iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Thanks. I’d definitely agree with that assessment so far!

010

Thanks Helen! My plan is still to write that biography of Tony Benn btw

020

Thanks Andrew. By the way, I read ‘Our NHS’ over the summer. A fantastic book. I really enjoyed it

Political Quarterly @politicalquarterly.bsky.social · 01/09/2026

Reposted by Tom Kelsey

The possibility that Treasury constraint could be beneficial is largely absent from debate. Many see the Treasury as responsible for Britain’s poor economic performance in recent years. But is this fair? By @tomkelsey.bsky.social politicalquarterly.org.uk/blog/history...

022

Political Quarterly @politicalquarterly.bsky.social · 24/08/2026

After nearly 18 months at @niesrorg.bsky.social, I’m excited to be starting a new role as a Lecturer in Defence Studies at the UK Defence Academy. Great to be back with @kingscollegelondon.bsky.social. Very grateful to everyone at NIESR for a transformative time, and excited for the next chapter!

6221

Reposted by Tom Kelsey

History suggests Treasury control is sometimes for the best. By @tomkelsey.bsky.social politicalquarterly.org.uk/blog/history...

111

Tom Kelsey @tomkelsey.bsky.social · 19/08/2026

I’ve written a 1,000 word version of my new Political Quarterly article. The argument is deliberately unfashionable: sometimes Treasury constraint is useful. The real challenge is building a state capable of knowing whether the Treasury should win: politicalquarterly.org.uk/blog/history...

politicalquarterly.org.uk

History Suggests Treasury Control is Sometimes for the Best

Why the failures of Concorde and British-designed nuclear reactors serve as a reminder of what can happen when the ‘Treasury view’ is sidelined.

031

Tom Kelsey @tomkelsey.bsky.social · 18/08/2026

Nine years ago, I called Concorde the “flying Brexit” in the @theguardian.com Looking back, I’m now struck by the differences, especially how Concorde was secretly cancelled, while Brexit certainly was not. See my blog for @conteurohistory.bsky.social New Voices: www.cambridge.org/core/blog/20...

cambridge.org

Was Concorde Really the Flying Brexit? « History# « Cambridge Core Blog

The Anglo-French supersonic airliner, Concorde, is well known as a symbol of European collaboration. With its dubious economics, it is no surprise that Britain partly stayed in the project to ease its...

021

Tom Kelsey @tomkelsey.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

The Treasury isn’t always right, but it is not always wrong either. Rather than breaking up the Treasury, the state should be strengthened with the capacity to make difficult cross-departmental decisions. Devolution offers a better route to more modest, locally responsive economic policies.

111

Tom Kelsey @tomkelsey.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

The Treasury is often blamed for Britain’s economic problems: too powerful, too short-termist and too sceptical of industrial policy. But Concorde and nuclear power suggest the opposite problem. In these cases, there was too much industrial ambition, and too much long-termism.

151

Tom Kelsey @tomkelsey.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

Does the Treasury deserve its reputation for holding back the British economy? My new article in The Political Quarterly uses the histories of Concorde and civil nuclear power to challenge common arguments about the Treasury, industrial strategy, and state capacity. 🧵

1138

Reposted by Tom Kelsey

King's CHoSTM @kingschostm.bsky.social · 30/06/2026

Join us for a conversation about the historical background of the 2017 "Asilomar Conference on Beneficial AI". Dr David Cole explores the significance and legacy of the famed 1975 Asilomar conference on recombinant DNA and DNA cloning for contemporary efforts to shape the future of AI. #histstm

eventbrite.co.uk

Asilomar Revisited: Beneficial AI and the History of Scientific Ethics

Join us for a conversation with Dr David Cole about the legacy of Asilomar 1975 for contemporary efforts to shape the future of AI

144

Many thanks to everyone who has supported the project over the years—and especially to my family. More details to follow! @kingschostm.bsky.social @blavatnikschool.bsky.social @niesrorg.bsky.social

040

The Retreat from ‘High Technology’ in Post-War Britain*

The book examines the demise of techno-nationalism in post-war Britain through rewriting the histories of Concorde and civil nuclear power. I argue that this economic nationalism was undermined from within the state itself. See below for more details: academic.oup.com/ehr/article/...

academic.oup.com

Abstract. This article argues that the 1970s saw an important change in the attitude of the British state to civil technological projects. It focuses on su

130

It was also bought partly to celebrate the acceptance of my first book, The End of the British Future: Nationalism, Liberalism, and ‘High Technology’ in the Post-War Era, for publication by Cambridge University Press.

