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Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann, PhD

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 20/09/2026

🚀 With Russian ballistic missile production rising and far outpacing Europe's ability to supply interceptors, Ukraine has little choice but to try to interdict Russian ballistic missiles before they are launched. But can it do so? missilematters.substack.com/p/can-ukrain...

missilematters.substack.com

Can Ukraine Hunt Russian Mobile Missile Launchers?

Why Ukraine's effort to interdict Russian Iskander-M launchers is difficult but not impossible

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 20/09/2026

Whenever I'm briefed by people working in the European oil sector, their assessments of just how bad the last 12 months have been for Russia's oil sector consistently exceed those reported in public news. And it's just going to get worse from here.

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 20/09/2026

My latest Missile Matters post traces the problem from nuclear counterforce strategy to Ukraine's current campaign, argues that the task is difficult but not impossible, and identifies the kill-chain elements that will determine its success.

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 20/09/2026

Strikes on Russia's ballistic missile industry have scored painful hits, yet output keeps growing. The alternative is to hunt Russia's mobile missile launchers in the field, one of the hardest tasks in modern warfare, above all with stand-off weapons.

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 20/09/2026

missilematters.substack.com

Can Ukraine Hunt Russian Mobile Missile Launchers?

Why Ukraine's effort to interdict Russian Iskander-M launchers is difficult but not impossible

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

My latest Missile Matters post profiles all six missile systems in this emerging arsenal, covering performance characteristics and production rates. I also identify the single supply-chain vulnerability the arsenal currently rests on. 3/3

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

In some raids, they already account for half or more of incoming projectiles. These missiles exploit a gap in Ukraine's layered air defense that neither interceptor drones nor high-end surface-to-air missiles can close cost-effectively. 2/3

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 07/09/2026

Since early 2026, Russia has fielded a family of low-cost, turbojet-powered cruise missiles and dramatically scaled up production. Russia is now launching hundreds of low-cost cruise missiles each month, soon likely thousands. 1/3 missilematters.substack.com/p/cheap-fast...

missilematters.substack.com

Cheap, Fast, and Mass-Produced: Russia's New Low-Cost Cruise Missile Arsenal

Profiling the systems now filling the gap between drones and high-end missiles

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Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann, PhD

Andrej Matisak @matisaksk.bsky.social · 06/09/2026

Cheap, Fast, and Mass-Produced: Russia's New Low-Cost Cruise Missile Arsenal. @frhoffmann.bsky.social profiles the systems that are filling the gap between drones and high-end missiles. substack.com/app-link/pos... #Russia #Putinswar #Ukraine

substack.com

Cheap, Fast, and Mass-Produced: Russia's New Low-Cost Cruise Missile Arsenal

Profiling the systems now filling the gap between drones and high-end missiles

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 31/08/2026

2) How will Russia react? As we deploy more of these weapon systems, and for specific purposes, this will trigger Russian counterreactions. That is not an argument against arming in the deep-strike domain, but a factor to keep in mind as we move forward. The adversary gets a vote too. 4/4

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 31/08/2026

1) What exactly do we want to deploy these systems for? Right now, it seems to me that we procure, in part, for procurement's sake. But what exactly are the deterrence and warfighting objectives we want to achieve? We need to answer that question for ourselves and signal it to our adversary. 3/4

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 31/08/2026

As Europe discusses the deployment of counterstrike capabilities to compensate for the inability of today's ballistic missile defense to deal with the scope of the threat, there are two things to keep in mind: 2/4

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 31/08/2026

I had the pleasure of sitting down for a long interview with the German newspaper Handelsblatt on ballistic missile defense challenges in Ukraine, Europe, and the Middle East. One thing I was glad was raised is the issue of doctrine. 1/4 www.handelsblatt.com/politik/inte...

handelsblatt.com

Rüstung: „Wer mit ballistischen Raketen angreift, ist immer im Vorteil“

Der Luftkrieg mit Raketen stellt den Westen vor ein Dilemma: Angreifer produzieren mehr und billiger als Verteidiger, sagt Fabian Hoffmann. Im Interview skizziert der Politikwissenschaftler Lösungen.

