iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 18/02/2025

The authors said “suffer” is “language of illness” and while it may provoke empathy “it does also suggest BAME victimhood rather than steadfastness and agency”.

An example of a message that made people less likely to think of racism as a systemic problem was one that said: “This country’s black and minority ethnic communities still suffer poorer outcomes across education, employment, health and in the criminal justice system. In order to achieve genuine racial equality, we must work towards an inclusive Britain in which we all feel valued, enjoy equal opportunities and share a common sense of belonging.”

The authors said “suffer” is “language of illness” and while it may provoke empathy “it does also suggest BAME victimhood rather than steadfastness and agency”.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 18/02/2025

Job discrimination faced by ethnic minorities convinces public about racism (2022) Study finds the best way to convince the public that racism is a real problem and requires major change: tell them about a study exposing discrimination faced by job applicants. www.theguardian.com/money/2022/d...

Researchers believe they may have found the best way to convince the public that racism is a real problem and requires major change: tell them about an Oxford University study exposing discrimination faced by job applicants.

A groundbreaking project exploring how better to boost public support for action against systemic racism tested which messages best move people towards a more anti-racist position.

Reframing Race, a charity, tested dozens of arguments on almost 20,000 people and found highlighting research from 2019 showing ethnic minority applicants received less positive responses to job applications than white people, was the “blockbuster” in terms of making people more likely to agree that all races and ethnic groups are equally as capable as one other.

By contrast using well-trodden language about people “suffering” from “inequality” was less likely to convince people of the systemic problem and even sometimes backfired.

The need for better arguments was made clear by a survey for the study covering England and Scotland, which revealed widespread racist attitudes with 40% of people believing that “some races or ethnic groups are naturally harder working than others” and one in five think some races are more intelligent than others.

The research also showed it remained easier to get audiences to accept racism as a real and pressing problem than to get them to support particular solutions.

“If we want to end racism and entrench anti-racism it is critical to build public demand for deep and irreversible progress,” said Sanjiv Lingayah, report author and director of Reframing Race. “[This] shows there is still a way to go. The data shows significant attachment to deep-seated and debunked myths about ‘race’. More positively, the findings show that the public can understand systemic racism and that they can be rallied around far-reaching anti-racist solutions.”

The researchers found the message with the most potential was when people in England were told Oxford University researchers had applied for more than 3,000 jobs in the names of fictitious applicants, randomly varying the ethnicity, but keeping the skills, qualifications and work experience the same. White British applicants had to make four applications to get a positive response while ethnic minority applicants had to make seven.

“It is an almost watertight piece of evidence about the existence of racism in hiring,” the authors said. “The experiment ‘catches racism red-handed’. Naming Oxford University gives the results further credibility. And, additionally, the way that the fake CV ‘sting’ is outlined gives the message the feel of a compelling story – with plot, characters and a powerful ending.”

Other effective messages involved telling people about far worse maternal mortality rates for black women than faced by white women and even using a metaphor to describe racism as a birdcage which traps people all boosted public acceptance of racism as a problem.

120

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 18/02/2025

White people more likely to confront authors of racist online posts to set discussion rules (2024) White people surveyed indicated they'd be more likely to confront those posting racist content to defend norms for political discussion, not change their prejudices. news.illinois.edu/white-people...

“Overall, we found that reframing the confrontation goal from changing someone’s mind to setting social norms increased participants’ willingness to challenge these types of posts,” Coles said. “Participants also indicated greater willingness to confront someone they were closer to rather than someone who was relationally distant, such as a stranger or acquaintance.”

Norm-setting changes the nature of the social media environment, eroding the social power that allows users to disseminate racist ideology, the researchers said.

It also was an appealing strategy for two groups of people in the study – those who were the most cynical about the value of discussing political issues such as race and those with the greatest reluctance to challenge offensive content posted by relationally distant users such as strangers and acquaintances, the researchers found.

Some research has shown that challenging hate speech and racist stereotypes posted online reduces the odds that offenders will repeat it. However, the hostility and entrenched viewpoints that permeate online communities, as well as widespread cynicism about politics in general and the likelihood of changing others’ beliefs about race through online discourse may discourage users from objecting to racist content, according to the study.

