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modemrunner

@modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy
3 followers 0 following 45 posts

privacy is about life 🌉 bridged from ⁂ social.vivaldi.net/@modemrunner, follow @ap.brid.gy to interact

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Reposted by modemrunner
Daniel Supernault @dansup.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 16/10/2026
Anyone can now edit FediDB by logging in with their fediverse account! FediDB is now a Fediverse Wiki, someone already added the GotoSocial logo to the software listing! fedidb.com/software/gotosocial
fedidb.com
Software | FediDB
Software details on FediDB.
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 10/10/2026
October is the month of the digital switch. Two particularly useful resources: di.day/en and www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/opt-o… #privacy #optOut
di.day
Switch to the good side every first Sunday of the month — Digital Independence Day
On the first Sunday of each month we organise Digital Independence Day. This is when we reclaim our digital freedom and switch to democracy-friendly digital alternatives.
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 10/10/2026
Ok, but with the right tools! www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/10/… #fediverse #NoAlgorithms
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 08/10/2026
Guy Davis, Club Il Giardino, Verona - Italy #blues
Guy Davis with a guitar, sitting while singing a blues, in a musica club of Verona, Italy
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Reposted by modemrunner
Misinformation-Superhighwayman @damienwise.aus.social.ap.brid.gy · 08/10/2026
Vale Margaret Hamilton. She was a Software Engineer. She was the _first_ Software Engineer because she defined the term, Software Engineering: "When I first came up with the term, no one had heard of it before, at least in our world. It was an ongoing joke for a […] [Original post on aus.social]
A B&W photo of a person standing next to a stack of printed paper as high as the top of their head. This is Margaret Hamilton, at work as a Software Engineer and the leader of a team of extremely specialised programmers who worked for NASA. The photo was taken in 1969, and it shows a physical form if her work since she joined the Apollo project in 1965 (she joined at the age of 29 by my calculation). My interpretation of the expression on her face is a mix of pride and mild amusement.  She has glasses, long, straight hair, and neat office attire. Margaret Hamilton has her hands placed gently on the stack of printouts to keep it all balanced upright. The pages appear to be arranged in bundles, ranging from 8-10 centimetres thick, to 20cm thick or more. The resulting stack of printouts is physically impressive for being an unusual feat, and it represents something even more impressive: it's the printed form of the source-code she and the team she led wrote for the NASA Apollo project. Their software ran on the Apollo Guidance Computer that was that on board each Apollo command module and Apollo Lunar Module. The Apollo Guidance Computer onboard the Eagle was an essential flight instrument for Neil Armstrong when he piloted the craft to land on the surface of the moon.
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Reposted by modemrunner
bryan newbold @bnewbold.net · 07/10/2026
ah damn, RIP Margaret Hamilton. she took safety-critical software engineering seriously, and got people to the moon and back. news.mit.edu/2026/margare...
old photos of a woman (Margaret Hamilton) standing next to a tall stack of books (printouts of Apollo space mission software source code)
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Reposted by modemrunner
Degrowth or Extinction @ecosurrealism.jorts.horse.ap.brid.gy · 04/10/2026
#thePoint #mastodon #degrowth #burnTheRich
there is this meme of a person rejecting on the upper box.
and down acknowledging.
on the top says:
"banning teenagers from using social media"
on the bottom one says
"banning billionaires from owning social media"
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 04/10/2026
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/opt-o… #privacy
eff.org
Opt Out October: Daily Tips to Protect Your Privacy and Security
Trying to take control of your online privacy can feel like a full-time job. But if you break it up into small tasks and take on one project at a time it makes the process of protecting your privacy much easier. This month we’re going to do just that.
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Reposted by modemrunner
Open Source Hardware News @pythonlinks.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 03/10/2026
This open source printer is the poster child for open source hardware. It frees us from the tyranny of having to pay more for printer ink than the price of gold. www.opentools.studio Read more at: UncensoredNews.US/end-user-devices-…
A photograph of the Open Printer.  There is a roll of paper above the rectangular printer.  The printer is on.a table with a cable going out of ths side.  Looks very nice.
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Reposted by modemrunner
OpenTech(AUC) @opentech-auc.social.edu.nl.ap.brid.gy · 03/10/2026
De #NRC, one of the main newspapers in the #Netherlands, set up its own Mastodon server! Journalist @MarloesdeKoning played a key role in this development. We believe ournalists and academics have a special responsibility to start building the alternative networks of the future. Step by step […]
social.edu.nl
Original post on social.edu.nl
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 26/09/2026
www.globalencryption.org/2026/04/op… - Open Letter on Bill C-22, An act respecting lawful access #privacy #cryptography
globalencryption.org
Open Letter on Bill C-22, An act respecting lawful access
On 28 April 2026, civil society organizations, companies, and cybersecurity experts, including Global Encryption Coalition members, published an open letter to Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney, Canadian Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree, and Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada Sean Fraser P.C., M.P., urging the federal government to withdraw Bill C-22,_An Act respecting lawful access._ By undermining encryption, Bill C-22 would jeopardize Canada’s digital security, privacy, and safety on and offline. We are welcoming civil society organizations, companies, and cybersecurity experts to sign on to this open letter! Signatures will continue to be accepted until 12 May 2026. Sign The Letter The Right Honourable. Mark Carney, P.C., O.C., M.P. Prime Minister of Canada The Honourable Gary Anandasangaree P.C., M.P. Minister of Public Safety The Honourable Sean Fraser P.C., M.P. Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada The undersigned civil society organizations, companies, and cybersecurity experts, including members of the Global Encryption Coalition, urge the federal government to withdraw Bill C-22,_An Act respecting lawful access._ While Bill C-22 aims to make Canadian’ safer, Part 2 of the Bill, the _Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act_ , will instead force services to install “technical capabilities” to access Canadians’ communications and sensitive data.1 The consensus among cybersecurity experts is clear. There is no way to provide backdoor access to encrypted data and communications without compromising the privacy and security of millions of law-abiding citizens. This is particularly true in the wake of new AI systems that can autonomously scan software, find the vulnerabilities created by encryption backdoors, and write attacks to break in. AI has collapsed the timeline from discovery to exploitation from months to mere hours, ensuring that any mandated backdoor will be weaponized by adversaries almost instantly. In 2025, the federal government attempted to pass Bill C-2, which included lawful access provisions. Part 2 of Bill C-22 would create the same and worse problems as last year’s legislation. By forcing companies to build encryption backdoors into their services, Bill C-22 would: * expose Canadians and Canadian institutions to foreign surveillance and interference. * jeopardize the security and privacy of people in Canada and abroad, including children and vulnerable communities. * undermine the growth and resilience of Canada’s digital economy. * subject Canadians to the rising cost of cybercrime The Bill’s so-called protections related to “systemic vulnerabilities” in Part 2 of Bill C-22 are not adequate to protect the security and integrity of Canadian data. The term “systemic vulnerability” is vaguely defined and “encryption” remains undefined in the legislation. Furthermore, the Bill gives the Governor in Council wide remit to make changes to the definitions and processes in Part 2 of the Bill. This risk of limited safeguards being eroded even further is even greater with the government’s admission that it is open to broadening C-22 powers for law enforcement. Strong encryption is crucial to keep private information out of the wrong hands. In a digital society where online services are increasingly collecting, compiling, and selling identifiable and sensitive data, encryption is often our last line of defense for privacy and security online. Preventing people and businesses from protecting themselves with the strongest security tools available would be disastrous. **Bill C-22 will expose Canadians and Canadian institutions to foreign surveillance and interference.** Bill C-22 could expose everyone in Canada to international surveillance and undermine Canada’s efforts to improve national security amid geopolitical uncertainty. There is no such thing as a backdoor that is only open to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. And if you build it, the question is not ‘if’ adversaries will exploit the vulnerability, but ‘when’. The threat to Canada is real. In March 2026, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) noted that “Russian cyber threat actors are very likely targeting Canadian government, military, private sector and critical infrastructure networks.” Furthermore, a CCCS 2025 bulletin, found that a Chinese hacking group, Salt Typhoon, “almost certainly” targeted the Canadian telecommunications sector and other industries. The 2024 Salt Typhoon cyber espionage campaign is a stark reminder that backdoors are never only available to the ‘good guys’. Nation-state attackers gained access to highly sensitive US national security information by taking over the built-in wiretap capabilities of US telecommunications networks.1 Crucially, the attackers did not need to exploit a technical flaw in the intercept system itself to break in. They breached the perimeter using everyday software bugs and stolen credentials, and then simply commandeered the mandated backdoor to conduct their own espionage. Furthermore, infected US telecommunications companies may never be able to undo the espionage campaign’s compromise to their networks. Salt Typhoon’s devastation happened because a US policy decision forced the creation of a powerful “dual-use” tool, proving that any mandated access system will become a weapon for anyone who compromises the host network. Bill C-22 could do far worse—threatening the security of virtually any Internet-based service (within Canada and abroad) that receives similar orders, as well as the individuals and businesses that rely on them. New AI tools recently showed how quickly and cheaply attackers can spot and exploit vulnerabilities. Because AI drastically lowers the cost and skill floor for vulnerability discovery, the “time to exploit” window has collapsed. Cyber security professionals already face a significant challenge in combatting this threat, but C-22 would force services to introduce new vulnerabilities for these models to exploit, not fix them. **Bill C-22 will jeopardize the security and privacy of people in Canada and abroad, including children and vulnerable communities.** Bill C-22’s lawful access provisions would erode a last line of defense to ensure people can have safe experiences on and offline. International human rights bodies and child safety experts have recognized the importance of encryption to protect the safety and privacy of people, including children and vulnerable communities. Encryption ensures people have safe lines of communication online when they need it most. For survivors of domestic violence, encryption is a lifeline that secures confidential communication about escape plans and protecting victims (including children) from abusers. For children, it means schools and health authorities can help keep their sensitive data out of the hands of predators. For Indigenous communities and marginalized groups, it can help create safe spaces to engage in advocacy and connect with communities while avoiding harassment and surveillance online. Encryption also protects people from transnational repression, shielding sensitive data from other governments that could misuse it to silence criticism through intimidation or threats of violence. **Bill C-22 will push innovation, talent, and investment dollars away from Canada** Requiring businesses to reconfigure their systems specifically to enable access to communications systems to comply with government orders would force businesses to choose between weakening the security of their services and putting users’ security and privacy at risk, or withdrawing their secure services and/or products from Canada altogether. Either choice will weaken Canadians’ security. Businesses have already faced this impossible choice. A recent United Kingdom (UK) government order issued to Apple under its Investigatory Powers Act led Apple to stop offering Advanced Data Protection within the UK, rather than weaken the security of its product by providing the UK government with backdoor access. While some businesses may choose to move out of Canada altogether, Canadian companies that are not able to leave the jurisdiction will likely suffer the economic consequences of a distrusted tech sector. An Internet Society-commissioned report on the economic consequences of laws that weaken encryption found that Australia’s Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) (TOLA) Act caused massive distrust in Australia’s tech sector and significant financial losses. One company interviewed estimated an “adverse economic impact” to the order of AU$1 billion. With the tech sector employing 2.2 million Canadians, the economic consequences of this disruption would be large. **Canada will become a hotbed for cyber incidents and Canadians will shoulder the cost** Canadians are increasingly at risk of data breaches and financially motivated cybercrime. Statistics Canada says Canadian businesses spent 1.2 billion on cyber incident recovery in 2023. Strong encryption is crucial to help prevent and mitigate the impact of cyber incidents. It allows people, businesses, and networks to send sensitive information over the Internet so eavesdroppers and attackers cannot see or tamper with the content. This is critical to making sure online services (e.g., banking, ecommerce, tax filing, telemedicine)—as well as the Internet infrastructure that makes them possible—operate in the way that people and businesses expect. The volume and impact of cyber incidents could soar under Part 2 of Bill C-22 and the cost will most certainly be passed onto consumers, contributing to an already growing cost of living and doing business in Canada. **The undersigned signatories ask that the federal government withdraw Bill C-22** to address the immediate threats Part 2 and conduct a full study including consultations and an Internet Impact Assessment to mitigate risks in the Bill. Only by making sure people and businesses have the strongest tools to