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Reposted by Kateryna Stepanenko

Institute for the Study of War @thestudyofwar.bsky.social · 28/05/2026

Ukraine is gaining an advantage over Russia as the war enters a new phase. ISW's @katstepanenko.bsky.social and @georgewbarros.bsky.social discussed their recent special report during The Brief with Jim Sciutto on CNN. Watch the full video: isw.pub/4e9ZcVy

youtu.be

CNN: Ukraine Holds Advantage over Russia in War | ISW's Kateryna Stepanenko and George Barros

YouTube video by Institute for the Study of War

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Reposted by Kateryna Stepanenko

Institute for the Study of War @thestudyofwar.bsky.social · 14/11/2025

Russian advances in Pokrovsk resulted not from a sudden breakthrough but rather from months of dedicated battlefield shaping. Read more in the November 14, 2025, report by @katstepanenko.bsky.social: isw.pub/RussianBAIBST

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

This amendment, however, does not likely presage a large-scale involuntary reserve call up similar to the one that brought hundreds of thousands of Russians into the military in 2022.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

Compulsory rolling mobilization of reservists may enable Russia to generate forces more cheaply as Russia’s main method for generating manpower through high financial incentives and price surging is reportedly losing momentum.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

The amendment will likely allow the Kremlin to deploy active reservists into combat more rapidly than was possible under the previous mechanism that required a formal declaration of war or mobilization order.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

The Kremlin remains unlikely to declare general mobilization of the inactive reserve (“zapas”) due to concerns over the impacts on regime stability, the Russian economy, and the administrative capacity of Russia’s military bureaucracy.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

The Kremlin will likely use the amendment to centralize control over the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) units, which have been largely functioning as irregular formations and often under the supervision of Russian businessmen and officials.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

The Kremlin will likely use the amendment to involuntarily call up personnel in Russian irregular formations whom Moscow has been treating as an informal active reserve.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

The Kremlin will likely misrepresent the mobilized reservists as members of the professional reserve who volunteered to fight in Ukraine to prevent Russian society from opposing increased deployments of mobilized reservists.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

The new regulation approved on October 13 only concerns members of Russia’s active reserve, not Russia’s larger ”zapas.”

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

Russia also retains an inactive reserve (also known as the human mobilization resource or “zapas” in Russian), which includes Russian men with a military registration age as old as 65-70 (in certain circumstances) who are not actively affiliated with the Russian Armed Forces.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

Russia has two types of reserves. Russia retains a higher-readiness “human mobilization reserve,” an active reserve, in which Russians sign a contract w/ MoD on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve in exchange for compensation while remaining civilians except when called up.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

The draft amendment also creates a new category of force assemblies called “special assemblies,” during which mobilized reservists would train for no more than two months before being deployed abroad.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

The Russian Cabinet of Ministers’ Commission on Legislative Activity approved a MoD draft amendment to permit the military to use reservists from the “human mobilization reserve” in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 14/10/2025

The Kremlin will likely formally amend restrictions on mobilizing Russia’s active reserve to conduct rolling partial mobilization without declaring war on Ukraine or formally announcing that it is conducting a partial involuntary call up. A🧵on our latest with @georgewbarros.bsky.social

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Reposted by Kateryna Stepanenko

Institute for the Study of War @thestudyofwar.bsky.social · 24/09/2025

NEW: Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov outlined 10 priority objectives for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during the Russian MoD Collegium on August 29. 🧵(1/5) Read more:

isw.pub

Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update, September 24, 2025

Russian Defense Minister Belousov outlined 10 priority objectives for the Russian MoD on August 29, per ISW.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

@thestudyofwar.bsky.social also regularly covers Russia's efforts to condition Russian society and youth for military service and raise societal support for Russian war efforts in weekly Force Generation & Technological Adaptations reports. www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder...

understandingwar.org

Institute for the Study of War

This page collects ISW's Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Updates. The Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update tracks Russian recruitment efforts, force gen...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

Check out our recent primer on Russian cognitive warfare with @nataliyabugayova.bsky.social, in which we assess that cognitive warfare is Russia’s way of war, governance, and occupation. bsky.app/profile/thes...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

Russian global and domestic cognitive warfare, therefore, are deeply connected and cannot be understood in isolation from one another -- as the Kremlin relies on domestic conditioning to continue its war efforts abroad.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

The Kremlin is using military-patriotic propaganda and education to indoctrinate children into eventual military service; offering high financial rewards to attract Russian volunteers; & conditioning Russian society to accept greater sacrifices.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

The Kremlin’s cognitive warfare inside Russia is not just about regime stability as the Kremlin uses cognitive warfare inside Russia to generate resources for its external military efforts.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

Russia will reportedly conduct this neurological profile testing through August 2025 and then will hold the seminar in September 2025, during which the organizer will identify leaders and anti-leaders who are prone to destructive behavior.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

Persona Head Vladimir Kozlov claimed that neurological profiling can help discover motivated Russian patriots.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

Rospatriotstentr partnered with the private Russian company Persona that specializes in DeepTech and human potential management using neurological profiling and AI technologies & sells neurological tests that claim to increase team building via subconscious cognitive perceptions of visual symbols.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

