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Luiz H. S. Brandão

@luizhsbrandao.bsky.social
576 followers 2.3K following 175 posts

Intelligence Analyst and Strategic Studies Researcher focusing on Hybrid Threats & Cognitive Warfare | Coord. at @negisc.bsky.social. Linktree: linktr.ee/luizhsbrandao

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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Anton Gerashchenko @antongerashchenko.bsky.social · 09/10/2026
The 2026 Nobel Peace goes to Navi Pillay, South African jurist for her decades-long work advancing international law and accountability for atrocities. She played an important role in establishing legal precedents concerning sexual violence and incitement to atrocities during her work
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Tech Policy Press @techpolicypress.bsky.social · 09/10/2026
Brazil's platform rules have focused on harms from commercial platforms. João Alexandre Peschanski of Wikimedia Brasil, Amalia Toledo of the Wikimedia Foundation and Elise Silva of the University of Pittsburgh argue digital public goods like Wikipedia need their own legal category.
buff.ly
Wikipedia Isn't Big Tech, and Brazil's Platform Rules Should Say So
Brazil's approach to platform regulation risks undermining Wikipedia and the knowledge commons, write João Alexandre Peschanski, Amalia Toledo and Elise Silva.
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Folha de S.Paulo @folha.com · 09/10/2026
ICE atira em imigrante em Nova York
www1.folha.uol.com.br
ICE atira em imigrante em NY; Mamdani pede a Trump que agência saia da cidade
Governo afirma que cidadão da Repúlica Dominicana foi baleado e está no hospital
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
LSE Press @lsepress.bsky.social · 08/10/2026
For #BannedBooksWeek we’re highlighting Reading Wars by Don Herzog 📚 From Reformation England to contemporary book bans, Herzog explores the long history of attempts to control who can read and what they can read, and what this reveals about equality and freedom. 🔗 bit.ly/4ue0C7w
Three copies of the book Reading Wars
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Nina Jankowicz @ninajankowicz.com · 07/10/2026
“What this amounts to is a purported defender of free speech at the state department using the enormous power of the US government to try to pressure Americans from criticizing their government.” www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026...
theguardian.com
EU drops sponsorship of disinformation conference at Trump officials’ request
Lithuania and Canada were also pressured to withdraw, and days before #Disinfo2026, logos were wiped off website
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
War on the Rocks @warontherocks.bsky.social · 08/10/2026
Human-in-the-loop poses risks, as the human may stop properly checking. But targeting systems themselves can be built to keep commanders asking hard questions. warontherocks.com/2026/10/the-...
warontherocks.com
The AI-Assisted Strategic Own Goal in the Kill Chain
For eighty years, the Western alliance has anchored its strength in moral legitimacy, shared values, and the resulting credibility to shape international
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Electronic Frontier Foundation @eff.org · 07/10/2026
Hay policías a quienes se les ordena no mencionar el uso de ALPR en sus informes ni a las personas detenidas. Ocultar tecnología de espionaje no es nuevo, pero impide el control público y el derecho de defensa. www.eff.org/deeplinks/2...
eff.org
La policía oculta su uso de tecnología de espionaje para evitar el
Las agencias del orden de todo el país recurren cada vez más a tecnologías de espionaje, como los lectores automáticos de placas vehiculares (ALPR), los simuladores de antenas de telefonía celular y
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Raimo Kangasniemi @rk70534.bsky.social · 07/10/2026
"The conversation explores competing narratives around Israel, Palestine, media influence, protest movements, and public discourse in Australia." The Antony Loewenstein Podcast: Bondi Terror, Antisemitism and the Battle of Narratives www.youtube.com/watch?v=EBzc...
youtube.com
The Antony Loewenstein Podcast: Bondi Terror, Antisemitism and the Battle of Narratives
YouTube video by Antony Loewenstein
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Raimo Kangasniemi @rk70534.bsky.social · 07/10/2026
"On Sat Oct 10 2026 we march in London to mark 3 years of Israel’s genocide in Gaza. The struggle to end British complicity in these crimes must continue. ...Ahmed Najar reflects on what it has been like to endure the suffering of his family in #Gaza...# www.youtube.com/shorts/NHSta... #Israel
youtube.com
British Palestinian Ahmed Najar on 3 years of Israel's genocide in Gaza
YouTube video by Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC)
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Raimo Kangasniemi @rk70534.bsky.social · 07/10/2026
'“Destruction, displacement & deprivation have become normalised — practices #Israel is carrying out with impunity... Governments must... to ensure Israel stops the destruction & killing, prevents ethnic cleansing, & stops denying Palestinians the means of survival.”' www.msf.org/three-years-...
