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Experimental Philosophy

@xphilosopher.bsky.social
7.7K followers 1.6K following 707 posts

An account for experimental philosophy - an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of philosophy and psychology en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimenta…

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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 21h
Best way to learn about his extraordinary work is to check out his Google Scholar page: scholar.google.com/citations?us...
scholar.google.com
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 21h
I am still just SO excited that Felipe De Brigard (@felipedebrigard.bsky.social) got a MacArthur Genius Grant! He has done so much amazing work in experimental philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and a million other fields, and it's absolutely wonderful to see him getting recognized like this
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
This is certainly a controversial question, but we address it in section 4.1 of this paper One key piece of evidence is that non-human primates have an ability to track a certain kind of factive state that they are unable to track in cases that look a whole lot like Gettier cases
philarchive.org
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
This is such a great result! I wonder if it is at all related to what Matthew Weiner says here: bsky.app/profile/matt...
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
OK, maybe I was wrong about this, but just to clarify, the claim in our paper is: There are certain complex things that human beings can do but other primates cannot (including belief attribution), but knowledge attribution is "simple" in the sense that other primates could also do it
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
This is a great point in general, but I’m not sure it applies here. Some of the philosophers making these claims are very explicit about the fact that they are trying to say something about ordinary language or the ordinary concept of knowledge 
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
Good point. We never seem to succeed at analyzing any concept into other concepts, so if we want to claim that a certain view is “too complex,” we would need to have some way of making sense of that claim without giving an analysis of knowledge
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
But I don't mean that you should take a look at our work before commenting! Even if you don't look at all at that paper, I would love to hear your thoughts
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
Not sure if this will be at all helpful, but my co-authors and I have proposed a theory about why the ordinary concept is so simple and, in particular, why it is that the process of knowledge attribution is so much simpler than the process of belief attribution philarchive.org/rec/PHIKBB
philarchive.org
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
Ha! Since we don't have a successful analysis for any ordinary concept of philosophical interest, it is extremely unlikely we will ever have an analysis of the concept of knowledge But we can still discover truths about the concept! I would be really interested to hear any thoughts you might have
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
I am fascinated by that question, but I don't know the answer One possible answer would be that it is a sociological process of the type Cummins describes in this famous passage, where agreeing with certain claims becomes an entrance requirement for even participating in the discussion
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
What we see with this experimental work on the concept of knowledge is very different from what we see with work on other concepts Just in this one specific case, philosophers seem to talking about something very complex that is wildly out of step with the (much simpler) ordinary concept
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
Not only do philosophers attribute knowledge differently from ordinary folks, they attribute knowledge differently from *all other academics*
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics
Academics across widely ranging disciplines all pursue knowledge, but they do so using vastly different methods. Do these academics therefore also have different ideas about when someone possesses kn...
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
In fact, people are happy to attribute knowledge of a proposition even when they would not agree that the person *believes* this proposition
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Knowing That P without Believing That P
Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert...
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
Similarly, people are happy to attribute knowledge in Gettier cases when the outcome is something morally bad
tandfonline.com
Gettier made ESEE
Previous research in experimental philosophy has suggested that moral judgments can influence the ordinary application of a number of different concepts, including attributions of knowledge. But sh...
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
There are a variety of different kinds of cases that philosophers call “Gettier cases.” Of these, there are some where ordinary folks are happy to attribute knowledge People only deny knowledge in a specific type of Gettier case
sciencedirect.com
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
In “high stakes” cases, ordinary people are still inclined to attribute knowledge In fact, they attribute knowledge even in the exact high stakes cases that have been most discussed in philosophy (e.g., “bank cases”)
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes
Click on the article title to read more.
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
People tend to attribute knowledge in what philosophers call “fake barn” cases These cases don’t satisfy the “safety” condition — meaning that people are happy to attribute knowledge even when this condition is not satisfied
link.springer.com
Knowledge and luck - Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
Nearly all success is due to some mix of ability and luck. But some successes we attribute to the agent’s ability, whereas others we attribute to luck. To better understand the criteria distinguishing...