390

Tom Kelsey @tomkelsey.bsky.social · 30/05/2026

Delighted with my Father’s Day gift from my wife and daughter. No doubt Lego has sold more Concordes than Britain and France ever did.

1110

Delighted to receive my print copy of the latest Technology and Culture. My prize-winning essay on Concorde's critics appears in this volume, which tells a new story about the technological disillusionment of the late 1960s. You can also read it online: muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/articl... ✈️

091

Tom Kelsey @tomkelsey.bsky.social · 07/05/2026

Thanks for reposting! I should have added to my thread that I conducted the research for the article while a PhD student with @kingschostm.bsky.social

020

I am delighted to see this article published. It has been a long time coming. Back in 2023, it won the Levinson Prize from the @shothisttech.bsky.social for the best unpublished essay from an early-career scholar. The peer review process made it a much better piece. Let me know what you think

020

Counterintuitively, the Concorde tale represents an internal scepticism towards state-led R&D programmes, and its effective cancellation is part of the story towards a free market economy. This was a political-economic shift in which economic and industrial arguments were central.

100

One official wrote: ‘On the whole Mr Wiggs’ case is well-argued and fully substantiated, exposing the BAC pamphlet for what it was – an ill-conceived, misleading and highly inaccurate document.’ The British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) was the key defender of the programme.

100

Environmentalism mattered to these critics, but it wasn’t the whole story. They also made economic and industrial criticisms. An analysis from inside the Department of Industry commented on how well-formed their arguments were, especially compared to Concorde’s advocates.

100

Despite echoing the internal realities, these public critics fared less well. The Anti-Concorde Project, led by Richard Wiggs, struggled to gain traction in Parliament or the Press. They were condemned as Luddites and charged with complaining about a great export success yet to come.

100

The public debate saw liberals arguing against state intervention, the advocates of ‘social democracy’ who thought the money would be better spent on other priorities, and nationalists arguing that it was damaging Britain’s aviation industry by focusing on a technological dead-end.

100

In practice, scepticism from the Treasury and concerns in the Department of Trade and Industry defined the outcome. As Heseltine himself said, putting 16 in production was “in effect cancellation”. For all the talk of supersonic luxury, Concorde ended up as a budget programme.

100

There was a deep and growing economic and industrial opposition to Concorde within the state, which ushered in its effective cancellation. The manufacturers wanted to develop a new one and put 100 into production. These plans were rejected, and only 16 Concordes were made.

100

Governments were constantly on the verge of cancelling Concorde. Few ministers believed it would be a commercial success, though they publicly maintained this line. Michael Heseltine speaks in his memoir about the difficulty in being honest with Parliament while acting as a salesperson.

100

In this journal article, I examine the critics of Concorde in post-war Britain, from the 'neo-liberal' right to the radical left. What united them was not environmentalism, but a wariness of state power and a belief that mendacity was obscuring a white elephant. They had a point.

100

Project MUSE -- Verification required!

The aeroplane often fits into standard arguments about the technological disillusionment of the late 1960s: that it came via environmentalists, or a crisis of expertise. But I argue differently: this was about political economy. For the full story: muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/articl...

muse.jhu.edu

120

Concorde, an Anglo-French project, was the only supersonic airliner to enter regular service. It was meant to be the future of aviation, but ended up as an aberration – subsonic jets dominated. One economist described it as one of the worst public investment decisions ever taken.

100

On the outside, Concorde was a symbol of national genius. On the inside, some government officials were privately calling it a “commercial disaster”. Here’s a thread about political economy, state propaganda, and supersonic transport. 🧵📚✈️

121

I’d be delighted to hear thoughts, especially from those working on economic history, political economy, or defence policy.

010

As I have said elsewhere, to understand the rise of free markets in post-war Britain, we need to look inside the state, where many of the key battles were hidden from view.

These findings reinforce Richard Vinen’s argument: Thatcher can be seen as defending the post-war consensus of the 1950s, an era of technological ambition, against the progressive consensus of the 1960s and 1970s.

What’s striking is how little public opposition there was. Even the Labour Party largely supported an autarkic defence policy during the 1980s.

120

This also complicates Thatcher’s relationship with Europe. In defence and aerospace, her governments often worked to support European industry against American technological dominance.

Why? Because they prioritised maintaining design capabilities and sustaining domestic and European industry over arguments about market efficiency.

By contrast, Thatcher and her ministers frequently rejected this logic. They backed UK and European projects—despite the costs.

I argue that the Treasury, not Thatcher, was often the most consistently economically liberal actor. It pushed to shrink Britain’s arms industry and argued for buying more American weapons.