Reposted by Mark Ungrin
“faster care for one patient isn’t a system-wide reduction in waiting if someone else simply waits longer. Choice is not the same as capacity. And activity is not the same as progress.”
#abpoli #ableg #cdnpoli
edmontonjournal.com/opinion/colu...
edmontonjournal.com
Opinion: Will Alberta's dual-practice model cut surgery wait times — or only for the rich?
When my time matters most, will my place in line be determined by how urgently I need care — or by how much I can afford to pay for it?
![None of the evidence we reviewed showed any communication
or coordination between AHS EPH officials and Alberta OHS at
this time. In response to our freedom of information requests for
email correspondence between the manager for OHS in Calgary
and several AHS officials who were directly involved in the Cargill
response, we were informed by the Government of Alberta’s
access to information that “a thorough search […] did not yield any
records responsive to your request.”195
By April 16, the total number of known confirmed positive cases
had reached approximately 550. At this point, there had only
been one in-person inspection of the plant, that being AHS’ April
7 visit, which resulted in non-binding recommendations. And, as
mentioned, there was no epidemiological analysis of the outbreak
showing the temporal pattern of the spread within the plant and
in the community.
An internal AHS MOH update on April 17 noted that “84% of
new COVID-19 cases [in the province] are in Calgary Zone, ‘most
related to Cargill.”196 By this time, a Cargill worker and union shop
steward had been admitted to an ICU. On April 18, another worker
would need life support care in the ICU. Cargill, AHS, and OHS had
lost control of the outbreak.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:ou6sjyhswn7s3qyfqhw7mbk6/bafkreievc5urg7ipxcuw4jug5bbwo4tro6fpdptwv4r4gsvwjbtxvm2pwa)
![Echoing Cargill’s response to the union’s April 12 letter, Dreeshen
cautioned workers not to listen to “inflammatory rhetoric” and
appealed to them to instead focus on information from public
health experts:
“…On this call are Alberta’s best medical minds and
they provide Alberta’s government with the best up
to date information on a daily basis and I would just
like to encourage everyone to not get distracted by
misleading noise or inflammatory rhetoric because
any government's primary goal — our core goal — is
to keep our people safe…”
Immediately after the town hall, Dreeshen posted on his social
media: “Directly communicated with [Cargill] workers to reassure
them that their worksite is safe.”217 Internal email messages
among senior officials with the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry suggest there was also “a request” to share some “key
messages” about the safety of Cargill’s plant through Hinshaw’s
Twitter account.218
Hours after the town hall, Dr. Nick Etches, acting lead medical
officer of health for the Calgary Zone, wrote to colleagues
requesting assistance with an epidemiological analysis of
the outbreak:
“[Hu] just spoke with [Hinshaw] and she wants us
to answer some questions that will likely require
additional epi support. Essentially we want to
determine the proportion of the Cargill-associated
cases that are due to:
1) Workplace transmission](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:ou6sjyhswn7s3qyfqhw7mbk6/bafkreiducdnl5mzbehcbulfzcxrgndii3fjhezu7znkdstgpwd26gtcy2i)
![Citation: Luo Yinbo, Li Gaiyun, Zhou Xinyang, Li Fenfen, Tong Yeqing, Guan Xuhua, Wu Yang, Chen Qi. Epidemiological investigation of a cluster of severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome caused by human-to-human transmission[J]. Disease Surveillance, 2026, 41(7): 922-927. DOI: 10.3784/jbjc.202509190651
shu
Epidemiological investigation of a cluster of severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome caused by human-to-human transmission
Luo Yinbo1, ,
Li Gaiyun2,
Zhou Xinyang3,
Li Fenfen1,
Tong Yeqing1,
Guan Xuhua1,
Wu Yang1, , ,
Chen Qi1, ,
1.
Hubei Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Wuhan 430070, Hubei, China
2.
Xiaogan Municipal Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Xiaogan 432000, Hubei, China
3.
Jingmen Municipal Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Jingmen 448000, Hubei, China
Funds:
This study was supported by the Public Health Talent Training Support Program of National Disease Control and Prevention Administration (2023-2026)
the Science and Technology Project of Hubei Provincial Health Commission (WJ2025Q080)
More Information
Abstract
Objective
Investigate the source of infection, transmission routes of a cluster outbreak of severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome(SFTS) in Jingmen city, Hubei province in June 2024, and put forward prevention and control recommendations.
Methods
In this study, case definitions were developed to search for cases, and then epidemiological investigations were conducted among cases and related persons, and the basic information, the onset and visit of the cases were described, and the source of infection and transmission route were analyzed through the above content. Finally, the monitoring of tick density and infection rate were carried out.
Results
A total of 6 infected cases were found in the epidemic, including 1 case in the first generation (death), 5 cases in the second generation (3…](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:ou6sjyhswn7s3qyfqhw7mbk6/bafkreieaneyfzv557j4grpon6ok3xaztrv4svziovdwsqokg5uzuxkp6dy)
