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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 20/09/2026

Thanks! I can surely write a blog post. There will be a new substack soon to write regularly about hypothesis-testing and philosophy of statistics:)

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 30/08/2026

Getting an argument for the value-free ideal of science through peer review

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 27/08/2026

Enter Hegel: Indem jener sich auf das Gefühl, sein inwendiges Orakel, beruft, ist er gegen den, der nicht übereinstimmt, fertig; er muss erklären, daß er dem weiter nichts zu sagen habe, der nicht dasselbe in sich finde und fühle; mit anderen Worten, er tritt die Wurzel der Humanität mit Füßen

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PhilSci-Archive @philsci-archive.bsky.social · 29/05/2026

New on the Archive: Uygun Tunc, Duygu (2026) What is an informative replication? In: UNSPECIFIED. philsci-archive.pitt.edu/29781

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 17/08/2026

Getting more and more into crafts...

Bathory, under the sign of the black mark album cover, 1/24 diorama

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/04/2026

Sharing something completely unrelated to philosophy or science. Thinking of picking up a hobby before retirement - feels good to do something with hands in all 'this', you know.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 29/03/2026

Thanks! It is sometimes nice to aim for zero citations:)

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 05/01/2026

After 3 years, this paper is finally out OA! We engage with the idea (that many entertain, if not endorse) that science can progress (or be fixed) thanks to its incentive structures alone - no explanatory role left to truth-seeking, curiosity, or scientific integrity. doi.org/10.1007/s112...

doi.org

Individual and collective epistemic virtue in science - Synthese

Synthese - We investigate the explanatory role of epistemic virtue in accounting for the success of science as a social institution that is characterized by predominantly epistemic ends. We explore...

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 05/01/2026

If requiring that some scientists autonomously care about truth, reliability and the like sounds 'unrealistic', I guess we should remember that there is no guarantee that the scientific profession can continue without scientific progress - the former serves the latter, not the other way around.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 05/01/2026

A scientific community without (some critical mass of) virtuous scientists doesn't have the means to maintain this normative alignment. This idea is neither naive nor conservative. It has just been sidelined for being a fantasy (Probably due to the widespread allure of neoliberal fantasies).

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 05/01/2026

They provide the negative feedback mechanism that maintains the alignment between two sets of norms - the epistemic norms of science and the social norms of the scientific profession (the so-called incentives). The latter cannot do the job of the former, via some invisible hand mechanism.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 05/01/2026

We argue that it is time that we abandon this idea, which we dub 'radicalism about intellectual virtue'. Although the social system of science is well equipped to tolerate most honest error and even some misconduct, virtuous scientists play a critical role in any scientific community:

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 05/01/2026

doi.org

Individual and collective epistemic virtue in science - Synthese

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 04/12/2025

I'll discuss a forthcoming paper about the intellectual virtue, incentives in science, and whether the latter can replace the former at #APACentral in February in Chicago. Happy to meet if anyone is and want to talk.

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Reposted by Duygu Uygun-Tunc

Daniel Lakens @lakens.bsky.social · 25/06/2025

The Paul Meehl Graduate School Meta Research Symposium 2025 is on October 17. Keynote speakers are @uyguntunc.bsky.social and @lspitzer.bsky.social. The symposium is free to attend for everyone - also if you are not a PhD student. And will soon announce an extra workshop the afternoon of the 16th.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 24/05/2025

Setting aside the fact that the history of science is not neatly organisable under one methodological principle, this is not the right time to smuggle methodological anarchism. We need rigor more than ever, to be able to prevent wacky science from gaining ground and sidelining legitimate science.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 08/05/2025

We talk about this in one dedicated section (6). Here there are 2 questions that are conflated, one concerns error-control and the other evidential readiness. Values clearly apply to the second question but should not influence how we answer the first.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

In our new paper with @mntunc.bsky.social (philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25...) we reassess the Inductive Risk Argument (IRA) and its implications for the value-free ideal of science. We say that IRA's call for social value-encroachment in scientific inference is mistaken. Here's an overview:

philsci-archive.pitt.edu

Is the value-free ideal of science untenable? Part I: Inductive risk - PhilSci-Archive

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 04/05/2025

Finally saw Aristotle's Lyceum. Not much to see, really. It was fun to imagine where he might have sat, though:)

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 04/05/2025

But important to note is that convergent evidence can also be misleading in the way consensus can be misleading - if convergence is not robust, namely if the errors of different lines of inquiry are not independent. Convergent evidence then strenghtens bias.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 04/05/2025

I may have missed the whole context, but the term convergent evidence is more reflective of the inquiry process exactly because it does not misleadingly focus on the social aspect of it, which is a consequence not a cause. When ppl say science is a 'consensual' activity they miss its epistemology.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

25/We believe these arguments undermine the epistemic insufficiency thesis. But even if one remains unconvinced, there are further critical problems with legitimate value encroachment, which we explore separately. We'll address those issues in the next thread. #PhilSci #metasci

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

24/Such judgments are fallible—but they are aimed at epistemic values like coherence or accuracy, which are thought to be reliable guides to better hypotheses - while social values have no such property.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

23/When scientists judge that one piece of evidence is more compelling than another, or that one method better tracks truth, they exercise epistemic discretion. So, rational disagreement in science is possible.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

22/Science progresses because it remains open to challenge and revision. Letting social or ethical concerns lead to premature acceptance or rejection of scientific claims threatens this process, leading to epistemic stagnation masked as social legitimacy or moral progress.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

