iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/06/2025

Girkin, for example, formed the “Club of Angry Patriots” in Spring 2023 composed of anti-Putin veterans of the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014 — people whom the Kremlin was increasingly sidelining by early 2023.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated on June 9 that organizers of the Time of Heroes program, such as Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko said that there are problems with the program.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/06/2025

Putin notably met with Time of Heroes participants on June 11 to commemorate Russia Day and stated that he had created the Time of Heroes program to ensure that future Russia is connected to Russian veterans.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 12/06/2025

Some milbloggers even called on the Kremlin to recreate PMCs with a higher level of independence, implying that the Russian MoD & military are incapable of attracting qualified recruits for Russian operations abroad. understandingwar.org/backgrounder...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 12/06/2025

Russian insider sources claimed on May 14 that Russian authorities informed Wagner Group mercenaries stationed in Africa that their deployments would end in June-July 2025.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 12/06/2025

The Wagner Group announced on June 6 that it is leaving Mali after 3.5 years, likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) ongoing effort to replace remaining Wagner personnel with state-controlled Africa Corps.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 30/04/2025

Putin called Russian veterans interested in government service Russia's "real gold reserve" and claimed that veterans constitute a new elite. Putin expressed hope that the "Time of Heroes" program will generate more parliamentarians and deputies during the April 28 Council of Legislators meeting.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 30/04/2025

Putin responded by encouraging municipal leaders to find and help veterans who do not meet eligibility qualifications and stated that these requirements can be changed if a veteran was a patriot and made sacrifices to defend Russia.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 30/04/2025

Another municipal official proposed to Putin to drop higher education and prior professional experience as an eligibility requirement for municipal government service, even suggesting that one year of combat experience could count as two years of municipal service experience.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 30/04/2025

Putin heard reports from municipal leaders about the progress of the "Time of Heroes" Higher School of Public Administration program and its affiliates, such as "Schools of Heroes" on April 21. Putin used this meeting to set information conditions for the expansion of the "Time of Heroes" program.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 17/04/2025

Russian federal subjects appear to have been intensifying their recruitment efforts since March 2025 & are spending significant funds on advertising, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain current force generation efforts for some time, peace talks notwithstanding.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 17/04/2025

For example, Primorsk Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako has increased the regional enlistment bonuses three time since the start of 2025.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 17/04/2025

Some estimates suggest that Russia is currently recruiting around 1,300 volunteers per day, or about 39,000 per month.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 17/04/2025

Peskov implied that Ukraine's ban on negotiations with Russia is inhibiting progress towards ending the war. The Ukrainian government is legally prohibited from lifting martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine, however.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 16/04/2025

2. April 11: Popov's lawyer stated that Russian authorities had not yet considered Popov's petition to suspend court proceedings and send Popov to fight in Ukraine. 3. April 16: Popov's lawyer asked Tambov Garrison Military Court to issue Popov an acquittal.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 16/04/2025

Popov is affiliated with the “Storm Gladiator” penal special purpose assault battalion, but it is unclear whether the Kremlin will assign Popov to command this unit. www.currenttime.tv/a/gladiator-...

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 16/04/2025

A Russian security official later revealed on April 9 that Popov will assume command of an unspecified “Storm Z” penal detachment operating in Ukraine. The Russian military command primarily uses “Storm Z” penal detachments in suicidal frontal assaults -- effectively a death sentence.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 16/04/2025

On April 9, Popov’s lawyer announced on April 9 that Popov signed a military service contract with the Russian MoD and will return to military service in Ukraine in exchange for the suspension of his impending criminal trial.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 16/04/2025

Popov then once again weaponized the Russian information space by publishing a public appeal to Putin in late March 2025, demonstrating that the Kremlin has not yet fully solved the problem of military commanders using their popularity to pressure the president.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 16/04/2025

The Kremlin also seemingly punished high-ranking Russian officials who attempted to defend Popov’s criticisms of the Russian military command in July 2023, although it is unlikely that these removals were solely because of Popov’s controversy - namely Gurulev and Andrei Turchak.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

The establishment and rapid development of the Association of “SVO” Veterans and the “SVOi” Military Brotherhood demonstrate that the Kremlin is prioritizing establishing administrative, financial, and organizational control over Russian veterans’ communities and organizations in 2025.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

The Kremlin created the Association of “SVO” Veterans in November 2023 & the “SVOi” Military Brotherhood in October 2024 to replace other existing veteran civil societies that have been critical of Russia’s conduct of the war in Ukraine but essential for supporting Russian training & recruitment.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

The Kremlin uses the "Time of Heroes" program to set conditions for permanent recruitment and militarization of Russian society to continue its aggression against Ukraine and possibly against NATO.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

The Kremlin established the "Time of Heroes" Higher School of Public Administration in February 2024 to form a new Russian elite composed of a limited number of loyal and ultranationalist veterans that will continue to militarize the Russian society over the long term.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

