iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 25/08/2026

The Kadyrov regime like to use former separatist fighters as part of their effort to legitimise their activities. For example, in April 2022, Ramzan Kadyrov posted a video of a man claiming to be Ruslan Chakhkiyev.

Screenshot from video showing a man claiming to be Ruslan Chakhkiyev

121

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 05/08/2026

Here’s just one resource you might find useful: An interactive network map showing all the Chechen units and their institutional affiliations: www.threatologist.com/rsrl/researc...

Screenshot of an interactive network map of the Chechen security services

130

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 28/01/2026

Slowly but surely, the Russian Security Research Lab (RSRL) is coming to life. I've been working on this for over a year, but most of the infrastructure is in place...

140

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 22/01/2026

I have used both ChatGPT and Claude for a variety of business-related tasks. They can be genuinely useful, but sometimes they do things that are very worrying. Exhibit A, which came appended to an actual answer to a question I posed:

Text of a response from Claude detailing a word association quiz for people to learn the names and spellings of actors from the North Caucasus

110

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 09/01/2026

1) The quality of the response is directly linked to the quality of the input. Short prompts produce shitty responses. So whereas Jeremy asked a three-line prompt (see image), really you need at least a half page of instructions to get anything worthwhile.

110

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 09/01/2026

Incidents were geographically more clustered in Dagestan and more dispersed in Stavropol Kray compared to 2024.

Fig 5: A map showing the geographical distribution of incidents across the region.

110

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 09/01/2026

A total of 26 events were recorded in Ingushetia, 22 in Dagestan, and 27 in Stavropol Kray. Together, these three republics accounted for 71% of the regional total.

Fig 4: A vertical bar graph displaying the number of incidents by republic in 2024 and 2025. The details are discussed in the body of the report.

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 08/01/2026

Every year, I publish an annual report based on a unique open-source incident database that I’ve compiled. One of the most significant changes this year is a drop in the number of casualties produced by incidents: between 35 and 42 compared to 82 and 122 in 2024.

Fig. 2: Horizontal bar graph showing low and high casualty figures from rebel attacks by republic in 2025. The figures are 2 (low) and 3 (high) for Chechnya, 8 and 14 for Dagestan, 5 and 5 for Ingushetia, 2 and 2 for Kabardino-Balkaria, 0 and 0 for Karachayevo-Cherkessia, 3 and 3 for North Ossetia, and 3 and 3 for Stavropol Kray.

Fig. 3: Horizontal bar graph showing low and high casualty figures from security service operations by republic in 2025. The figures are 0 (low) and 0 (high) for Chechnya, 8 and 8 for Dagestan, 0 and 0 for Ingushetia, 4 and 4 for Kabardino-Balkaria, 0 and 0 for Karachayevo-Cherkessia, 0 and 0 for North Ossetia, and 0 and 0 for Stavropol Kray.

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 12/11/2025

And here's its faithful representation of that photo! I may be sticking with ChatGPT for this task...

010

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 12/11/2025

Because ChatGPT has been winding me up and for many things people say Claude is better, I thought I'd give it a go. Here's the picture that I gave it:

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 12/11/2025

Sometimes, what AI produces is objectively hilarious. I've been asking ChatGPT to produce illustrations from photos, according to a specified style. The output can be inconsistent and ChatGPT infuriating, but sometimes it works.

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 08/10/2025

The casualty figures were much higher in 2024 than 2025, but there’s an easy explanation for that: the major attacks in Dagestan in June 2024, which distort all the figures.

Graphic showing casualties from terrorism-related incidents across the North Caucasus in the first nine months of 2024 and 2025

110

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 08/10/2025

The bigger picture is arguably more revealing: The volume and geographic spread of incidents for the first nine months of 2025 is almost identical to the same period of 2024.

Graphic showing terrorism-related incidents across the North Caucasus in the first nine months of 2024 and 2025

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 08/10/2025

The picture is similarly ambiguous when you look at the number of casualties caused by incidents: Here, the last quarter was much less violent than the one that came before it, but more violent than the same period last year. And overall casualty figures are low.

Graphic showing casualties caused by terrorism-related incidents across the North Caucasus by quarter.

