iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

The question we need to ask is how to minimize attack surface across the force. That might mean small autonomous vessels, that might mean distributed basing. US has been moving in this direction but not fast enough.

3291

The real problem is that the US reliance on centralized basing and large surface vessels presents a huge attack surface (quite literally) to the adversary. Given the scale of the threat and the limits on VLS tube space, "more bombs" only helps to an extent.

1272

In a China conflict for example US would be facing contested logistics and a much more sophisticated adversary with real joint strike options. US had it relatively easy with Iran, as their strike patterns were predictable and their missiles relatively unsophisticated.

1243

If the interceptor and munitions stockpile looks the way it does after a relatively brief conflict with Iran, a conflict in which logistics were mostly uncontested, then I dont think "more bombs" really solves our problems.

1251

There is a lot of very justified concern about the interceptor stockpile, but the solutions forwarded are really unconvincing. US must rethink our approach to force design more broadly. "More bombs deter more" doesn't cut it.

1528

For instance, discussions of TNF that don't factor in how adversaries view conventional counterforce, entanglement, etc.

030

But RU and PRC thinkers generally don't quite think like this - conventional level conflict has always been a major input factor for them on calculating "stability" in a way it hasn't been for US. This continues to, in my opinion, drive US mistreatment of the security environment.

140

Its explicitly assumed in US definitions of "strategic stability." The conventional stuff doesn't factor, so why worry about it? Conventional stuff is the conventional warfighter's job.

130

I'd argue that we in the United States have a tendency to do this especially (compared to RU and PRC) because our basic deterrence theory assumes that nuclear and conventional operations are effectively entirely distinct levels of conflict.

180

Yes, its now very difficult to make assessments on which particular piece of tech they fear more if RU generals view the entire thing as one conventional/nuclear strike complex.

010

My sense is that people still seem to think that Europe and Asia are going to snap awake at some point and dramatically change their approach to weapons basing, which is an argument one could have plausibly made in the Biden admin after 2021/22, and one you really can't make in the Trump admin.

1113

If you optimize for fear at the most extreme level, all you end up with is nuclear war.

120

You are doing both - US force design optimizes for a certain level of instability. You want your forces to be threatening enough to cause the adversary to think twice, but not so destabalizingly threatening that it forces the adversary to think they need to act first. Kent/Thaler 1989 says this best

120

Doesn't matter if its true (its not, in my opinion) what matters is that they strongly believe it.

140

...and if that is your view, then a significant nuclear buildup in NATO looks an awful lot like US building options for sudden counterforce campaigns to quickly paralyze RU with conventional + LY weapons. Adding additional TNF makes this concern stronger, thus increasing first strike incentives.

240

Difficult to answer briefly, but its a combination of capabilities, generation, and numbers. Keep in mind that RU generals I've read seem to view US TNF has a way US can augment conventional massed aerospace campaigns...

240

The current era of warfare is defined by high speed of detection and targeting. Introducing theater nuclear forces produces different incentives than they did in the cold war becuase of these vulnerabilities, combined with conventional entanglement. Simply carrying over cold war assumptions won't do

091

As I also said on the other site, the development of a land-based theater nuclear deterrent is defeated by geography in East Asia and in Europe is not only unnecessary, it likely simply increases Russian first strike incentives. Glance at what Gen. Karakayev has written and you'll see why.

2121

Decker Eveleth @dexeve.bsky.social · 29/08/2026

There is one additional wrinkle I'd highlight here, and that's the expenditure pressure that comes with exquisite live ISR. I suspect Maven's capabilities significantly increased expenditure by continually feeding targeters lists of dynamic targets to shoot at with whatever weapon they had on hand.

030

We seem to be ignoring a whole host of employment and strategy discussions that could make what we have and what we are building stretch. Stop letting allies put their fire control systems on full auto. Stop shooting tomahawks at low priority fixed targets. etc. etc. etc.

1141

Decker Eveleth @dexeve.bsky.social · 29/08/2026

A lot of debate right now on the stockpile is very tiring. Yes, we should build more munitions, but that only solve issues to an extent. No, "do less war" isn't really a helpful comment unless you have some sort of plan to change the landscape of American politics.

1201

E) if C or D, why did the drones explode while not on a terminal attack path? That suggests a lack of safeties. Information is very limited, but if this is true, than multiple things were either not planned for or failed during the mission for this to occur.

031

C) did they simply run out of fuel and fall out of the sky? D) or did these drones have an intentional "abort" system that makes them clobber in seemingly unpopulated areas, like Tomahawk?

131

B) the possibility of something like this happening should have been brought up during mission planning. Colocation of nuclear facilities with your mission area is a big deal.

131

This is very odd to me...its possible its true, but it raises a number of follow up questions: A) why were the drones loitering over an area 10km away, especially when that area is OBVIOUSLY a military facility?

282

There will apparently be a pretty lengthy correspondence about it in the next issue.

030

Decker Eveleth @dexeve.bsky.social · 23/08/2026

Mearsheimer's latest article reminds me of Japanese holdouts pillaging the Phillipines countryside in the 1960s. The paradigm wars are over man. You can go home.

1130

lol, Ferrari -automated tweet, sent every Sunday

070

Decker Eveleth @dexeve.bsky.social · 22/08/2026

Very funny, and also probably true.

3251

Decker Eveleth @dexeve.bsky.social · 19/08/2026

The death of hyper-specific professional forums, where knife fights can be performed safely out of the public eye, has dragged a lot of inside-baseball fighting out into the open, and now such knife fights are performed in the pages of major magazines.

161

Decker Eveleth @dexeve.bsky.social · 18/08/2026

Succeeded how? They succeeded by being a resilient regime. Id argue the cost imposition did not deter all military action, considering Trump back to war twice.

020

Limits of airpower goes both ways. I don't think a lot of possible future US military action is going to sway Iranian leaders. I am also skeptical, given all the evidence of how the WH has worked through this so far, that further Iranian cost imposition will either.

1151

Will continued Iranian cost imposition campaigns actually compel US? I think its a little unlikely. If US leadership was that cost-sensitive I think we would have taken an off-ramp months ago.

2131

Iranian leadership on the other hand think that US scaled down operations because of successful Iranian cost imposition. A lot of US leaders do not share this view. In both cases, the costs the other are attempting to impose are not actually altering decision-making.

1151

My own sense is that US decision-makers largely believe that the reason why US has scaled down operations is because the tools US was using were not fit for the job, leading to a lack of results. Iranian regime is largely stable, and costs imposed were largely irrelevant to Iran.

1151