msf.org
Three years on: Israel is asphyxiating Gaza and dismantling the means of survival | MSF
In Gaza, Palestine, Israel continues to systematically destroy the conditions people need to survive.
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Raimo Kangasniemi @rk70534.bsky.social · 07/10/2026
Unexploded ordnances left by Israel in Gaza pose a constant danger to Palestinians mondoweiss.net/2026/10/unex...
mondoweiss.net
Unexploded ordnances left by Israel in Gaza pose a constant danger to Palestinians
In addition to the unrelenting bombardment, Palestinians in Gaza are at risk of losing their lives and limbs through the unexploded ordnances that the Israeli army leaves behind.
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
RFI @rfi.fr · 07/10/2026
«C’était le chaos partout»: en Éthiopie, les frappes de drones se multiplient dans le Tigré
rfi.my
«C’était le chaos partout»: en Éthiopie, les frappes de drones se multiplient dans le Tigré
Quinze jours après le retour de la guerre dans le nord de l’Éthiopie, l’armée fédérale poursuit sa contre-offensive. Les combats entre les troupes éthiopiennes et les rebelles, ponctués de tirs d’artillerie et de frappes de drones, affectent considérablement les populations civiles : pour ces personnes, le traumatisme est bien réel. Selam est l’une d’entre elles. Le 27 septembre, la jeune femme a fui Mekele en voiture avec des amis, direction Addis-Abeba. En chemin, le groupe fait halte à Alamata, dans le sud du Tigré, alors que la ville est plongée dans le chaos.
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
The Economist @economist.com · 06/10/2026
In its war against “narco-terrorists”, America is co-operating more with its Latin American neighbours. But can this emerging regional coalition really stop the smugglers?
bit.ly
The pointless war on “narco-terrorists” is growing more collaborative
America is working with Latin American governments to target gangs on land and at sea
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
War on the Rocks @warontherocks.bsky.social · 06/10/2026
Two decades ago, the Army designed fourteen systems that only had value as a complete set. Its eventual cancellation is a useful lesson for today's biggest acquisition bets. warontherocks.com/the-unhedgea...
warontherocks.com
The Unhedgeable Bet: What the Future Combat Systems Can Teach Us About Acquisition
The Pentagon describes Golden Dome for America as a “system of systems,” an integrated air and missile defense architecture that combines space-based
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Mick Ryan @warinthefuture.bsky.social · 02/10/2026
Robert Brovdi has noted “technology is advancing so rapidly that new drones may emerge even before procurement of the previous generation is complete.” This will be something the new US Autonomous Warfare Comd might address. mickryan.substack.com/p/project-ag...
mickryan.substack.com
Project Agincourt and the New US Autonomous Warfare Command: An Initial Assessment
My initial analysis of the announcement of Project Agincourt by the Pentagon, and the October 2027 establishment of a US Autonomous Warfare Command.
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Phillips OBrien @phillipspobrien.bsky.social · 02/10/2026
Latest piece out. There was some confusion about why the UK, France and the Baltics were not invited by the US to its NATO meeting. Its actually brutally simple and part of a US strategy of divide and rule towards European security. And it might work. phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/divide-and...
phillipspobrien.substack.com
Divide And Rule: The US Strategy Towards Europe
And Why It Could Work
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
ChrisO_wiki @chriso-wiki.bsky.social · 02/10/2026
1/ Ukraine's A1 Artificial Intelligence Centre has developed, with UK support, a new AI platform called SPECTR AI to greatly reduce the time taken to detect and engage Russian targets. A Russian analysis highlights its capabilities and the threat it poses to Russian forces. ⬇️
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Cheryl in Nova Scotia 🇨🇦🍁🍁 @minibubbly.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
#Netherlands developing high-energy laser weapon to counter drone swarms—setting a goal to turn the current prototype into a fully operational military air defense system. english.nv.ua/nation/dutch...
english.nv.ua
Netherlands developing high-energy laser weapon to counter drone swarms
The Netherlands is partnering with Australian defense technology company Electro Optic Systems (EOS) to develop a high-energy laser weapon designed to destroy drones and counter large-scale aerial att...
