection would not originate from the chip itself. In fact, it doesn’t even have to originate from the server that the chip is in

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

So if a chip is being sold to a data center in Singapore but the connection originates from an IP address in China (or anywhere else), well, that means you might have a potential transshipment on your hands that warrants BIS investigation

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

The US exporter would then have the country from where the secure mTLS conn is originating from and match it against the customer KYC and export info data that they had been collected during the export process to determine whether country of shipment matches country of use

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

US exporters would run mTLS webservers with public key versions of the EXPORT_CERTs loaded on them (they would get them from the chip designers) to record the IP addresses and their geolocation from where the connections are originating

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

Foreign end-users (wouldn’t apply to US customers or perhaps to trusted foreign govs) would then be obligated by BIS to use this cert for mTLS (mutual-auth) Client Key Exchange connection generation to the US exporter of the chip on a periodic basis (ex. once a week/month)

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

New AI chips going forward can incorporate a new certificate with a private key (EXPORT_CERT) in their Secure Enclave (they already have other certs for secure boot/attestation). So this is a very simple task

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

Here is one technical solution for chip location verification that can be easily implemented by AI chip designers, which is not onerous and won’t require GPS receivers or comms functionality inside the chip or significantly restrict its use in air gap environments👇

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

CSA bill should tell BIS to rely on NIST to come up with the appropriate technical solution that is as technically simple as possible for both chip designers, exporters, and end-users

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

CSA won’t solve every problem and it’s not full-proof (evasions can still occur although will be harder to pull off) but it does provide additional resources to identify malign actors that have gone undetected in opaque supply networks

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

The most important thing about the Chip Security Act and why it’s different from other proposals is that it is an investigative tool for enforcement, not an enforcement mechanism on its own

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

The idea behind CSA is not to prevent chips from working in banned locations like China but to simply expose more data to exporters of chips (and ultimately US BIS) on their end-users to enhance investigations of transshipping violators

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

It is also important that Congress avoid imposing a specific technical approach on the industry (it’s not good at that), nor require geofencing or kill switches built into chips that would turn this into an unworkable solution

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

The idea of chip geolocation is not new but various proposals have been plagued over the years with technical challenges, over-engineering complexity, and the perfect approach being the enemy of the “good enough”

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

By allowing China to procure advanced AI chips, such as those from Nvidia and AMD, we are literally arming our enemy for a potential conflict with us and this has to be addressed with tightening and stricter enforcement of chip export controls

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

Some have estimated that as many as 30% of American GPUs are being diverted to China today but real numbers are impossible to validate because of the current ease of diversion

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

AI chip diversion to China is a huge problem as it is not only helping CN companies in competition with US firms in the most important industry of the future - AI, but also helps them develop advanced weapons systems that we and our allies would confront in a potential conflict

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Dmitri Alperovitch @dmitri.silverado.org · 16/07/2025

Chip Security Act (CSA) is a new bipartisan bill in Congress that requires advanced AI chips to have location verification to combat illicit diversion of exports of these chips to banned countries like China. A 🧵 on how this could work to enhance US export control enforcement

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