"However, if the objective is reframed from trying to change a transgressor’s deep-seated attitudes to a potentially more achievable goal – that of defining the social norms for political discussions – participants’ willingness to confront others about racist content increases,” Coles said.

With fiery comments about societal problems such as immigration, antisemitism and police officers’ treatment of minorities commonplace on social media, there is a critical need for interventions that empower people to challenge online hate speech because it is intricately tied with perpetuating structural racism and acts of racial violence, Coles said.

“Framing the confrontation goal as norm-setting may spur white social media users to step up rather than stand by,” he said. “This may change the social power dynamics online, instead of trying to convince racist users to behave better out of the goodness of their own hearts.”

020

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 18/02/2025

Experiment #3 When far-right individuals choose to share misinformation, virtue signal. Virtue signaling is strongest when the misinformation presented relates to sacred community values (immigration, religion, nationalism).

To understand the brain activity of political extremists viewing misinformation, the researchers conducted a third experiment on 36 participants from Spain who supported the far-right political party, Vox. Here, the researchers repeated the same procedure as in the first and second experiments, but this time they conducted an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) to observe the changes in participants’ brains as they were asked to decide if they would reshare the social media post.

The experiment revealed that certain parts of the brain, like the bilateral inferior frontal cortex and the precuneus, were more active in these individuals when they contemplated sharing the post. These areas of the brain are involved in making you feel like you belong to a social group, understanding other people’s emotional states, and responding to social cues in ways that are considered socially appropriate.

Plainly speaking, when these far-right individuals choose to share misinformation, they are likely doing so because they view it as a way to signal to other like-minded extremists that they belong to the same social and political group. This need to virtue signal is the strongest when the misinformation presented to them is related to values that are considered sacred to their community, which, in the case of the far-right, may involve issues such as immigration, religion, or nationalism.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 18/02/2025

Experiment #2 Republicans who voted for Trump were undeterred by Twitter fact-checks and were willing to share the misinformation anyway. Social media fact-checks or flagging of “fake news” may not sufficiently prevent the spread of misinformation, especially if it has an extremist agenda.

For the second experiment, the researchers replicated the social media experiment in the United States, where they found similar results among Trump-supporting Republicans. In fact, Republicans who voted for Trump (and self-identified as Trump supporters) were found to be undeterred by Twitter fact-checks and were willing to share the misinformation anyway. This tells us that social media fact-checks or flagging of “fake news” may not sufficiently prevent the spread of misinformation, especially when it has an extremist agenda attached to it.

To understand the brain activity of political extremists viewing misinformation, the researchers conducted a third experiment on 36 participants from Spain who supported the far-right political party, Vox. Here, the researchers repeated the same procedure as in the first and second experiments, but this time they conducted an fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) to observe the changes in participants’ brains as they were asked to decide if they would reshare the social media posts.

100

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 18/02/2025

Experiment #1: Despite fact-checks and accuracy nudges, far-right individuals were far more likely compared to center-right individuals to reshare blatant misinformation - especially if it resonated with their sacred values & if their personal identity closely related to their political ideology.

A recent study published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General explored, through a series of three experiments, how conservatives in Spain and the United States respond to misinformation that aligns with their political values.

In the first experiment, conservatives from Spain who were either far-right or center-right were shown various social media posts criticizing the liberal government. These posts were designed to either appeal to their conservative sacred values or their non-sacred values. Sacred values are moral imperatives that people are unwilling to compromise while non-sacred values can be weighed against other values and may be subject to negotiation or trade-offs.

The experiment showed that despite fact-checks and accuracy nudges (like you would see on popular social media platforms like Twitter or Instagram), far-right individuals were far more likely compared to center-right individuals to reshare blatant misinformation. This was especially true if the post resonated with their sacred values and if their personal identity was closely related to their political ideology.

100

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 17/02/2025

How empathic we are is not just our experiences experience but also our genes - How empathetic we are is partly due to genetics (10%) - Women are on average more empathetic than men, but not due to genetics - These variants also associate with higher risk for autism www.cam.ac.uk/research/new...