avoid data breaches and the next major cyberattack, can we promote the resilience of Canada’s digital economy and protect people and vulnerable communities from harm. 1. There are a range of concerns with the current draft of Bill C-22—many of which have already been raised by other organizations and experts— including around surveillance and online privacy, however, the focus of this open letter is on Part 2 of the Bill. ↩︎ **Signatories:** **Organizations** 3 Steps Data Africa Media and Information Technology Initiative (AfriMITI) Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication Betapersei SC Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC) Center for Democracy & Technology Chayn Comunitatea Internet Association Cryptopocalypse Cybersecurity Advisors Network DNS Africa Media and Communications DNS World Media and Comnmunications Fight for the Future Global Partners Digital Human Rights Journalists Network Nigeria Indigenous Connectivity Institute International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group Internet Infrastructure Coalition Internet Society Internet Society Catalan Chapter (ISOC-CAT) Internet Society Colombia Chapter Internet Society Ecuador Chapter Internet Society Portugal Chapter Internet Society Uganda Chapter JCA-NET LGBT tech Mozilla Open Knowledge Nepal OpenMedia Privacy and Access Council of Canada Proton Start Point Organization TiBaza The Tor Project Tuta VPN Trust Initiative Webfala Digital Skills for all Initiative YOUTH FORUM FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE **Individual Experts*** Steve Anderson, CEO and Founder of New/Mode Jessie Arsenault Steven M. Bellovin, Professor Emeritus of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York Konstantin Beznosov, University of British Columbia Christian Brière, cybersecurity professional Jon Callas, Indiana University Jean Camp, Fellow of the IEEE, ACM, and AAAS Ron Deibert, Citizen Lab, University of Toronto Dr. Richard F. Forno, University of Maryland Baltimore County Tim Geoghegan, Internet Security Research Group John Gilmore, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Cypherpunks Ian Goldberg, University of Waterloo Professor Oscar González, University of Managua Shane Grant Rubia Reis Guerra, University of British Columbia Nguyen Phong Hoang, University of British Columbia Youssef Hojeij Mark Jeftovic, Co-founder & CEO easyDNS Technologies Inc. Susan Landau, Tufts University Gabrielle Lim, University of Toronto Steven Mansour, Center for Agentic AI Research Luiza Correa de Magalhães Dutra, PhD, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul/Brazil Michelle Mazurek, University of Maryland Puneet Mehrotra, University of British Columbia Sascha Meinrath, X-Lab Mr Michele Neylon, Founder & CEO of Blacknight Caleb Ogundele Mitch Richard, Hivenet Paulo Rená da Silva Santarém, Universidade de Brasília – UnB Margo Seltzer, The University of British Columbia Adam Shostack, Author, Threat Modeling: Designing for Security Eugene H. Spafford, Distinguished Professor, Purdue University Prof Nicolas Suzor, Queensland University of Technology Joel Templeman, Internet Society Manitoba Chapter Inc. ***Affiliations listed for identification purposes only** Le très honorable Mark Carney, C.P., O.C., député Premier ministre du Canada L’honorable Gary Anandasangaree, C.P., député Ministre de la Sécurité publique L’honorable Sean Fraser, C.P., député Ministre de la Justice et procureur général du Canada Les organisations de la société civile, les entreprises et les experts en cybersécurité soussignés, y compris les membres de la Global Encryption Coalition (coalition mondiale pour le chiffrement), exhortent le gouvernement fédéral à retirer le projet de loi C-22, _Loi concernant l’accès légal.___ Même si le projet de loi C-22 vise à renforcer la sécurité des Canadiens, sa deuxième partie, la _Loi sur le soutien en matière d’accès autorisé à de l’information_ , obligera au contraire les fournisseurs de services à mettre en place des « moyens techniques » permettant d’accéder aux communications et aux données sensibles des Canadiens.[1] Le consensus parmi les experts en cybersécurité est clair. Il est impossible de fournir un accès dérobé aux données et aux communications chiffrées sans compromettre la vie privée et la sécurité de millions de citoyens respectueux des lois. Cela est particulièrement vrai avec l’apparition de nouveaux systèmes d’IA capables d’analyser de manière autonome les logiciels, de détecter les vulnérabilités créées par les portes dérobées de chiffrement et de concevoir des attaques pour s’introduire dans les systèmes. L’intelligence artificielle a réduit le délai entre la découverte et l’exploitation de plusieurs mois à quelques heures seulement, garantissant ainsi que toute porte dérobée imposée sera exploitée par les pirates presque instantanément. En 2025, le gouvernement fédéral a tenté de faire adopter le projet de loi C-2, qui comprenait des dispositions relatives à l’accès légal. La deuxième partie du projet de loi C-22 entraînerait les mêmes problèmes, voire des problèmes plus graves, que la loi de l’année dernière. En obligeant les entreprises à intégrer des portes dérobées dans leurs services, le projet de loi C-22 aurait pour effet : * d’exposer les Canadiens et les institutions canadiennes à la surveillance et à l’ingérence étrangères; * de compromettre la sécurité et la vie privée des personnes au Canada et à l’étranger, y compris les enfants et les communautés vulnérables; * de nuire à la croissance et à la résilience de l’économie numérique canadienne; * d’exposer les Canadiens à l’augmentation du coût de la cybercriminalité. Les mesures dites de protection prévues dans la partie 2 du projet de loi C-22 concernant les « vulnérabilités systémiques » ne suffisent pas à garantir la sécurité et l’intégrité des données canadiennes. Le terme « vulnérabilité systémique » est défini de manière vague et le terme « chiffrement » n’est pas défini dans la législation. En outre, le projet de loi confère au gouverneur en conseil un large pouvoir pour modifier les définitions et les procédures prévues à la partie 2 du projet de loi. Ce risque de voir les garanties déjà limitées s’éroder encore davantage est d’autant plus grand que le gouvernement a admis qu’il était disposé à élargir les pouvoirs conférés par le projet de loi C-22 aux forces de l’ordre. Un chiffrement solide est essentiel pour empêcher que des informations privées ne tombent entre de mauvaises mains. Dans une société numérique où les services en ligne collectent, compilent et vendent de plus en plus de données identifiables et sensibles, le chiffrement est souvent notre dernier rempart pour préserver la confidentialité et la sécurité en ligne. Empêcher les particuliers et les entreprises de se protéger à l’aide des outils de sécurité les plus puissants disponibles serait désastreux. **Le projet de loi C-22 exposera les Canadiens et les institutions canadiennes à la surveillance et à l’ingérence étrangères** Le projet de loi C-22 pourrait exposer l’ensemble de la population canadienne à une surveillance internationale et compromettre les efforts déployés par le Canada pour renforcer la sécurité nationale dans un contexte d’incertitude géopolitique. Il n’existe pas de « porte dérobée » réservée exclusivement aux forces de l’ordre et aux services de renseignement. Et si vous la créez, la question n’est pas de savoir « si » les pirates exploiteront cette vulnérabilité, mais « quand ». La menace qui pèse sur le Canada est bien réelle. En mars 2026, le Centre canadien pour la cybersécurité (Centre pour la cybersécurité) a indiqué que « les cybercriminels russes ciblaient très probablement les réseaux du gouvernement canadien, de l’armée, du secteur privé et des infrastructures essentielles ». Par ailleurs, un bulletin de 2025 du Centre pour la cybersécurité a révélé qu’un groupe de pirates informatiques chinois, Salt Typhoon, avait « presque certainement » pris