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InterSecLab

@interseclab.bsky.social
174 followers 111 following 64 posts

InterSecLab is a specialized digital security laboratory with advanced capabilities in digital forensics, research and threat intelligence.

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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
Share this with anyone who uses Max, or works with people who do. Read the full report: The Max Messenger: An Analysis of Russia's State-Mandated Messaging Application. interseclab.org
interseclab.org
Home | InterSecLab
InterSecLab is a specialized digital security laboratory with advanced capabilities in digital forensics, research and threat intelligence.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
Our nine-week technical investigation found no end-to-end encryption, VPN detection, network probing, voice transcription, and address books uploaded in cleartext. Many of these capabilities can be switched on remotely by VK, for a single account, without the user ever knowing. #MaxApp
interseclab.org
The Max Messenger: An Analysis of Russia’s State-Mandated Messaging Application
VK can change what the Russian Max messenger does to you, one user at a time. Its surveillance features can be switched on without you noticing. Read our full analysis.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
For millions of people in Russia and occupied Ukraine, Max isn't optional. It's the state-mandated messenger. For journalists, activists, minorities and anyone at risk, the choice is not between convenience and privacy. interseclab.org/research/max/
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anoni.net NEWS 新聞導讀 @news.anoni.net · 29/09/2026
InterSecLab’s technical analysis of Russia’s state messenger Max
anoni.net
InterSecLab’s technical analysis of Russia’s state messenger Max
InterSecLab finds that Max, the messaging app Russia requires on new devices, has no end-to-end encryption. VPN detection, network probing and voice transcription can be switched per account from the server with nothing shown in the app. The mandate applies only to devices sold in Russia.
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anoni.net NEWS 新聞導讀 @news.anoni.net · 29/09/2026
俄羅斯國家通訊 App Max 的技術分析 InterSecLab 分析俄羅斯規定預裝的通訊 App Max,發現它沒有端對端加密。VPN 偵測、網路探測與語音轉文字都能從伺服器針對個別帳號切換,介面上沒有任何提示。預裝規定只在俄羅斯實施。
anoni.net
俄羅斯國家通訊 App Max 的技術分析
InterSecLab 分析俄羅斯規定預裝的通訊 App Max,發現它沒有端對端加密。VPN 偵測、網路探測與語音轉文字都能從伺服器針對個別帳號切換,介面上沒有任何提示。預裝規定只在俄羅斯實施。
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Steve Puluka @spuluka.bsky.social · 30/09/2026
Interesting deep dive on the mandated Russian messaging service Max from @interseclab.bsky.social This is what state mandated surveillance looks like. interseclab.org/research/max/
interseclab.org
The Max Messenger: An Analysis of Russia’s State-Mandated Messaging Application
VK can change what the Russian Max messenger does to you, one user at a time. Its surveillance features can be switched on without you noticing. Read our full analysis.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 28/09/2026
@doxajournal.bsky.social began in 2018 covering state pressure on Russian students and is now one of Russia's largest independent outlets. Follow their work at doxa.team
doxa.team
DOXA — медиа против войны, диктатуры и неравенства
DOXA — это медиа о войне, диктатуре и неравенстве. Мы создаём пространство, где можно обсуждать то, как мы могли бы изменить мир к лучшему вместе
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 28/09/2026
We shared our findings on Max, Russia's mandatory messenger, with @doxajournal.bsky.social ahead of publication. They added reporting on the Russian context and made an incredible video for the people who have to live with this app. In Russian, with English subtitles: youtu.be/zJtn19XuLo4
youtu.be
MAX тебя слышит. Обзор эксклюзивного расследования и советы как обезопасить себя
YouTube video by DOXA | ДОКСА
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VPNLab @vpnlab.io · 25/09/2026
Researchers say VK can turn on Max surveillance for one account at a time InterSecLab spent nine weeks inside Max. It reports no end-to-end encryption, an address book uploaded in cleartext and VPN checks toggled per account. #russia #max #vk
vpnlab.io
Researchers say VK can turn on Max surveillance for one account at a time
InterSecLab spent nine weeks inside Max. It reports no end-to-end encryption, an address book uploaded in cleartext and VPN checks toggled per account.