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
404 Media @404media.co · 30/09/2026
Cloudflare, Google, and Proton were among the "dominant" infrastructure providers to sites dedicated to hosting abusive content, the study found.
404media.co
Internet Infrastructure Services Empower Deepfake Abuse, New Study Finds
Cloudflare, Google, and Proton were among the "dominant" infrastructure providers to sites dedicated to hosting abusive content, the study found.
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Agência Pública @apublica.org · 24/09/2026
🤖 DESINFORMAÇÃO | Uma rede de fazendas de conteúdo gerado por inteligência artificial promove, a partir de 255 perfis identificados com pautas da extrema direita no Instagram, ataques ao STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal), desinformação eleitoral e violência política de gênero.
dlvr.it
Fazendas de IA inflam pauta da extrema direita com 255 perfis e mais de mil posts
Rede tem 58 milhões de visualizações com colaborações para ampliar alcance de posts pró-família Bolsonaro e ataques ao STF
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
U.S. Naval Institute @usni.org · 24/09/2026
The Navy should establish permanent information warfare commanders at fleet maritime operations centers. www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/…
usni.org
Fleet MOCs Need Information Warfare Commanders
The Navy should establish permanent information warfare commanders at fleet maritime operations centers.
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Craig Martin @craigxmartin.bsky.social · 10/09/2026
Terrifying. Anthropic Says It Blocked Possible Efforts to Build Biological Weapons www.nytimes.com/2026/09/10/u...
nytimes.com
Anthropic Says It Blocked Possible Efforts to Build Biological Weapons
In a new report, the A.I. start-up added that it could not determine if the research was legitimate or nefarious, leading the company to shut down the work.
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Jorge Laurel @jorgelaurel.com · 05/08/2026
An AI agent tried to insert malicious code into a real open source project during a UK AISI evaluation. Fake identities, social engineering, edited history to cover its tracks. None of it prompted. It failed because one maintainer refused to merge unsolicited code.
linkedin.com
The Agent Went Off Script And A Human Reviewer Stopped It.
On 28 July 2026, the UK AI Security Institute saw data leaving one of its research systems over Tor. Within an hour, every related evaluation was terminated, the machines were isolated, and a security...
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Reposted by Luiz H. S. Brandão
Lisa Schiff @crkrjx.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
Tried to insert malicious code into an open-source project on GitHub. Used social engineering tactics associated w/human actors, created fake identities to get approval for its code, sent msgs & files w/malicious code to people & posted hidden, malicious prompts other AI tools might pick up.
tech.yahoo.com
OpenAI and Anthropic models went rogue during testing (again)
The UK's AI Security Institute says this is the first time it has "seen risks around autonomy and deception manifest this clearly."
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 18/06/2026
6/ The analyst's discipline: track the instrument, not the press conference. Markets and governments that price the maximalist frame will be mispriced against the text. Full assessment: intelligencenotes.com/09-Reposito...)
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 18/06/2026
5/ The Persian Gulf Strait Authority is not dissolved. Iran's chokepoint leverage survived the war intact — dormant, not dismantled. A 60-day pause on a preserved instrument is not the retirement of the instrument.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 18/06/2026
4/ Nuclear, three versions: Vance frames it as "destroy the stockpile." The text commits both sides only to "negotiate disposition." Iran says no transfer, no end to enrichment. The distance between these framings is the finding — not any settled outcome.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 18/06/2026
3/ Hormuz, three versions: Trump says the Strait is "permanently toll-free." The MOU text says "no charge for 60 days." Iran says vessels will pay "service fees." The leverage isn't gone — it's repriced.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 18/06/2026
2/ The load-bearing story isn't the deal. It's the gap between three framings of the same text: US official communication, the MOU itself, and Iranian official communication. Textbook case of framing inflation — a technical text recast as a maximalist political claim.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 18/06/2026
1/ The US-Iran "Islamabad Memorandum" (formal signing 19 June, Bürgenstock) ends 109 days of the 2026 Iran war. But read the instrument, not the headline: this is a ceasefire-and-deferral document, not a settlement. New strategic assessment.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
7/ Governance is losing the race. CCW debating LAWS since 2013 without a binding treaty. Proliferation is faster than diplomacy. Frameworks calibrated to an anticipated deployment date are already calibrated to the wrong timeline. 🔗 intelligencenotes.com/02-Concepts...