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Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann, PhD

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 30/08/2026

🚀 Why spend 22.9 billion USD on 7,000+ Tomahawks when low-cost alternatives are available en masse? My latest Missile Matters post takes this question apart. Full analysis available here: missilematters.substack.com/p/high-low-m... 1/3

missilematters.substack.com

High-Low Mix: The Three Tiers of Modern Missile Arsenals

High-end systems, low-cost missiles, long-range drones, and the future missile arsenals of the world

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 30/08/2026

The post assesses which high-low mixes will appeal to which states, from the missile great powers to mid-sized and smaller states across Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. 3/3

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 30/08/2026

Modern long-range and deep-strike arsenals now span three tiers: multi-million-dollar systems like JASSM-ER and Dark Eagle, low-cost cruise missiles at 150,000 to 500,000 USD, and long-range drones from 30,000 USD. Each buys something different. The question is what, and for whom. 2/3

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 30/08/2026

missilematters.substack.com

High-Low Mix: The Three Tiers of Modern Missile Arsenals

High-end systems, low-cost missiles, long-range drones, and the future missile arsenals of the world

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 21/08/2026

... and why Russia, which before 2022 faced a Europe with empty arsenals and a moribund missile industry, has brought about precisely the threat environment it arguably sought to avoid. 3/3

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 21/08/2026

We also discuss why Europe has many national arsenals but no shared deep-strike doctrine, how low-cost cruise missiles and long-range drones are lowering barriers to entry for states like the Baltics, what this means for arms control... 2/3

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 21/08/2026

🚀 New Mildly Alarmed episode out. @alanderminna.bsky.social and I discuss one of the key topics of my recently defended PhD: How does the proliferation of long-range strike weapons to small and medium-sized states affect strategic stability? 1/3 www.youtube.com/watch?v=sRLD...

youtube.com

When small states get long range missiles | Mildly Alarmed

YouTube video by Mildly Alarmed

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Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann, PhD

Dr. Viktor Baranov🧪🦟🐛🪲 @swarmofthoughts.bsky.social · 21/08/2026

listening to @alanderminna.bsky.social and @frhoffmann.bsky.social, on "Mildly alarmed" on deterrence by punishment and missiles. Its a bummer, my phd was not on anything that impactful.. (does cat dads allowed dad jokes?)

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

My latest Missile Matters post examines all three factors and outlines which Ukrainian deep-strike systems could become a true export hit. 4/4

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

But export viability differs sharply by category, hinging on three factors: surplus capacity, competitive positioning in the global export market, and legal constraints, which weigh more heavily on some segments than others. 3/4

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

Since April, a new export framework has permitted controlled surplus weapons sales to partner countries, in principle covering long-range drones and missiles in short supply across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 2/4

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

🚀 Ukraine's deep-strike production capacity is quoted at up to 25 billion USD for 2026. How much of it can foreign buyers access? Link: missilematters.substack.com/p/exporting-... 1/3

missilematters.substack.com

Can Ukraine Become a Missile and Long-Range Drone Exporter?

Internal, competitive, and legal barriers to Ukrainian deep-strike exports

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Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann, PhD

Department of Political Science, University of Oslo @statsvitenskap.bsky.social · 14/08/2026

Congratulations to @frhoffmann.bsky.social who defended his PhD thesis, "The Strategic-Level Effects of Conventional Long-Range Strike Weapons: Implications for Strategic Stability", yesterday! 💐👨‍🎓👏

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Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann, PhD

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 08/08/2026

🚀 I just published my latest Missile Matters post on Ukraine's missile defense crisis, outlining why ballistic missile defense is so challenging and what can be done to alleviate pressure. Access the post here: missilematters.substack.com/p/ukraines-m... Summary below. 1/5

missilematters.substack.com

Ukraine's Missile Defense Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions

How Russian ballistic missiles overwhelm Ukraine's missile defenses and what can be done

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 08/08/2026

Clarification: MBDA Germany will start delivering PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors in 2027. Production is initially slated for Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain, which together ordered 1,000 interceptors. For that supply to arrive in Ukraine, it would have to be diverted.

