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Greg

@jamyang.net
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Greg @jamyang.net · 22/09/2026
julianassange.org relaunched 17 Sept. Sole content: 庄子·山木 [Zhuangzi, "The Mountain Tree"], the useless tree / silent goose passage, ending on 先生将何处 ["Master, where will you stand?"] with Zhuangzi's reply omitted. Sino #Bluesky, thoughts pls? @bokane.org @beijingpalmer.bsky.social @samuelwa.de
Screenshot of julianassange.org, labelled “official Julian Assange website,” with bright green monospace text on a black background. A readme dated 17 September 2026 contains a Chinese passage about Zhuangzi: a tree survives because its wood is useless, while a goose is killed because it cannot honk. A disciple asks how to reconcile these outcomes. Below are text-file entries linking to the website and the X account @JulianAssange.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/09/2026
WSJ @joshchin.bsky.social on #ZRON: the #APT toolkit's old news — RATs, webmail harvesters, keyloggers. The shift is the #genAI layer on top. Stolen foreign govt mail run through #DeepSeek models into PSB-ready reports. Collection was never the bottleneck. Analysis was: archive.is/zvNu9
Screenshot of a Wall Street Journal article titled “How a Chinese Hacking Firm Tapped AI to Supercharge Cyber-Spying,” by Josh Chin, Gabriele Steinhauser and Tripti Lahiri, dated Sept. 15, 2026. A photo shows Tiananmen Gate in Beijing. The summary says internal data from Chinese cybersecurity firm ZRON shows hackers-for-hire using AI to organise and analyse stolen foreign government secrets.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 11/09/2026
What's new is not that the #Tibetans are a PRC collection target. It's that one operator with a commercial model now does the work of an analyst team, on a daily cadence, & that a Western AI company holds account level evidence of it and chose to publish. Kudos. www-cdn.anthropic.com/e50be2e51e76...
Title page of report, branded Anthropic: “Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026.”
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Greg @jamyang.net · 11/09/2026
Third, GTG-14021: municipal police and a state security bureau (likely Zhejiang) producing daily 维稳 (stability maintenance) briefings. No #Tibetan targets named, but the same templates, and one operator was a serving detective and police academy student. #transnationalrepression
Report excerpt titled “GTG-14021,” describing the disruption and banning of China-based accounts allegedly used for “stability maintenance” surveillance, domestic sentiment monitoring, and targeting overseas dissidents and civil-society organizations.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 11/09/2026
Second case, GTG-14022: a commercial contractor for government clients ran an automated 舆情 (public opinion) briefing pipeline, 15 to 30 articles a day under a v2.6 manual. " #Uyghur, #Tibetan and Falun Gong activity; specific advocacy organizations " was one of six standing categories.
Screenshot of a report titled “GTG-14022: Disrupting a China-based ‘public opinion monitoring’ and dissident surveillance operation,” describing the disruption of an operation that used Claude to create government-style intelligence briefings on dissidents, activists, minority groups, diaspora communities, and foreign media.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 11/09/2026
The prompts told #Claude to 站在中方立场 (stand with the Chinese position) and describe the CTA as an "illegal separatist administration". Collection covered birth dates, immigration dates, social handles, and venue reconnaissance down to floor plans.
Table listing Chinese-language terminology that may signal internal personnel-research templates or state-security attribution, including “intelligence clue report,” “situational awareness,” “work handles,” and “overseas China-related matters.”
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Greg @jamyang.net · 11/09/2026
It ran a dedicated #Tibetan workstream: target set "administration in exile and advocacy groups; PRC registered associations". Output: daily situational digests and an "organization dataset". Alongside it, workstreams on Catholic cardinals, Taiwanese Presbyterians, and Falun Gong.
Table outlining five religious-target workstreams, their target groups, outputs, and reporting cadence: Catholic leadership, Taiwan religious civil society, Tibetan Buddhists, Falun Gong, and Christian missionary networks.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 11/09/2026
The main case is GTG-14020: a China based religious affairs intelligence desk, aligned to the United Front Work Department and the MSS. One user disclosed being a state information security officer. Claude replaced what had once been many teams of analysts.
GTG-14020: Disrupting a China-based religious affairs intelligence operation targeting Catholic, Tibetan Buddhist, Falun Gong, and Taiwanese Christian communities