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 08/10/2025

That, however, is offset by a factors such as interconnected incidents and a series of drone attacks (which are really political violence rather than terrorism) inflating the numbers.

Graphic showing terrorism-related incidents by quarter across the North Caucasus

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 01/07/2025

Here's what the different scenarios look like when they're mapped out:

Graphic showing different scenarios for Chechen succession, varying according to the level of control exercised by the Kremlin.

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 20/05/2025

When Ramzan Kadyrov steps down as head of Chechnya, what happens? I've been playing around with visualising the different scenarios, based around two key questions: Does the Kremlin maintain control of the succession process? And do other influential actors accept a claim to power?

Visualisation of different scenarios of Chechen leadership succession

130

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 03/04/2025

This is seen mostly clearly in the number of incidents classified as successful detentions: 11 in the first quarter of 2025 compared to 16 in the same period of 2024 and 18 in the last quarter of 2024.

Graphic showing the number of incident types by quarter. There were 11 successful detentions in Q1 2025, compared with 16 in Q1 2024 and 18 in Q4 2024. By contrast, there were three insurgent attacks in Q1 2025, compared with one in Q1 2024 and three in Q4 2024.

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 03/04/2025

Political violence is down in the North Caucasus for Q1 2025 compared to both Q1 2024 and Q4 2024. That’s true for both the number of terrorism-related incidents and their deadliness. But the fall is not the result of declining insurgent activity.

Graphic showing terrorism-related incidents by quarter. There were 21 incidents in total in Q1 2025, compared to 26 in Q1 2024 and 34 in Q4 2024.

Graphic showing the number of casualties by quarter. There were eight casualties in terrorism-related incidents in Q1 2025, compared to 12 in Q1 2024 and 20 in Q4 2024.

101

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 01/04/2025

The answer is a clear yes: The number of casualties is similarly down – from 17 in 2024 to 8 in 2025. But does that mean all is rosy in the region?

Graph showing casualties in terrorism-related incidents by republic in Q1 2025 compared to Q1 2024

110

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 01/04/2025

What does terrorism in the North Caucasus look like thus far in 2025? Well, in simple terms, there has been a decline in the number of terrorism-related incidents: From 26 in Q1 2024 to 21 in Q1 2025. Is that downward trend supported by casualty figures though?

Graph showing geographic distribution of terrorism-related incidents in Q1 2025 compared to Q1 2024

141

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 25/03/2025

Who is Khuseyn Mezhidov, one of the Chechen commanders potentially implicated in the Bucha massacre?

110

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 05/03/2025

If you’re going to shake someone down, make sure they’ve not got friends in high places. This, at least, is one of the lessons from the downfall of a Russian mercenary group.

Cartoon showing a werewolf in epaulettes

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 04/03/2025

What raccoons can tell us about Russia’s violent entrepreneurs. The history of ENOT Corp mirrors the evolution of Russia’s mercenaries. 🧵

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 27/02/2025

Captchas just get more and more complicated...

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 27/02/2025

Lady Macbeth exits stage left Ayshat Kadyrova, the daughter of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrova, has announced that she is quitting as Chechen deputy prime minister, a role she has occupied since October 2023.

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 26/02/2025

I was wrong, btw: the casualty figures aren't exactly in line with population. North Ossetia is suffering much greater losses than the other federal subjects of the North Caucasus, while Chechnya and Ingushetia are relatively low. Details and discussion in Friday's newsletter.

Table showing losses weighted by population

010

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 22/02/2025

The best* book ever written on the Caucasus Emirate’s ideology is now available for pre-order. The Caucasus Emirate: Ideology, identity and insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus (Manchester University Press) amzn.eu/d/6QrSQ3h * and only

Front cover of The Caucasus Emirate: Ideology, identity and insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus

33616

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 18/02/2025

Do you want to keep up-to-date on what Russian groups are doing in Africa? Then sign up to Threat Monitor, the free newsletter that helps you stay ahead without information overload. www.threatologist.com/newsletter

010

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 18/02/2025

Where are Russian groups likely to appear in the future?