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Крым.Реалии - krymr.com [Unofficial] @ru.krymr.com.web.brid.gy · 24/09/2026
ru.krymr.com
Лаборатория InterSecLab нашла в российском мессенджере Max опции для слежки за пользователями
VK может удаленно включать отдельные функции мессенджера для конкретных аккаунтов
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Meduza in English @meduza.io · 24/09/2026
Russia’s Kremlin-backed Max messenger has broad surveillance capabilities that VK can secretly switch on or off for individual accounts, researchers found. meduza.io/en/feature/2...
meduza.io
Russia’s state-backed messaging app Max can secretly change how it surveils individual users, researchers at InterSecLab find — Meduza
The Kremlin-backed Max messenger has broad capabilities for tracking users, but their configuration can vary from account to account and is controlled by its developer, the Russian social media…
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 24/09/2026
Thank you for sharing our report with your network.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 24/09/2026
The choice Max presents is not convenience against privacy. With no viable alternative communication platforms, the choice is to use a surveillance channel operated by a hostile state or have no ability to communicate at all. Here's everything we could find: interseclab.org/research/max
interseclab.org
The Max Messenger: An Analysis of Russia’s State-Mandated Messaging Application
VK can change what the Russian Max messenger does to you, one user at a time. Its surveillance features can be switched on without you noticing. Read our full analysis.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 24/09/2026
For journalists, opposition members, lawyers, religious and ethnic minorities, queer Russians, anyone with family abroad, and Ukrainians under occupation, it is not abstract. For them, a messenger is a helpline, a livelihood, a community, and a way to reach the people who keep them alive.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 24/09/2026
What Max does today is not what Max is. Network probing, VPN detection, voice transcription and elevated logging sit behind feature flags VK can switch on remotely, for a single account, in real time. That person can be placed under closer surveillance without ever knowing it.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 24/09/2026
Some of our findings: • No end-to-end encryption at all • VPN detection that blocks message sending • Network probing • Voice transcription using a server-supplied keyword model • Real-time presence tracking for non-contacts • Address book uploaded in cleartext, names paired with numbers
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 24/09/2026
InterSecLab's new investigation: "The Max Messenger: An Analysis of Russia's State-Mandated Messaging Application." Yes, Max is built to watch you. That part isn't news anymore. What our nine-week technical investigation reveals is how far its surveillance goes. interseclab.org/research/max
Report cover by InterSecLab in deep reds and orange. A huge orange sun rises behind the dark skyscrapers of Moscow's financial district, including the twisting Evolution Tower and a tower with construction cranes on top. In the foreground, a young woman with long hair, drawn in bright orange and seen from behind, looks at her phone. Red speech bubbles with ellipses float among the buildings. White text reads "The Max Messenger: An Analysis of Russia's State-Mandated Messaging Application."
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 14/09/2026
We've expanded to LinkedIn. If that's where you follow security research and digital rights work, come find us there. Same investigations, one more place to connect. www.linkedin.com/company/inte...
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
We are honored to be shortlisted for the IJ4EU Impact Awards 2026, for The Great Firewall Export: China's Censorship Technology Goes Global. Thank you so much, @ecpmf.bsky.social.
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European Centre for Press and Media Freedom @ecpmf.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
China´s Censorship technology goes global. “The Great Firewall Export” examines the global export of China's Great Firewall and who enables it: interseclab.org/research/the... @interseclab.bsky.social @amnesty.org @justiceformyanmar.org @ftm.eu @theglobeandmail.com
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
Read The Internet Coup: interseclab.org/research/the...
interseclab.org
The Internet Coup: A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes | InterSecLab
This research reveals groundbreaking findings on how Geedge Networks is selling an extensive suite of next-generation digital repression tools to client governments around the world.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
Thank you to IJ4EU and our partners: Amnesty International, Justice for Myanmar, Paper Trail Media, The Globe and Mail, the Tor Project, Der Standard and Follow the Money. @amnesty.org @justiceformyanmar.org @papertrailmedia.de @ftm.eu @theglobeandmail.com @torproject.org @derstandard.at
investigativejournalismforeu.net
Ten investigations shortlisted for IJ4EU Impact Awards 2026 - IJ4EU
Ten outstanding investigations have been shortlisted for the 2026 IJ4EU Impact Awards, celebrating collaborative journalism that drives real change across borders in Europe.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
This took a coalition. InterSecLab built the secure research infrastructure that turned a 600GB leak into a searchable dataset for every partner, then ran the forensic analysis of how the system works.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
Already running in Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Myanmar. Internal job postings point to Malaysia, Bahrain, Algeria and India next. Where these systems run, a trusted VPN no longer guarantees safety.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
The system watches a whole country's internet: deep packet inspection, VPN blocking, real-time user tracking and mobile interception. All maintained and run from China.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
China's censorship model is now a product. Geedge Networks, founded by Fang Binxing, known as the father of China's Great Firewall, is selling it ready-made to governments abroad.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 06/08/2026
We are honored to be shortlisted for the IJ4EU Impact Awards 2026 | @ecpmf.bsky.social, for The Great Firewall Export: China's Censorship Technology Goes Global. A cross-border investigation by eight organizations. What we found, in a thread. 🧵 #IJ4EUImpactAward
Wide banner on a beige-to-pink background with cascading green binary code and scattered red Chinese characters for censorship terms such as wall, censor, delete, monitor and block. The IJ4EU Impact Award logo sits in the top left. Below it, the title "THE GREAT FIREWALL EXPORT:" in white on black bars, a red rule, and the subtitle "China's Censorship Technology Goes Global". The title repeats in italics above the byline: "By InterSecLab, Amnesty International, Justice For Myanmar, Paper Trail Media, The Globe and Mail, the Tor Project, DER STANDARD and Follow The Money". On the right, a collage of the investigation's news articles and report covers from Der Standard, Follow the Money, The Globe and Mail, Tor, InterSecLab's "The Internet Coup", Justice for Myanmar's "Silk Road of Surveillance" and Amnesty International's "Shadows of Control". A badge in the bottom right reads "Shortlisted, IJ4EU Impact Award 2026".
