Sign in

William Ellis

@willellisecon.bsky.social
157 followers 18 following 125 posts

Senior Economist at IPPR, focussing on the macro economy. Ex-HMT and Oxford Economics. Special interest in macro and AI/Automation. All views are my own.

PostsRepliesMedia
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 3h
As I said last year: "The smart move in autumn is to hold the forecast steady and wait for a clearer picture of the UK economy to evolve." I think that's been proven correct.
ippr.org
Navigating in the fog: Why the OBR should hold its nerve on the productivity forecast | IPPR
Productivity growth is central to the UK economy. Higher productivity allows the UK to produce more output without increasing its inputs (eg an employee pr
010
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 3h
The OBR should have waited until this year, and they could have downgraded just once to a higher level - rather than a downgrade a year ago and then (potentially) upgrade now. Some tax increases at Budget 2025 might not have been necessary if the OBR didn't jump the gun.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 3h
Interesting to see what the OBR will do in autumn, but if they do upgrade their productivity assumption I'll be the first to say I told you so (again). Excessively chopping and changing assumptions is not helpful - it means unnecessary fiscal adjustment that can damage growth.
110
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 3h
This follows huge ONS revisions to official productivity statistics, which have completely changed the picture on UK productivity (albeit through hours worked) - as highlighted by the FT.
ft.com
UK productivity grew twice as fast as thought after 2008 financial crisis
New official figures put Britain more in line with peer countries in terms of output per hour worked
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 3h
@theifs.bsky.social yesterday upgraded their medium-term assumption above the OBR, following that pre-emptive downgrade last year. They even highlight an 'important upside risk' due to the development of AI.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 3h
Over a year ago, I argued that the OBR should hold off the productivity downgrade (and received a fair bit of flack for it). This wasn't because the forecast was 100% correct, but because they should wait for uncertainty to settle. That take has aged well. A thread on why 🧵:
110
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 12/10/2026
IFS does not establish a fixed £35bn “black hole” at the Budget. They show real spending pressures and forecast changes that can go both ways. There is huge uncertainty. For instance, IFS earnings scenarios put headroom £11bn lower or £14bn higher than March, before policy.
000
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 12/10/2026
IFS show that if the gov decided not to go ahead with these real cuts - alongside increases in health growth and maintenance in defence spending - it would cost £9bn. But that is not an automatic fiscal rule shortfall, and remains a choice about what to fund and protect.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 12/10/2026
It’s a problem, but the Chancellor doesn’t have to specify which departments take the cuts at this Budget. That can wait until next year’s Spending Review. So (for now), he could pencil in future cuts without allocating them, and revisit spending if the fiscal outlook improves.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 12/10/2026
3. There’s also a legacy issue: the spending totals HMT has given the OBR imply cuts to other departments under assumptions about health, defence and other commitments. Chart 4.4 in the March OBR forecast shows the big implied real-terms cut:
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 12/10/2026
The IFS put that defence uplift at £7bn in 2029/30 and £11bn in 2030/31. That is conditional on the path to 3% and decisions that are made, not a fixed Budget bill. Funding existing defence plans is different and easier (£0.9bn unfunded in 2029/30).
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 12/10/2026
2. This includes defence reaching 3% of GDP by 2030/31. But the FT reports that Healey is shelving the 2030 deadline and leaving the bigger spending decisions until next year’s Spending Review.
ft.com
Healey to shelve his own defence spending target of 3% of GDP by 2030
Chancellor resigned as defence secretary in June over what he saw as inadequate ambition for military spending by Sir Keir Starmer’s government
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 12/10/2026
1. The £35bn number is for 2030/31, but the current fiscal-rule target is 2029/30. So it isn't a £35bn 'headroom' shortfall against that rule. Spending pressures still matter for this Budget, but these are different things. Here’s the passage:
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 12/10/2026
@theifs.bsky.social did great analysis here, but the £35bn “black hole” reporting is misleading. This is an “illustrative total” of extra spending in 2030/31, depending on policy choices and how pressures develop - not a fixed bill for the Autumn Budget. Here’s why:
132
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 08/10/2026
The government wants to support pubs and live venues - and given a tough fiscal picture - one of the best ways to do that is through reform that makes online tax fairer. @aditisriram.bsky.social has a great proposal on this below - that the chancellor should absolutely consider come budget!
010
Reposted by William Ellis
Aditi Sriram @aditisriram.bsky.social · 08/10/2026
1/ The high street has changed, but our tax system hasn't kept up. When most shopping happened in physical stores, focusing business taxation on commercial property made more sense. But with nearly 3 in 10 sales now happening online, that logic is increasingly outdated.