We banned a group of accounts we believe is linked to a China-based, PRC government-aligned intelligence operation. The actor used Claude as a stand-in for a staffed analyst team, building Chinese-language dossiers targeting religious leaders and

Source: Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026 p.89
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Greg @jamyang.net · 03/08/2026
Report—CDT appears on pp. 4 & 8–10: cf-assets.www.cloudflare.com/dzlvafdwdttg... #transnationalrepression
Cover of the “2026 Cloudflare Report on Cyberattacks Against Civil Society,” featuring the Cloudflare logo and an illustrated telescope beneath a starry purple/pink sky.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 30/06/2026
China’s repression of Uyghurs does not stop at borders. Reyhan Topal’s new report documents how digital #transnationalrepression targets #Uyghur activists abroad through phishing, deepfakes, silent calls, police intimidation & coerced community #surveillance www.opentech.fund/wp-content/u... 
Cover page of a report titled “Digital Transnational Repression of Uyghurs: The Costs of Dissent Beyond Borders” by Reyhan Topal. The minimalist cream-colored design features large grey serif text, thin coral horizontal lines, three grey dots near the bottom, and the logos “UTJD” (Uyghur Transitional Justice Database.) and “OTF” (Open Technology Fund) in reddish-orange.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 17/06/2026
China has all but admitted the "Xizang" rebrand flatlined algorithmically: worldwide users still search #Tibet and get the real #Tibetan story. According to SCMP Xizang is now one layer of a deeper play: big data profiling, precision psychographic targeting, & #genAI content archive.is/JlMbo #认知域作战
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Greg @jamyang.net · 12/04/2026
Orbán concedes election to Tisza’s #Magyar www.theguardian.com/world/live/2...
15.23 EDT
Orbán concedes election to Tisza’s Magyar
That’s it.

Viktor Orbán is now speaking at Fidesz’s election night and he says the election result is “clear” as he concedes defeat.

He says he congratulated the winning party and admits the result is painful for Fidesz.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 31/03/2026
via @tibcert.bsky.social
Striking graphic with a Chinese flag background and several CCTV cameras labeled #Hikvision and #Dahua around a large red “BANNED” stamp. Headline says, “India bans Chinese CCTV giants Hikvision and Dahua.” Smaller text says that from April 1 the companies will be barred from selling internet connected CCTV cameras in India as part of tighter security standards under MeitY’s Essential Requirements norms introduced in April 2024. (c) 2026 TibCERT Tech Update
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Greg @jamyang.net · 20/03/2026
The EU has sanctioned #i-Soon and its founders: CEO Wu Haibo & COO Chen Cheng. i-Soon's clients included China's PLA, MSS, & MPS. Our @turquoiseroof.org Bulletin (2024) showed they used compromised #Tibetan exile inboxes to demo #surveillance tools to clients data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document...
Council of theEuropean UnionBrussels, 10 March 2026(OR. en)5136/26LIMITECORLX 12CFSP/PESC 19RELEX 11CYBER 6JAI 23FIN 10LEGISLATIVE ACTS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTSSubject: COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION implementing Regulation(EU) 2019/796 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacksthreatening the Union or its Member States 

