nytimes.com
Threats of Political Violence Have America’s Elected Officials Living in Fear (Gift Article)
A Times investigation has found that violent threats have become a new normal among public officials, reshaped private lives, cost millions in security and pushed people out of office.
![Here, most importantly, Defendants have not identified any process Plaintiff received before they removed him to Equatorial Guinea. Their declarant attests only that
Equatorial Guinea provided diplomatic assurances, that the State Department found them
credible, and that ICE followed the Guidance. No. CV-26-02888-PHX-JCH, Doc. 15-1
¶¶ 5–8. Under the Guidance, those assurances permit removal “without the need for further
procedures.” (Doc. 9-1 at 2–3.) Defendants maintain that “the government has in fact
implemented procedures to protect [Plaintiff’s] interest” because the Guidance prohibits
removal absent either credible assurances or an individual hearing. (Doc. 9 at 5.) But the
assurance route is the absence of individualized process: it provides no notice of the
country of removal and no opportunity to be heard. The Court finds this insufficient to
abide by due process prior to removing Plaintiff to a third country. See Smith, No. CV-26-
04065-PHX-SHD (JFM), Doc. 19 at 6 (holding that reliance on diplomatic assurances “is
insufficient process before removing Petitioner to a third country”).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:2vtbmhmrwzbqcfv4we4uxzzt/bafkreiglijejdqoympsywdoytshknwipvcbhndri77v4mae2cpgeyeudcu)
![Defendants also contend Plaintiff “focuses on the lack of notice regarding the
country of removal as if [his] fear depends on receiving that notice.” (Doc. 9 at 11.) But
notice is the predicate for the opportunity to be heard; a person cannot raise a fear-based
claim against removal to a country he does not know he will be sent to. In any event,
Plaintiff did express fear and ask for a fear interview prior to removal, and he was refused.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 1; Doc. 1-1 at 27.)
The Court’s conclusion rests on binding Ninth Circuit authority and does not depend
on the D.V.D. judgment. It is, however, consistent with that judgment, which declared that
class members have the right to meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to raise a
country-specific claim before removal to any third country, 821 F. Supp. 3d 102, and which
the First Circuit affirmed, D.V.D., 2026 WL 2797801.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has established actual success on Count One. Plaintiff’s
removal to Equatorial Guinea without notice and a meaningful opportunity to raise a
country-specific claim against removal there violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Andriasian, 180 F.3d at 1041.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:2vtbmhmrwzbqcfv4we4uxzzt/bafkreiceeuxgrjplhokrat6kv2qsso5lhsbs3rtftuyxlwhhxbmk6ynhma)
![Nor is this a “like case[].” (Doc. 9 at 1 (quoting Boyle, 145 S. Ct. at 2654.) It is an individual action, decided on the merits, brought by a plaintiff who has already been removed and who presents unrebutted evidence of detention and abuse in the receiving country. And this Court remains bound by Ninth Circuit precedent—including the authority discussed in Part IV—unless that precedent is “clearly irreconcilable” with intervening higher authority. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). An unreasoned order staying a class-wide preliminary injunction is not such authority. Defendants’ related assertion that Plaintiff’s removal was “entirely consistent with” the stay orders (Doc. 9 at 16) conflates the absence of a class-wide injunction with an affirmative determination that the process Plaintiff received satisfied due process. The stay orders made no such determination.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:2vtbmhmrwzbqcfv4we4uxzzt/bafkreidv26uxx4hdsrcqgwdhodojjepvjlqcg5s6d4uxdmwkjjonchgxe4)
