Taylor Kordsiemon
@tkords.bsky.social
578 followers 1.3K following 787 posts
Dad. Lawyering in Utah. Occasional pretend scholar. Movies. Books. Lawyer Work: www.mc2b.com/taylor-kordsiemon Pretend Scholar Work: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAu…
![¶24 Where an insurance policy obligates an insurer todefend claims of unintentional injury, the insurer is obligatedto do so until those claims are either dismissed or otherwise resolved in a manner inconsistent with coverage. Even where thecomplaint details egregious, intentional conduct, an expectedinjury exclusion like the one found in the Homeowners Policy doesnot relieve an insurer of its duty to defend claims ofunintentional injury. Inferences and assumptions about aninsured’s intent to injure are improper and inconsistent bothwith the well-accepted practice of alternative pleading and withour oft-repeated instruction that “insurance policies should beconstrued liberally in favor of the insured and theirbeneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes ofinsurance.” United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); seealso Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, ¶ 24, 99 P.3d 796.
¶25 Because Amica owed a duty to defend the negligentinfliction of emotional distress claims, Amica owed a duty todefend all of the claims brought by Borthick and Allen. “[W]henthere are covered and non-covered claims in the same lawsuit, theinsurer is obligated to provide a defense to the entire suit, atleast until it can limit the suit to those claims outside of thepolicy coverage.” Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice§ 136.2[D] (2d ed. 2006); see also Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v.Greenbaum, 127 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[I]f an insurer hasa duty to defend one count of a complaint, it must defend themall.”).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreid3ydvsrcey2523ai7nyxqinew4oxyy6x2w6sm5ejxx3eqiav7ite)
![Turning to this appeal, we recognize that Berriel and Farmer addressed the term “imminent” in other statutory contexts, but
we still find these decisions persuasive as to how that same word should be interpreted for purposes of the Act. And against that backdrop, we turn to the evidence presented below.
¶22 As noted, the Commissioner based his decision on the July 20 text. In the Commissioner’s view, this text was an “expression of anger” showing that Green had “some desire to engage in a physical altercation.” Even accepting that premise, however, several things stand out to us.
¶23 First, in the text, Green never said that she was actually going to hit Canteros-Alvarez. Instead, what she said was she
would like to hit her. These are different things.
¶24 Second, on the face of the text, Green expressed that desire
in conditional terms. Again, Green said that she hoped Canteros-Alvarez would “swing first so that [she could] beat the shit out of
[her].” In this sense, what she said was that she was not going to hit Canteros-Alvarez unless Canteros-Alvarez hit her first,
meaning that the threat of violence was dependent on an event that had not yet happened and might not happen. In our view, the conditional nature of this statement weakens any suggestion that
the threatened violence was “impending” and “about to occur at any moment.” Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 36 (quotation simplified).
¶25 Third, because the text was sent while the two were some distance away from each other, it seems analogous to the situation involved in Berriel. And again, the supreme court there held that although the friend told the defendant, over the phone, that she was under a threat of violence “at the time of the call,” this was distinguishable from a suggestion that she was still facing an “imminent” threat of danger at the time of the subsequent
stabbing. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 16 (emphasis omitted).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreif4ljutvcxarwvwkpnqicxeglvdf4tzmrbuobnrahglf47ibxjiv4)
![Fourth, there was no indication in the record that there was any history of violence between Canteros-Alvarez and Green, such that Canteros-Alvarez would have had some contextual reason to believe, based on past patterns, that physical violence was in any way imminent. In fact, in the ruling, the Commissioner
noted that he wasn’t “getting a sense [there had] been any actual physical contact, in terms of violent physical contact between the parties.” Rather, he observed that the conflict between the sisters “[had] to do with the acrimony that [was] going on between the parties with respect to another matter involving guardianship, or . . . [Green’s] belief that [Canteros-Alvarez] isn’t a good parent” and her desire “to try to take” Canteros-Alvarez’s son “in some
sort of legal fashion.”
¶27 Pulling all this together, we conclude that Green’s text was decidedly indefinite as to both (1) whether Green actually intended to physically harm Canteros-Alvarez, and, if so, (2) when any such violence would occur. But as noted, the Act requires proof of a threat of imminent physical harm. See Utah Code § 78B-7-102(1). Taking this statutory requirement at face value, we conclude that this text could not support the issuance
of a protective order. Because the Commissioner’s ruling was based on this text, we conclude that it should not have been issued.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreif733ibqzvtxnkoinygy6z5s246vm57no2bkknxn6aiipjdm3rvhi)
![¶17 A court may issue a protective order under the Act “[i]f it appears . . . that domestic violence or abuse has occurred” or “that there is a substantial likelihood domestic violence or abuse will occur.” Utah Code § 78B-7-603(1). In the ruling at issue, the Commissioner never referred to domestic violence, instead focusing on abuse, and the parties have followed suit on appeal. In challenging the issuance of the protective order, Green’s principal argument is that there was insufficient evidence to show that abuse had either occurred or was substantially likely to occur. We agree.
¶18 Abuse is defined under the Act as “intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to cause another individual
physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing another individual in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm.” Id. § 78B-7-102(1). As noted, Canteros-Alvarez never alleged that Green had actually physically harmed her. Instead, Canteros-Alvarez alleged that Green had abused her by placing her in fear…](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreih5xej3gvmik63kmoluyavobngyijzy37owm65fi4xxhgjvkv5loy)
![Callais does make it very difficult—perhaps almost impossible—to use the VRA to deliberately create majority-minority districts in response to “vote dilution,” which reduces the power of minority voters. Under previous Supreme Court precedent, such districts could be and were created in a wide range of circumstances in which minority influence might otherwise be diluted in the district line-drawing process, even in circumstances where there was no evidence of deliberate racial discrimination.
The VRA enforces the 15th Amendment, which mandates that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The ban on racial discrimination with respect to voting is categorical, and does not make any exception for racial gerrymandering intended to increase minority representation, rather than reduce it.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreidhseumxiq3mf3dksvqicmorfgchmmg67duzyz6eldcyxyfn6qv44)
![Article VIII, Section 13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.]
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established which shall investigate and conduct confidential hearings regarding complaints against any justice or judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the Judicial Conduct Commission may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary retirement of any justice or judge for the following:
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in office;
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law;
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties;
(4) disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties; or
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.
Prior to the implementation of any commission order, the Supreme Court shall review the commission's proceedings as to both law and fact. The court may also permit the introduction of additional evidence. After its review, the Supreme Court shall, as it finds just and proper, issue its order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the commission's order. The Legislature by statute shall provide for the composition and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreictiuwumqzrxtbabkv7pqa64ojnzwviznv36ysbk2vvvmeaoeftyi)
![The Court was led to observe that “in view of the current state of international law and of the elements of fact at its disposal, [it] cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. The Court added, lastly, that there was an obligation to pursue in good faith and to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:aeh25pysb2rcvipzfijs72gh/bafkreihx4xc4whfx2ouq7nnwcdj5uqsv3ysksdf5pahaagni7p3fadxgru)