pour cible le secteur canadien des télécommunications ainsi que d’autres secteurs d’activité. La campagne de cyberespionnage « Salt Typhoon » de 2024 nous rappelle brutalement que les portes dérobées ne sont jamais réservées aux « gentils ». Des pirates informatiques agissant pour le compte d’États ont réussi à accéder à des informations hautement sensibles relatives à la sécurité nationale américaine en prenant le contrôle des dispositifs d’écoute intégrés aux réseaux de télécommunications américains.1 Il est important de noter que les pirates n’ont pas eu besoin d’exploiter une faille technique du système d’interception lui-même pour s’introduire dans le système. Ils ont franchi le périmètre de sécurité en exploitant des failles logicielles courantes et des identifiants volés, puis ont simplement pris le contrôle de la porte dérobée imposée pour mener leurs propres activités d’espionnage. De plus, les entreprises de télécommunications américaines touchées pourraient ne jamais parvenir à remédier aux dommages causés à leurs réseaux par cette campagne d’espionnage. Les ravages causés par Salt Typhoon sont dus au fait qu’une décision politique américaine a imposé la création d’un puissant outil « à double usage », démontrant ainsi que tout système d’accès obligatoire peut se transformer en arme entre les mains de quiconque parvient à compromettre le réseau hôte. Le projet de loi C-22 pourrait avoir des conséquences bien plus graves : il menacerait la sécurité de pratiquement tous les services en ligne (au Canada et à l’étranger) qui reçoivent des ordonnances de ce type, ainsi que celle des particuliers et des entreprises qui en dépendent. De nouveaux outils d’IA ont récemment montré à quel point les pirates peuvent repérer et exploiter des vulnérabilités rapidement et à moindre coût. L’IA réduisant considérablement les coûts et le niveau de compétence requis pour détecter les vulnérabilités, le délai avant l’exploitation de celles-ci s’est considérablement raccourci. Les professionnels de la cybersécurité sont déjà confrontés à un défi de taille pour lutter contre cette menace, mais le projet de loi C-22 obligerait les services à introduire de nouvelles vulnérabilités que ces modèles pourraient exploiter, au lieu de les corriger. **Le projet de loi C-22 mettra en péril la sécurité et la vie privée des personnes au Canada et à l’étranger, y compris celles des enfants et des communautés vulnérables** Les dispositions du projet de loi C-22 relatives à l’accès légal porteraient atteinte à l’un des derniers remparts garantissant la sécurité des utilisateurs, tant en ligne que hors ligne. Les organismes internationaux de défense des droits de la personne et les experts en protection de l’enfance ont reconnu l’importance du chiffrement pour protéger la sécurité et la vie privée des personnes, notamment des enfants et des communautés vulnérables. Le chiffrement garantit aux personnes des moyens de communication en ligne sécurisés lorsqu’elles en ont le plus besoin. Pour les victimes de violence familiale, le chiffrement est un rempart qui sécurise les communications confidentielles concernant les plans d’évasion et la protection des victimes (y compris les enfants) contre leurs agresseurs. Pour les enfants, cela signifie que les écoles et les autorités sanitaires peuvent continuer à protéger leurs données sensibles contre les prédateurs. Pour les communautés autochtones et les groupes marginalisés, cela peut aider à créer des espaces sûrs pour mener des actions de sensibilisation et entrer en contact avec d’autres communautés tout en évitant le harcèlement et la surveillance en ligne. Le chiffrement protège également les personnes contre la répression transnationale en préservant les données d’autres gouvernements qui pourraient les utiliser à mauvais escient pour faire taire les critiques par l’intimidation ou les menaces de violence. **Le projet de loi C-22 fera fuir l’innovation, les talents et les investissements hors du Canada** Exiger des entreprises qu’elles reconfigurent leurs systèmes spécifiquement pour permettre l’accès aux systèmes de communication afin de se conformer aux ordonnances gouvernementales les obligerait à choisir entre affaiblir la sécurité de leurs services et mettre en péril la sécurité et la vie privée des utilisateurs, ou retirer purement et simplement leurs services et/ou produits sécurisés du marché canadien. Quel que soit le choix retenu, il compromettra la sécurité des Canadiens. Les entreprises ont déjà été confrontées à ce choix cornélien. Une récente décision du gouvernement britannique, prise à l’encontre d’Apple en vertu de la loi sur les pouvoirs d’enquête (Investigatory Powers Act) a conduit Apple à cesser d’offrir la protection avancée des données au Royaume-Uni, plutôt que d’affaiblir la sécurité de son produit en fournissant au gouvernement l’accès à une porte dérobée. Si certaines entreprises peuvent choisir de quitter définitivement le Canada, d’autres qui ne sont pas en mesure de le faire subiront probablement les conséquences économiques d’un secteur technologique en perte de confiance. Un rapport commandé par l’Internet Society sur les conséquences économiques des lois qui affaiblissent le chiffrement a révélé que la loi australienne sur les télécommunications et autres modifications législatives (assistance et accès) (TOLA) a provoqué une méfiance massive envers le secteur technologique australien et des pertes financières importantes. Une des entreprises interrogées a estimé que les « répercussions économiques négatives » s’élèveraient à environ 1 milliard de dollars australiens. Le secteur des technologies employant 2,2 millions de Canadiens, les conséquences économiques de cette perturbation seraient considérables. **Le Canada deviendra un foyer de cyberincidents et les Canadiens en assumeront le coût** Les Canadiens sont de plus en plus exposés aux risques de violations de données et de cybercriminalité motivée par les gains financiers. Selon Statistique Canada, les entreprises canadiennes ont dépensé 1,2 milliard de dollars pour se remettre de cyberincidents en 2023. Un chiffrement puissant est crucial afin de prévenir et d’atténuer l’impact de cyberincidents. Il permet aux particuliers, aux entreprises et aux réseaux d’acheminer des informations sensibles sur l’Internet sans que des espions ou des pirates ne puissent voir ou altérer leur contenu. Cela est essentiel pour garantir que les services en ligne (les services bancaires, le commerce électronique, les déclarations fiscales, la télémédecine), ainsi que l’infrastructure Internet qui les rend possibles, fonctionnent de la manière attendue par les particuliers et les entreprises. Le nombre et l’impact des cyberincidents pourraient monter en flèche en vertu de la partie 2 du projet de loi C-22, et les coûts seront très certainement répercutés sur les consommateurs, ce qui contribuera à aggraver le coût de la vie et le coût des affaires au Canada, déjà en hausse. **Les signataires ci-dessous demandent au gouvernement fédéral de retirer le projet de loi C-22** afin de remédier aux menaces immédiates découlant de la partie 2 et de mener une étude approfondie, comprenant des consultations et une analyse d’impact sur Internet, afin d’atténuer les risques liés à ce projet de loi. Ce n’est qu’en veillant à ce que les particuliers et les entreprises disposent des outils les plus efficaces pour prévenir les fuites de données et la prochaine cyberattaque de grande ampleur que nous pourrons renforcer la résilience de l’économie numérique canadienne et protéger la population ainsi que les communautés vulnérables contre tout préjudice. Signé **Organisations** **Organizations** 3 Steps Data Africa Media and Information Technology Initiative (AfriMITI) Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication Betapersei SC Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC) Center for Democracy & Technology Chayn Comunitatea Internet Association Cryptopocalypse Cybersecurity Advisors