Source: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5136-2026-INIT/en/pdf
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
The Galaxy of #FIMI Operations maps 3,000 core channels. The report identifies distinct Chinese-attributed infrastructure: #Spamouflage, CGTN-linked #Falsos Amigos, #Paperwall, #HaiEnergy, alongside Russian-attributed channels. [p.25, p.28-29]
THE GALAXY OF FIMI OPERATIONS IN 2025
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
The EEAS outlines a #deterrence toolkit for countering #FIMI infrastructure & raising the cost: account removal, demonetisation, #transparency requirements under the Digital Services Act. The report presents these tools as underused. [p.16 onwards]
Figure 14_Layers of the architecture of FIMI threats and deterrence mechanisms included in the FIMI Toolbox
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
China's most common 2025 #narratives: positioning itself as a 'force for peace,' reliable partner for the #GlobalSouth, while framing Western criticism as cynical. ( #Tibet features in the defensive human rights posture track). [p.13]
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
Transnational Information Suppression (silencing critical voices outside #China) is flagged as a 'key concern' of Chinese #FIMI. Targets include #diaspora individuals and their families. It straddles FIMI & human rights/ #transnationalrepression against #Tibetans #Uyghurs & #HongKong [p.13]
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
27% of all #FIMI incidents in 2025 involved AI tools: up 259% from 2024. #Russian and #PRC aligned actors have 'fully embedded AI' into operations: cartoons, voice cloning, impersonation video. Low engagement, high volume. [p.14] #genAI
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
China's #FIMI approach is described as 'cheap and fast.' (EEAS) #AI allows mass content production at scale. The EEAS notes, across FIMI actors broadly, that the objective is 'not precision but presence.' [p.14, p.34] #genAI
Instead of carefully targeting a single audience, AI tools aredeployed at scale to keep a steady stream of content flowing.The objective is not precision but presence, ensuring thatnarratives are constantly circulating, even without clearlydefined targets.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
The EEAS report includes an example: Figure 20 shows an AI-assisted #Spamouflage impersonation video posted to #Bluesky.
Figure 20_Example of impersonation video by #Spamouflage on #Bluesky
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
EEAS: In 2025, #Spamouflage perfected a new attack pattern: the use of #AI-assisted impersonation videos. This builds on its previous creation of poorly edited pictures and is specifically employed to degrade dissidents and discredit opposition voices. #transnationalrepression
The new old: Spamouflage content creationThe IMS Spamouflage consists of newly created, repurposed,or hijacked53 social media accounts that post and amplifystate messaging across more than 50 platforms54, engagingalmost exclusively with other Spamouflage content. In2025, Spamouflage perfectioned a new attack pattern: theuse of AI-assisted impersonation videos. This buildson its previous creation of poorly edited pictures andis specifically employed to degrade dissidents anddiscredit opposition voices.Spamouflage appears to use AI to produce more content.Its accounts frequently share AI-generated cartoons builtaround similar narratives, allowing them to quickly generatelarge amounts of tailored material targeting specific actorsor issues.Even if overall engagement remains low, the repeatedposting of varied content creates the impression thatthese views are widely shared. For example, this techniquewas used to target both the EU and the US, with at least50 AI-generated cartoons portraying the EU as subordinateto the US.Spamouflage has also used AI to refine its impersonationtactics and vary its attacks. The IMS manipulated videosusing AI tools to imitate opposing voices. This marks a stepbeyond its earlier use of poorly edited images targetingindividuals.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
#Spamouflage, the Chinese state-linked influence network, operates across more than *50 platforms.* #genAI
SPAMOUFLAGEThe Chinese-aligned IMS47 is only partially representedin the graph for illustrative purposes, as it comprises alarge number of inauthentic accounts that would otherwiseovercrowd the visualisation. The IMS is mostly activeon X, where its activity is organised around clustersof accounts. These clusters are characterised by theirown behavioural patterns, and are mobilised for specificpurposes, like responding to breaking news events, targetingdissidents or advancing Chinese propaganda points. Asa result, the IMS does not follow a single, consistentoperational model. One prominent pattern of Spamouflageinvolves a first cluster of seeder accounts impersonatingdissidents, which post a video or an image containing falseallegations. Then, a second cluster of amplifier accounts thatdisseminate the content by posting it as a reply to relevantentities, such as government bodies accounts. Finally, athird cluster of accounts posts, also as a reply to similarentities, a screenshot of the initial video and hashtags tocriticise and call for action against the dissident who allegedlypublished the content. A later section of the report examinesSpamouflage’s emerging use of AI-generated impersonationvideos.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
#Tibet is explicitly named as one of China's 'big four' #FIMI topics, alongside #Taiwan, #HongKong, and #Xinjiang. PRC information operations in 2025 maintained a 'defensive posture on human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet.' [p.13]
The narrative portraying the EU as subservient to the US interms of foreign policy (e.g. on Gaza, Ukraine) remained,but this year also included criticism of the EU leadershipas hawkish on China, as well as on Russia, Iran, and theDPRK. The change of US trade policy was used to deploynarratives calling for closer cooperation between theEU and China in setting up a new multilateral order.This narrative was particularly prominent around theEU-China Leaders’ Summit in July. The so-called bigfour topics (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet)featured heavily, primarily through defensive posture onhuman rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet. Hong Kong,Taiwan, and the situation in the South China Sea wereused in conjunction with promoting China’s concepts andviews on sovereignty and territorial claims. The ecosystemcontinued presenting Russia’s war against Ukraine andUkraine's accession to the EU as a source of division.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/EEAS%204th%20Threat%20Report_web%20version_1.pdf
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/03/2026
The source: EEAS 4th Report on Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference Threats, March 2026. Based on 540 documented incidents involving 10,500 channels mobilised to produce or amplify #FIMI globally in 2025. [p.5, p.9] www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/defaul...
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Greg @jamyang.net · 22/01/2026
So the story is not just #decarbonisation. It is Beijing rewiring the geography of compute: moving clean generation from the colonial frontier to the coast. The #UHV line is a wager that the next phase of growth in the Greater Bay Area runs on #Tibetan kilowatt hours as much as on GPUs.
Map titled “Tibet–Guangdong ultra-high-voltage power transmission project route”. Credit: SCMP Graphics, (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 14/01/2026
@hpeaks.bsky.social
A paperback book titled Ocean, as Much as Rain by Tsering Woeser lies on an oak table. The cover features a colourful, circular mandala-like design with layered patterns, clouds, and waves in blues, oranges, and greens, with a small empty chair at the centre. Subtitles note it is a collection of stories, lyrical prose, & poems from Tibet, edited and translated by Fiona Sze-Lorrain with Dechen Pemba.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 14/09/2025
Silicon Valley’s Surveillance Technology Transfer Problem (Davi Ottenheimer) www.flyingpenguin.com?p=72174
Historians Produce Pattern Recognition

