iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

10/10 But in the end, the whole project feels a bit like the Russian proposal for gigantic nuclear-powered Arctic LNG submarines: technically conceivable, strategically imaginative, but always hovering somewhere between concept study, signaling, and reality.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

9/10 That said, Moscow may well have revived the project under new strategic conditions: New START no longer constrains such deployments, and funding exotic nuclear systems is easier to justify amid long-term confrontation with the West, especially given Russia disadvantages in resources & geography

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

8/10 Adding a possible element of confusion (which might well explain some reporting), NATO’s designation for the RSM-54 Sineva SLBM (deployed on Delfin/Delta-IV SSBNs), that had also been designed by the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau, is SS-N-23 Skiff.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

7/10 Andrei Riskin, a reserve navy commander, argued in NVO for example, that deploying seabed missile systems on a meaningful scale would have required enormous funding at a time when Russia was already struggling to finance construction of Borei-class SSBNs. www.ng.ru/armies/2017-...

ng.ru

Сенатор-генерал Бондарев пополнил ядерную триаду страны донными ракетами / Воины и Армии / Независимая газета

Независимая газета,

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

5/10 Four years later, in Nov 2017, Viktor Bondarev, then (now deputy) chairman of the Federation Council’s Defense and Security Committee and recently retired commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, casually mentioned that “Skif” was part of Russia’s arsenal. tass.ru/armiya-i-opk...

tass.ru

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

4/10 Yet, Sychev remained unconvinced. There were major technical challenges, especially underwater communication. Russia had no urgent operational need for such missiles, since SSBNs were already effective. New START (2010) would have prevented deployment and there was no known procurement plan.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

3/10 At the time, the test of the “new ballistic missile” was expected to take place on the floor of the White Sea using the Project 20120 diesel-electric submarine B-90 Sarov as the launch platform. The real innovation may have been the underwater launch container, not the missile itself.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 23/05/2026

Secret #Russian Wunderwaffen: Project #Skif. So secret that Russian media have occasionally reported on it over the past 13 years. Yet, most commentators remained sceptical. In 2013, Lenta reported that it was being developed by the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau. 1/10 #defense #nuclear

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Reposted by Alexander Graef

Gabriela I. Rosa @gabrielairosa.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

In our latest collaboration, @alxgraef.bsky.social and I, scrutinize the conditions under which public commentators can shape Russian foreign policy, despite strategic decision-making being tightly controlled by the President and his inner circle. 1/? academic.oup.com/isagsq/artic...

academic.oup.com

The “Karaganov Debate”: How Policy Entrepreneurs Shape Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine

Abstract. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, public references to nuclear weapons within Russia have surged. A key moment came

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

5/5 We conceptualize the resulting interaction as a form of foreign policy “co-production” under authoritarian rule. For those interested in Russia, nuclear signaling, authoritarian politics, or agenda-setting, we hope the article offers something new. Comments welcome.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

4/5 More broadly, we argue this entrepreneurship was possible not despite personalist authoritarianism, but partly because of it. When channels to the President narrow, actors inside the bureaucracy may rely on outside actors to surface arguments through the public sphere.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

3/5 Looking at the debate and Russia’s doctrinal revision, we show how public commentators can amplify ideas already circulating inside the military bureaucracy, test elite reactions, and elevate sensitive issues to key decision-makers. More than propaganda. Not linear causation.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

2/5 We push back against two readings: that figures like Karaganov merely echo what the Kremlin wants, or that they directly cause policy change. Both miss something more interesting. Under certain conditions - timing, uncertainty, acumen - they can act as policy entrepreneurs.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 24/04/2026

New article (open access) with Gabriela I. Rosa Hernandez in Global Studies Quarterly on the “Karaganov debate”: Can public debate matter even in something as closed as #Russian #nuclear policymaking? We argue yes — and in ways current debates often miss. 1/5 academic.oup.com/isagsq/artic...

academic.oup.com

The “Karaganov Debate”: How Policy Entrepreneurs Shape Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine

Abstract. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, public references to nuclear weapons within Russia have surged. A key moment came

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Reposted by Alexander Graef

European Leadership Network (ELN) @theeln.bsky.social · 18/03/2026

The evolving confrontation between Europe & Russia is not a temporary crisis but a long-term condition. ELN Senior Policy Fellow @alxgraef.bsky.social sets out a new strategy for governing an adversarial relationship with Moscow beyond the war. europeanleadershipnetwork.org/report/manag...

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 20/12/2025

Kanada ist nicht Teil der nuklearen Teilhabe. Zertifizierung ist das Problem.