Network DNS Africa Media and Communications DNS World Media and Comnmunications Fight for the Future Global Partners Digital Human Rights Journalists Network Nigeria Indigenous Connectivity Institute International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group Internet Infrastructure Coalition Internet Society Internet Society Catalan Chapter (ISOC-CAT) Internet Society Colombia Chapter Internet Society Ecuador Chapter Internet Society Portugal Chapter Internet Society Uganda Chapter JCA-NET LGBT tech Mozilla Open Knowledge Nepal OpenMedia Privacy and Access Council of Canada Proton Start Point Organization TiBaza The Tor Project Tuta VPN Trust Initiative Webfala Digital Skills for all Initiative YOUTH FORUM FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE ******Experts individuels******* Steve Anderson, CEO and Founder of New/Mode Jessie Arsenault Steven M. Bellovin, Professor Emeritus of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York Konstantin Beznosov, University of British Columbia Christian Brière, cybersecurity professional Jon Callas, Indiana University Jean Camp, Fellow of the IEEE, ACM, and AAAS Ron Deibert, Citizen Lab, University of Toronto Dr. Richard F. Forno, University of Maryland Baltimore County Tim Geoghegan, Internet Security Research Group John Gilmore, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Cypherpunks Ian Goldberg, University of Waterloo Professor Oscar González, University of Managua Shane Grant Rubia Reis Guerra, University of British Columbia Nguyen Phong Hoang, University of British Columbia Youssef Hojeij Mark Jeftovic, Co-founder & CEO easyDNS Technologies Inc. Susan Landau, Tufts University Gabrielle Lim, University of Toronto Steven Mansour, Center for Agentic AI Research Luiza Correa de Magalhães Dutra, PhD, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul/Brazil Michelle Mazurek, University of Maryland Puneet Mehrotra, University of British Columbia Sascha Meinrath, X-Lab Mr Michele Neylon, Founder & CEO of Blacknight Caleb Ogundele Mitch Richard, Hivenet Paulo Rená da Silva Santarém, Universidade de Brasília – UnB Margo Seltzer, The University of British Columbia Adam Shostack, Author, Threat Modeling: Designing for Security Eugene H. Spafford, Distinguished Professor, Purdue University Prof Nicolas Suzor, Queensland University of Technology Joel Templeman, Internet Society Manitoba Chapter Inc. * **Affiliations mentionnées uniquement à titre d’identification** * * * [1] Le projet de loi C-22 suscite toute une série de préoccupations, dont bon nombre ont déjà été soulevées par d’autres organisations et experts, notamment en matière de surveillance et de protection de la vie privée en ligne; toutefois, la présente lettre ouverte porte principalement sur la partie 2 du projet de loi.
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 19/09/2026
www.404media.co/theres-a-100-chance… - There’s a 100% Chance AI Agents Are Already Ruining the Internet #AI
404media.co
There’s a 100% Chance AI Agents Are Already Ruining the Internet
“AI agents” now have enough power and permission to be extremely annoying online.
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Daniel Supernault @dansup.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 18/09/2026
fediverse software version tracker (updated daily) mastodon - fedidb.com/software/mastodon/versio… pixelfed - fedidb.com/software/pixelfed/versio… misskey - fedidb.com/software/misskey/versions lemmy - fedidb.com/software/lemmy/versions peertube - […]
mastodon.social
Original post on mastodon.social
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 15/09/2026
@thomasp thanks for your work! 🙌🏻
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Tommi 🤯 @tommi.pan.rent.ap.brid.gy · 12/09/2026
RE: berlin.social/@berlinfediday/117259… We need a Fediverse Join Party! @douwe @berlinfediday #FediDay
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Bruce Sterling @bruces @bruces.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 11/09/2026
*Quite a mystery. Opaque to mere human analysis, etc
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 30/08/2026
www.wired.com/story/sensitive-info-… - Sensitive Info Goes Into ‘No Reply’ Emails Constantly. This Guy Sees It All #email
wired.com
Sensitive Info Goes Into ‘No Reply’ Emails Constantly. This Guy Sees It All
Two security researchers bought cheap domains—including noreply.net and deleteduser.com—and set up email listening services. Hundreds of companies are sending them corporate secrets.
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🇨🇦Samuel Proulx🇨🇦 @fastfinge.fed.interfree.ca.ap.brid.gy · 30/08/2026
Every time I do a tab cleanup of my Hundreds of tabs, I should post some of them just to shame myself in public for the nonsense I keep open. So, let's see: * a website for a manufacturer of organic cream of wheat, complete with trademark signs and "official" recipes * a review for the movie […]
fed.interfree.ca
Original post on fed.interfree.ca
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Dan Gillmor @dangillmor.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 28/08/2026
If you trust your data to a company like Microsoft, you are gambling with your future, as a slew of nonprofits discovered to their horror. slate.com/technology/2026/08/micros…
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wakest ⁂ @fedi.wake.st · 27/08/2026
"Now that infrastructure itself is being treated as evidence of terrorism, and solidarity is turning into “material support.” This isn't only an attack on A/I. It's a warning to anyone building servers, encrypted communications, independent publishing platforms and other infrastructure that […]
social.wake.st
Original post on social.wake.st
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Reposted by modemrunner
Lazarou Monkey Terror 🚀💙🌈 @lazarou.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 03/07/2026
Today, the Voyager 1 spacecraft is 25.50 billion kilometres away from your bullshit. 🚀
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René Mayrhofer :verified: 🇺🇦 🇵🇸 @rene-mobile.infosec.exchange.ap.brid.gy · 09/06/2026
I'm leaving #Google: www.mayrhofer.eu.org/post/leaving-g… While I believe that I have been able to do some good with my continuing (part-time) engagement in the Android security and privacy team since returning to Austria a couple of years ago, the deal with the US #DoW is […]
infosec.exchange
Original post on infosec.exchange
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 06/06/2026
fsfe.org/news/2026/news-20260603-01… - The European Commission published its Technological Sovereignty Package on 3 June 2026, containing the new "Open Source Strategy". If implemented, it could mark a paradigm shift by adopting the Free Software Foundation Europe’s “Public Money? […]
social.vivaldi.net
Original post on social.vivaldi.net
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 21/02/2026
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/02/open-… - Open Letter to Tech Companies: Protect Your Users From Lawless DHS Subpoenas #privacy #eff
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 17/02/2026
www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026… - AI and the Corporate Capture of Knowledge - "If we allow AI companies to profit from mass appropriation while claiming immunity, we are choosing a future in which access to knowledge is governed by […]
social.vivaldi.net
Original post on social.vivaldi.net
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 14/02/2026
greenwald.substack.com/p/amazons-ri… - Amazon's Ring and Google's Nest Unwittingly Reveal the Severity of the U.S. Surveillance State #privacy
greenwald.substack.com
Amazon's Ring and Google's Nest Unwittingly Reveal the Severity of the U.S. Surveillance State
Just a decade after a global backlash was triggered by Snowden reporting on mass domestic surveillance, the state-corporate dragnet is stronger and more invasive than ever.
