Does anyone in Minneapolis have a recommendation for a contractor? After a few years of holding this issue at bay with patchwork solutions, we need to actually resolve it. Exterior door frame seems to be shot.
Daniel Suitor
@danielsuitor.com
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If you're gonna be dumb, you gotta be tough. New England then, Minneapolis now, housing and economic justice forever.
![III.
Minnesota Statutes section 351.02 (2024) does not apply to district court
referees.
Father also argues that the district court abused its discretion by misapplying
Minnesota Statutes section 351.02 when it rejected father’s argument that the presiding
referee lacked jurisdiction because the referee did not reside in Minnesota. Father has
unsuccessfully asserted that the referee cannot proceed because of her residence on
multiple occasions before the district court and on appeal, but not under this specific
statute. In the November 24 order, the district court rejected father’s argument on the basis
that neither the Minnesota Constitution nor statutes governing referees require referees to
be residents of Minnesota, but it did not reference section 351.02 in reaching its conclusion.
We understand father’s argument to be that a referee who resides outside of Minnesota has
vacated their office under section 351.02, paragraph 4, and thus the district court lacked
jurisdiction to file any recommended findings or orders from that referee.
District court referees are appointed by the chief judge of a judicial district. Minn.
Stat. § 484.70, subd. 1 (2024). Such referees “hold office at the pleasure of the judges of
the district court.” Id.; see also Minn. Stat. § 2.722, subd. 4a (2024) (providing that a
referee vacancy occurs “[w]hen a referee of the district court dies, resigns, retires, or is
voluntarily removed from the position” (Emphasis added.)).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:ccm7gttkbfs2eyyrlpshmeun/bafkreigm2ne5hvkdo44ttfkh7yzsecxi4acvclrqadytxm5qqbmzhum3je)
![Section 351.02 does not provide a statutory definition for a qualifying “office” under
the statute. “In the absence of a statutory definition, we generally turn to the plain, ordinary
meaning of a statutory [word or] phrase.” State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn.
2011). “We can determine the plain meaning of statutory words and phrases by construing
them according to the rules of grammar and common usage based on their context . . . .”
State v. Gutzke, 996 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Minn. App. 2023). “In considering whether a statute
is ambiguous, the statute must be construed as a whole and the words and sentences therein
are to be understood in light of their context.” State v. Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 646
(Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted); see also State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.
2011) (“[W]e do not examine different provisions [of a statute] in isolation.”).
A cursory reading of section 351.02 may suggest that the position of a district court
referee is an “office” to which the vacancy provisions in that statute apply. The statute
provides that “[e]very office shall become vacant” upon the happening of certain events,
and one might suppose that the common understanding of the phrase “every office” broadly
refers to any public position of duty, trust, or authority that an individual holds, including,
as relevant here, a district court referee position. Minn. Stat. § 351.02 (emphasis added).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:ccm7gttkbfs2eyyrlpshmeun/bafkreidjbfybbc2zjxmsd6xl62dhsotebolv2lygbmwiwwqz6caefmio3e)