The new study has three important results. First, it found that how empathetic we are is partly due to genetics. Indeed, a tenth of this variation is due to genetic factors. This confirms previous research examining empathy in identical versus non-identical twins.

Second, the new study confirmed that women are on average more empathetic than men. However, this difference is not due to our DNA as there were no differences in the genes that contribute to empathy in men and women.

This implies that the sex difference in empathy is the result of other non-genetic biological factors, such as prenatal hormone influences, or non-biological factors such as socialisation, both of which also differ between the sexes.

Finally, the new study found that genetic variants associated with lower empathy are also associated with higher risk for autism.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 16/02/2025

Airbnb is an extremely unethical company for many reasons. www.theinvisibletourist.com/why-you-shou... They also support Trump. www.newsweek.com/american-businesses-supporting-donating-donald-trump-list-2027957

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 16/02/2025

Why Russia Won’t Catch Up in the Space Race (2014) The U.S. and Russia were once the Castor and Pollux of space travel, but now - for Russia - not so much. Russia is grimly trying to claw its way back—and the grimness is a problem. time.com/2937697/russ...

And so it will probably go with Russia in space. The original space race was no less political than anything Russia is doing today, but both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were operating from positions of strength, projecting their competing power over a sprawling region of client states and taking the duel to the cosmic high ground.

Russia today—with Putin calling the shots on when a booster should be launched and the government issuing petulant threats to quit flying American astronauts to the International Space Station—is acting neither strong nor confident.

It is, instead, joining the long list of states that have dreamed of space but sought to power themselves more with rage than rocket fuel. And consider how far they’ve gotten. North Korea? Pathetic. Iran? Please. China? They’re doing great things now, but that only started when they climbed down from their revolutionary zeal and started focusing on the engineering and physics instead of the ideology and slogans.

And Russia? Not so much. The collapse of communism, the loss of Kazakhstan—which put the Baikonaur Cosmodrome, Russia’s Cape Canaveral, in an entirely different country—and hard economic times made space an unaffordable luxury. But now Russia is grimly trying to claw its way back—and the grimness is a problem.

100

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 16/02/2025

Putin and Trump could be on the same side in this troubling new world order (2016) Dugin: We must create strategic alliances to overthrow the present order, everything that is the face of the Beast, the anti-Christ. www.theguardian.com/world/commen...

Putin and Trump could be on the same side in this troubling new world order

The hacking crisis may be distracting. Us from a disturbing convergence between 2 mighty powers.

Mon. 19 December 2016 01.00 EST

[Graphi]
Graffiti depicting Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump: 'Alexander Dugan was one of the first public figures in Russia to spot that Trump was a potential ally photograph.' Mindaugas Kubis/AP.

My point is that the battle of ideas matters even when those in power pour scorn upon it, or claim themselves to be no more than practitioners of “common sense”.

Discourse analysis teaches us that ideas are the magmatic force of public life, rumbling beneath the feet of the mighty, shaping their actions and the popular response. As Isaiah Berlin put it, ideas “are indeed the central complex of relations of a man towards himself and to the external world”.

In Dugin’s case, the “central complex” is a mess of imperialism, bigotry, reactionary religiosity and a loathing of social diversity. To confuse matters further, he has borrowed from postmodernism the idea that “truth is a matter of belief … there is no such thing as facts”.

In the year of “post-truth politics”, this contention resonates all too deeply. Worse, Dugin’s ideas help to explain why the present tensions between the US and Russia may be distracting us from a potential convergence between the two mighty powers – and not the good kind, either.

This is Dugin’s world. In it, Trump and Putin, for all their differences, would be on the same side.

The core lesson of 2016 is that there is nothing inevitable in the march of progress. But it is equally true that the ultra right has no providential monopoly on success. Vile as they are, Dugin’s ideas constitute a half-mad manual to what is happening today, and may happen tomorrow. It should be read with care by all those who are planning the counterattack.

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 16/02/2025

FUN FACT: when you try to go to the OMB website to see their data from this USA Gov link (www.usa.gov/agencies/off...), it now redirects you to this instead (www.whitehouse.gov).