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
What the studies keep showing, again and again, is that ordinary folks are happy to attribute knowledge in cases where philosophers would deny knowledge The ordinary concept *does not* seem to involve all of the complex conditions that philosophers have invoked in their theories
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
There has been a huge amount of experimental philosophy research on the concept of KNOWLEDGE This research finds that the ordinary concept doesn’t work at all the way philosophers said it does A thread with some examples: 🧵
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Jorge Morales @jorgemorales.me · 29/09/2026
Massive congratulations to my colleague @felipedebrigard.bsky.social for being awarded a MacArthur Fellowship! today.duke.edu/2026/09/duke...
today.duke.edu
Duke Scientist Awarded MacArthur ‘Genius Grant’ | Duke Today
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 24/09/2026
There hasn’t been enough discussion in philosophy of this wonderful research by April Bailey (@ahbailey.bsky.social) She provides a mountain of evidence for the claim that people see MEN as the prototype of the category of human beings www.researchgate.net/profile/Apri...
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 24/09/2026
Such wonderful news!!
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 22/09/2026
The link above is to a very nice paper by Phelan that reviews this whole debate (Phelan is on the opposite side of the debate from me, but I still think this is a great review)
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 22/09/2026
One view: People are more likely to attribute consciousness to an entity when it is EMBODIED - i.e., when it has a biological body In experimental philosophy, there's a big debate about whether this view is true, with lots of intriguing evidence on each side
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 22/09/2026
Imagine an LLM that behaves like a person in some ways but runs on completely different physical stuff (microchips instead of a biological brain). Would this LLM be conscious? There is a lot of experimental philosophy research on precisely this question markmphelan.github.io/papers/consc...
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koenfucius @koenfucius.bsky.social · 20/09/2026
Research by @kevintobia.bsky.social argues lay vs legal concepts of the same notion (eg acting ‘intentionally’) can be neither identical nor distinct, and interpretation among non-legal experts may vary (lay person > student > law student): buff.ly/Smevt0T HT @xphilosopher.bsky.social
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 19/09/2026
The point I was making is that one common thing for experimental philosophers to do is to work on technical questions in formal semantics As an example, here's a paper I did with @justinkhoo.com onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics
When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evide...
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 19/09/2026
If you look at the day-to-day work that experimental philosophers actually do these days, it is obviously very philosophical -- but it's almost completely unrelated to the thing that non-experimental philosophers keep talking about when they write papers about the nature of experimental philosophy
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 19/09/2026
So strongly agree with this!
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 19/09/2026
In formal semantics, there is a growing emphasis on experimental work (from Kate Davidson, Athulya Aravind, @fabiennemartin.bsky.social, and many others) Experimental philosophy research on language increasingly looks like: the philosophy part of that much larger interdisciplinary field
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 19/09/2026
Actual day-to-day research in experimental philosophy is becoming ever more closely aligned with the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science So experimental philosophy of language looks more and more like: the part of experimental work in linguistic semantics that is in philosophy departments
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 19/09/2026
I appreciate these helpful comments, but I see the situation very differently I think the real issue is that discussions of experimental philosophy among non-experimental philosophers are becoming increasingly unmoored from facts about what experimental philosophers actually do day-to-day
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Gabor Brody @gaborbrody.bsky.social · 18/09/2026
This is such a cool paper on why and how a broken fork is "1 fork" www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
tandfonline.com
Children and adults’ treatment of partial objects in bounded quantificational contexts
When asked to count under specific instructions, for example, to count “the forks,” or to identify the referent of “a fork,” children have been shown to treat whole forks and detached parts of fork...