The Associated Press investigation into Silicon Valley’s role in building China’s surveillance state reads like an old 1940s playbook. The birth of Silicon Valley was unlimited federal funding to develop radar technology for Allied forces. Eventually the results threatened American planes over Korea in a devastating turnabout. The cultural shock resuled in a “Top Gun” project that only escalated the cycles. This context matters greatly when considering tech giants like IBM, Dell, Cisco, and Intel spending over two decades essentially building the world’s most sophisticated digital prisons and handing the keys to America’s most obvious geopolitical rival.

The scale of stupidity is sobering. American companies sold billions of dollars in surveillance technology to Chinese police and government agencies, as if emboldened by repeated Congressional warnings that these tools were being used to crush dissent and target minorities.

Can you imagine a CEO at a tech firm giving an executive team presentation that “these elected politicians are telling us if we get rich helping China we also can destroy democracy and instrument racism globally, hell yeah!”
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Greg @jamyang.net · 27/07/2025
"Everyday activities such as language preservation, passing on traditional #Tibetan practices, these are being criminalised. #Surveillance is at the heart of this process of subjugating the Tibetan people, of making them Chinese. www.sbs.com.au/news/datelin...
Caption: Cybersecurity expert, Greg Walton believes the government is focused on monitoring religious life. Credit: Hardcash Productions
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Greg @jamyang.net · 21/07/2025
Schneier on Security: #Massistant is the presumed successor to Chinese forensics tool, “MFSocket”, reported in 2019 and attributed to publicly traded cybersecurity company, Meiya Pico www.schneier.com/blog/archive...
Screen shot text:

The Chinese have a new tool called Massistant.