100

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 16/02/2025

FUN FACT: did you know there used to be a video game that was essentially The Sims, but for explaining Clinton's health plan to the common person? It was called SimHealth: The National Health Care Simulation. It was ended because it wasn't terribly fun. en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/SimHealth

[Screenshot of video game]

SimHealth: The National Health Care Simulation

100

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 16/02/2025

Psychology of Terrorism (2004) In an ongoing effort to better understand the causes, motivations & determinants of terrorist behavior through a comprehensive review of scientific and professional literature, it analyzes key findings on the “psychology of terrorism.” www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ni...

Psychology of Terrorism
Randy Borum
Director, Psychology of Terrorism Initiative

• Surprisingly little research or analysis has been conducted on terrorist recruitment. Recruitment efforts do appear concentrated in areas where people feel most deprived and dissatisfied. Relationships are critical. Effective recruiters create and exploit a sense of urgency and imminence.

• Effective leaders of terrorist organizations must be able to: maintain a collective belief system; establish and maintain organizational routines; control the flow of communication; manipulate incentives (and purposive goals) for followers; deflect conflict to external targets; and keep action going.

• Research on the psychology of terrorism largely lacks substance and rigor. Cultural factors are important, but have not been studied. Future research should be operationally-informed; maintain a behavior based focus; and derive interpretations from analyses of incident-related behaviors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 3

Introduction 4

Aims & methodology 6

Psychological approaches to understanding violence 9
*Instinct Theories
*Drive Theories (Frustration – Aggression)
*Social Learning Theory
*Cognitive Theory
*Biological Factors
*Raw Empirical Approaches

First generation psychological
research on terrorism 18
*Psychoanalytic Theory
*Narcissism
*Early Typologies

Contemporary psychological research
on terrorism 22
*How and why do people enter, stay in, and leave terrorist organizations?
*To what extent is psychopathology relevant for understanding or preventing terrorism?
*To what extent is individual personality relevant for understanding or preventing terrorism?
*To what extent are an individual’s life experiences relevant for understanding or preventing terrorism?
*What is the role of ideology in terrorist behavior?
*What distinguishes extremists who act violently from those who do not?
*What are the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups?
*How do terrorist organizations form, function, and fail?

Conclusions on the state of research 64

References 64

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 16/02/2025

Sex & the Psychology of Authoritarian Ideologies Despite socio-cultural and religious differences, racially and religiously supported totalitarian ideologies are built on similarities in societies, namely, patriarchy and sexual repression. health21initiative.org/article/sex-...

Sex-negation in children, therefore, inhibits “rebellious forces” because disobedience translates into anxiety (Reich 1947, 25).

This, accordingly, extends to other domains of social life. Reich claims that by preventing “sexual curiosity” and “sexual thinking” in a child, a general fear toward political criticality and curiosity develops. Character-analytic investigations show that, especially during the first years of childhood, imposing restrictions on sexual behaviour are consequential because the intertwining of “the socio-economic and the sexual structure as well as in the structural reproduction of society” takes place in this time frame in the patriarchal family (Reich 1947, 24).

At the cost of generalization, it can be argued that fascism is the answer to patriarchal longing. Reich clarifies the support for totalitarian systems in sex-negating patriarchies arguing that, instead of one being a clearly articulated policy of the other, their relationship is threefold:

Suppression of sex creates a structure with an interest in “actively supporting the authoritarian order;”

“The process makes the mass individual passive and unpolitical” (Reich 1947, 27, 26); As Reich already presumed in 1933, repression of “natural sexual satisfaction” results in different kinds of “substitute gratifications” – traits essential in war, such as “natural aggression” and “brutal sadism” (1947, 27).

It is, therefore, in the totalitarian system’s interest to protect itself through discourses and narratives spread in media and religion to avoid rebellion and population uprisings. The family is the “factory” of ideology for society, a function continued by religious institutions (Reich 1947, 51), which will be addressed in the following section.

Sexual suppression is that of producing an individual who is adjusted to the authoritarian order and who will submit to it in spite of all misery and degradation (Reich 1947, 25).

Patriarchies with their intrinsic suppression of sexuality in children and women are a criterion for totalitarian ideologies to gain hold and to thrive.

