marginalrevolution.com
Trump Administration Limits Predatory Lending in Education
The New Republic writes “President Trump is banning students majoring in degrees that don’t make enough money from taking out college loans.” Yes, but do note that no student is banned from any major and the lending rule is mild. Undergraduate programs must show:
> that their graduates earn more than the typical _high school diploma holder_ …[and] graduate programs will be required to demonstrate that their graduates earn more than the typical _bachelor’s degree holder_. (emphasis added).
Think about how low that bar is. The comparison group for an undergraduate program is working adults aged 25-34 with nothing more than a high school diploma. A college program that can’t beat that has almost certainly made its students worse off. For graduate programs the bar is the _lowest_ of several bachelor’s benchmarks, including bachelor’s holders in the same field. A master’s in social work need only beat people with a bachelor’s in social work. A program must also fail in two out of three years before it loses loan eligibility. The Department estimates that about 5% of programs will fail in the first year.
I mocked the term “predatory lending” when it first became common in the financial crisis but in this case predatory lending fits the bill because the real borrower isn’t the individual student. Under income-driven repayment, the taxpayer is a forced co-signer, and it’s the taxpayer who gets predated.
Most expansions of the student loan program have been motivated by the picture of an enterprising student who works hard and wants to major in mechanical engineering or nursing but because of their poor circumstances they can’t afford college. “Credit constraints, asymmetric information, you can’t collateralize human capital,” said the economists. Nice theory, what’s the practice?
The economists wanted loans for good investments and insurance against bad luck but the economists can’t swing the vote and once the government is lending, colleges want more tuition money and students want more forgiveness. The result is a subsidy for programs whose graduates are never likely to repay. As Looney and Yannelis document:
> Starting in the late 1990s, policymakers weakened regulations that had constrained institutions from enrolling aid-dependent students. This led to rising enrollment of relatively disadvantaged students, but primarily at poor-performing, low-value institutions whose students systematically failed to complete a degree, struggled to repay their loans, defaulted at high rates, and foundered in the job market. As these new borrowers experienced similarly poor outcomes, their loans piled up, loan performance deteriorated, and with it the finances of the federal program.
Indeed, the program worked in reverse of what was promised. The biggest subsidies went to programs whose graduates were least able to repay, rather than programs with the strongest case for public support. As I wrote earlier:
> Looney does a back of the envelope calculation and estimates that typical graduates in Mechanical Engineering will on average get a 0% subsidy but graduates in Music will get a 96% subsidy, in Drama a 99% subsidy and Masseuses a 100% subsidy on average. This of course is exactly the wrong approach. If we are going to subsidize, we should subsidize degrees with plausible positive spillovers not masseuses.
The courts later blocked Biden’s Save plan but the problem is built into income-driven repayment. If music, drama and masseuses are promised a 95%+ subsidy who is paying? The taxpayers. Moreover, it’s even worse than this because the very existence of these loans incentivizes the creation of expensive, useless programs. It’s not just the drama colleges, however. Not surprisingly, the law schools have proven adept at using Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) to rip off the taxpayer. The school raises tuition, then covers the student’s small income-driven payments for ten years, and the taxpayer forgives the rest. In short, protecting students from the cost of failure rewards colleges for producing it.
Fortunately, the same bill limiting loans ended Grad PLUS loans and capped graduate borrowing. You can see the logic: if taxpayers are going to insure the loans, they need some say over which programs qualify and how much is borrowed. I don’t like giving government that power, but this is the Mises–Higgs intervention ratchet in action: subsidize the loans, absorb the losses, then regulate the programs to limit the losses.
My ideal program would get the government out of the student loan business altogether but until then this is a good first step at limiting one of the most expensive and wasteful programs of the federal government.
