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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

hey this sounds like a fun research idea! Should we work on it?

Reposted by Lorenzo Crippa

Hannah Hughes @hannahhughes.bsky.social · 23/09/2026

In this paper we quantify government's engagement in the topics of carbon management (abatement technologies, CDR, BECCS, etc.) and nature based solutions in the approval of the #IPCC #AR6, two topics that would land in the outcome of the first global stocktake at #COP28

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Reposted by Lorenzo Crippa

Mirko Heinzel @mirkoheinzel.bsky.social · 02/07/2026

CFP: Special issue of the Review of International Organizations on "Bringing Individuals Back In: The Influence of Agents in International Cooperation." How and when do individuals shape IOs and global governance? Deadline: 1 Nov 2026, rolling review. Details 👇

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

This work complements our recent @iojournal.bsky.social piece on Trump's suspension of US anti-corruption law and how investors rewarded firms at a corruption risk: doi.org/10.1017/S002... Taken together, we find that firms are responding to (current) changes in anti-corruption enforcement. 12/12

doi.org

Making Bribery Profitable Again? The Market Effects of Suspending Accountability for Overseas Bribery | International Organization | Cambridge Core

Making Bribery Profitable Again? The Market Effects of Suspending Accountability for Overseas Bribery - Volume 79 Issue 4

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

The findings speak to current debates about anti-corruption and competitiveness. Bribery competitive pressures are real. The question is how to address those pressures without weakening (or weaponizing) anti-corruption, as done by the current US Admin. www.foreignaffairs.com/united-state... 11/12

foreignaffairs.com

How Washington Is Weaponizing Anticorruption Law

The era of neutral enforcement is over.

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

More broadly, the paper contributes to research on international institutions, regulatory spillovers, and unintended consequences of governance. The challenge is not only securing compliance, but also limiting opportunities for leakage. 10/12

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

The implication is not that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention failed. Quite the opposite! Our results suggest enforcement works, but its effectiveness is constrained when major competitors operate under different regulatory standards. 9/12

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

But that's not the whole story. Where firms from signatory countries competed heavily against outside firms, we find leakage: there is a growing *negative* enforcement effect, compounded of compliance and leakage. As regulated firms reduced bribery, unregulated competitors increased it. 8/12

The plot shows the marginal effect of Phase 3 on bribery cases vs. competition between firms; marginal effect line, binned estimates at terciles, and 95% confidence interval are reported; histogram below shows data distribution of the competition measure. The results show a decreasing line, indicating a more negative marginal effect of Phase 3 as competition increases

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

Results from a staggered DID are encouraging. Following the OECD Convention's transition into its intensive enforcement phase, firms from participating countries became significantly less likely to engage in foreign bribery. The Convention appears to have changed firms' behavior. 7/12

Line graph showing the number of exported bribes over years relative to OECD ABC peer review phase 3, with confidence intervals and an overall ATT of -0.48 indicated. The post-phase 3 estimated effects indicate a reduction in bribery, with a constantly decreasing trend. Pre-phase 3 effects trend flat.

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

To test this idea, we assembled a global dataset of 1,445 documented cross-border bribery cases (2000–2019). We also developed a measure of competition between firms from OECD ABC signatories and non-signatories. To our knowledge, this is the first global test of ABC compliance vs leakage. 6/12

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

But compliance and leakage are observationally intertwined. With stronger enforcement, a bribery gap between regulated and unregulated firms could be due to regulated firms bribing less (compliance), unregulated firms bribing more (leakage), or both. Competition helps us disentangle the two. 5/12

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

Building on existing evidence from Vietnam, we argue that stronger enforcement can generate both: - Compliance: regulated firms reduce bribery. - Leakage: unregulated competitors increase bribery to exploit the resulting opportunities. 4/12

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

We study a major international anti-corruption agreement: the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC). The ABC requires signatories to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials by their firms and enforce these laws extraterritorially. Does stronger enforcement actually reduce bribery? 3/12

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

IR scholars often focus on whether states comply with international agreements. But often international regimes regulate non-state actors, like firms or individuals. We ask: What happens when some actors comply, but others remain outside the regime? 2/12