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 06/02/2026
www.404media.co/the-washington-post… - The Washington Post Is No Longer Useful to Jeff Bezos - "In our current kleptocracy, there is no need for a multibillionaire with tons of business before the government to invest in or have a media company focused on […]
social.vivaldi.net
Original post on social.vivaldi.net
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 05/02/2026
pulse.internetsociety.org/en/blog/2… - Visualizing How the Internet Breathes #internet
pulse.internetsociety.org
Visualizing How the Internet Breathes
**In short:** * The need to visualize network performance data is especially relevant in today’s increasingly large network telemetry datasets. * Researchers have produced a geographical-like representation of network delay measurement data that is both visually compelling and operationally informative. * New visualization can serve as inspiration for other researchers and operators. Humans are inherently visual creatures. As a result, data visualizations are among the most powerful tools network researchers and operators have for clearly and memorably conveying information. The importance of good visualizations is especially relevant with today’s increasingly large network telemetry data sets. A survey of networking papers reveals a strong presence of traditional visualizations, such as line graphs, histograms, bar charts, and scatter plots. In this post, we present an argument for creative, nonstandard approaches to data visualization, especially for spatiotemporal and other types of multidimensional network data. In particular, we will discuss a problem that traditional visualizations cannot address: how to show a network “breathes” over time. ## Network Latency Measurements as Time Series One set of quantities commonly gathered by network operators is the pairwise round-trip times (RTTs) between routers, usually measured at regular intervals and represented as individual time series, one per router pair. Anomalies in these time series can reveal inefficient routing, extreme traffic conditions, link outages, and more. We refer to this as the _time series representation of network delay measurement data_. Figure 1 — Example of the time series representation of network delay measurement data. The y-axis has RTTs (in milliseconds), and the x-axis has measurement timestamps. For visual clarity, only a selection of 100 time series is shown. This time series representation (Figure 1), comprised of a set of standard line plots, has a number of drawbacks: * Even for modestly sized networks, there are too many measurements to easily identify which line corresponds to which pair of routers. * Although some anomalies may be obvious in the graph, it is hard to tell the geographic context of the events. For example, is the event at the beginning of Figure 1 localized, or does it affect the entire network all at once? * It is very difficult to tell the severity of any given anomaly. In Figure 1, numerous changes in RTTs are evident; however, it is challenging to determine which are severe enough to warrant operator intervention. Our goal is to produce a representation of this network delay measurement data that is both visually more compelling and operationally more informative. ## A Creative Alternative Our solution is to represent a snapshot of the network delay measurement data at time _t_ as a surface (_manifold_), much like a topographical map. We call this surface the _network delay space_ _at time_ _t_. Intuitively, the measured RTT at time _t_ between two routers corresponds to the shortest (_geodesic_) distance between them on the surface. In effect, walking on the surface along such a geodesic as if it were the Earth defines a path whose length approximates the measured latency. Figure 2 — A snapshot of a network delay space. Circles represent routers. Colored lines represent the shortest (geodesic) paths. As we generate and consider different snapshots over time, we can smoothly interpolate between surfaces at each snapshot to create a cohesive animation that shows how the network delay space evolves; that is, a visualization of how the network breathes. Our approach to transform a time series representation of network delay measurement data into a breathing network delay space leverages tools and techniques from Riemannian Geometry and is described in more detail in our HotNets paper. ## A Breathing Example To demonstrate the utility of our visualization method, we apply it to publicly available data provided by ESnet, a DoE-funded high-performance, unclassified network built to support scientific research. We use 56 routers and more than 100,000 measurements to create the animation. The final animation is shown below: Figure 3 — A breathing network. To draw the viewer’s attention, large changes to the manifold are highlighted in red. Furthermore, the shortest (geodesic) paths are drawn between several endpoints. There are several notable events in the animation. At time 0:12, a large shift occurs in the Utah/Colorado area. As a result, the geodesics passing through that area are pushed south. This corresponds to the first spike in the time series in Figure 1. With the animation, we now have the geographic context that the latency increases were due to an anomaly near the Four Corners region, not a wide-scale outage. In contrast, at time 1:15, a minor shift occurs in Arizona, leading to the final spike in the time series shown in Fig. 1. We conclude that the latter event is more local and less significant than the time series suggests. Finally, we observe that the network does not “hyperventilate,” but instead remains stable throughout much of the measured period. This suggests that ESnet provides consistent performance, and deviations from that consistency are relatively minor. Using the power of non-standard animation, we have created a visualization that offers a deeper understanding of a network’s delay space than could be achieved with more traditional methods. We believe that recent, increasingly large datasets necessitate the adoption of creative visualization techniques, and we hope this work serves as _inspiration_ for other researchers and operators. _Stephen Jasina_ _is a PhD student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison under the supervision of Prof. Paul Barford. His primary interests are Internet measurement and data visualization, though he has a soft spot for abstract math._ * * * The views expressed by the authors of this blog are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Internet Society.
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 24/01/2026
aboutsignal.com/news/signal-now-big… - Signal now bigger than Telegram in the Netherlands #signal #messenger
aboutsignal.com
Signal is working on labels for groups
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 17/01/2026
modemrunner.vivaldi.net/life-under-… - modemrunner's blog
modemrunner.vivaldi.net
Life Under a Clicktatorship
> […] What do I mean by a clicktatorship? A “clicktatorship” is a form of government that combines a social media worldview with authoritarian tendencies. This implies that people working in this form of government are not just using online platforms as a mode of communication, but that their beliefs, judgment, and decisionmaking reflect, are influenced by, and are directly responsive to the online world to an extreme degree. The “clicktatorship” views everything as content, including basic policy decisions and implementation practices. […] https://donmoynihan.substack.com/p/life-under-a-clicktatorship Internet Archive copy https://web.archive.org/web/20260117132903/https://donmoynihan.substack.com/p/life-under-a-clicktatorship
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 06/01/2026
www.theguardian.com/technology/2025… - “As their capabilities and degree of agency grow, we need to make sure we can rely on technical and societal guardrails to control them, including the ability to shut them down if needed.”
theguardian.com
AI showing signs of self-preservation and humans should be ready to pull plug, says pioneer
Canadian computer scientist Yoshua Bengio warns against granting legal rights to cutting-edge technology
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Paco Hope @paco.infosec.exchange.ap.brid.gy · 27/12/2025
I never knew it was called the “Moylan arrow.” But now that I know, I will call it that. It’s such a super simple, yet super valuable innovation. www.jalopnik.com/2061179/inventor-l…
jalopnik.com
The Inventor Of The Little Arrow That Tells You What Side The Fuel Filler Is On Has Died
The idea came to Moylan on a rainy day in April 1986 when he hopped in one of Ford's employee fleet cars to drive to a meeting at another building.
