iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Naval shipbuilding is hard - there are no simple solutions, as others around the globe demonstrate. But there is a necessity to move faster than the Hunter project has - hopefully it will be plain sailing from here... 4/

Beyond even this - delays cause problems. Since June 2018 there have been: 2 Sec Defs 4 CDFs 4 CNs All bring their own ideas and vision for 🇦🇺 strategy & the fleet. The world also changes - driving further changes to the capability - which in turn drives delays. 3/

Given the stated strategic situation it means that the necessary capability is not getting into the water fast enough. These vessels were supposed to replace the Anzacs, which are at end-of-life. Delays have meant the SEA3000 has had to try to plug that gap. 2/

131

Keel laying today for the first ship of the Hunter Class. This is good news, but it comes over 8 years after the selection of BAE's Global Combat Ship design. I know there have been issues, but 8 year from selection to keel laying is just too long. 1/ minister.defence.gov.au/media-releas...

minister.defence.gov.au

141

Richard Dunley @redunley.bsky.social · 06/08/2026

Latest read has just arrived. I don’t agree with a lot of what Hugh has argued in recent years, but it is impossible to ignore the role he has played in shaping the 🇦🇺 strategic debate for the past two decades. I am looking forward to being challenged 😂

160

How do AUKUS subs fit into 🇦🇺 maritime strategy? In this piece I use the historical example of HMAS Australia I to discuss enduring aspects of 🇦🇺 maritime strategy, and how SSNs could support it. www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/hmas...

militarystrategymagazine.com

HMAS Australia, Australian Maritime Strategy, and the AUKUS Agreement - Military Strategy Magazine

At first glance the battlecruiser HMAS Australia appears to be an unlikely model for the AUKUS agreement, however this article argues that it offers useful insight into enduring features of Australian...

063

Richard Dunley @redunley.bsky.social · 20/07/2026

Public attitudes towards the ADF - Strong public trust in the institution - Limited support for additonal funding - Mixed public opinion on conscription - Increased opposition to working with allies The latest piece from myself and @townsend-nic.bsky.social theconversation.com/australians-...

theconversation.com

Australians are more concerned about terrorism and cyberattacks than war: new research

A new survey reveals Australians’ growing sense of insecurity in the wake of the Bondi terror attack and global threats.

234

The ongoing focus in Canberra on collective deterrence and a middle power strategy is going down well in DC! For all the amusement it does again highlight the increasingly irreconcilable inconsistency in 🇦🇺 grand strategy

040

Finally, the survey shows very strong public support for action on veterans’ issues, and good confidence in government responses. 42% believed the government was doing a good job in this area as against 26% who didn’t. 11/

021

This was despite very limited actual knowledge of the arrangements – only one third of respondents stated that they were aware of the Puk Puk Treaty prior to the survey. 10/

110

The survey suggests that Australians are very supportive of the country’s new defence agreements, with 48% believing that the Puk Puk Treaty will make Australia more secure, and 54% backing the recruitment of PNG citizens into the ADF. 9/

110

Similarly, those backing the idea that the ADF should be deployed to support allies & partners such as the US in crisis or conflict also fell. Support fell below 50%, whilst the numbers actively opposed is relatively small but has grown sharply. 8/

Public perception of how the ADF should be employed is the area where we saw the most notable changes from 2025. The numbers supporting prioritising alliances, especially the US, fell sharply, albeit from a very high level. 7/

In contrast to the focus of the NDS, the public perceived Army to be the most important service, followed by Air Force and then Navy. The ranking was also reflected in priorities for spending. This seems noteworthy given the cost of the maritime mega projects e.g. AUKUS. 6/

The numbers supporting a growth of the ADF remained pretty constant from 2025. The most notable year-on-year change was the growth of those who feel the ADF is too large – 12%, up from 7%; and those who feel too much is spent on the ADF – 15%, up from 11%. 5/

In line with findings from Lowy & NSC our respondents reported feeling a growing sense of insecurity, but this did not translate into support for growing the ADF. 39.8% of those surveyed felt that the ADF was too small, and 33.9% felt that too little was spent on defence. 4/

