Reposted by Olanrewaju Yusuff, PhD
If you are at #2025APPAM, check out IRP scholar @olayusuff.bsky.social, Georgia State University, presenting: “Health Effects of Local and Geographic Access to Mental Health Treatment Facilities.” Sat 11/15, 8:30 to 10:00 am, Hyatt Regency Seattle, 5th Floor, Rm 512
![Should Physicians Choose Their Reimbursement Rate? Menu Design for Physician Payment Contracts. Abstract: The optimal design of physician reimbursement contracts is challenging because there is information asymmetry between physicians and patients. Common reimbursement arrangements like a piece rate ("fee-for-service") or a flat fee ("capitation") are widely believed to incentivize wasteful spending or inadequate treatment. Moreover, a physician's socially efficient reimbursement arrangement may vary with unobserved characteristics like cost of effort, productivity, and altruism. I show how offering physicians a menu of reimbursement contracts can improve welfare. Depending on the correlation in physicians' private information, the private and social benefits of a high piece rate may be aligned. I develop a model of physician treatment decision-making and estimate model primitives using detailed administrative data on Norwegian primary care physicians and their patients. [...]](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:uigrz5yligfmhdxveysrtf2s/bafkreie7u5vcvuujdclrufu2seiztdna3zcbilphogrvnxlqepo7kfpyty)