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Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann, PhD

Karen-Anna Eggen @kaeggen.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

New episode of Mildly Alarmed is out! In this epiode we (@alanderminna.bsky.social @frhoffmann.bsky.social @lapatina.bsky.social) discuss some, of many, summer developments in Ukraine. Details 👇

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 08/08/2026

Even then, new interceptor supply will certainly remain far below the 700 to 800-plus ballistic missiles Russia produces annually, which may also continue to grow. 5/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 08/08/2026

By 2027, the situation could slightly improve. MBDA Deutschland's license-production facility begins delivering PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors, likely 120 to 170 per year. Ukraine's four SAMP/T NG fire units, with the improved Aster 30B1NT interceptor, also begin arriving in 2027. 4/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 08/08/2026

That leaves passive defense as the only viable option, meaning dispersing and hardening high-value targets, moving critical infrastructure underground, and stockpiling spare parts. Sustained deep strikes inside Russia to keep attrition mutual, rather than unilateral, also do their part. 3/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 08/08/2026

In the short term, expanding active defense is largely off the table. European officials appear unable or unwilling to justify drawing down remaining Patriot interceptor stocks. With the US not willing and now equally unable to deliver, this means Patriot supply is essentially exhausted. 2/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 08/08/2026

missilematters.substack.com

Ukraine's Missile Defense Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions

How Russian ballistic missiles overwhelm Ukraine's missile defenses and what can be done

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Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann, PhD

Dead Carl @deadcarl.bsky.social · 07/08/2026

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 02/08/2026

I am incredibly thankful for the support and trust of my readers over the last two years, and I look forward to what comes next. If you want to stay informed on missile-related events in the world, you can subscribe or upgrade your membership here: missilematters.substack.com/subscribe 5/5

missilematters.substack.com

Subscribe to Missile Matters — with Fabian Hoffmann

Missile Matters is my personal blog, where I share insights on the latest developments in the nuclear and missile domains in Ukraine and beyond. If Putin decides to nuke us all, you will read about ...

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 02/08/2026

Paid subscribers receive one to two monthly deep dives on missile capabilities, industries, and markets, a monthly research digest, and access to a subscriber-only chat. Founding members receive invites to three to four exclusive Q&A calls per year. 4/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 02/08/2026

The work also stays independent: no sponsors, no advertisers, just analysis funded by readers. Part of the blog stays free. All reactive analysis (initial strike assessments, BDAs, commentary on breaking missile-related news) will continue to arrive at no cost. 3/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 02/08/2026

The reason is simple. The posts that resonate most (missile production estimates, market assessments, defense-industrial analyses) require days of research. As the blog is increasingly used as a professional resource, paid subscriptions allow me to do more of this work. 2/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 02/08/2026

🚀 A few days ago, Missile Matters passed 10,000 subscribers. Today I published a post announcing the biggest change since the blog began: Missile Matters now offers a paid subscription tier. Short summary below. missilematters.substack.com/p/10000-subs... 1/5

missilematters.substack.com

10,000 Subscribers and a New Chapter: Missile Matters Adds a Paid Tier

Missile Matters is launching paid subscriptions. Much of the blog stays free. Here is what changes and why.

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 27/07/2026

The campaign also cuts against Russian society's image of itself as powerful, protected, and untouchable. Whenever serious talks over a post-war order begin, the missile will be on the table. Russia will negotiate with the Ukrainian state the missile made. 5/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 27/07/2026

A state that can hold an adversary's economy at risk at will occupies a different category of actorhood in the international system. Ukraine has turned from a coerced state into a coercing one. 4/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 27/07/2026

Charles Tilly famously argued that war made the state and the state made war. Ukraine suggests a contemporary variant. Sovereign deep strike at this scale confers what Schelling called the power to hurt. 3/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 27/07/2026

Between 18 and 24 July, Ukrainian drones struck several Wildberries logistics hubs. Russian analysts estimate the economic damage at up to 1.3 billion USD. The attritional logic of Ukraine's deep-strike campaign is familiar. The constitutive effect is less discussed. 2/5

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 27/07/2026

🚀 New Missile Matters post on how Ukraine's deep-strike campaign has transformed the Ukrainian state itself. In short: the state makes the missile, and the missile makes the state. Short summary below. missilematters.substack.com/p/the-state-... 1/5

missilematters.substack.com

The State Makes the Missile, and the Missile Makes the State

The power to hurt: Ukraine's deep-strike campaign and the transformation of the Ukrainian state

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Fabian Hoffmann, PhD @frhoffmann.bsky.social · 27/07/2026

"The state that enters those talks differs in important respects from the state Russia invaded in 2022: a missile power in its own right, retaining the power to hurt. Russia will be negotiating with the missile on the table and state the missile made." missilematters.substack.com/p/the-state-...

missilematters.substack.com

The State Makes the Missile, and the Missile Makes the State

The power to hurt: Ukraine's deep-strike campaign and the transformation of the Ukrainian state

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