Repression of sexuality creates an unsatisfied human need that can shift into aggression and other radical substitution gratifications. Mysticism that upholds the impurity of sex through the patriarchal family, and later religious institutions, can also equate to an embarrassment associated with rebellion.

This is comparable to the one felt when engaging in sexual pleasure despite the societal narrative and discourse condemning it.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 16/02/2025

Here's a link to the Jack Smith Final Report. 96 mentions of Pence included. It's worth a read. www.justice.gov/storage/Repo...

152

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

National security implications, and how the national security relates to the Patriot Act and use of National Security Letters, strategic oil reserves, and crude storage.

National Security Implications [infographic]

1. Military implications
2. Economic implications
3. Border security implications

Strategic Oil Reserves and National Security [Infographic]

1. Energy Security
2. Economic Stability
3. Geopolitical Leverage
4. Supply Disruption Management
5. Energy Transition Challenges
6. Global Oil Price Influence
7. Strategic Locations.

National Security and Crude Storage [Infographic]

1. Energy security in a volatile world
2. Geopolitical considerations
3. Costs and storage capacity
4. Strategic stock pile release policies
5. Technological advances and future considerations.

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Balancing National Security and Transparency, the role of redacted documents, the balance of Freedom of Information, and protecting American jobs

Balancing National Security and Transparency [Infographic]

A. The Ethics of Redaction

B. The primary argument in favor of reduction is the preservation of national security.

C. On the other hand, critics argue that excessive reduction can hinder transparency and accountability.

D. One example that highlights ethical challenges of reduction is the release of government documents related to surveillance programs.

E. Tips for ethical reduction include ensuring that reductions are consistent and clearly marked to avoid misleading interpretations.

F. The balance between national security and transparency is a delicate one, and there is no one-size-fits-all solution.

G. In conclusion, the ethics of the reduction revolve around the tension between national security and transparency.

The Role of Redacted Documents in National Security

1. Protecting Sensitive Information
2. Preserving Operational Integrity
3. Ensuring Diplomatic Confidentiality
4. Balancing Transparency and Security
5. Case Study
6. Tips for Effective Redaction
7. Redaction in Government

Balancing National Security and Freedom of Information [Infographic]

1. The ethical dilemma
2. The need for national security
3. Freedom of information in government transparency
4. Striking a balance
5. Case studies
6. Conclusion

Protecting American Jobs and National Security [Infographic]

1. Protecting American jobs
2. National security
3. Impact on consumers
4. Alternative

100

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Striving For Transparency In National Security A compilation from various blogs that the delicate balance of transparency and protecting national security. **Link can be a bit buggy on mobile devices, but great summary & graphics.** fastercapital.com/topics/striv...

Striving for Transparency in National Security [Infographic]

1. The issue of transparency in national security is one that has sparked intense debate and controversy in recent years.

2. While it is understandable that certain aspects of national security need to be kept classified, it is crucial for governments to be transparent about their actions and decisions in order to maintain public trust.

3. One example of the importance of transparency in national security can be seen in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States.

4. Tips for achieving transparency in national security include establishing independent oversight mechanisms such as parliamentary committees. Or umbudsman to ensure the government actions are subject to scrutiny.

5. Case studies from various countries can also provide valuable insights into the challenges and benefits striving for transparency in national security.

6. On the other hand, countries like China and Russia have been criticized for their lack transparency in national security.

7. In conclusion, while achieving complete transparency and national security may not be feasible or desirable. Government must make a concerted certain effort to be as transparent as possible without compromising their ability to protect the nation.

Balancing Transparency in National Security [Infographic]

1. In the modern era of journalism, the delicate balance between transparency and national security has become an ethical dilemma that journalists often grapple with.

2. Redacted information, also known as blackout, refers to the removal of obscuring of sensitive or classified information from documents or reports.

3. One notable example of redacted information in journalism is the release of the Mueller Report in 2019.

4. Tips for journalists navigating the ethical dilemma of balancing transparency and national security include seeking alternative sources of information, conducting thorough investigations, and challenging redactions through legal means.

5. Case studies have shown the potential consequences of redacted information and journalism.

6. The impact of reducted information goes beyond the immediate limitations on public knowledge.

7. Ultimately, the ethical dilemma of balancing transparency and national security requires careful consideration and critical thinking from journalists.