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Olya Oliker aka Dr. Olga Oliker (she/her) @olyaoliker.bsky.social · 17/12/2025

Russian aircraft over NATO members' skies are not new. But with full-scale war raging in Ukraine & a volatile information environment, policymakers must do better at identifying what's up there & responding appropriately. @alxgraef.bsky.social & I explain for the @deepcutsproject.bsky.social

deepcuts.org

A Three Body Problem: NATO, Russia and the Politics of Air Incursions : DeepCuts

The Deep Cuts Project analyses the potential for US-Russian nuclear arms control under adversarial conditions.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 17/10/2025

The FT story about Alaska does not come as a surprise. Trump is transactional; Putin less so - but certainly not on Ukraine. Trump clearly expected a deal, but got a long history lesson instead. Aggrieved, he adjusted his policies, but no new principles emerged. The transactional mindset persists.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 16/09/2025

5/5 Ever more cut off from the West and increasingly reliant on Russia, such practices also reflect an effort to safeguard sovereignty while securing U.S. buy-in. The fact that Moscow has thus far refrained from blocking such actions though is noteworthy europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/n...

europeanleadershipnetwork.org

Not so quiet on the Western Front: Why Russia’s Zapad exercise highlights the need for military confidence-building measures

Russia’s strategic exercise Zapad, which begins later this week, is not only about combat preparation; it is also an instrument of strategic communication. The real challenge is reading it correctly. ...

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 16/09/2025

4/5 The prominent coverage by Belarusian state media of the participation of U.S. representatives now, coupled with the MFA’s emphasis on “standing shoulder to shoulder” and its claim that “dialogue speaks louder than confrontation,” stresses the precarious position of Belarus

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 16/09/2025

3/5 Formally though, this is also the case for Zapad. More importantly, however, “observations” only refer to the possibility of being present at a single stage, at one training ground, even though the exercise typically encompasses over a dozen sites with related activities.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 16/09/2025

2/5 At the time Russia declared that this step responded to NATO not inviting Russian observers to Steadfast defender 2021. Yet, NATO was not obliged to invite observers under the Vienna Document because it did not reach the necessary thresholds.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 09/09/2025

2/2 "Inviting observers to major exercises, for example, can bolster deterrence by showcasing capabilities and providing another source of information to cross check insights collected by intelligence."

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 09/09/2025

"Exercises are also instruments of strategic communication, intended to shape perceptions, signal resolve, and strengthen deterrence. The real challenge is reading them correctly. This is where confidence- and security-building measures may help" 1/2 europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/n...

europeanleadershipnetwork.org

Not so quiet on the Western Front: Why Russia’s Zapad exercise highlights the need for military confidence-building measures

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 31/08/2025

Habe mit dem @derstandard.at über die strategische Lage in der Ukraine gesprochen: 'Der möglich, zukünftige Einsatz von Systemen wie Flamingo setzt Moskau unter Druck, aber es ist auch klar, dass RU alles versuchen wird, diese Entwicklung präemptiv zu verhindern' www.derstandard.de/story/300000...

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Reposted by Alexander Graef

Lukas Mengelkamp @lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social · 24/08/2025

Presenting an early draft of a paper by @alxgraef.bsky.social and myself at EISA PEC.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 12/07/2025

Arms control has a bad image mainly because people conflate it with unilateral disarmament or frame it as the opposite of deterrence. The less they understand it, the more they fall for these fallacies.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 02/07/2025

Excited to join the European Leadership Network as Senior Policy Fellow for Russia–West relations in tense times, working to address escalation risks.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 01/07/2025

Zum einen, weil diese durch den Krieg ausgedünnt sind. Zum anderen, weil, wie beschrieben, Russland dabei ist vor allem seine Landstreitkräfte umzubauen.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 30/06/2025

Ja, aber das macht es nicht besser. Entscheidend ist hier die Entwicklung im Zeitverlauf. Die Mehrzahl der zukünftigen Zuwächse wird über 'Kontraktniki" geleistet werden. Das hat wiederum politische Gründe. Auch ein Grund, warum sich der Kreml bisher der 2 Jahresfrist verweigert.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

10/10, vor großen Herausforderungen, finanziell, beim Personal und bei der Qualität des Materials. Anstatt einzelne Generäle in Talkshows zu setzen, sollten Bundeswehr (und auch der BND) dem guten Beispiel Verbündeter folgen und Lageanalysen veröffentlichen, damit eine sinnvolle Debatte möglich wird

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

9/10 Solange der Krieg in der Ukraine mit gegenwärtiger Intensität andauert, bleibt die volle Umsetzung dieser Pläne zweifelhaft. So sieht es auch der norwegische Nachrichtendienst NIS, der eine Umsetzung mit 5 bis 10 Jahren nach Kriegsende beziffert. Denn Russland steht, trotz aller Rhetorik ...