The Kremlin is likely establishing the fund as the sole mechanism through which veterans can receive compensation, possibly making it harder for independent veterans civil society to seek funding outside the government framework.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

The Kremlin launched the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund in April 2023 as a long-term initiative intended to coopt veterans by monopolizing all veterans' support initiatives and funds.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

Putin officially declared 2025 the “Year of the Defender of the Fatherland,” signaling the Kremlin’s growing commitment to expanding state control over veterans’ lives and civil society.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

These efforts aimed at arresting voices that resonated with or weaponized the veteran communities such as Prigozhin, Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin & former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

The Kremlin faced the threat of an emerging veteran opposition movement against the Putin regime between late 2022 and mid-2023 when patrons - such as Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin - tried to weaponize Russian servicemen and veterans to advance personal political objectives.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

The Kremlin is likely particularly concerned that veterans’ return could trigger a new wave of "Afghan syndrome" and the rise of new veterans groups critical of the Russian war effort or military - especially because the Kremlin failed to militarize and mobilize Russian society for a protracted war.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 24/03/2025

It is falsely framing its efforts to co-opt veteran life as preventative measures against the reemergence of “Afghan syndrome” - a Russian term used to describe the aftermath of the Soviet government’s failure to reintegrate traumatized veterans into society upon their return from Afghanistan.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

8) The establishment of limitations on non-state volunteer procurement and supply efforts may significantly degrade or eliminate this community

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

7) The Russian MoD’s efforts to monopolize the procurement & supply of Russian unmanned systems to Russian drone and specialized detachment may erode a competitive and flexible environment conducive to innovation.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

6) The “Rubikon” Center and the Russian military command’s prior misunderstanding of evolving technology may also lower standards for Russian unmanned systems training and manufacturing.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

5) The new centralized Russian drone & specialized technological detachments are also unlikely to guarantee that the Russian military command will not use these specialists in assaults due to persistent manpower needs to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

4) The Russian MoD's reorganization of the Russian drone operators and specialists into separate detachments may impact the Russian tactical reconnaissance strike complex & reduce the cohesion between assault, drone, & artillery elements.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

3) The Russian forces will gain new capabilities if the Russian MoD is successful. The success of this effort will depend on the Russian military leadership's commitment to these reforms, prioritization & availability of supplies. Such success is not a given.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

2) The Russian MoD is unlikely to emulate the USF’s structure for its own Unmanned Systems Forces given its focus on disbanding and reorganizing existing drone and specialized detachments.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

Forecast: 1) @thestudyofwar.bsky.social assessed prior to Belousov's announcement on December 16 that the establishment of the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces will likely require at least 6 months to a year to complete given the complexity of the required force restructuring & procurement reforms.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

The Russian MoD is simultaneously monopolizing its control over Russian unmanned systems procurement processes by raising new state-affiliated procurement organizations & restricting Russian non-state volunteer organizations’ operations on the frontlines.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

The Russian information space most notably expressed outrage over the deaths of two prominent drone operators of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment Junior Sergeant Dmitry Lysakovsky (alias Goodwin) and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Gritsai (alias Ernest) in early September 2024.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

The Russian military command reportedly began increasingly committing drone operators and other specialists such as signalmen, engineers, and medics in assault operations starting in August and September 2024, which resulted in the deaths of several Russian specialists.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

The Russian MoD likely began forming unmanned systems detachments under the “Rubikon” initiative by disbanding informal drone detachments & removing specialists from military units, generating controversy in the Russian information space following the deaths of drone operators & specialists.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

The Russian MoD announced that the "Rubikon" Center had formed an unspecified number of unmanned systems detachments that are already operating in the Donetsk, Belgorod & Kursk directions, indicating that the Russian MoD formed these detachments prior to October 2024.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

The Russian MoD established a new organization – the "Rubikon" Center for Prospective Unmanned Technologies – in August 2024 likely to selectively reorganize and form new MoD-controlled unmanned systems detachments and centralize unmanned systems assets.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

4) The Russian MoD also seeks to centralize and fully control the procurement, development, and production of unmanned systems – processes that also sprung up in a partly unofficial and decentralized manner.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

3) The Russian MoD at least partly aims to centralize control over informal drone and specialized detachments to free up additional manpower to conduct grinding assaults in Ukraine.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

2) The Russian MoD simultaneously aims to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces to centralize control over the Russian informal drone & specialized detachments that have arisen organically in an ad hoc manner within regular Russian units and existing irregular formations.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

The Russian MoD & Kremlin are trying to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces for several possible reasons: 1) The Russian MoD is likely trying to catch up to the establishment of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) earlier in 2024.

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Kateryna Stepanenko @katstepanenko.bsky.social · 18/12/2024

The organization of the Unmanned Systems Forces within the larger Russian military remains unclear given the differences between Putin's and Belousov's descriptions of the formation as a separate branch or branch.

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