Massistant is the presumed successor to Chinese forensics tool, “MFSocket”, reported in 2019 and attributed to publicly traded cybersecurity company, Meiya Pico.
The forensics tool works in tandem with a corresponding desktop software.
Massistant gains access to device GPS location data, SMS messages, images, audio, contacts and phone services.
Meiya Pico maintains partnerships with domestic and international law enforcement partners, both as a surveillance hardware and software provider, as well as through training programs for law enforcement personnel.
From a news article:

The good news, per Balaam, is that Massistant leaves evidence of its compromise on the seized device, meaning users can potentially identify and delete the malware, either because the hacking tool appears as an app, or can be found and deleted using more sophisticated tools such as the Android Debug Bridge, a command line tool that lets a user connect to a device through their computer.

The bad news is that at the time of installing Massistant, the damage is done, and authorities already have the person’s data.

Slashdot thread.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 11/07/2025
One to watch at #BlackHatUSA: @rondeibert.bsky.social will lay out the Lab’s future mission: including tackling AI-enabled subversion, “Dark PR,” & ad intelligence, as public-interest research itself faces rising authoritarian threats: www.blackhat.com/us-25/briefi...
Screenshot of BlackHat(USA) overview of Ron Deibert's keynote:

"Keynote: Chasing Shadows: Chronicles of Counter-Intelligence from the Citizen Lab
Ron Deibert  |  Director, The Citizen Lab, Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto
Date: Wednesday, August 6 | 1:30pm-2:10pm ( Oceanside A, Level 2 )
Format: 40-Minute Keynote
Track: Keynote

For over twenty years, the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab has pioneered investigations into digital security and human rights—from exposing state cyber espionage to uncovering the global spread of mercenary spyware targeting journalists, activists, and human rights defenders. Drawing from my latest book, Chasing Shadows, I will recount how our mission to conduct "counter-intelligence for civil society" revealed surveillance around the inner circle of murdered Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi and uncovered domestic espionage campaigns across Mexico, Spain, Hungary, Poland, Thailand, El Salvador, and most recently, Italy. As our small team disarmed cyber mercenaries and helped improve the digital security of billions, we, too, became targets—caught in the same sinister crosshairs as those we sought to protect. I will also look ahead to the future of our mission and the rising challenges of AI-enabled subversion, Dark PR, and advertising intelligence, and how the kind of public-interest research the Lab has championed is now under threat from a growing tide of despotism and authoritarianism."
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Greg @jamyang.net · 07/07/2025
Visions for Potential AGI Futures, Scenario 6: Authoritarian Advantage (Centralised AGI Development Empowers the PRC) Key assumption: AGI will bolster authoritarian regimes: plug governance gaps via AI-driven planning, & urban #surveillance; solve the dictator’s dilemma by offering reliable advice:
Screen cap of Scenario from RAND report on Visions for Potential AGI Futures:

Scenario 6. Authoritarian Advantage (Centralized AGI Development
Empowers the PRC)
The text box below outlines our sixth scenario.
Authoritarian Advantage: Description
As AGI systems are developed and deployed, they turn out to fundamentally favor authoritarian regimes
because of their centralized control and ability to mitigate any adverse consequences associated with the
rapid implementation of AGI. The PRC leverages its lead in the widespread commercialization and societal
integration of AGI to spread its influence in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East by offering ubiquitous
surveillance technologies, infrastructure investments, and strategic partnerships for compute-sharing.
Automated surveillance systems allow authoritarian regimes and leaders to control information, selectively
repress dissidents with near perfect accuracy, and influence group behavior through the sophisticated
network mapping of human relationships. In addition, the PRC’s investments and innovation in industrial
robotics pays off, enabling the replacement of low-skilled labor with loyal AIs.
Meanwhile, the United States and its allies grapple with domestic challenges, including rampant
disinformation campaigns that undermine public trust in institutions, high unemployment rates exacerbated
by automation, and heightened civil unrest driven by socioeconomic disparities and political polarization.
These internal issues strain the U.S. government’s resources and reduce its ability to act abroad, leading to a
retrenchment in international influence. In a bid to achieve autarchy and avoid dependence on Chinese
manufacturing, the United States implements protectionist policies and reshoring initiatives. However, these
measures come at the cost of depressed economic growth because of inefficiencies and higher production
costs, and they strain relationships with traditional allies who are economically intertwined wi…
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Greg @jamyang.net · 05/07/2025
China is building an entire empire on data www.economist.com/leaders/2025... Leaders (economist.com) | #Surveillance state
Screenshot of the concluding paragraph of the article linked in the post:

