I guess Bluesky has at last achieved its final form and blocked every last user. Internet accomplished.
Grant Gould
@nonnihil.hachyderm.io.ap.brid.gy
29 followers 17 following 209 posts
Roboticist, meticulous software dead-ender, Im in ur C++ objecting to ur barepointers. Cambridge, MA; he/him; grumpy but anarchist-ish. No time for: * LaTeX in code […] 🌉 bridged from ⁂ hachyderm.io/@nonnihil, follow @ap.brid.gy to interact
![LLM-Scanner Anti-Analysis
The _index.js payload begins with a large JavaScript block comment containing fake system instructions and policy-triggering content. Because it is inside a comment, it does not affect JavaScript execution. The runtime skips it. The real malware begins after the comment with a try{eval(...)} wrapper around a large character-code array and a ROT-style substitution function.
This header appears designed for AI-mediated analysis, not for Node, Bun, or Python. It attempts to derail scanners or analyst copilots that feed the beginning of a file to a language model without clearly isolating the content as untrusted data. In weak pipelines, this can cause refusal behavior, prompt confusion, context pollution, or premature classification before the scanner reaches the actual malware.
This is not a magical bypass against static detection. YARA rules, entropy checks, AST parsing, string extraction, deobfuscation, and behavioral rules still work. But it is a practical anti-analysis trick against naive LLM-first triage systems.
[Image of text with C-style /* comment and then text about nuclear weapons design]
Caption below image: The malicious _index.js begins with a non-executing JavaScript comment designed to trigger LLM safety refusals and disrupt AI-assisted malware triage before the scanner reaches the obfuscated Hades payload.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:7ixolzataqsaxfm2ams6zrg6/bafkreifz2qwgzsl72dmmbb6hhb7nakdpxk7xny5g4z5b7hmjdfxah4hsky)