21/The 2nd problem is that when values influence thresholds, they can force scientific questions to settle prematurely, foreclosing debate, testing, and revision. This undermines science’s core virtue: its openness to self-correction.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

20/Adjusting the need for scientific rigor based on social value-judgments risks wishful thinking, because one would systematically lower the standards for pet hypotheses and increase them for alternatives.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

19/Thus, fallibility presents an ever-present challenge for science—but it is a challenge best met by reinforcing epistemic norms, not by opening inference to moral or social encroachment. Otherwise, we risk 1) wishful thinking and 2)premature closure.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

18/ On the contrary, the fallibility of scientific knowledge increases, rather than weakens, the need for epistemic discipline. If science is prone to error, introducing non-epistemic values into evidential reasoning only amplifies risks of distortion and misjudgment.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

17/Instead, they merely reaffirm what **fallibilism** already implies: scientific reasoning involves uncertainty, vagueness, and the need for judgment. But good scientific judgment need not involve extra-scientific considerations.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

16/Therefore, appeals to arbitrariness fail to establish IRA’s stronger claim: that non-epistemic values must systematically influence the internal inferential standards of science.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

15/In fact, **fallibilism** about scientific knowledge already prepares us for this: scientific judgments can be uncertain and revisable, but they can still be disciplined by epistemic norms alone.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

14/Vagueness simply means that **reasonable people may disagree** near the margins. It does not mean that there is no right answer, nor that decisions must be guided by external, non-epistemic considerations.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

13/Similarly, scientific evidential thresholds ("sufficient evidence") can be vague but they are by no means arbitrary. They are guided by epistemic standards, while open to rational contestation, and they usually reflect a strong disciplinary consensus.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

12/The paradox suggests that vagueness leads to indeterminate boundaries, but it doesn't imply that these concepts are arbitrary. In fact, there are many proposed solutions to this paradox, showing that vagueness doesn’t require arbitrary judgments.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

11/The Sorites Paradox highlights a problem with vague predicates: if one grain of sand isn’t a heap, and adding one grain doesn’t change that, when does a heap actually form? It challenges how we define thresholds for vague terms like "heap" or "significant effect”.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

10/Now, some might argue that because evidential thresholds involve vagueness, threshold-setting must be arbitrary. The classic Sorites Paradox is invoked: when is evidence "enough"? But vagueness alone does not entail arbitrariness.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

9/Second, there is **constrained arbitrariness**, where the precise location of threshold is somewhat vague or flexible but it is justified by clear epistemic norms (e.g., reproducibility, accuracy). Scientific thresholds often fall into this second category.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

8/ First, one can simply set the success criteria post hoc. Evidential thresholds typically aren't arbitrary in this sense.Thresholds are often set through shared practices and standards within a research community. Even if imperfect, these practices and standards are not without reason.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

7/ We argue that this move is problematic. **Arbitrariness** comes in different senses, and there is no sense that both applies to how scientists set evidential thresholds and lends support to IRA.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

6/So, IRA says social or moral values must guide where to set the evidential thresholds by weighing the practical consequences of different kinds of error (e.g. acceptable type 1&2 error-rates).

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

5/First, Epistemic Insufficiency. IRA highlights that evidential sufficiency thresholds are not dictated by the *internal* norms and standards of science alone. Scientific inference is not algorithmic, hence evidential thresholds are **arbitrary**.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

4/Thus IRA rests on two claims: (1) Epistemic Insufficiency: epistemic norms alone can’t settle evidential thresholds. (2) Legitimate Value-Encroachment: non-epistemic values should influence scientific inferences. We challenge both claims.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

3/To fix an evidential threshold, one must appeal to non-epistemic values as well. IRA argues that only by considering the moral or social consequences of error can such thresholds be properly set.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

2/According to IRA, setting an evidential threshold—deciding how much evidence is "strong enough" to make a scientific claim—cannot be determined purely by epistemic criteria. Scientific inference does not have purely internal standards of sufficiency.

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Duygu Uygun-Tunc @uyguntunc.bsky.social · 02/05/2025

philsci-archive.pitt.edu

Is the value-free ideal of science untenable? Part I: Inductive risk - PhilSci-Archive

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Jonathan Birch @birchlse.bsky.social · 22/02/2025

I've written a free and accessible guide to Cephalopod Sentience with Alex Schnell, Piero Amodio and Peter Morse, stunningly illustrated by Roksolana Tkach. Please download and share! It's worth it for the illustrations alone! 🐙 thebrooksinstitute.org/sites/defaul...

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Retraction Watch @retractionwatch.com · 13/02/2025

Thrilled to announce the creation of the @elisabethbik.bsky.social Science Integrity Fund to provide "funding for training programs, grants, or awards for science integrity advocates." Thanks to @science.org for covering this. Help us grow the fund with a tax-deductible donation.

science.org

Renowned scientific integrity investigator endows fund to support fellow sleuths

Microbiologist Elisabeth Bik donates $200,000 to support training, travel

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The New York Times @nytimes.com · 13/02/2025

For years, officials in the Czech Republic had pushed a dam project to protect a river south of Prague, and the critically endangered species living in it. But the project stalled. In the meantime, the beavers of Prague simply built dams themselves, saving the government some 1.2 million euros.

nytimes.com

Czech Dam Project Was Stalled by Bureaucracy. Beavers Built Their Own.

The dam project, drafted in 2018 and based on a former military training site south of Prague, had been delayed by land negotiations. Local beavers built several dams, saving the government more than ...

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