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Reposted by Timur Kadyshev

CNTR | Arms Control Research @cntrarmscontrol.org · 09/06/2026

Wie kann KI die Rüstungskontrolle unterstützen – welche neuen Proliferationsrisiken bringt sie mit sich? Das Kapitel im @friedensgutachten.de 2026 zeigt: Algorithmen können Verifikationsprozesse stärken, aber auch Missbrauch ermöglichen. #OpenAccess www.friedensgutachten.de/2026/inhalt/...

friedensgutachten.de

Die neuen Warlords. Gewaltdynamiken einhegen – friedensgutachten

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Reposted by Timur Kadyshev

Lukas Mengelkamp @lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social · 05/06/2026

My colleague Ulrich Kühn moderates a crucial panel at the Belfer Center on the Fall Nuclear Crisis 2022 during the Russo-Ukraine war. Joining him: Colin Kahl, Janice Stein, & Kristin Ven Bruusgaard. You can watch it online. It will take place on 22 June 2026, from 12:00 pm to 1:30 pm (EDT).

belfercenter.org

Shadow of Catastrophe and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence

In October 2022, the CIA assessed a fifty percent or greater chance that Russia could use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Apparently, the world had come closer to nuclear use than at almost any point sinc...

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 31/10/2025

So... according to Ukrainian sources, the missile was used 23 times, of which once to about 1,200 km range. Only one? And 22 times to <500 km?

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Reposted by Timur Kadyshev

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 26/10/2025

On 21 October 2025 Russia conducted "the key test" of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile (also referred to as SSC-X-9 Skyfall). The test is reported to be successful. The missile travelled 14,000 km in a 15-hour flight (Image: Pan'kovo test site). Links follow 1/

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Reposted by Timur Kadyshev

James Acton @nuclear-jim.bsky.social · 30/09/2025

The End of MAD? Join me, Steve Fetter, @jaysankarans.bsky.social, TD MacDonald, Ton Stefanik, @lauraegrego.bsky.social, @fiona-cunningham.bsky.social, and Charlie Glaser to discuss whether technological developments are undermining mutually assured destruction. Link for virtual rego in next post.

media.tenor.com

a man in a shirt and tie is screaming with his hands in the air .

ALT: a man in a shirt and tie is screaming with his hands in the air .

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Reposted by Timur Kadyshev

Franziska Stärk @franziskastaerk.bsky.social · 26/09/2025

Climate change & nuclear weapons are often seen as twin threats to future generations. My new open access article shows that while both pose similar moral dilemmas, intergenerational nuclear injustice is harder to spot—and harder to fix. doi.org/10.1111/1758... 1/🧵

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 12/09/2025

Deutsche Bahn is cautiously optimistic

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 03/09/2025

Our workshop report “Assessing Missile Defense Technology and Policy Half a Century After the ABM Treaty” is now out in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

tandfonline.com

Assessing Missile Defense Technology and Policy Half a Century After the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: A Workshop Report

Published in Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (Ahead of Print, 2025)

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 03/09/2025

Yes, and Russia denied this, see e.g. london.mid.ru/en/press-cen... Thus the "damned uncertainty". To resolve it, a proof must be presented of either a test or a use of this missile to >500 km range, while calculations of maximum theoretical range are irrelevant.

london.mid.ru

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 17/08/2025

Mine has never done this ...so far.

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

- therefore the question of whether 9M729 was in violation with INF Treaty or not cannot be decided by calculation of its maximum theoretical range, it’s a purely political question - until Russia or the US reveal a definitive information about it. 2/2

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

To be sure, I'm not saying that Russia did not violate INF Treaty, my points are: - calculation of maximum theoretical range of a CM is not a correct way to determine its actual maximum range; 1/2 bsky.app/profile/kady...

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

To advance this argument you need to state (and prove) which known Russian INF-range ALCM or SLCM the allegedly offending 9M729 actually is. 6/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

Russia of course could have demonstrated something definitive out of good will. Unfortunately, what they did - the January'19 briefing - raised more questions than it answered. But then again, they have the right to protect sensitive information as much as the US, aren't they? 5/6

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

Russia would have explaining to do if the US said exactly what, when and where was tested in violation of the Treaty. What they did say instead was what the allegedly offending missile was NOT. I understand that this was to preserve their sources, but it does not help the situation. 4/6

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

By your calculation, maximum range of 9M728 is >500 km, correct? If yes, why was it not considered to be in violation? Once more, calculation of theoretical maximum range is not a definitive way to determine GLCM’s actual maximum range, see Article VII.4 of the Treaty. 3/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

For GLCM maximum range in its standard design mode can be very different from its range in the mode optimized for maximum range (as illustrated in my thread you're answering to). That’s why the treaty has "standard design mode" in the range definition. 2/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 14/08/2025

BM and CM are very different beasts. Why do you think GLBM range is defind as “range,” while GLCM range need to be ”determined by projecting its flight path onto the earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact."? 1/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

Yes, that's what I said, "the United States found the “Russian Federation in violation of its obligations under the INF treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a GLCM with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.”

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

I cannot deny (or confirm) what I don't know. The US official statement is that 9M729 was tested at "over 500 km" range, and objectively at this time everything else is just speculation. While Russia’s credibility is doubtful, the US version is not necessarily definitive.

