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Are Russian grey ops the new War on Terror?

The Russian security threat can be both real and exaggerated at the same time

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 2h

Are Russian grey ops the new War on Terror? In my latest newsletter, I ponder the parallels between the GWOT and current approaches to Russian hybrid operations and note that the threat can be both real and exaggerated at the same time.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 30/09/2026

If you’re interested in this topic, I’ll be ruminating on these ideas and how to address them in my next newsletter. Sign up to receive it when it’s next released.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 30/09/2026

This mirrors the way that terrorism was tackled: It takes a real issue and inflates it, and there is a lack of nuance and understanding in how it is discussed. This serves obvious interests, but ultimately benefits Russia more than anyone else.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 30/09/2026

It’s clear that Russia is engaging in nefarious activities across Europe and this threat exists. But the coverage often conflates different types of activity to create a ubiquitous, all-powerful bogeyman.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 30/09/2026

Every day, there are articles warning about Russian “hybrid” or “grey” operations that seek to test Western resolve, undermine its security, and push the boundaries.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 30/09/2026

To my mind, the way the media and the security community frame the “Russian threat” has a lot in common with the Global War on Terror.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 23/09/2026

I'll leave it to the lawyers to work out the validity of transferring a company to a non-existent legal entity!

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 23/09/2026

What pretty much everyone, from most of the media to the Kremlin, seems to have forgotten is that H&N became Logika Moloka in late 2025. That's the name of the company that exists in the Unified State Register and is under the control of the nephew of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 23/09/2026

On 21 September, Putin signed an executive order placing Aptar Vladimir under the control of H&N (Health & Nutrition), which previously acquired the Russian assets of French dairy company Danone. Aptar Vladimir is the Russian subsidiary of US packaging manufacturer AptarGroup.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 23/09/2026

If you've ever wondered about the dubious legality of Russian wartime asset redistribution, here's one for you: Putin has transferred control of a factory to a company that does not legally exist.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 01/09/2026

Presumably, if Chechen volunteers couldn’t give a shit about “our [ethnic] Russian people” and their liberation, they’re free to loot, because the goal is moot…

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 01/09/2026

Not “don’t loot because it’s wrong”. Not “don’t loot because it’s, you know, a crime”. But “don’t loot because it’s not in our interests”. Looting isn’t intrinsically wrong, it’s just not good for us right now.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 01/09/2026

According to Iraskhanov, “Your goal is to liberate our Russian people, right? Therefore, looting is not in our interests, it will not be correct”.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 01/09/2026

Take, for example, this treasure from May 2022: Chechen Deputy Interior Minister Aslan Iraskhanov called on volunteers about to deploy from Chechnya to Ukraine to not engage in looting.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 01/09/2026

Sometimes, when you’re researching, you come across little gems. They may not make it into publications, but they make you laugh for capturing something in an absurd way.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 27/08/2026

If anyone wants to commission something thorough on them, then get in touch!

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 27/08/2026

There isn’t much solid work on any of these groups, and the scale of their operations and the credibility of their claims is very much open to question. But their activities are not entirely fictional and there are some very interesting characters among them.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 27/08/2026

Then there’s Ilya Ponomarev’s National Republican Army www.threatologist.com/rsrl/organis..., the Russian Volunteer Corps www.threatologist.com/rsrl/organis..., and the Freedom of Russia Legion www.threatologist.com/rsrl/organis... itself.

threatologist.com

National Republican Army (NRA)

A paramilitary group opposed to the regime of Vladimir Putin that may not actually exist

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 27/08/2026

According to Volobuyev, Chernaya Iskra has carried out multiple attacks on Russian oil refineries in an attempt to undermine the Russian economy.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 27/08/2026

Igor Volobuyev, the former Gazprombank vice president who travelled to Ukraine to join the Free Russia Legion, now claims to be the representative of Chernaya Iskra. You can find a brief profile of him in the Russian Security Research Lab: www.threatologist.com/rsrl/people-...

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Volobuyev, Igor Mikhailovich

Igor Volobuyev is a former Gazprombank senior executive who is fighting against Russia in Ukraine.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 27/08/2026

One subject that is crying out for more research: The existence and operations of resistance groups operating in Russia.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 26/08/2026

This is worth bearing in mind when reading about the Chechen security services. RFE/RL is a good source and provides valuable coverage, but it also has a clear editorial agenda. It might have a higher credibility than Kadyrov, but its material shouldn’t be used uncritically.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 26/08/2026

But the video clearly does not attempt to tackle the topic objectively or critically examine competing claims. It aims to make a polemical assertion.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 26/08/2026

There is nothing in the video that is inaccurate per se: Ramzan Kadyrov has made exaggerated threats throughout the conflict; the Chechen security forces have filmed staged videos; and many people have questioned their military competence.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 26/08/2026