101
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
The framing implies that a Burnham premium is a case of when, not if. But the government can and has acted against it, and hasn't seen a premium emerge yet. It's important they carry that same emphasis into the Budget at the end of the month.
010
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
At conference, government signalled: - Commitment to fiscal rules - Welfare reform/tackling NEETs ("not progressive to allow a bigger and bigger benefits bill") - Triple lock reform, at political cost - Care service yes, but later and "fully funded and not through borrowing"
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
The ultimate test comes at the Budget (where again, fiscal credibility should absolutely be seen as vital!), but we should give credit for the fact that the new administration has treated the issue seriously so far.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
The post itself notes there "still isn't much of a 'Burnham premium'", and many other sensible economic commentators of varying views agree (of which Julian is definitely one!) The UK starts from a higher level - warranting caution - but that gap pre-dates this government.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
As I read it: if UK yields rise by more than others = really scary, because there is a "Burnham premium". They don't = really scary, because the "Burnham premium" is yet to come. Feels a bit damned if they do and damned if they don't.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 01/10/2026
I'm also concerned about UK borrowing costs and fiscal credibility, and it absolutely should be a cornerstone of the upcoming Budget. But this framing I'm seeing feels a tad unfair to me.
123
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
10/ Apart from higher inflation, these changes look positive and set to reduce some gilt market pressure - but this is just an initial view. Markets seem to agree, but it will take time to full digest. We'll start to fully understand the impact as the MPC/HMT set out more.
010
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
9/ Change 4: The Bank now expects inflation above 4% in 2027. The Bank expects around 3¾% in Q4 2026 and slightly above 4% in Q1 2027. In July it expected 3.2% for Q4 2026 and Q1 2027. A 0.8 percentage points upgrade in two months.
122
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
8/ The Treasury funds the purchase by issuing gilts, so the market absorbs the same debt either way. What changes is the maturity. HMT can retire long gilts and refinance short, which makes sense while the pressure sits at the long end.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
7/ If the Bank changes the pace of sales it is effectively setting part of the government’s borrowing plans, since HMT has to fund the purchases. Hence uncomfortable questions about the monetary-fiscal split. A fixed pace helps, and the MPC has chosen £20bn a year.
120
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
6/ The challenging part here is that Treasury becomes the buyer, so the price is agreed between two public bodies rather than set by the market. Naturally, the Treasury will have an incentive to pay less than market price
220
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
5/ Change 3: The Bank wants to sell its remaining gilts to the government, not the market. This is a fundamental shift. Rather than sell gilts to the market, the Bank has engaged HMT and the DMO on selling to them instead. Not agreed yet, and subject to a final decision.
120
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
4/ Change 2: £120bn of gilts will now never be sold, instead kept to back banknotes. Notes are a Bank liability needing interest-yielding assets behind them. Full QT would mean no assets to back. In 2006 it concluded gilts were the right backing asset. This returns to that.
110
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
3/ What changes is which gilts are sold. Sales are limited to 2035-2049 maturities. Everything longer is out for good. The Bank is the only major central bank actively selling rather than waiting for maturity. It still is, just not at the long end:
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
2/ Change 1: The Bank is slowing QT, and has taken the longest gilts out of active sales. The gilt stock falls by an average £46bn a year to 2034, down from £70bn last year. But active sales overall barely move, £21bn to £20bn.
111
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
1/ The Bank of England held rates today, as expected. But the bigger story is buried. QT (QE’s scarier evil twin) has been fundamentally rewritten. I’ve read the minutes so you don’t have to. Strap in for a dive into these key changes and what they could mean: www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/c6...
bbc.co.uk
Bank of England holds interest rates at 3.75%, but governor says high energy costs may lead to increase
Six members of the Monetary Policy Committee, which makes the decision, voted to hold the rate - while the other three wanted an increase to 4%.
185
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
8/ Ahead of last year's downgrade, I argued the OBR should hold its nerve. The data was noisy, revisions on this series run to ±0.6pp, and there was every chance it would have to revisit. Lo and behold - here we are: www.ippr.org/articles/nav...
120
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
7/ The complication is that the revision comes from lower hours, not higher output. If the OBR reduce the average hours forecast accordingly, we won't get a fiscal benefit. But the forward path is what matters here, and the OBR are unlikely to project hours to fall forever.