110

Much trust was implicit. Public perceptions of knowledge of ADF activities has ticked up but remains low. This perception is backed up by the responses to a number of the specific questions which highlight limited public awareness of defence issues. 3/

On the critical metric of maintaining public trust the ADF continues to perform well. 69.4% of respondents trusted the institution, and only 7.7% expressed distrust. Results were similar when asked about trust in the ADF to act ethically. Noteworthy given ongoing issues re Afghanistan. 2/

Richard Dunley @redunley.bsky.social · 18/06/2026

The 2026 Public Attitudes towards the ADF survey by the War Studies Research Group at UNSW Canberra has just been released. It follows up & expands on the 2025 survey assessing what the public think of Defence & the ADF. Here are a few highlights. www.unsw.edu.au/content/dam/... 1/

143

“If it doesn't get done in 60 days, it's all right," Trump said. "We go back to bombing." Having bombed themselves into a far worse position this time around, I’m not sure why 🇮🇷 would consider this to be a credible threat. www.bbc.com/news/article...

bbc.com

Initial US-Iran agreement leaves many key issues to be negotiated

Trump has insisted the deal ensures that Iran will never buy, develop or produce a nuclear weapon. But text of the agreement falls short of that.

050

Overall, this reinforces the point that Australian debates about AUKUS are not about submarines at all – they are in reality about the alliance and attitudes towards the US. We would be much better off being honest about that. 8/

073

Fall Out Boy Crystal Ball

How do we weigh the possible advantage of an additional hull in the 2050s, as against the likelihood of greater commonality. The degree of which we don’t know…. My crystal ball is not that good. 7/

static.klipy.com

ALT: Fall Out Boy Crystal Ball

There is also the question of the value of having a 3rd“orphan” submarine in the last decade or so of its life. Australia would notionally be operating 1 Virginia through the 2050s & 2060s which is far from ideal. 6/

Also, as @alxluck.bsky.social has pointed out there is the question of the future of SSN(X). If, as appears likely, this program is kicked into the long grass, then the potential for major upgrades on later Blocks is high. 5/

And here we get into trouble, because the simple answer is that we do not know. Even if that information is known in NAVSEA/ASA, we are not party to it, nor are we ever going to be. 4/

However, as others have focused upon there are advantages to having 3 subs from the same block in terms of commonality of maintenance, sustainment and training. The extent of this advantage depends on the differences between a Block IV and a Block VII. 3/

140

Are there advantages to having a Block VII – yes. The hull would give you 10-15 years more capability, which could be extremely valuable, especially if SSN AUKUS is delayed. It would also contain any upgrades on sub-systems providing you with a truly cutting-edge platform. 2/

140

Richard Dunley @redunley.bsky.social · 03/06/2026

The whole Block IV vs Block VII discussion is highlighting the utter inability to have any reasonably informed debate about AUKUS. Despite the categorical claims made by advocates & detractors the reality is that we don’t know if this a positive or negative 1/

1102

Of all the handwriting I’ve ever had to try and decipher, John Buchan’s is undeniably the worst!

030

Richard Dunley @redunley.bsky.social · 28/05/2026

A quiet revolution has happened in maritime strategy and we are only just beginning to realise. Some thoughts from me on how sea control has changed and what it means. warontherocks.com/a-sea-contro...

warontherocks.com

A Sea Control Revolution?

Sea control has changed. In recent years, there has been a quiet revolution in maritime strategy that has seen navies increasingly expected to exert

096

Any 🇺🇸-led coalition is networked by the maritime connections and moving men materiel and other resources across them will be an essential prerequisite to any successful campaign. No amount of prepositioning or low sustainment models will change that.

030

War in the IP is likely to be a long industrial conflict in which both production, and the ability to get men and materiel forward and then into theatre are critical. In the maritime IP this is a challenge but the reality is that it will be essential.

It’s all very well saying that you want to pre-position supplies and be able to fight with what you’ve got for 45 days - but does anyone seriously think that a conflict with 🇨🇳 would be over in that timeframe. At best this seems to delay rather than solve the key problem.