iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

7. I didn’t see the UAE-linked Russian plane registered to a company in Burkina. But it seems no doubt that UAE-supplies continue via Chad though perhaps the country is no longer the main gateway (Libya, Ethiopia, CAR etc

000

6. But a cooperation on anything else from trade to development and even security (intel sharing ?) seems possible. Apparently French business delegations are expected …. Lots of French entrepreneurs are still in Chad. It’s the only place in Sahel where you see French flags

100

5. The UN faces major funding shortfalls but got bit of relief due to a US contribution. USAID is gone but the US made a contribution. Otherwise the European Union funds now half of the UN ops (the rest also mainly comes from EU members

100

4. Total number of refugees including Chadian returnees ? Maybe 1.5 million. Given the lack of solution in sight very few have the option of going back. There are some Arab refugees who fled after the army retook Khartoum but 90% + are victims of the RSF backed by the UAE

100

3. When I visited Tine in February hundreds of Sudanese were arriving every day - mainly survivors from the RSF El-Fashir massacre who had been hiding first in villages. Now the flow is down to tens per day

100

2. The situation in the east at the Tine has calmed a bit since the incursions by the Rapid Support Force. Chad has reinforced its military presence in the borderland. Apparently the RSF tried surrounding both Tine towns (on Sudan and Chadian side), hence there incursion

100

1 N’Djamena always looks so peaceful. The principal road lining the presidential palace, which had been partially closed after the attack last year, is now fully back open. The tranquilite in N’Djamena is often deceptive

100

Posting a few thoughts about my latest trip to Chad. Our trip to Faya up in the north didn’t work out as the UN flight was cancelled due to low visibility. But it was good to be back in N’Djamena…. #chad #sudan

Ulf Laessing @ulflaessing.bsky.social · 14/04/2026

Morocco has invested for years in boosting relations with Mali by offering investments, flight connections and future Atlantic port access, which explains why Bamako has adopted the kingdom’s position in the West Sahara conflict, I told Le Monde. lnkd.in/ej8e5aMC

lnkd.in

This link will take you to a page that’s not on LinkedIn

011

Ulf Laessing @ulflaessing.bsky.social · 11/04/2026

Burkina Faso has hired some 50000 volunteers to fight jihadists, a force with little training that gets blamed for many killings of civilians, I told The Economist lnkd.in/e26BSyBk

lnkd.in

This link will take you to a page that’s not on LinkedIn

000

Reposted by Ulf Laessing

Länder-Analysen @laenderanalysen.bsky.social · 26/03/2026

Die neuen Russland-Analysen 479 sind online: Angelina Davydova & Aleksej Martow analysieren, wie der Naturschutz geschwächt wird. Dazu Kommentare von @marknkatz.bsky.social, @ulflaessing.bsky.social und @jkleinschmidt.bsky.social zu außenpolitischen Fragen. 👇 laender-analysen.de/russland-ana...

002

Ulf Laessing @ulflaessing.bsky.social · 03/02/2026

Say what you want about the US Sahel engagement - in contrast to the EU they at least have a plan on how to deal with Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso #Sahel

000

10. I also can understand those who do not want to engage with the AES. But the US, Russia, China and Turkey do, and through the Sahel pass two migration routes to Europe. The aid package was meant to ease poverty and migration pressures, so...

000

9. think the way forward would be transparency. The vote had been scheduled by a little-known technical EU body called NDICI - Global Europe - you needed to be a EU expert to spot the agenda. I was tipped of by someone so I followed it, and so was @TableBr

100

8. This is all speculation if another EU member voiced concerns. But fact is that the non-vote and last minute agenda change created a lot of friction in Brussels. And the EU gave another time the impression getting bogged down in details without seeing the big global picture

100

6. I also don't know what happened but some questions got me thinking . How much of a stumbling bloc has been the jailing (since August) of a French officer accredited as diplomat in Mali. Diplomats can be expelled but should not be jailed, this is not just for France a grievance

100

5. Some EU members had on Wednesday sent senior staff to Brussels who found out upon arriving that the vote about the aid package would not take place. "I am very angry," one EU diplomat texted me. Nobody seems to know why...