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

the question boils down to whether one believes the Russian or US account. Ultimately, whether 9M729 violated the INF Treaty cannot be determined by calculating its theoretical maximum range. At present it's a political judgment, not a technical one, though additional evidence could change that. 6/6

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

The 9M729 controversy is not about its theoretical maximum range (which, if not corresponding to its standard design mode, would be irrelevant), but about US allegations that it was tested to more than 500 km from a mobile launcher. There is no verifiable open-source evidence to confirm this and 5/6

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

The decisive point is not the theoretical maximum range, but whether the missile was tested to the range in question or not. In the case of the 9M728, which could theoretically be flown much further than 500 km, no range-related issue arose because it was never tested beyond that threshold. 4/6

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

For GLBMs, a missile tested to less than 500 km could theoretically fly farther, and one tested above 5,500 km could fly shorter ranges. The same applies to GLCMs: a missile designed and tested for under 500 km in its standard design mode could, in a different mode, fly farther. 3/6

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

and for cruise missiles as “the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion.” While the wording differs, in both cases the underlying criterion is the missile’s tested capability. 2/6

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

On the 9M729 Controversy Under INF Treaty Rules A followup to my reply bsky.app/profile/kady... to the discussion on 9M729 (re)initiated by @frhoffmann.bsky.social Under the INF Treaty, “range capability” is defined for ballistic missiles as “the maximum range to which it has been tested,” 1/6 ‬

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

Combining that with less efficient engine (sfc=0.92) and smaller fuel fraction (fuel mass 400 kg), the range is ~530 km. Terminal maneuvering can cut it further down to below 500 km. Cruise missile's maximum theoretical range can be far from actual range for a specifically optimized flight profile.

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

For the original flight profile, using Breguet equation, and assuming cruise speed 900 km/h, sfc=0.72 kg/(kgf*h) initial mass 1315 kg (2900 lb) and fuel mass 500 kg, effective L/D is 2.68. Now, for very low altitude flight effective L/D can be below 2 (let's take 1.5). 2/3

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

Interesting post by ‪@frhoffmann.bsky.social‬ My own ball-park calculations on the subject: let's take Tomahawk 1,600 km range-optimized version and try to estimate its range at very low altitude for the duration of the flight. 1/3 bsky.app/profile/frho...

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

Combing that with less efficient engine (sfc=0.92) and less fuel fraction (fuel mass 400 kg), the range is ~530 km. Terminal maneuvering can cut it further down to below 500 km. Cruise missile's maximum theoretical range can be far from actual range for a specifically optimized flight profile.

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 11/08/2025

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 09/08/2025

Bild today: "Trump's special envoy, Witkoff, is said to have... misinterpreted Russia's demand for a "peaceful withdrawal" of Ukrainians from Kherson and Zaporizhia as an offer of a "peaceful withdrawal" by the Russians from these regions." www.bild.de/politik/ausl...

bild.de

„Friedlicher Rückzug“: Hat Trumps Mann Putin falsch verstanden?

Verwirrung um Ukraine-Friedensgipfel: Witkoff missinterpretiert Putins Forderungen.

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Reposted by Timur Kadyshev

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 07/08/2025

In case you missed it, here is "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988" history.state.gov/historicaldo...

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 05/08/2025

The war started in 2014, and it was definitely not about INF (or NATO expansion). Neither was(is) the full-scale invasion. It's all about regaining "the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state."

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 26/07/2025

A general question is valid too: is the deterree going to believe in the extended deterrence, i.e. that the ext-deterrer is willing to risk its own cities for the citites of its allies? I'm pretty sure that the universal answer is no.

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 23/07/2025

Join IFSH! We are seeking a Senior Researcher with broad expertise in dual-use technologies and their impact on deterrence, defense, and arms control policies. The position will not focus on cyber topics. ifsh.de/en/institute...

ifsh.de

IFSH: A Senior Researcher (full-time) for the “Research and Transfer Project Arms Control and Emerging Technologies – Phase II”

The IFSH is an interdisciplinary foundation and research institution at the University of Hamburg, which is institutionally supported by the Free and…

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 18/07/2025

Of course, the deterree may choose not to be convinced and instead work to mitigate the effects of anything that threatens its ability to retaliate. 2/2

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 18/07/2025

Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder. In the context of extended deterrence, the deterree must be convinced that the deterrer is willing to risk absorbing a retaliatory strike. Missile defense (including counterforce targeting as a left-of-launch component) contributes to this perception. 1/2

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 17/07/2025

I don't see a contradiction: "strenghtening" is a relative term. Extended deterrence is strengthened by counterforce targetting, but not ensured.

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

Iskander-K is a non-existent designation. There is Iskander-M system that can launch both ballistic 9M723 and cruise 9M728 missilies. Kh-47M2 is an incorrect, made-up designation, Russian military designation for the Kinzhal missile is 9-A-7760.

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 20/06/2025

Frankly, I couldn't belive my eyes reading the June 13 letter. It essentially said "deny the reality and your argument collapses".

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 17/06/2025

Svalbard is an interesting place: Russian flags are side by side with the Soviet slogan “our goal is communism” :)

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Reposted by Timur Kadyshev

Hanna Notte @hannanotte.bsky.social · 14/06/2025

How does #Russia look at the #Israel-#Iran war? How is Russia reacting; how will it position itself; what are its cards; what are its concerns - and what are the implications for its war against #Ukraine? A🧵on 6 themes

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 12/06/2025

The outrage was not about nuclear war consequences awareness part of it.

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 09/06/2025

I read it as referring to the acquisition and deployment of additional heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, within the meaning of the Treaty. Theoretically, they could also convert some heavy bombers currently equipped for non-nuclear armaments to nuclear, if necessary.

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Timur Kadyshev @kadyshev.bsky.social · 09/06/2025

Fewer aircraft in rotation means a faster attrition rate.

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