All countries need scale and efficiency in data management. Yet for democracies the task is harder, because they must build in checks and balances that safeguard property rights, privacy and civil liberties. As it embraces its vast experiment, China will put less weight on such things and could build an efficient and dystopian system of surveillance. For decades it has been a “fast follower” of Western innovations. If China now races ahead in showing the financial value of its national data ocean, its method of centralisation will pose not just an economic challenge, but also a political one. ■
Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence.
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This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline “China’s formidable data empire”
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Greg @jamyang.net · 19/06/2025
As U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies, the ability to dominate both space and cyber will be a key factor in determining the shape of world peace, and whether it is along Chinese or American lines, argues @usip.org www.usip.org/publications...
The Element of Surprise: Space and Cyber Warfare in U.S.-China Rivalry
KEY TAKEAWAYS

China’s hacking efforts are becoming increasingly strategic in effect and particularly dangerous in relation to space systems.
In the information age, strategic surprise can have long-lasting impacts.
The U.S. needs to be clear with China that its hacking will not be met with impunity. [ Source: USIP ]

PHOTO: An internet cafe in Beijing, July 28, 2011. (Sim Chi Yin/The New York Times)
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Greg @jamyang.net · 11/06/2025
China’s Global Security Initiative and the Burma Junta’s PSMS #Surveillance eng.mizzima.com/2025/06/06/2...
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Greg @jamyang.net · 25/05/2025
RecordedFuture's AI-driven #yararules system dynamically adjusts extraction sensitivity, enhancing precision & coverage in #malware detection. Inspired by #bioinformatics, it reduces complexity by filtering false positives based on pattern length not corpus size go.recordedfuture.com/whitepaper/a...
Screen cap of RecordedFuture whitepaper cover: Auto YARA: Automated Yara Rule Generation for High-confidence Threat Detection #bioinspiration
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/05/2025
China’s next-gen #surveillance tools get AI boost to target #Telegram and #VPN users archive.is/W9PxD
[ screenshot of a selection of text from a SCMP article ] :

