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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺

@rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy
9 followers 1 following 18 posts

PhD in Computer Science, MSc in Physics, and cosmopolitan from Berlin working on digital policy and programmes at @EUCommission; ex-@EDPS; ex-@inria. Personal opinions […] 🌉 bridged from ⁂ chaos.social/@rriemann, follow @ap.brid.gy to interact

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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
Jordan Maris 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 #NAFO @jmaris.me · 22/10/2026
(1/4) Some thoughts on yesterday's #PHP vulnerability: 🔒 Normally, vulnerabilities are patched before we hear about them, with key distributors notified in advance to reduce risk. This time, a security researcher accidentally published details early, and a for-profit PHP distributor broke […]
eupolicy.social
Original post on eupolicy.social
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
Jordan Maris 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 #NAFO @jmaris.me · 16/09/2026
Ursula Von der Leyen is just starting her #StateOfTheEU speech (#SOTEU) with "It was the best of times it was the worst of times" Oh brother Liveposting the SOTEU here
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 09/09/2026
Are you an ICT professional interested in working at the EU institutions, as a permanent official? Applications are now open for an #EPSO AD8 competition covering two fields: #AI and #cybersecurity 🎉 If you have experience from relevant fields, apply by 13 October – all the information is […]
chaos.social
Original post on chaos.social
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
Kris @isotopp.infosec.exchange.ap.brid.gy · 03/09/2026
RE: mastodon.social/@LukaszOlejnik/1172… We must not see this as an AI problem at all. This is an obvious attempt by OpenAI to create regulatory lock-in for AI use, make local, "ungoverned" AI look dangerous, and require people to use AI-as-a-service from a licensed and […]
infosec.exchange
Original post on infosec.exchange
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
Jan Penfrat @ilumium.eupolicy.social.ap.brid.gy · 25/08/2026
Helping your friends, colleagues and family de-BigTechify their lives is like Morpheus fishing individual humans out of #TheMatrix: Of course the absolute number of people you can free is infinitesimally small when compared to those who stay captured. But if you get the right people, they're […]
eupolicy.social
Original post on eupolicy.social
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 23/07/2026
RE: mastodon.social/@pojntfx/1169705422… Participate in this survey and help determining the design of the new #euro #banknotes! surveys.ecb.europa.eu/10b/ecbeuro
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 28/06/2026
@MapComplete @osm_be I just found out that Brussels has only one Baby Cafe wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Baby_ca… according to overpass-turbo.eu/?template=key-val… How could we add this valuable info for parents best?
wiki.openstreetmap.org
Baby café - OpenStreetMap Wiki
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 03/06/2026
The EU #OpenSource strategy is out! digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/li… Link to the PDF: ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirecti… Link to the Annex […]
chaos.social
Original post on chaos.social
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
Jordan Maris 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 #NAFO @jmaris.me · 03/06/2026
The #EU is about to release its #Tech #Sovereignty package. You can listen to @HennaVirkkunen 's press conference here. I'll be livetooting in this thread as soon as it gets started 🧵 ⬇️ audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/ebs/gri… #EUpol #OpenSource
audiovisual.ec.europa.eu
Audiovisual Service
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 03/06/2026
Follow now live the presentation of the #CADA Cloud and AI Development Act and the EU #OpenSocial strategy by the @EUCommission Executive Vice President @HennaVirkkunen audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/ebs/gri…
audiovisual.ec.europa.eu
Audiovisual Service
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
Jordan Maris 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 #NAFO @jmaris.me · 01/06/2026
RE: social.opensource.org/@osi/11667616… Working on this has been an incredible experience! I wanted to share a bit of what I've been doing (and some behind the scenes stuff)! ⬇️ #OSI #Diplomacy #G7 #AI #OpenSource
social.opensource.org
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
daniel:// stenberg:// @bagder.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 11/05/2026
#Mythos finds a #curl vulnerability yes, as in singular one. daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/05/11/myth…
daniel.haxx.se
Mythos finds a curl vulnerability