Redacted Content and National Security [Infographic]

1. The Legal Perspective

2. Balancing Act

3. Exemptions and Justifications

4. Judicial Review and Transparency

5. The Snowden Effect

6. Ethical Considerations

7. The Future of Redacted Content

The Role of Coterminous Borders in National Security

1. Preventing illegal immigration

2. Stopping the flow of illegal drugs

3. Preventing the spread of diseases

4. Reducing tensions between neighboring countries

5. Enhancing trade and economic growth.

100

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Are you aware that there is a large gender gap in the tech space? What implications could this have on coders deciding what programs or initiatives are fraud or DEI? A Look at Gender Demographics in the Developer Community, Part 2 (2023) dev.to/sachagreif/a...

Using the U.S. as a baseline, while some stats point to 28.7% of software programmers being women, according to Wikipedia, “fewer than 12% of computer science bachelor's degrees were awarded to women at U.S. PhD-granting institutions in 2011.”

First, the status quo of the developer community is very male-oriented, not only in terms of demographics but also in terms of vocabulary, branding, and more. Changing that will take some deliberate action in the opposite direction, not just staying neutral.

Second, few people are actually tracking these issues in a transparent and reliable manner, and it's hard to improve what you don't track. We shouldn't be happy to merely adopt the language of inclusivity if we're not also keeping ourselves accountable to see if our efforts are effective or not.

Third, an effective way to diversify your audience is to make more beginner-friendly content, as that segment of the population is the most diverse one.

Fourth, even with the best intentions, it's really hard to break out of your own bubble. We naturally tend to attract an audience who looks, talks, and thinks like us, which is why it's so important to involve people who aren't like us every step of the way to counteract this natural tendency.

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

One way scientists can help right now.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Digital Disinformation About COVID-19 and the Third-Person Effect: Examining the Channel Differences and Negative Emotional Outcomes Links exposure to disinformation in different digital channels, TPEs, & emotional outcomes in context of a public health crisis. www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/...

Abstract

Expanding third-person effect (TPE) research to digital disinformation, this article investigates the impact of COVID-19 digital fake news exposure on individuals' perceived susceptibility of influence on themselves, their close others, and their distant others.

Findings from a survey of 511 Chinese respondents suggest that, overall, individuals would perceive themselves to be less vulnerable than close others and distant others to the impact of COVID-19 digital disinformation.

The highest self-other perceptual discrepancy is found when individuals receive disinformation on mobile social networking apps. Also, individuals who practice more active fact-checking perceive themselves to be less susceptible. The perception of disinformation effects on self as well as the self-other perceptual discrepancy is both positively related to emotional responses (anxiety, fear, and worry) to the COVID-19 pandemic.

This study contributes to existing research by linking exposure to disinformation in different digital channels, the TPEs, and emotional outcomes in the context of a public health crisis. It also highlights the importance of educating and enabling fact-checking behaviors on digital media, which could help to reduce negative emotional impact of the disinformation.

Results

Results in Table 1 showed that the perceptual gaps between one's self and distant others (t = 29.46, p < 0.001, Cohen's d = 1.84) and between one's self and close others (t = 15.95, p < 0.001, Cohen's d = 0.99) were significant, supporting H1.

Besides, the perceptual gap between close others and distance others was also significant (p < 0.001), and Cohen's d = 0.75, supporting H2.

Table 1. Mean Comparisons of Perceived Effects of Fake News About COVID-19 on Self and Others

Self Close others Distant others
Mean (SD) 1.85 (0.84) 2.79 (1.04) 3.56 (1.01)
Mean difference
Self vs. close others*** t = 15.95, p < 0.001; Cohen's d = 0.99
Self vs. distant others*** t = 29.46, p < 0.001; Cohen's d = 1.84
Close others vs. distance others*** t = 11.99, p < 0.001; Cohen's d = 0.75
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
SD, standard deviation.

As for H3, results in Table 2 showed that fake news exposure on MSNs was positively associated with self-other perceptual discrepancy (β = 0.26, p < 0.001), and the perceptions of disinformation effect on close others (β = 0.30, p < 0.001) and distant others (β = 0.30, p < 0.001).