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Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
joannad-c.bsky.social @joannad-c.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
Hiring! 🧠❤️🤔If you’re a philosopher working in ethics/ x-phi/ empirically informed moral philosophy / moral psychology / applied ethics, consider applying for a 2.5 year research postdoc with me in my lab at Oxford. Deadline noon 16th Oct. Details 👉 philjobs.org/job/show/32101 Hit me up with q’s!
static.klipy.com
Shameless Fiona Gallagher
ALT: Shameless Fiona Gallagher
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
Also, Clifford is an interesting example of a real-life Paderewski case. I bet very few people know that the philosopher Clifford (who James tries to refute in "The Will to Believe") and the mathematician Clifford (who developed Clifford algebras) are actually the same guy!
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
This new tech is a way of building on Hansen's beautiful experimental philosophy paper "Socratic Questionnaires" (with Kathryn Francis & Hamish Greening) philarchive.org/rec/HANSQ
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
Here are some screenshots from my session I am pretty impressed. This thing is asking questions that feel a lot like the questions that philosophers typically ask students in classes
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
Philosopher @nathansen.bsky.social has created a website that uses AI to take people through a Socratic dialogue about a philosophical thought experiment I gave it a try. In my opinion, it really does help users think through these questions www.ux-phi.com/experiments
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Nick Byrd, Ph.D. @byrdnick.com · 14/09/2026
If you had to guess whether someone’s a philosopher, what’d be more predictive? Their decisions about thought experiments? Or their scores on assessments of neurodivergent traits? In more than 1000 people, the measures of #autistic (and other traits) were more predictive:
doi.org
Thinking differently: neurodivergent traits and responses to thought experiments in philosophers and the general population
Philosophers have long speculated that individual differences in temperament influence philosophical thinking, yet empirical research has rarely explored the role of neurodivergent traits in this d...
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
This is a fair question. The contrast is between philosophical views of professional philosophers and philosophical views of non-philosophers (views like: being a conservative, being an effective altruist, being a Christian...) The latter seem to be tied to larger traits of the people who hold them
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 12/09/2026
Good point, but perhaps taking a philosophical position also differs from ordinary belief in another way, namely, in how it is adopted in the first place? It seems that the process is sometimes like: considering a philosophical issue and searching for a new position that is creative and interesting
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 12/09/2026
I agree! In our studies on people's views about religion, politics, love, etc., we find that: (a) people openly acknowledge that these views are not evidence-sensitive but (b) people nonetheless do refer to these views as "beliefs" @m-meyer.bsky.social philarchive.org/rec/MEYDOI-2
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 12/09/2026
That's a great question! I don't know the answer, but maybe @existwell.bsky.social, @androidson.bsky.social or @byrdnick.com know
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 12/09/2026
In some existing work, participants are explicitly asked whether their views have some hallmark properties of belief psycnet.apa.org/record/2026-... www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti... Participants sometimes openly acknowledge that they don't – which makes this seem like a workable strategy
psycnet.apa.org
APA PsycNet
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 12/09/2026
The key question is whether this position plays the role in their lives that is characteristic of things they really believe (e.g., whether they use it to guide their own life decisions) But I actually think it might be possible to explore that question just using self-report measurements
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 12/09/2026
This conversation is moving in some very valuable directions I agree with Nick that it probably wouldn't work to explicitly ask philosophers whether they really believe one of the positions they defend. ("Do you just defend consequentialism in philosophy papers, or do you really believe it")
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 12/09/2026
This is such a beautiful example! In this type of case, you might think "I am not feeling at all happy right now" and yet also think, at the very same time, "This is what real happiness is all about"
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Justin Weinberg @dailynous.com · 10/09/2026
“Do philosophers really think differently than non-philosophers?” A team of researchers focusing on neurodivergent traits and responses to thought experiments offers a partial answer...
dailynous.com
How Different Are Philosophers? (guest post) - Daily Nous
"Do philosophers really think differently than non-philosophers?" That's the question taken up by a team of researchers in a recent study published in Philosophical Psychology. Focusing on differences...
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Experimental Philosophy @xphilosopher.bsky.social · 11/09/2026
A person can decide to defend a particular position within the practice of philosophy, and that decision seems to be shaped by distinctive features of this practice For example, philosophers are often drawn to defend positions that are creative or interesting
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