yes, as in singular _one_. Back in April 2026 Anthropic caused a lot of media noise when they concluded that their new AI model _Mythos_ is _dangerously good_ at finding security flaws in source code. Apparently Mythos was so good at this that Anthropic would not release this model to the public yet but instead trickle it out to a selected few companies for a while to allow a few good ones(?) to get a head start and fix the most pressing problems first, before the general populace would get their hands on it. The whole world seemed to lose its marbles. Is this the end of the world as we know it? An amazingly successful marketing stunt for sure. ## My (non-) access Part of the deal with _project Glasswing _was that Anthropic also offered access to their latest AI model to “Open Source projects” via Linux Foundation. Linux Foundation let their project Alpha Omega handle this part, and I was contacted by their representatives. As lead developer of curl I was offered access to the magic model and I graciously accepted the offer. Sure, I’d like to see what it can find in curl. I signed the contract for getting access, but then nothing happened. Weeks went past and I was told there was a hiccup somewhere and access was delayed. Eventually, I was instead offered that someone else, who has access to the model, could run a scan and analysis on curl for me using Mythos and send me a report. To me, the distinction isn’t that important. It’s not that I would have a lot of time to explore lots of different prompts and doing deep dive adventures anyway. Getting the tool to generate a first proper scan and analysis would be great, whoever did it. I happily accepted this offer. (I am purposely leaving out the identity of the individual(s) involved in getting the curl analysis done as it is not the point of this blog post.) ## AI scans of curl Before this first Mythos report, we had already scanned curl with several different very capable AI powered tools (I mean _in addition to_ running a number of “normal” static code analyzers all the time, using the pickiest compiler options and doing fuzzing on it for years etc). Primarily AISLE, Zeropath and OpenAI’s Codex Security have been used to scrutinize the code with AI. These tools and the analyses they have done have triggered somewhere between _two and three hundred_ bugfixes merged in curl through-out the recent 8-10 months or so. A bunch of the findings these AI tools reported were confirmed vulnerabilities and have been published as CVEs. Probably a dozen or more. Nowadays we also use tools like GitHub’s Copilot and Augment code to review pull requests, and their remarks and complaints help us to land better code and avoid merging new bugs. I mean, we still merge bugs of course but the PR review bots regularly highlight issues that we fix: our merges would be worse without them. The AI reviews are used _in addition_ to the human reviews. They help us, they don’t replace us. We also see a high volume of high quality security reports flooding in: security researchers now use AI extensively and effectively. Security is a _top_ _priority_ for us in the curl project. We follow every guideline and we do software engineering properly, to reduce the number of flaws in code. Scanning for flaws is just one of many steps to keep this ship safe. You need to search long and hard to find another software project that makes as much or goes further than curl, for software security. Steps involved in keeping curl secure ## May 6, 2026 It was with great anticipation we received the first source code analysis report generated with Mythos. Another chance for us to find areas to improve and bugs to fix. To make an even better curl. This initial scan was made on curl’s git repository and its master branch of a certain recent commit. It counted 178K lines of code analyzed in the src/ and lib/ subdirectories. The analysis details several different approaches and methods it has performed the search, and how it has focused on trying to find which flaws. A fun note in the top of the report says: > curl is one of the most fuzzed and audited C codebases in existence (OSS-Fuzz, Coverity, CodeQL, multiple paid audits). Finding anything in the hot paths (HTTP/1, TLS, URL parsing core) is unlikely. … and it correctly found no problems in those areas. Completely unscientific poll on Mastodon about people’s expectations for Mythos scanning curl ## The size of curl curl is currently 176,000 lines of C code when we exclude blank lines. The source code consists of 660,000 words, which is 12% more words than the entire English edition of the novel War and Piece. On average, every single production source code line of curl has been written (and then rewritten) 4.14 times. We have polished on this. Right now, the existing production code in git master that still remains, has been authored by 573 separate individuals. Over time, a total of 1,465 individuals have so far had their proposed changes merged into curl’s git repository. We have published 188 CVEs for curl up until now. curl is installed in over _twenty million instances_. It runs on over _110 operating systems_ and _28 CPU architectures_. It runs in every smart phone, tablet, car, TV, game console and server on earth. ## Five findings became one The report concluded it found **five** “Confirmed security vulnerabilities”. I think using the term _confirmed_ is a little amusing when the AI says it confidently by itself. Yes, the AI thinks they are confirmed, but the curl security team has a slightly different take. Five issues felt like nothing as we had expected an extensive list. Once my curl security team fellows and I had poked on the this short list for a number of hours and dug into the details, we had trimmed the list down and were left with _one_ confirmed vulnerability. The other four were three false positives (they highlighted shortcomings that are documented in API documentation) and the fourth we deemed “just a bug”. The single confirmed vulnerability is going to end up a _severity low_ CVE planned to get published in sync with our pending next curl