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 20/12/2025
www.joanwestenberg.com/comfort-food… - "No new movement of rough, vital, angry thinkers ready to call bullshit on the whole enterprise. Our intellectual underground, such as it is, consists of Substack, a platform funded by some of […]
social.vivaldi.net
Original post on social.vivaldi.net
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Bonfire @bonfire.indieweb.social.ap.brid.gy · 19/12/2025
RE: socialwebfoundation.org/2025/12/19/… Big news for the #Fediverse! End-to-end encryption is coming to #ActivityPub. @swf with support from @sovtechfund is coordinating two interoperable implementations. Bonfire is proud to be one of […]
indieweb.social
Original post on indieweb.social
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 17/12/2025
savesocial.eu/en - Saving social media as a democratic force #socialMedia
savesocial.eu
🇬🇧
Saving social mediaas a democratic force Nina George, Schriftstellerin, Ehrenpräsidentin European Writers’ Council (EWC) Foto: Heike Blenck Rocko Schamoni, Schriftsteller, Regisseur, Musiker, Künstler Foto: Kerstin Behrendt Prof. Dr. Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Bundesministerin der Justiz a. D. Foto: Sebastian Bolesch Sebastian Klein, Mitgründer Karma Capital & Neue Narrative Dota Kehr, Sängerin Foto: Annika Weinthal Dr. Eckart v....
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Mastodon Engineering @mastodonengineering.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 10/12/2025
The November "Trunk & Tidbits" is out! Read about our new organisational announcements and events; the start of development for our Collections feature; CSS theme tokens and Helm chart; and, the latest stable releases. #mastoadmin #OpenSource […]
mastodon.social
Original post on mastodon.social
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 13/12/2025
hey.paris/posts/appleid - 20 Years of Digital Life, Gone in an Instant, thanks to Apple #gafam #apple
hey.paris
苹果公司已锁定我的Apple ID,我束手无策。恳请帮助。
Apple has locked my Apple ID, and I have no recourse. A plea for help (hey.paris) 12:55  ↑ 170 HN Points
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 13/12/2025
www.accessnow.org/publication/inter… - For people trapped amid rubble or under siege, connectivity is a literal lifeline, without which they cannot contact emergency services, locate missing family members, document human rights violations, or access vital […]
social.vivaldi.net
Original post on social.vivaldi.net
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Mastodon Engineering @mastodonengineering.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 12/12/2025
As we're working on Collections (an upcoming feature similar to "starter packs"), and improvements to the design of user profiles, we would like to hear from you! Please use our - short & anonymous! - User Experience Survey to share your thoughts. #Mastodon #UserExperience #Design […]
mastodon.social
Original post on mastodon.social
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🇨🇦Samuel Proulx🇨🇦 @fastfinge.fed.interfree.ca.ap.brid.gy · 03/12/2025
Huh. Just chatted in person with someone who's been on #mastodon for a while, now, who honestly thought that all the Mastodon domains were run by Mastodon. And having a different domain was, like, just a vanity thing to look cool. It only came up because they were complaining about an issue they […]
fed.interfree.ca
Original post on fed.interfree.ca
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 11/12/2025
www.datacenterwatch.org/report - $18 billion worth of data center projects were blocked, and another $46 billion of projects were delayed over the last two years in the face of opposition from residents and activist groups #AI #datacenters
datacenterwatch.org
$64 billion of data center projects have been blocked or delayed amid local opposition — Data Center Watch
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 09/12/2025
www.theguardian.com/media/2025/dec/… - ‘Don’t pander to the tech giants!’ How a youth movement for digital justice is spreading across Europe #socialMedia
theguardian.com
‘Don’t pander to the tech giants!’ How a youth movement for digital justice is spreading across Europe
Gen z are the first generation to have grown up with social media, they were the earliest adopters, and therefore the first to suffer its harms. Now they are fighting back
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Mastodon @mastodon.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy · 09/12/2025
Today we are calling on institutions around the world to take control of their #DigitalSovereignty, including their social accounts. Governments should communicate directly with their citizens on open platforms, not through the mouthpiece of a corporation […]
mastodon.social
Original post on mastodon.social
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 08/12/2025
about.iftas.org/2025/10/05/coordina… - Coordinated Pro-Russian Propaganda Network Targeting ActivityPub and ATProto Services #mastodon #activityPub
about.iftas.org
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 07/12/2025
signal-contingency-plan.info - Signal messenger is great, but do you have a contingency plan? #signal #privacy #censorship
signal-contingency-plan.info
Signal Contingency Plan
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 07/12/2025
www.accessnow.org/eu-abandons-human… - One year on, the new European Commission is abandoning human rights #eu #privacy
accessnow.org
Just over a year ago, as the new EU mandate was beginning, **we laid out our desire to see EU leaders prioritize respect for digital rights** in order to deliver **sustainable prosperity, democracy, and social fairness for all**. Sadly, we’ve been disappointed. As we break down in this blog post, the new European Commission has gone in the opposite direction, sidelining human rights in favour of bowing to industry lobbying demands and framing all policies through a security lens (also known as “**securitization**“). #### **Harmful deregulation under the guise of helpful simplification** Under the banner of**“simplification”, the European Commission is pushing ahead with****harmful deregulation**. If this was only about cutting burdensome red tape or simplifying procedures while still upholding human rights protections, that would not necessarily be a bad thing. But the Commission’s simplification agenda is a blatant effort to strip away human rights safeguards, purely to benefit private companies’ profit lines. The most egregious example of this can be seen in the **recently released Digital Omnibus Package****,** which proposes **a dangerous watering-down of legislation****including the AI Act and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)** , among other digital policies. The AI Act only began to be implemented last year, and most of its provisions have yet to be tested in action — but already the Commission is (**once again**) bending**** to **industry pressure to roll back its human rights protections**, in a way that risks completely undermining the legislation’s core tenets. One proposal, for instance, would remove a key oversight mechanism in the high-risk classification process. During negotiations around the AI Act, the private sector successfully lobbied for a **derogation allowing providers to unilaterally exempt themselves from all obligations for high-risk systems** — but this came with the obligation for such exemptions to be registered and explained in a public database. The Omnibus proposes to remove this requirement entirely, **allowing irresponsible actors to exempt themselves from the AI Act’s obligations without trace or accountability**. Meanwhile, **efforts are underway to undermine the key parts of the GDPR**, which is the cornerstone for protecting digital rights in the EU. The AI Act, for instance, only makes sense as an addendum to the fundamental protections and safeguards provided by the GDPR, with******its risk-based approach requiring the rights-based foundation of the GDPR** to be even remotely useful. Despite this, the Commission is **proposing amendments to core parts of the GDPR**, proposing new legal bases for data processing and weakening the definition of personal data. This, in turn, will open the door to attacks on other key provisions and could weaken the entire edifice of digital rights protections in the EU. #### **Expanding surveillance on “security” grounds** Even as it pushes ahead with deregulation on the one hand, the Commission has, on the other, been rolling out wave upon wave of new legislation in the area of securitization and migration — showing its **intent to deregulate all the things, except when it comes to policing and migration**. Notably in the past year, we’ve continued to see migration policies used to cement