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

8/10 Denn Russland ist dabei den ehemaligen westlichen Militärbezirk und auch die eigenen Streitkräfte umzubauen. 2023-2024 wurden u.a. 10 "neue" Divisionen aus bestehenden Einheiten geformt. Weitere werden folgen. Diese müssen aber erst aufgefüllt werden. Ein langwieriger Prozess.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

7/10 Dazu gehören z.B. Aussagen von Verteidigungsminister Andrey Belousov und Admiral Igor Kostyukov (Chef des Militärgeheimdienstes GU), die einen Einblick in russische Perzeptionen geben. Es sollte auch nicht verwundern, wenn Großgerät nicht an die Front, sondern in Depots geht.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

6/10 Richtig ist, dass Russland weiterhin militärisch investiert, um auf jede Entwicklung, auch auf eine mögliche Auseinandersetzung mit der NATO in den nächsten 10 Jahren, vorbereitet zu sein. Aber dazu muss man keine TV shows zitieren. Es gibt bessere Quellen, die dies explizit benennen.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

5/10 Dafür müsste das Gesetz "Über die Wehrpflicht und den Militärdienst" entsprechend geändert werden. Tatsächlich wurden zuletzt im Apr 2025 Ergänzungen vorgenommen, darunter z.B. die Verlängerung der Gültigkeit des Einberufungsbescheids. Die Zeit der Wehrpflicht blieb jedoch bisher dieselbe.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

4/10 Zur Wehrpflicht: Anders als General Mais behauptet, beträgt die Wehrpflicht in Russland weiterhin 1 Jahr. Diese Regelung besteht seit 2008, zuvor waren es 2 Jahre. Seit 2022 gibt es jedoch immer wieder Forderungen im Militär und von Abgeordneten der Duma zur 2 Jahres-Regelung zurückzukehren.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

3/10 Die weiteren Zahlen für die Kriegsjahre 2022 bis 2024 weichen davon nicht wesentlich ab. Für das Frühjahr 2025 wurde die Zahl jedoch auf 160.000 erhöht - die größte Einberufung seit 2011. All diesen Zahlen liegen entsprechende Erlässe (Ukas) des Präsidenten zugrunde.

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

2/10 Zunächst sind die Zahlen nicht überraschend. Russland kennt zwei Einberufungszeiträume, Frühling und Herbst. In jedem Zeitraum werden üblicherweise zwischen 120.000 und 150.000 Personen eingezogen. Schon vor 2022 lag die Gesamtzahl jährlich über 250.000. Hier die Zahlen von 2015 bis 2021

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 29/06/2025

Der Inspekteur des Heeres General Alfons Mais sagt bei maybritillner, Russland ziehe jährlich 200.000 Wehrpflichtige ein. Außerdem sei die Wehrpflicht kürzlich von 1 auf 2 Jahre erhöht worden. Das Problem: Beides stimmt nicht. youtu.be/ioG_cGQI4qI?... 1/10

youtu.be

Krieg oder Frieden – Sicherheit nur mit den USA? | maybrit illner vom 26. Juni 2025

YouTube video by ZDFheute Nachrichten

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Björn Müller @bjoernm.bsky.social · 02/06/2025

🧵 1/4 Heeresinspekteur Alfons Mais zur #Rüstung u. künftigen Kampfweise der Landstreitkräfte im Behördenspiegel. Darstellung sehr diffus. Vlt. hat der eine oder andere sinnvolle Hinweise zur Einordnung. „Im dt. Heer 2035 plus wird Abstandsfähigkeit konsequent höher priorisiert als Duellfähigkeit.“

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Alexander Graef @alxgraef.bsky.social · 22/05/2025

These are the escalation scenarios that should keep us up at night- not some sudden land grabs to dismantle NATO: Shadow fleet showdown in the Gulf of Finland. War is about politics, not simply the balance of power. Recall the Obama doctrine: Don’t do stupid shit! www.lloydslist.com/LL1153505/Es...

lloydslist.com

Estonia redirects maritime traffic after Russia detains Greek tanker

Russia’s detention of Greece-owned aframax just three days after another Baltic Sea incident saw Nato and Russian jets scrambled amid growing security concerns, has prompted EU ministers and Nato officials to discuss shadow fleet clashes

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