"“Without cybersecurity, there is no national security” read a prominent slogan in the exhibition hall.
The Third Research Institute of the Ministry of Public Security showcased a tool that it claimed could monitor Telegram, a widely used instant messaging app known for its privacy and security. It said the tool could monitor Telegram accounts registered with Chinese mobile phone numbers, which have strict real-name requirements.
To date, the tool has collected more than 30 billion messages and monitored 70 million Telegram accounts, as well as 390,000 public channels and groups, according to the institution.
A promotional video from the institution showed how drug transactions could be monitored in group chats by logging into Telegram with a hacked Chinese mobile phone number.
It also said that messages on Telegram involving topics related to politics and Hong Kong could be monitored. The institute cited the widespread use of Telegram by anti-government protesters in Hong Kong in 2019 as one of the reasons for developing the tool.
In mainland China, internet users have to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to access Telegram, as well as the website for the South China Morning Post. But a technology company from the eastern city of Nanjing showcased a tool capable of detecting such use."
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Greg @jamyang.net · 14/05/2025
China International Exhibition on Police Equipment kicks off in Beijing, with robots, AI products in focus (Global Times) archive.is/1tU6g #surveillance
A man operates a remote-controlled robotic dog equipped with surveillance and multi-barrel launching devices at the 12th China International Exhibition on Police Equipment (第12届中国国际警用装备博览会) in Beijing. The booth displays additional robots with tracks and mounted equipment. (Image credit: Global Times, 14 May, 2025)
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Greg @jamyang.net · 22/04/2025
@tibetnetwork.bsky.social now appears to be shielded by @cloudflare.social and is back online
A screenshot showing a Cloudflare security verification page in Chinese for the website tibetnetwork.org, asking users to verify they’re human by checking a box before accessing the site.
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Greg @jamyang.net · 17/03/2025
Meanwhile, in China’s "authoritarian platform empire", Big Data meets Big Brother. Algorithms predict dissent before it emerges, mercenary corporate #spyware fuels party-state control: #surveillancecapitalism in dystopian overdrive, a Philip K. Dick nightmare made real:
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Greg @jamyang.net · 05/03/2025
Meta's threat intelligence team found this PRC Strategic Influence operation as a result of an earlier internal investigation into suspected recidivist activity linked to the network - removed and reported in a previous Adversarial Threat report (Q3 2023):
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Greg @jamyang.net · 05/03/2025
Meta deleted multiple accounts on its platforms for violating their policy against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This PRC network targeted the #Tibetan diaspora primarily in Nepal, India and Bhutan across multiple services including Meta's and X (formerly Twitter):
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Greg @jamyang.net · 24/02/2025
China’s homegrown tech boosts global #surveillance, social controls www.rfa.org/english/chin...
A technician works on a video surveillance system on Beijing's Tiananmen Square. (Reuters)
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Greg @jamyang.net · 18/02/2025
Inside China: The Battle for Tibet - A missing boy, a culture under threat - undercover cameras expose China’s control over Tibet as the ageing Dalai Lama’s succession nears: www.itv.com/watch/inside... (1 hour, geo-restricted UK)
A poster for a documentary broadcast on ITV1 and streamed on ITVx : Inside China: The Battle for Tibet - A missing boy, a culture under threat - undercover cameras expose China’s control over Tibet as the ageing Dalai Lama’s succession nears
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Greg @jamyang.net · 06/02/2025
DGSI launch a helpline for anyone targeted by #transnationalrepression on French territory: La lutte contre la répression transnationale www.dgsi.interieur.gouv.fr/dgsi-a-vos-c... (中文版/ Русская версия/English version/ النسخة العربية)
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Greg @jamyang.net · 30/01/2025
Chinese #APT actors used Google's Gemini to conduct reconnaissance, for scripting and development, to troubleshoot code, and to research how to obtain deeper access to target networks: services.google.com/fh/files/mis... #AI
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Greg @jamyang.net · 28/01/2025
this response via DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B, (that runs locally in your browser with WebGPU acceleration - with no data sent to servers) via HuggingFace I can't yet reproduce it on locally installed through ollama it is one of the stranger hallucinations i've seen so far
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Greg @jamyang.net · 24/01/2025
The BBC's 'Shadow War: China and the West' is back on Radio4 at 11:45 each morning. I'm interviewed by @gordoncorera.bsky.social in episode 2 (The Canary in the Coalmine) www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/... How the Himalayas became the front line for a cyber war ...
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Greg @jamyang.net · 27/12/2024
The @ceccgov.bsky.social Annual Report (2024), released last week, cites a report on #surveillance in Tibet I wrote with @choekyitenzin.bsky.social for @turquoiseroof.org 🙏 www.cecc.gov/publications... (p.235-36) see sections on tech-enhanced authoritarianism, and on #Tibet
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Greg @jamyang.net · 16/12/2024
2073: in interview w/ @carolecadwalla.bsky.social: @asifkapadia.bsky.social‬: "even the interrogation that Ghost receives after being profiled and targeted as “suspicious” is based on questions posed to #Uyghur detainees in .. re-education camps in China.." #重点人员 www.theguardian.com/film/2024/de...
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