Europe’s vision of a surveillance-based society, with the Commission **expanding Europol’s power**, **digitalising its deportation regime**, and creating an **EU war budget** which earmarks billions of euros for surveillance technology and “fully digitalised border control management”. The European Parliament recently **approved****** the Commission’s proposal to **expand the powers****** of the EU’s police agency, Europol, in the name of fighting “migrant smuggling” — despite **civil society warning that this plan will further criminalise and persecute migrant people** — and this expansion is likely to **continue into 2026**, alongside also granting new powers to the EU’s border agency, **Frontex**. It also comes hot on the heels of the **Commission’s proposal for a “Return Regulation”****** that would **expand the detention and deportation of migrant people, including children, in the EU**, via the increased use of digital surveillance infrastructure. Expanding such infrastructure is also foreseen under the **EU’s Multi-Annual Financial Framework 2028-2034****,** laid out in July, and the **ProtectEU internal security strategy**, published in April, with the **latter aiming to instate “technological solutions that would enable law enforcement authorities to access encrypted data in a lawful manner.” **Creating a backdoor into encryption that only the ‘good guys’ can use is the stuff of science fiction, as **we’ve said before**; yet the Commission is **pushing ahead** as part of a wider “**roadmap of lawful and effective access to data for law enforcement**”, which also confirms increased funding for surveillance technology. Looking at all these initiatives together, one might wonder if the Commission read George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four as an instruction manual, rather than a cautionary tale. #### **Ignoring the increasing abuse of spyware** In parallel with its efforts to expand surveillance on security grounds, the Commission has been **woefully slow** to confront the EU’s spyware crisis. Despite this year’s **revelations about the Italian government’s extensive use of Paragon spyware technology to surveil** journalists, activists, and humanitarians, the Commission has yet to implement, or **even respond to**, **recommendations****** on tackling spyware issued by the European Parliament three years ago. In the meantime, recent **investigations** have shown how **EU innovation funds** have flowed directly to commercial spyware vendors; with the Commission **unable to offer any reassurances about safeguards** or details on current funding when **pressed by MEPs**. In short, it looks like **EU taxpayers are still bankrolling an industry that undermines democracy**. Enforcement of the **Dual-Use Regulation**, which governs the export of items with both civilian and military applications, including cybersurveillance exports, remains weak, while **surveillance tools made in the EU****** continue to surface in repressive contexts. During the next evaluation of the **regulation**, **planned** for between 2026 and 2028, it is essential that the Commission finally close the loopholes that allow this to happen, by implementing transparency on licensing, increased **sharing if and when such licenses are denied**, and post-shipment checks that actually happen. The EU digital rights agenda is also proving ill-equipped to protect civil society in exile from digital transnational repression. We have seen multiple instances of human rights defenders, journalists, and activists from non-EU countries targeted with **spyware**, **phishing attacks**, and **online harassment** while within EU borders; yet EU institutions have offered little in the way of redress for victims or accountability for perpetrators. The recent **European Democracy Shield announcement** , for instance, failed to highlight spyware abuses as a threat to democracy but promised to scale up efforts to provide anti-surveillance solutions to “civil society actors and journalists under authoritarian regimes” — suggesting that the Commission hasn’t admitted the full extent of abuse by and within EU member states. #### **Failing to hold platforms accountable** Another flagship piece of EU digital legislation failing to live up to its initial promise is the **Digital Services Act (DSA)**, which was supposed to create “a safer digital space where the fundamental rights of users are protected.” Despite coming into full effect nearly two years ago, enforcement of key parts of the DSA’s transparency and procedural protections remains one of the major stumbling blocks. While the Commission has launched investigations into and issued preliminary findings against several large platforms for failure to protect peoples’ rights, including through a******lack of algorithmic transparency or access to effective remedy**, no substantial enforcement outcomes have yet materialized. Similarly, significant gaps in identifying **systemic risks** remain, as reported by civil society and researchers from **Germany****** and **Romania**. While tech companies have been **quick to paint the DSA as a tool for censorship**, we **have long made clear** that censorship is neither the purpose nor the function of the regulation. In contrast, a key aspect of the DSA is supporting people’s ability to appeal takedowns or censorship of their content. This has profound implications for the EU’s wider global reputation as a defender of******fundamental rights and freedoms**. The European Commission must enforce the DSA in a way that upholds these rights and freedoms, and prevents censorship, as a counterweight to other regions’ opaque authoritarian models. Otherwise the EU risks sending a message of much talk but no action; opening the door to future abuses. At the same time, EU regulators must also remain vigilant about how their legislative efforts, including the DSA, are co-opted by third-country authoritarian regimes to justify censorship measures and target dissenting voices and independent journalists. We have already raised concerns about problematic bills in **Brazil** and **Costa Rica**, where vague definitions of illicit content and content moderation could fuel arbitrary content removal, undermining freedom of expression and expanding censorship. #### **Heading towards a dangerous digital dystopia** The new Commission’s decision to prioritize deregulation and securitization above all else is taking the EU in a dangerous direction; one where human rights, once seen as fundamental for the European project, are being sidelined. This will not make people’s lives easier, nor keep them safer. Rather it will transform the EU into a digital dystopia, and ultimately undermine the foundations of European democracy. With four years left in its current mandate, there’s still time for this Commission to move beyond false binaries such as ‘regulation versus innovation’ and ‘privacy versus security’. There can be no prosperity without safeguards, and no true security in a surveillance state. We hope they make the right choice and recommit to protecting human rights.
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 06/12/2025
theconversation.com/how-the-interne… - How the internet became enshittified – and how we might be able to deshittify it #internet #enshittification
theconversation.com
How the internet became enshittified – and how we might be able to deshittify it
The internet offered a world of connection and cooperation. What we got was a world of ruthless monopolies and oligarchs.
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 06/12/2025
labs.watchtowr.com/stop-putting-you… - Stop Putting Your Passwords Into Random Websites (Yes, Seriously, You Are The Problem) #security
labs.watchtowr.com
Stop Putting Your Passwords Into Random Websites (Yes, Seriously, You Are The Problem)
Welcome to watchTowr vs the Internet, part 68. That feeling you’re experiencing? Dread. You should be used to it by now. As is fast becoming an unofficial and, apparently, frowned upon tradition - we identified incredible amounts of publicly exposed passwords, secrets, keys and more for very sensitive
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 06/12/2025
www.404media.co/the-last-video-rent… - The Last Video Rental Store Is Your Public #Library #archive #internetarchive
404media.co
The Last Video Rental Store Is Your Public Library
Audio-visual librarians are quietly amassing large physical media collections amid the IP disputes threatening select availability.
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modemrunner @modemrunner.vivaldi.net.ap.brid.gy · 02/12/2025
blog.liw.fi/posts/2025/stop-evil - Stopping evil and open source: my thoughts (Lars Wirzenius) #openSource
blog.liw.fi
Stopping evil and open source: my thoughts
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