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Jurre van Bergen @jurrevanbergen.nl · 25/04/2026
@interseclab.bsky.social published new research and looking at the supply chain based on the Geedge Networks leak. MADLink - A Taiwanese Vestige in the Geedge Supply Chain. interseclab.org/research/mad...
interseclab.org
MADLink: A Taiwanese Vestige in the Geedge Supply Chain | InterSecLab
New findings expose a Taiwanese vestige in Geedge Networks' supply chain: 1,708 ADLINK units enabling state-level surveillance systems exported to authoritarian governments.
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Open Technology Fund @opentechfund.bsky.social · 13/11/2025
New @economist.com article cites @interseclab.bsky.social 's @opentechfund.bsky.social-supported research into how Chinese firm Geedge Networks exports internet-control technology. www.economist.com/internationa...
economist.com
China’s creepiest export surge
Countries are queuing to buy the tools and techniques of the CCP’s security state
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 30/10/2025
The translation, other #GreatFirewallExport reports, interviews, and other updates are available on interseclab.org/research/the...
interseclab.org
The Internet Coup: A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes | InterSecLab
This research reveals groundbreaking findings on how Geedge Networks is selling an extensive suite of next-generation digital repression tools to client governments around the world.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 30/10/2025
Anonymity Networks Community is a group, based in Taiwan, focused on "Anonymous Networks" and "Internet Freedom", aiming to raise public awareness about the importance of internet freedom through tools like Tor, Tails, and OONI. Learn more: anoni.net/docs/en/about/
anoni.net
About Us - Anonymity Network Community, Anoni.net/Docs
Promotion and Translation of Anonymous Network Tools: Tor, Tails, and OONI in Taiwan.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 30/10/2025
We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Anonymity Networks Community @anoni.net for their support to spreading our report further and help communities to understand the implications of these findings.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 30/10/2025
Their goal with this translation is to ensure this critical information is widely understood and discussed across diverse cultural and linguistic contexts, fostering greater dialogue and collaboration in collectively addressing the challenges of the digital age.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 30/10/2025
Readers in Chinese-speaking regions can now gain deeper insights into our findings on Geedge's suite! Our report “The Internet Coup” is now available in Traditional Chinese (using Taiwanese terminology), thanks to the translation by @anoni.net. #GreatFirewallExport anoni.net/docs/report/...
anoni.net
網路政變 / The Internet Coup | InterSecLab - 匿名網路社群 Anoni.net/Docs
關於中國網路防火牆服務輸出到其他國家,希望引起各界對網路自由和網路治理的反思和警覺
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Jurre van Bergen @jurrevanbergen.nl · 23/10/2025
PBS did a great section on the Great Firewall Export, that we published together with @papertrailmedia.de @interseclab.bsky.social @justiceformyanmar.org @theglobeandmail.com @torproject.bsky.social and us @amnesty.org. www.pbs.org/newshour/sho...
pbs.org
Massive leak exposes how China’s ‘Great Firewall’ is being exported to other countries
For years, China’s government has used what’s known as the “Great Firewall” to censor the internet inside its country and block access to select foreign websites. Now, a document leak shows that a lit...
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 16/10/2025
Our post reveals what this shift means: when repression becomes a service that can be bought, civil liberties now depend on what states can afford to purchase. Read more: interseclab.org/can-mass-sur... #GreatFirewallExport
interseclab.org
Can mass surveillance be a consumer product? | InterSecLab
Surveillance company leaks expose mass surveillance, state control, and private sector involvement. What does this mean for global privacy?