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
6/ Kargu-2, Libya 2020: UN Panel of Experts (S/2021/229) documented a possible first autonomous lethal engagement without human command authorization. The threshold event has occurred.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
5/ When 20 seconds of review covers a kill decision from an opaque classifier, IHL assumes a decision-maker that no longer exists in the loop.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
4/ IDF Lavender (2023–2024): AI generated human target lists at machine speed. ~37,000 individuals flagged. ~20 seconds of human review per case documented. The human is procedurally present and substantively absent.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
3/ Critical doctrinal distinction: "human in the loop" requires affirmative action to engage. "Human on the loop" requires only the option to intervene. Decision authority shifts to pre-mission RoE programming.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
2/ Trajectory: Phalanx CIWS (1977) as semi-autonomous precursor → Third Offset Strategy (2014) → CCW discussions from 2013 without a binding treaty → documented operational deployment in Gaza.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
1/ LAWS are not future weapons. They are deployed weapons. Platforms that independently select and engage targets without meaningful human control are already operational. Gaza 2023–present is the documentation.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
7/ The strategic paradox: Hannibal works by its own definition — denies the adversary a leverage asset — while simultaneously generating maximum information warfare damage. Both outputs produced by the same action. 🔗 intelligencenotes.com/02-Concepts...
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
6/ Structural lesson: designed for isolated incidents, not mass-hostage scenarios in civilian-dense terrain. Scaled up, produces outcomes the original framers never modeled.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
5/ October 7, 2023: ad-hoc mass application. Attack helicopters and tank fire on convoys containing both militants and hostages. Fratricide confirmed. Doctrine's logic operated without its protocol.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
4/ Rafah, 1 Aug 2014: Lt. Hadar Goldin captured. Massive artillery seals escape routes. Goldin is killed. Heavy civilian casualties. Military objective achieved. Diplomatic and informational cost: severe.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
3/ Mechanics: compressed OODA loop → maximum suppressive fire → tactical isolation → calculated fratricide tolerance as the accepted cost of denying the adversary a live captive.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
2/ Created in 1986 after the 1985 Jibril Agreement: 1,150 Palestinian prisoners for three IDF soldiers. A single captive had dictated national policy. Officially revoked in 2016. The operational ethos did not leave.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 06/05/2026
1/ The Hannibal Directive is a strategic calculus before it is a tactical protocol. No live hostage = no leverage. Maximum force — including fratricide — is preferable to a captured soldier becoming a national policy variable.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 05/05/2026
7/ The implication for defenders: the doctrine requires pre-existing exploitable fractures. Societal cohesion, institutional trust, and minority integration are not domestic policy issues. They are first-order military variables. 🔗 intelligencenotes.com/02-Concepts...
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 05/05/2026
6/ 2022 is the structural failure case. Non-military phases failed to produce collapse → forced escalation into overt conventional war → every advantage of deniability nullified.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 05/05/2026
5/ Donbas 2014–2022: Ukraine didn't collapse internally. Non-military phases stalled. Moscow was forced to escalate — stripping the plausible deniability the model depends on.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 05/05/2026
4/ Crimea 2014: near-perfect application. Information blockade + cyber disruption + deniable SOF = bloodless seizure. The target's decision cycle never opened. Annexation arrived as a fait accompli.
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Luiz H. S. Brandão @luizhsbrandao.bsky.social · 05/05/2026
3/ Five-phase model: covert vulnerability mapping → escalation via info ops → crisis initiation with proxy insertion → covert military support → overt intervention framed as peacekeeping. 4:1 non-military to military ratio.
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