130
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
6/ The OBR's 0.3pp downgrade cut expected receipts by around £16bn in 2029–30, in isolation. Every 0.1pp back on the assumption could be worth roughly £5–6bn a year: obr.uk/efo/economic...
obr.uk
Economic and fiscal outlook – November 2025 - Office for Budget Responsibility
The latest update of our forecasts was published on 26 November 2025 in the November 2025 Economic and fiscal outlook. Read the Executive summary for the key messages of our forecast or the full repor...
120
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
5/ This is not a niche data release. This new component approach will replaces the current productivity statistics from November onwards. In June, the ONS also recommended against the old productivity measure - in anticipation of this release: blog.ons.gov.uk/2026/06/16/h...
blog.ons.gov.uk
How the ONS measures productivity
There has been a lot of focus recently on labour productivity, which looks at how much is produced for each hour worked across the economy. Richard Heys explains the different measures the ONS
120
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
4/ Its own briefing paper calls projections that assume "the era of low post financial crisis productivity growth continues indefinitely" the pessimistic end of the range. On the new data, 1.0% is below even that. obr.uk/docs/dlm_upl...
obr.uk
120
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
3/ The OBR cut to 1.0% at last November's Budget and held it in March, both on the old data. If the OBR keeps this, it's forecasting that productivity growth in 2030 will be slower than what the economy actually managed in the decade after the crash.
220
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
2/ On the ONS's new component approach, output per hour grew 1.3% a year in 2009–19. The old LFS-based data said 0.7%. The OBR's medium-term assumption is 1.0%. That is starting to look pessimistic.
131
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 17/09/2026
1/ Might fly under the radar with monetary policy today - but this is big news. ONS have upgraded productivity growth today using a better measure. This is one of the most consequential numbers ahead of budget, and the update could be in the Chancellor's favour. www.ons.gov.uk/releases/com...
291
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
8/ Britain should pursue this deeper cooperation whether or not it joins the bank. But it cannot make defence free. Ministers still face honest choices on tax, spending and borrowing. Full analysis: www.ippr.org/articles/joi...
ippr.org
Joining forces: A better strategy for defence spending with allies | IPPR
Appointing John Healey as chancellor signals this priority. Healey resigned as defence secretary in June over shortfalls in funding the defence investment
000
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
7/ But the big fiscal prize is deeper cooperation: buying and stockpiling together. Europe fields 178 major weapons systems to America's 30. Pooling orders cuts that duplication. Stockpiling equipment until we need it defers the cost. Together this releases ~£3.4bn in headroom.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
6/ The government should be prepared to go further. Getting to 3% of GDP would cost around £13bn more a year in today's prices. The bank helps a little by easing defence inflation. Ammunition now costs 300-600% more than in 2021. Spending without capacity just bids up prices.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
5/ What it will not do is make borrowing cheaper. Six of the nine countries committed are rated below the UK by S&P, so a better rate than gilts should not be assumed. The case for joining is industrial finance and a bigger defence industry, not cheap money for the UK gov.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
4/ On the same multiplier, £870m could support roughly £4-7bn of defence financing across members. That matters. To build capability we need firms here making the drones and artillery, not just bigger budgets.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
3/ Reported UK entry cost is around £870m over three years. That barely touches the fiscal rules. Our debt rule measures net financial liabilities, and the capital we pay in counts as an asset (as a stake in a bank), so it cancels out. Only the debt interest scores, ~£50m.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
2/ First, how it works: members put in capital as a stake in the bank, and promise more if it takes losses. The bank borrows against that backing and lends to member governments or firms in the defence supply chain. On its own figures, a £1bn stake supports £5-8bn of financing.
100
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
1/ Pleased to see the UK considering the Canada-led defence bank, as we recommended last month: ippr.org/articles/joi... We can no longer rely on US security guarantees. Building our defence with partners beyond Washington is the right instinct - but we should go further:
ippr.org
Joining forces: A better strategy for defence spending with allies | IPPR
Appointing John Healey as chancellor signals this priority. Healey resigned as defence secretary in June over shortfalls in funding the defence investment
121
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
5/ Our analysis on how a well designed, temporary price ceiling could work: www.ippr.org/articles/pri...
ippr.org
Price caps and economic stability: How to manage the Iran war energy shock? | IPPR
As it drives up inflation, we estimate the Treasury could lose up to £8 billion a year from higher debt payments and lower tax revenues that result from lo
010
William Ellis @willellisecon.bsky.social · 16/09/2026
4/ Unlike the Bank, the government does have tools to directly help. If the conflict escalates, ministers should be ready to put a temporary ceiling on household energy bills. That tackles inflation at source and prevents lasting damage to the economy.
110