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 08/06/2026

Excited to share a new note with Edmund Malesky and Lucio Picci, forthcoming at @thejop.bsky.social! "Unpacking Compliance and 'Leakages' in International Regimes: The Case of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention" doi.org/10.1086/742490 A thread 🧵 1/12

doi.org

University of Chicago Press Journals: Cookie absent

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

I had a lot of fun chatting with @richard.wickedproblems.earth @davidrvetter.bsky.social and @fgenovese.bsky.social about markets, AI firms, and… popes ahead of Monday’s upcoming encyclical by Leo XIV! More below 👇

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Reposted by Lorenzo Crippa

Dave Vetter @davidrvetter.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

I joined a deeply insightful conversation about Papal Encyclicals and markets, the climate, AI and ethics. Thanks to @fgenovese.bsky.social, @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social and @richard.wickedproblems.earth

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Reposted by Lorenzo Crippa

Federica Genovese @fgenovese.bsky.social · 21/05/2026

To those in the EPSS2026 Climate Section: You've got mail 📨 You received a survey link from us via @patrickbayer.bsky.social re the state of climate/enviro/energy politics research. Pls give us 10 minutes! Then come to panel CL19 (or ask us later) for the data. To those of who already filled it: 💛

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 18/05/2026

It would indeed be about time! (This is me being not frustrated at all)

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Reposted by Lorenzo Crippa

Mike Denly @mikedenly.com · 03/05/2026

This @iojournal.bsky.social article from @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social et al. is one of the most important recent pieces on corruption, American politics, and democratic backsliding. It is an empirical research note, but I think its theoretical implications are much bigger. 1/n🧵

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 03/05/2026

Thanks, Mike! Very neat interpretation. I wish we had framed it in these terms! 😂 I think you touch on an important aspect, which yields important implications of the 2025 FCPA events for the broader anti-corruption regime (eg OECD ABC)

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 09/04/2026

Plenty of thoughts! I was in between 2 and 3 but opted for 3 just because I’m a sucker for placebos

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Reposted by Lorenzo Crippa

Foreign Affairs @foreignaffairs.com · 02/04/2026

“The transformation of U.S. antibribery tools into economic weapons threatens to undo the global system the United States helped establish to punish business corruption,” warn @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social, Edmund Malesky, and Lucio Picci.

foreignaffairs.com

How Washington Is Weaponizing Anticorruption Law

The era of neutral enforcement is over.

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Reposted by Lorenzo Crippa

Federica Genovese @fgenovese.bsky.social · 15/03/2026

I am not surprised re Thiel in Rome. Progressive Popes (eg Francis, Leo now) can spook the winners of late stage capitalism. Polarization around these Popes is driven by forces scared of how papal messages threaten their financial power. @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social and I documented this in our WP.

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 14/03/2026

There’s a lot more than the separation of careers IMO. They really try to change the Constitution and how the CSM is formed/nominated. So they do need a const ref. It also seems to me much more than just populism, it is a full on authoritarian attempt (de facto subjecting the judiciary to the exec)

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Reposted by Lorenzo Crippa

Foreign Affairs @foreignaffairs.com · 26/02/2026

Read @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social, Edmund Malesky, and Lucio Picci on the Trump administration’s weaponization of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: fam.ag/4aCQXQa

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

Our conclusion, from observing all this, is that you don’t need to repeal the FCPA to undermine the anti-corruption regime. You just need to signal that neutral enforcement is over. Even with an FCPA back on paper, markets are already pricing in that type of world. END

foreignaffairs.com

How Washington Is Weaponizing Anticorruption Law

The era of neutral enforcement is over.

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

The risk is that, going on, we will see more bribery, weaker enforcement, and weaker compliance with anti-corruption standards. All of this risks unraveling a global anti-corruption regime that's been in place for almost three decades. 10/

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

This has important repercussions beyond the US. Anticorruption enforcement is essentially a collective action problem. Countries restrain their own firms only if others do the same. Selective U.S. enforcement risks breaking that bargain. 9/

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

Markets paid attention to this change in enforcement priority. From June to, at least, December 2025, non-U.S. firms tainted by FCPA histories lost market value, while comparable U.S. firms gained about $10 per share, on average. That's about a 16% gain. 8/

Line chart titled “Weapons of Mass Corruption” showing average change in share prices since February 2025 for firms under FCPA scrutiny. Two lines compare U.S.-based firms (red) and non-U.S. firms (black) from January 2025 to January 2026. After a February 2025 executive order suspending FCPA enforcement, both lines rise. From mid-2025 onward, U.S. firms’ valuations increase steadily, reaching about +16 by January 2026, while non-U.S. firms decline after new FCPA guidelines and remain near zero. Vertical dotted lines mark key policy events: the FCPA executive order, a self-disclosure policy, new FCPA guidelines, and an FCPA conference. Shaded bands show 95% confidence intervals.