release 8.21.0 in late June. The flaw is not going to make anyone grasp for breath. All details of that vulnerability will of course not get public before then, so you need to hold out for details on that. The Mythos report on curl also contained a number of spotted bugs that it concluded were not vulnerabilities, much like any new code analyzer does when you run it on hundreds of thousands of lines of code. All the bugs in the report are being investigated and one bye one we are fixing those that we agree with. All in all about twenty bugs that are described and explained very nicely. Barely any false positives, so I presume they have had a rather high threshold for certainty. curl is certainly getting better thanks to this report, but counted by the volume of issues found, all the previous AI tools we have used have resulted in larger bugfix amounts. This is only natural of course since the first tools we ran had many more and easier bugs to find. As we have fixed issues along the way, finding new ones are slowly becoming harder. Additionally, a bug can be small or big so it’s not always fair to just compare numbers ## Not particularly “dangerous” My personal conclusion can however not end up with anything else than that the big hype around this model so far was primarily marketing. I see no evidence that this setup finds issues to any particular higher or more advanced degree than the other tools have done before Mythos. Maybe this model is a little bit better, but even if it is, it is not better to a degree that seems to make a significant dent in code analyzing. This is just _one_ source code repository and maybe it is much better on other things. I can only tell and comment on what it found here. ## Still very good But allow me to highlight and reiterate what I have said before: AI powered code analyzers are _significantly_ better at finding security flaws and mistakes in source code than any traditional code analyzers did in the past. All modern AI models are good at this now. Anyone with time and some experimental spirits can find security problems now. The high quality chaos is real. Any project that has not scanned their source code with AI powered tooling will likely find huge number of flaws, bugs and possible vulnerabilities with this new generation of tools. Mythos will, and so will many of the others. Not using AI code analyzers in your project means that you leave adversaries and attackers time and opportunity to find and exploit the flaws you don’t find. ## How AI analyzers differ * They can spot when the comment says something about the code and then conclude that the code does not work as the comment says. * It can check code for platforms and configurations we otherwise cannot run analyzers for * It “knows” details about 3rd party libraries and their APIs so it can detect abuse or bad assumptions. * It “knows” details about protocols curl implements and can question details in the code that seem to violate or contract protocol specifications * They are typically good at summarizing and explaining the flaw, something which can be rather tedious and difficult with old style analyzers. * They can often generate and offer a patch for its found issue (even if the patch usually is not a 100% fix). ## More details from the report **Zero memory-safety vulnerabilities found.** Methodology note: this review is hand-driven analysis using LLM subagents for parallel file reads, with every candidate finding re-verified by direct source inspection in the main session before being recorded. The CVE to variant-hunt mapping was built from curl’s own vuln.json. No automated SAST tooling was used. This outcome is consistent with curl’s status as one of the most heavily fuzzed and audited C codebases. The defensive infrastructure (capped dynbufs everywhere, `curlx_str_number` with explicit max on every numeric parse, `curlx_memdup0` overflow guard, CURL_PRINTF format-string enforcement, per-protocol response-size caps, pingpong 64KB line cap) systematically closes the bug classes that would normally be productive in a codebase this size. Coverage now includes: all minor protocols, all file parsers, all TLS backends’ verify paths, http/1/2/3, ftp full depth, mprintf, x509asn1, doh, all auth mechanisms, content encoding, connection reuse, session cache, CLI tool, platform-specific code, and CI/build supply chain. ## AI finds existing kinds of errors It should be noted that the AI tools find the usual and established kind of errors we already know about. It just finds new instances of them. We have not seen any AI so far report a vulnerability that would somehow be of a novel kind or something totally new. They do not reinvent the field in that way, but they do dig up more issues than any other tools did before. ## More to find These were absolutely not the last bugs to find or report. Just while I was writing the drafts for this blog post we have received more reports from security researchers about suspected problems. The AI tools will improve further and the researchers can find new and different ways to prompt the existing AIs to make them find more. We have not reached the end of this yet. I hope we can keep getting more curl scans done with Mythos and other AIs, over and over until they truly stop finding new problems. ## Credits Thanks to Anthropic and Alpha Omega for providing the model, the tools and doing the scan for us. Thanks also to the individual who did the scan for us. Much appreciated! Top image by Jin Kim from Pixabay Thanks for flying curl. It’s never dull.
