You can use PingOneHound in conjunction with BloodHound Community Edition to discover, analyze, execute, and remediate identity-based attack paths in PingOne instances.

Certify 2.0 features a suite of new capabilities and usability enhancements. This blogpost introduces changes and features additions.

Discover DeepPass2 - a secret scanning tool combining BERT-based model and LLMs to detect free-form passwords, and other structured tokens and secrets with high accuracy.

How Entra Connect and Intune can be abused via userCertificate hijacking to bypass conditional access and compromise hybrid domains

BloodHound PowerShell client. Contribute to SadProcessor/BloodHoundOperator development by creating an account on GitHub.

Summary of new auditing features and deployment details

The ability of an attacker controlling one domain to compromise another through an Active Directory (AD) trust depends on the trust type and configuration. To better map these relationships and make i...

Recently, Microsoft changed the way the Entra Connect Connect Sync agent authenticates to Entra ID. These changes affect attacker tradecraft, as we can no longer export the sync account credentials…

Walkthrough of how PDQ credentials encrypts service credentials

Get the gist for Natural Language Processing (NLP) and how tokenization plays a factor

Introduction

Claude MCP server to perform analysis on ROADrecon data - atomicchonk/roadrecon_mcp_server

Rob Joyce emphasized during a House hearing how important probationary employees are to NSA efforts to counter China and other threats in cyberspace.

A new Mythic add-on for Windows Agents

Learn about protected actions in Microsoft Entra ID.

Now that we know how to add credentials to an on-premises user, lets pose a question:

It’s no secret that Microsoft have been trying to move customers away from ADFS for a while. Short of slapping a “deprecated” label on it…

Presented by Cloud Security Podcast, Advent of Cloud Security is a 24 day event where we drop new video every single day.

This is part one in a two (maybe three…) part series regarding attacker tradecraft around the syncing mechanics between Active Directory…