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

Historically, FCPA enforcement enjoyed large credibility. That credibility is now eroding. New DOJ guidance, published in June and evidenced by new enforcement actions, prioritize cases tied to “US interests,” cartels, or security threats: vague categories that enable opportunistic enforcement 7/

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

That is a profound shift in FCPA enforcement. The FCPA was designed to be nationality-blind on paper: a constraint on bribery for U.S. and (certain) non-U.S. firms, wherever it occurred. Now, markets seem to price it in as if it was a tool of economic statecraft. 5/

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

A full year after the initial FCPA suspension (and subsequent return on paper), it looks like investors aren’t just betting on weaker anti-corruption enforcement overall. They’re betting on selective enforcement, expecting U.S. firms to be largely spared and foreign firms to still be exposed. 4/

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

When enforcement resumed in June, many expected the bubble to burst. In short, it didn’t. Extending our analysis, we now find that investment kept flowing, but only to U.S. firms. Foreign firms with similar corruption histories saw little or no gains. 3/

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

In Feb 2025, the Trump administration temporarily suspended enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In a recent @iojournal.bsky.social piece, we show markets reacted allocating ~39B to firms tied to past or ongoing bribery investigations. 📄 doi.org/10.1017/S002... 2/

doi.org

Making Bribery Profitable Again? The Market Effects of Suspending Accountability for Overseas Bribery | International Organization | Cambridge Core

Making Bribery Profitable Again? The Market Effects of Suspending Accountability for Overseas Bribery - Volume 79 Issue 4

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

Excited to share a new piece, co-authored with Eddy Malesky and Lucio Picci, at @foreignaffairs.com! We return to the Trump administration's decision to suspend (and reform) the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 🧵: "How Washington Is Weaponizing Anticorruption Law." 1/

foreignaffairs.com

How Washington Is Weaponizing Anticorruption Law

The era of neutral enforcement is over.

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 26/02/2026

I like that they need to clarify “don’t touch the overhead lines”

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Federica Genovese @fgenovese.bsky.social · 20/02/2026

🔥Revised paper🔥 More regressions. More tests of mechanisms. Same story. Tldr: Brexit caused much regulatory uncertainty at a moment when UK state capacity was v weak, and hard-to-regulate companies (aka oil firms) did not think twice and generated a mess in the high seas. Now with full receipts ⬇️

papers.ssrn.com

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 16/02/2026

Re upping the paper thread for the occasion: bsky.app/profile/fgen...

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Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin @tcdpoliticalsci.bsky.social · 16/02/2026

The Department of Political Science is looking forward to hosting Dr @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social for the Monday Seminar Series.

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 03/01/2026

The current uncertainty will be profitable to fossil giants in the US, too! I’m afraid to see what stocks of American FF and renewables will look like on Monday

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Reposted by Lorenzo Crippa

Vincent Arel-Bundock @vincentab.bsky.social · 17/09/2025

Whoa—my book is up for pre-order! 𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 𝐭𝐨 𝐌𝐞𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠: 𝐇𝐨𝐰 𝐭𝐨 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐭 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐭 & 𝐌𝐋 𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐬 𝐢𝐧 #Rstats 𝐚𝐧𝐝 #PyData The book presents an ultra-simple and powerful workflow to make sense of ± any model you fit The web version will stay free forever and my proceeds go to charity. tinyurl.com/4fk56fc8

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 10/12/2025

Thanks, Dan, very much appreciated!

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Lorenzo Crippa @lorenzocrippa.bsky.social · 10/12/2025

We got excellent feedback while working on this. Our warmest thanks go to @fhollenbach.org, @nikhil-kalyanpur.bsky.social, @szakonyi.bsky.social, and @rorytruex.bsky.social for excellent early feedback 🙏 We also thank Daisuke Fukamizu and audiences at Kyoto University, UCLA, and Strathclyde 11/n

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