100

4. The EU Sahel envoy, Portugal's @joaocravinho.bsky.social , has tried hard to get the 27 members behind a 195 million fund for development/aid projects (it was meant to happen by end-2025). Brussels had planned for Wednesday a vote that was mysteriously removed the last minute from the agenda

100

3. Italy and to a lesser extent Spain, Germany and the Durch want to engage pragmatically with AES but not upset France which is not keen on engaging more. The rest of the EU doesn't care much. That means that like in other regions the EU does very little

100

2. EU Sahel policy has been historically dominated by France with the rest following the former colonial power for a lack of interest. But since Paris has fallen out with the AES, the EU has been unable to offer a new approach

100

1. The EU has struggled to formulate a new strategy on how to deal pragmatically with the three military-run Sahel countries. It adopted after some 18 months of debate in November a new strategy replacing the last one from 2021 with a two-page paper that says little concrete

101

Last week, the EU showed it still hasn't grasped the geopolitical game in a changing world - by failing to approve again an aid package for Mali, Niger and Burkina - just after the Mercosur fiasco and as the US reached out to the military-run Sahel countries. #sahel

121

7. For many French officers, diplomats and even aid workers Chad is about nostalgy. Everyone has relatives who lived there in colonial times. Otherwise it’s hard to explain why France invested much with its expensive military ops and development in this Central African count

010

6. Mauritania is the other Sahel country with good Paris ties but there the French have traditionally kept a low profile. Mauritania quit ages ago the CFA demonstrating its independence and the territory was never as important during colonial times as Chad.

100

5. The ending of the French mil cooperation was hugely popular with many in Chad. But non-military ties continued. AFD development work, French biz people. There’s even a French run casino in N’Djamena (lovely bar) Chad is the only Sahel country where you still see French flags

4. Deby has shown his will to diversify partnerships by ending the French cooperation. I remember the French FM was in the air when the statement came out. Having made the point Deby can now renegotiate bilateral ties with Paris understanding they are no longer the sole partner.

100

3. I don’t think there will be a return of French soldiers anytime soon. But maybe some training or intelligence sharing ? I imagine the UAE might show less interest in Chad as RSF supply routes could move to Ethiopia, South Sudan ? Most recently they already gone through Libya.

100

2. Chad is fragile, very vast and difficult to govern. Under Deby Chad has not been rocked by constant rebellions like before but the risk is toujours there. Turkish drones and UAE do not buy complete security. The French had provided territory surveillance, which drones cant

1. By ending the military cooperation, going back to independence in 1960, Deby had shown that he is serious about diversifying ties. Visit to Putin in Moscow, the massive UAE partnership, Turkish drone contractors taking over the Abeche base. Visiting Orban in Budapest

Couple of quick thoughts on Deby’s visit to Paris. Interesting that Chad and France come together again to redefine their cooperation. Even after the abrupt end of French military cooperation bilateral ties have continued normally…

111

8. This is only anecdotal but there are fewer Russian flags in Ouaga streets than two years ago when there was a real hype. Relations with Moscow are strong, there is now an embassy, but others are there too such as Turkey selling drones. Lots of Chinese business people

010

7. Russia's involvement is much smaller than in Mali. IB visits Russia, sure, but there was never Wagner deployed, only the Africa Corps in a training capacity. Numbers? Hard to say but diplomats put it at 200 or so.

100

6. Some EU members still do development cooperation. Yes, there is pan-Africanism at the top but on ministry level there is a rather pragmatic approach towards Europe/US (minus France). The government wants a bigger say in projects but this is no different from Mali or Niger

5. Some EU members still do development cooperation. Yes, there is pan-Africanism at the top but on ministry level there is a rather pragmatic approach towards Europe/US (minus France). The government wants a bigger say in projects but this is no different from Mali or Niger

120

4. Popularity of the gov? I think if there were elections, IB would win as he has put the smallest Sahel country on the pan-Africanist map. This is not about downplaying criticism of a crackdown on critics - like in Mali or Niger people don't want the old elites back.

3. Was there a (new) coup attempt in January as the government says. Impossible to find out details but you can see authorities' concern when you drive by the primature whose security seems getting upgraded whenever I visit Ouaga.

2. The security situation has been the most difficult in the Sahel until the Bamako fuel blockade started. There is no such threat in Ouaga as the center and southwest are stable. There are no attacks close to the capital. But the north, east and south remain very difficult.

1. I have been going to Burkina since 2022 building up sources but it's the most difficult Sahel country to understand as people don’t talk much (for obvious reasons) or simply don't know. The government expects loyalty and critics have been sent to the front