Russian government documents showed that Rospatriotstentr is attempting to create neurological profiles of 10,000 children and teenagers aged 12 to 18 from different regions in order to identify 50 with “pronounced positive profiles,” who will then attend a five-day seminar in occupied Sevastopol.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

@rferl.org.web.brid.gy found that Rospatriotstentr of Russian Federal Youth Affairs Agency (Rosmolodezh) launched a neuro profiling project under the federal We Are Together program to advance "traditional, spiritual, and moral values" & to educate "a harmoniously developed personality" among youth.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 25/08/2025

The Kremlin launched an initiative to neurologically profile 10,000 Russian children to identify leaders and anti-leaders & improve patriotism among the Russian youth. This initiative is likely part of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort aimed at garnering support for Russia's war efforts.🧵

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Reposted by Kateryna Stepanenko

Institute for the Study of War @thestudyofwar.bsky.social · 07/08/2025

NEW: Russian Drone Innovations are Likely Achieving Effects of Battlefield Air Interdiction in Ukraine Read the Special Report by ISW Russia Analyst and Deputy Team Lead @katstepanenko.bsky.social: isw.pub/Russiandrone... Key Takeaways ⬇🧵(1/6)

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Reposted by Kateryna Stepanenko

Institute for the Study of War @thestudyofwar.bsky.social · 18/07/2025

Russian and Ukrainian drones use cellphone internet networks to operate, so shutdowns are one way authorities try to counter the attacks, said @katstepanenko.bsky.social, a Russia analyst at the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War.

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Reposted by Kateryna Stepanenko

Institute for the Study of War @thestudyofwar.bsky.social · 01/07/2025

NEW: Russia is a key player in the cognitive warfare space and a model for China, Iran, and North Korea. Understanding cognitive warfare is a national security requirement for the United States. Read our primer by @nataliyabugayova.bsky.social & @katstepanenko.bsky.social: isw.pub/RUSCognitive...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

Putin’s empowerment of Russian veterans runs the risk of following a similar path if the Kremlin does not control veterans’ expectations and demands early on.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

Putin’s decision to empower Prigozhin & grant the Wagner special privileges created the conditions that enabled Prigozhin to weaponize and leverage the Kremlin's reliance on Wagner forces to Prigozhin’s selfish ends.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

@thestudyofwar.bsky.social had already observed Russian reports of some veterans are already demanding promotions to high-ranking positions as regional governors or federal ministers. bsky.app/profile/kats...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

Putin's continued rhetorical emphasis on veterans' authority in Russia may backfire, however, by enabling empowered Russian veterans to blackmail the Kremlin.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

In practice, Putin is platforming veterans and transforming this demographic into one of the most influential groups in Russia in an effort to buttress credibility for Putin’s regime and its war efforts.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

The "Time of Heroes" program - in principle - allows the Kremlin to satisfy veterans' demands for recognition and purge the elite class, while building out the Russian bureaucratic machine with veterans directly indebted to Putin for their appointments.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

The Kremlin particularly focused on forming a new elite composed of a limited number of loyal and ultranationalist veterans as a way to safeguard his regime. The Kremlin is forming the new elite via the "Time of Heroes" program. bsky.app/profile/kats...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

The Kremlin was likely aware of this threat & began planning how to address it as early as Fall 2022 by introducing numerous force centralization efforts, co-opting of Russian milbloggers & increasingly sidelining Prigozhin. www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder...

understandingwar.org

Institute for the Study of War

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, March 12. This report establishes a comprehensive timeline of the rivalry between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Russian Minis...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

These instances demonstrate that veterans started to assemble into various groups by mid-2023, that these groups were bold enough to criticize the Russian MoD, & that social media platforms such as Telegram served as instrumental platforms for the emergence of these groups.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

Russian commanders such as Airborne (VDV) Commander Teplinsky activated the VDV veterans communities in JAN-MAR 2023 to influence Putin into reappointing him after he was reportedly relieved of command. understandingwar.org/backgrounder...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

Girkin, for example, formed the “Club of Angry Patriots” in Spring 2023 composed of anti-Putin veterans of the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014 — people whom the Kremlin was increasingly sidelining by early 2023.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

Imprisoned former Russian officer Igor Girkin, Prigozhin, and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov began amplifying Russian servicemen's complaints about the Russian MoD to blackmail the Kremlin into making political concessions.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

The Kremlin faced the threat of an emerging veteran opposition movement against the Putin regime between late 2022 and mid-2023 when patrons (like Prigozhin) tried to weaponize Russian servicemen and veterans to advance personal political objectives.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

Putin launched an ongoing campaign in late 2022 & early 2023 to prevent the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society in Russia -- likely fearing that veteran groups could threaten the stability of his regime. bsky.app/profile/kats...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

It's the second anniversary of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's mutiny & the Kremlin is trying to prevent another mutiny by raising a veterans-based elite. Putin, however, may once again inadvertently nurture a threat to his regime stability by emboldening veterans.🧵

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

Putin’s empowerment of Russian veterans runs the risk of following a similar path if the Kremlin does not control veterans’ expectations and demands early on.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

Putin’s decision to empower Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin & grant the Wagner special privileges created the conditions that enabled Prigozhin to weaponize and leverage the Kremlin's reliance on Wagner forces to Prigozhin’s selfish ends. www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder...

understandingwar.org

Institute for the Study of War

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