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 16/10/2025
What makes this leak significant is the technical detail showing how these systems track users across platforms, adapt to defeat Tor, and enable retroactive identification of activities that were legal at the time.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 16/10/2025
This connects to stories many outlets have covered: Myanmar's post-coup crackdown, new laws criminalizing VPNs, and the global surveillance market that emerged as Western export restrictions tightened.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 16/10/2025
Geedge Networks, founded by the architect of China's censorship system, is commercializing surveillance as a managed service — complete with maintenance, upgrades, and custom blocking rules.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 16/10/2025
Mass surveillance has become a consumer product. Our new blog post explores what 100,000+ leaked documents reveal about a new frontier in state control — and what it means for protecting privacy and digital security. Read more: interseclab.org/can-mass-sur... #GreatFirewallExport
interseclab.org
Can mass surveillance be a consumer product? | InterSecLab
Surveillance company leaks expose mass surveillance, state control, and private sector involvement. What does this mean for global privacy?
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 16/10/2025
This connects to stories many outlets have covered: Myanmar's post-coup crackdown, new laws criminalizing VPNs, and the global surveillance market that emerged as Western export restrictions tightened.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 16/10/2025
Geedge Networks, founded by the architect of China's censorship system, is commercializing surveillance as a managed service — complete with maintenance, upgrades, and custom blocking rules.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 29/09/2025
Interestingly, Geedge is developing the rules of censorship for and with the client governments. A list found inside the leak contains 281 applications to be blocked. Among them are VPNs, Tor/Orbot, the tool Psiphon, and – depending on the country – also messengers like Signal and Whatsapp.
interseclab.org
The Internet Coup: A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes | InterSecLab
This research reveals groundbreaking findings on how Geedge Networks is selling an extensive suite of next-generation digital repression tools to client governments around the world.
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Reporter ohne Grenzen @reporter-ohne-grenzen.de · 26/09/2025
Am Dienstag, dem 30. September, laden @amnesty.de und @hauberlin.bsky.social zum Event „Digital Surveillance: How States Are Spying on the Resistance“. Mehr Infos und Tickets zur Paneldiskussion: www.hebbel-am-ufer.de/programm/pde...
hebbel-am-ufer.de
Amnesty International
Digital Surveillance: How States Are Spying on the Resistance
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Lena Rohrbach @artepovera.bsky.social · 26/09/2025
Registration: www.hebbel-am-ufer.de/en/programme... Workshops and Digital Security Clinic for Civil Society (drop in) are free! If you cannot afford the evening panel ticket (8 Euro) but would like to join, reach out to me or @chorlitz.bsky.social.
hebbel-am-ufer.de
Amnesty International
Digital Surveillance: How States Are Spying on the Resistance
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Lena Rohrbach @artepovera.bsky.social · 26/09/2025
Join us? 💥Workshops w/ @papertrailmedia.de @amnesty.de @interseclab.bsky.social 💥Dig. Security Clinic w/ @accessnow.org, @pressefreiheit.bsky.social&Tact. Tech 💥Panel w/ @donncha.is @sophieintveld.bsky.social @davidyambio.bsky.social @anjaosterhaus.bsky.social &Art by @forensicarchi.bsky.social
Weißer Text auf schwarzem Grund: Digital Surveillance: How States are Spying on the Resistance, mit Logos von HAU und Amnesty International
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 26/09/2025
Other provinces affected are Fujian and Jiangsu. The Geedge activity inside China shows high levels of trust that the company enjoyed by the Chinese government. The leak also indicates a close relation between Geedge and Mesalab, an academic research laboratory at the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 26/09/2025
Previous research by the GFW Report already indicated the existence of provincial firewalls across China with different levels of surveillance and censorship. The Geedge leak confirms that. Xinjiang, the home of 11 million Uyghurs, seems to serve as a testing ground for Geedge's new features.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 23/09/2025
The unknown client: A24 is the codename for a client country we were not able to identify. Geedge’s naming convention suggests that the country starts with A and collaboration started in 2024. The implementation of Geedge tools at A24 has been in its early stages when the documents were leaked.
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InterSecLab @interseclab.bsky.social · 23/09/2025
Some ISPs that collaborated with Geedge have received investment from Western institutions. Frontiir (Myanmar) has been supported by the governments of Denmark, Norway and the UK. Safaricom (Ethiopia) received investment from the World Bank Group and British International Investment, among others.
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