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 21/04/2026
Please retoot! ♻️ eu-careers.europa.eu/sites/default/… #DSA policy coordinator job in Brussels? Apply before 6 May! #fedijobsearch #EUPolicy #digitalservicesact
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 04/04/2026
RE: social.bund.de/@zendis/116334872387… The Center for Digital Sovereignty of Public Administration (@zendis) aims to work with interested partners from administration, business, civil society, and research to define what digital sovereignty specifically means. And above all: how […]
chaos.social
Original post on chaos.social
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
Jordan Maris 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 #NAFO @jmaris.me · 02/04/2026
😂 youtu.be/WAUnmQt2Z7Y #AI
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
The Mïghty Kräcken @klaxun.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 26/03/2026
George Jetson unhappily vacuuming while Rosie the robot works on a painting.
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
Børge @forteller.tutoteket.no.ap.brid.gy · 22/03/2026
Merci Paris! Merci Lyon! Danke München! I can't lie. Things seem bleak. For years my hope seems to slip more and more each day. But then there are days like today. Today Paris chose to keep the green revolution from mayor Anne Hidalgo going, by electing her […] [Original post on tutoteket.no]
A digital poster from "The union of the Left and the Greens", a coalition of six parties. It shows Emmanuel Gregôire with a big grin, pedaling a white bicycle, which seems to be just a totally regular city bicycle, even a little bit dirty, on a protected bike lane in Paris. In the background are trees and a shared bicycle docking station, a few people and a car – and the word Merci! in big letters are "printed" on the poster.
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
Dan Gillmor @dangillmor.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 22/03/2026
As the U.S. sinks into dictatorship -- malevolent rule by corrupt politicians and oligarchs -- the institution I know the best has almost completely failed to recognize, much less counter, the threat. Big Journalism will be remembered for its cowardice and capitulation […]
mastodon.social
Original post on mastodon.social
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 11/03/2026
@Gina hi Gina, I sent an urgent mail to your professional mail with opensource@ in CC. You know if people look at it?
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Reposted by Robert Riemann 🇪🇺
pandoc @pandoc.fosstodon.org.ap.brid.gy · 04/02/2026
“pandoc for the people”, the pandoc wasm web-app, is now available at pandoc.org/app It allows to run any kind of document conversion that pandoc supports in the browser. The documents never leave the computer, thus ensuring *full privacy*. Conversions to pdf are done via Typst […]
fosstodon.org
Original post on fosstodon.org
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 21/02/2026
Dear #mastoadmins, I'd like to improve the current setup using #caddy and #podman #compose. Is anyone using #podman #quadlet with #systemd? Also I understand that having the connection between caddy reverse proxy and mastodon via sockets is very cool and I'd like to give this a try as well […]
chaos.social
Original post on chaos.social
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 15/02/2026
Hi @rstockm, @timpritlove ich höre gerade freakshow.fm/fs303-your-frustration… Ich empfehle dir unser Projekt @eu_os einmal anzuschauen. Ganz speziell denken wir hier auch schon an den Anwendungsfall in Schulen. Hier noch die Übersicht von bisherigen […]
chaos.social
Original post on chaos.social
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 10/02/2026
RE: fediway.com/@fediway/11589279608705… I agree. I would enjoy the Fediverse more with my own curation algorithm that is not just posts by chronology.
fediway.com
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 10/02/2026
Today I'm attending the Data Spaces Symposium #DSS2026 in Madrid. We discuss industrial initiatives to extract value from siloed European data treasures. Check out the programme: www.data-spaces-symposium.eu/program Check out the EU #EC_Simpl […] [Original post on chaos.social]
Photo from the Plenary session
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 07/02/2026
#Flathub has issues with website and API, so that my nightly #EU_OS builds stopped working. 😬 Point taken: mirror important #Flatpak apps to the #katello @foreman repo. #foreman #cfgmgmtcamp
flathub.org is showing an error
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 01/02/2026
The @EUCommission's open source #Simpl project presented at #fosdem! Read more at simpl-programme.ec.europa.eu/dashbo… about data spaces #fosdem26 #dataspaces #publiccodepublicmoney
Valentina from Simpl presenting
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Robert Riemann 🇪🇺 @rriemann.chaos.social.ap.brid.gy · 29/01/2026
I just updated my CV at: blog.riemann.cc/resume This January I started my new job at the @EUCommission #DGCNECT in the unit E.2 'Cloud and Software' to support the #Simpl programme that provides open source infrastructure for #dataspaces: code.europa.eu/simpl
blog.riemann.cc
Résumé (CV)
Resume (CV) of Robert Riemann, PhD.
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