Take, for example, this Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty video on their early activity in Ukraine – which is fundamentally indistinguishable from anything that might be produced by the Ukrainian military or pro-Ukrainian Chechens: www.svoboda.org/a/31796860.h...

svoboda.org

"Их боится только Москва"

Кадыровцы в Украине

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 26/08/2026

The Kadyrov regime is not the only one to engage in propaganda and sometimes the line between reporting and agitprop becomes blurred in the coverage of the Chechen security services.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 25/08/2026

It also allows him to implicitly demonstrate his coercive capacity: such individuals are effectively prostrating themselves before Kadyrov in public, and in most cases it will be presumed that they are being forced to.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 25/08/2026

The propaganda usage of such people allows Kadyrov to coopt some of the legitimacy of the first war (while glossing over the awkwardness of the narrative) – both for his regime and the current war.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 25/08/2026

Chakhkiyev (presuming the man in the video was indeed the same one), is only one of a number of former separatists who are used in this way. Indeed, a core of the original kadyrovtsy were those who switched sides.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 25/08/2026

He was reportedly killed in an attempted escape in 2008, but then apparently left prison very much alive in 2017. Yet, in 2022, he claims to again be going to fight for the “motherland” – this time by fighting with the Chechen security services against Ukraine.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 25/08/2026

In 2003, Chakhkiyev was sentenced to 24 years in prison for his role in explosions at markets in Vladikavkaz in 2001–2002, as a result of which 12 people were killed and more than a hundred injured.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 25/08/2026

Chakhkiyev fought on the Chechen side against Russia in 1994 in the First Chechen War, and the video shows an interview with him given at the time, when he was only 15.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 25/08/2026

The Kadyrov regime like to use former separatist fighters as part of their effort to legitimise their activities. For example, in April 2022, Ramzan Kadyrov posted a video of a man claiming to be Ruslan Chakhkiyev.

Screenshot from video showing a man claiming to be Ruslan Chakhkiyev

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 21/08/2026

I’ll look at why it’s important that we can say who exactly is operating where and when, why geolocation is so challenging, and what potential exists for resolving the issue as far as early Chechen activity in Ukraine is concerned.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 21/08/2026

In this week’s edition of Tracing Patterns, I’m going to reflect on some of the challenges that hinder efforts to track security service operations on the ground.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 21/08/2026

We need to know where the Chechen security services have operated if we want to make reliable assessments of the scale and significance of their activities. Yet the question of where is much harder to answer than it often appears.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

Postscript: A separate RFE/RL textual report published at the same time makes it clear that the claim regarding the 141st regiment comes from the head of the office of the Ukrainian President, but that only helps if someone sees both reports.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

The reader/viewer thus emerges with a misleading impression of what claims have been made, and by whom. This is why it’s always important to go to the original source and pay close attention to the specific language that is used.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

Later Reuters reporting identified many of the units responsible for the massacre, but it was unable to confirm whether this included Chechen ones. It could only confirm that specific commanders (including that of the 141st) had been near Bucha – not that the units had actually been in the town.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

or information is carelessly juxtaposed to create a misleading impression (other sources confirmed the Chechen presence in Hostomel, not Bucha, but these locations are bundled together to make the claim technically accurate).

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

This type of reporting seen in the RFE/RL report is fairly common. Either the source of information is not clear (if the source is not Reuters, then what is it?)

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

Reuters itself made no reference to the 141st Special Motorised Regiment (which is not an army unit, but Rosgvardia). Kadyrov had confirmed the presence of the 141st Regiment in Ukraine, but not in Bucha.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

What Reuters actually said is that it “ was not able to independently verify who was responsible for killing the dead residents”. Later in its text, it cites a local resident as claiming that a Chechen had threatened her, but Reuters noted “she did not say how she knew he was Chechen”.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

The only problem is that this isn’t what the likely original source said. Reuters published a report on the Bucha massacre: www.reuters.com/investigates..., but it didn’t claim that Chechen units were definitely involved.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

The video is a masterpiece of misleading juxtaposition and inference. The viewer emerges with the impression that concrete accusations have been made against the Kadyrovtsy in relation to the massacre; the 141st Regiment has been identified; and Kadyrov has confirmed the activities of the unit.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

The video then says that “the presence of the Kadyrov Regiment in Ukraine” was confirmed by the head of Chechnya himself. The source for the principle accusations isn’t explicitly stated and the passive tense is used, but the stamp in the corner of the video implies that it was Reuters.

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Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/08/2026

It then states that Russian army units have been identified that were in Bucha, Irpen, and Hostomel – including the Akhmat Kadyrov 141st Special Motorised Regiment.

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