110

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 18/02/2025

But hiring states are not always happy:

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 18/02/2025

Some hiring states are positive in their assessment of Russian groups:

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 18/02/2025

There are also often early indicators that states could welcome Russian PMCs:

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 18/02/2025

The hiring states have a lot in common:

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 18/02/2025

These groups provide a range of services to hiring states, including:

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 18/02/2025

These are some of the main countries where Russian groups have been operating:

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 18/02/2025

Russia is selling security. But who’s buying? And are they getting what they pay for? Here's what the research says 🧵

Russian private military companies (PMCS) have operated across the Middle East and Africa since 2013.

But why do states hire them?

And are they happy with what they get?

Here’s what the research says.

140

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 13/02/2025

Do you want to stay ahead on key Russian security issues – without information overload? This week’s issue of Threat Monitor examines the new deal over a naval base between Russian and Sudan. It'll be out tomorrow.

110

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 13/02/2025

Putin looks like he's threatening to come round your house if you don't settle your debts. Trump looks like he's listening to a recording of himself and saying "geez, what a smart guy!" Staged photographs capturing both guys pretty well here.

Photograph of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, both on the phone

021

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 12/02/2025

*grins in data geek at the massive database of relationships among the Chechen elite and security services that I am building* 😁

010

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 12/02/2025

Stavropol Kray resident accused of financing terrorism A court has arrested a 27-year-old resident of Neftekumsk who is accused of transferring money in 2022 to an acquaintance fighting in Syria.

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 12/02/2025

The Central District Military Court has sentenced a resident of Chelyabinsk to 19 years in prison for joining a banned terrorist group, cooperating with Ukraine, carrying out an arson attack on transport infrastructure, and planning a terrorist attack on a Defence Ministry property.

Chelyabinsk man convicted of treason, sabotage and terrorism

200

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 10/02/2025

Now I just need to finish the small process of converting and verifying all my data... But when it's finished, I hope there will be: → Backgrounders and explainers on key topics → Profiles of people and organisations → A library of research → And much more! Stay tuned 😁

000

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 10/02/2025

One of my big projects this year is to create the Russian Security Research Lab - a resource hub for Russian security professionals. Notion on the backend, Super on the Front. I've just tested the technical linkup, and the good news is that it works...

Screenshot of page from the Russian Security Research Lab

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 07/02/2025

How Russia is actually run: — Putin is frequently disinterested and arbitrates between competing groups. — Subordinates innovate and then seek approval. — Decisions are often ad hoc and reactive. — Subordinates guess what is required, based on signals. — The elite are sensitive to popular opinion.

A photo of Putin yawning during a meeting

170

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 07/02/2025

Most people don’t understand how Russia makes decisions. How people think Russia is run: — Putin decides everything. — Decisions flow from the top. — Superiors implement a strategic plan. — Subordinates know what is required. — The public has no influence on decisions.

173

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 27/01/2025

Let's be clear: This is a US president calling for ethnic cleansing. Whatever euphemisms the media will come up with, the 'clean out' of Gaza proposed by Trump would be violent, non-voluntary, and identity-based.

Headline: Trump urges 'clean out' of Gaza population

086

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 23/01/2025

Who is the relative of Ramzan Kadyrov appointed to lead an OMON unit? Abdul-Kerim Kadyrov is Ramzan's cousin, and now commander of OMON Akhmat-Krepost. If you want to know more about him, I'll be including a mini-profile in tomorrow's Threat Monitor newsletter. Sign up at www.threatologist.com

000

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 15/01/2025

One of the year’s deadliest events: Coordinated attacks in Dagestan claimed up to 74 lives. The June 2024 attacks in Makhachkala and Derbent represented the largest attack the republic and the region have experienced for several years.

A graph showing the number of incidents in Dagestan. Four rebel attacks producing between 48 and 74 casualties were reported. Eighteen security service operations producing three casualties and 36 detentions were also reported.

100

Mark Youngman @threatologist.com · 14/01/2025

Security services or rebels? In 2024, one caused 89% of incidents, the other 72% of the casualties.

A graph showing terrorism-related incidents by category and republic. The details are available in the full report.

130