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EXCLUSIVE: Anthropic warns AI may pose 'existential risks to humanity' in IPO filing reut.rs/4hvqeY1
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EXCLUSIVE: Anthropic warns AI may pose 'existential risks to humanity' in IPO filing
Anthropic plans to caution potential investors in its IPO that advanced AI could pose "catastrophic or existential risks to humanity," an extraordinary warning by a company seeking to profit from the same technology.
![The majority chooses not to recognize these cases as
extraordinary. Real harm results from that choice. We are now
forced to leave uncorrected the analytical flaws in the District
Court’s denial of discovery. They include the following.
II.A. On vindictive prosecution, we should remand
for discovery regarding the decision to
prosecute.
“[W]hile an individual certainly may be penalized for
violating the law, [s]he just as certainly may not be punished
for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.”
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982). To prove
vindictiveness, “a defendant may use evidence of a
prosecutor’s retaliatory motive.” United States v. Paramo, 998
F.2d 1212, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993). Based on evidence of animus
against her, Congresswoman McIver claims a story of
vengefulness behind her prosecution. I believe she has the
right to find out whether it is true.
The Government’s stated justification for prosecuting
Congresswoman McIver is that she physically assaulted DHS
agents. She contends this is a pretext for its actual goal: to
2 Moreover, these cases are readily identifiable. Courts need
only ask three questions: (1) Is this a criminal case against a
sitting Member of Congress? (2) Is the appealed order a denial
of a motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds of selective
or vindictive prosecution? And (3) do the selective or
vindictive prosecution claims allege political retaliation? Only
if all three answers are “yes” would the case fit this category.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:bbp2b224lro3bfnzcqwwnkfo/bafkreidoxvh6wdltjfv5towwmbwlkovuutfqfoflek2tdkadyhtnksc5be)
![As a result, the majority glosses over the unique
separation-of-powers concerns this case presents. Against the
backdrop of Congresswoman McIver’s claim, this case pits a
generally applicable criminal statute designed to protect certain
Executive Branch officials from interference with their duties,
18 U.S.C. § 111(a), against Section 527, a statute giving
Members of Congress a right of access to the very facility
Congresswoman McIver was attempting to enter and
prohibiting those officials from preventing her from doing just
that. The task before us now is not to work out how those two
statutes interact. We must, instead, contend with the
possibility that permitting the Government to prosecute
Congresswoman McIver for making incidental contact with an
Executive Branch official in these circumstances fails to
“reinforce[] the separation of powers” principles the Speech or
Debate Clause serves. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178. Because
these concerns loom large in this case, and for the reasons I
explained above, I would hold that Count Two charges
ambiguously legislative activity. The majority’s contrary
result fails to construe the Clause “broadly” to effect its
“prophylactic purposes,” chief among them “to prevent
intimidation by the executive and accountability before a
possibly hostile judiciary.” Id. at 180–82.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:bbp2b224lro3bfnzcqwwnkfo/bafkreidal4th3ijsnahd5tmj3agri4cgpnplv6tp2ljxjwhcbtst5vlumq)