Fake news exposure on social media was positively related to the perceptions of disinformation effects on close others (β = 0.18, p < 0.01).

Besides, fake news exposure on SLSSs was positively associated with the perceptions of disinformation effects on self (β = 0.18, p < 0.01), close others (β = 0.10, p < 0.05), and distant others (β = 0.17, p < 0.001).

No significant relationship between fake news exposure on online news media and TPE perceptions has been found.

Table 2. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Perceived Influence of Fake News About COVID-19 on Self and Others

Regarding H4, as depicted in Table 2, active fact checking behaviors were negatively associated with perceptions of disinformation effects on self (β = −0.19, p < 0.001) and close others (β = −0.11, p < 0.05).

Passive fact evaluation behaviors were positively related to perceptions of disinformation effects on self (β = 0.10, p < 0.05). H4 was partially supported.

Besides, Table 3 showed that the TPE was negatively associated with the emotions (anxiety: β = −0.13, p < 0.01; fear: β = −0.18, p < 0.001; worry: β = −0.13, p < 0.05), supporting H5.

Table 3. Hierarchical Regression Models of Emotions

Anxiety Fear Worry
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sociodemographics
Age −0.18*** −0.20*** −0.05 −0.05 −0.06 −0.10*
Gender −0.04 −0.08 −0.20*** −0.22*** −0.12** −0.17***
Education 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.17** 0.18** 0.08 0.07
Income 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.10* 0.14**
Residence 0.07 0.04 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.13** 0.08
Insurance 0.11* 0.13* 0.07 0.11* 0.05 0.07
ΔR2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06
Perceived exposure to fake news
MSNs −0.25*** −0.15** −0.17** −0.09* −0.27*** −0.17**
Social media 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.17** 0.22*** 0.10* 0.13*
Online news media 0.16** 0.16** 0.14** 0.13* 0.13* 0.14*
SLSSs 0.01 0.05 0.15** 0.20*** 0.14** 0.21***
ΔR2 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.11
Fact checking
Active fact checking −0.06 −0.11* −0.01 −0.06 −0.06 −0.12*
Passive fact evaluation 0.07 0.09* 0.12** 0.14** 0.09* 0.10*
ΔR2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Third-person variables
Self 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.17***
Close others 0.14** 0.17** 0.16**
Distant others 0.01 −0.11* 0.09
Self-other perceptual discrepancy −0.13** −0.18*** −0.13*
ΔR2 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.03
R2 0.32 0.23 0.37 0.28 0.28 0.22
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.20 0.35 0.26 0.25 0.20
F 15.41*** 11.03*** 14.36*** 15.01*** 12.56*** 8.29***
N 511 511 511 511 511 511
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Disinformation targeting communities of color is an ongoing problem that became even worse in the context of the 2020 elections taking place during the COVID-19 crisis.

Table 4. Measures for study topics.

* The total score represented the number of correct responses to the questions. An incorrect answer or an acknowledgment of uncertainty was coded as a lack of knowledge

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Nonwhite participants higher on COVID-19 disinformation beliefs tended to be male, lower in science media literacy, and lower on media literacy for source after science media literacy was statistically controlled.

Table 3. Media literacy and demographic associations with political engagement for white and nonwhite respondents.

Stepwise entry of demographics followed by stepwise entry of other independent measures. ~ns after other measures enter the equation; NW=nonwhite; W=white.

Statistical significance denoted by *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Gender coded as binary with higher score representing female. Degrees of freedom reported are for the final block of measures entering the equation.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Associations between media literacy and demographics were weak.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

People of color tended to report less general and science-specific media literacy, lower levels of voting intent, and more willingness to take risks to protest for racial justice. People of color tended to report more acceptance of COVID-19 disinformation and less accurate knowledge about COVID-19.

Findings
Finding 1: As shown in Table 1 below, people of color tended to report less general and science-specific media literacy, lower levels of voting intent, and more willingness to take risks to protest for racial justice.

This may reflect that when institutional barriers exist for making a difference through voting, people of color embrace other ways to advocate for change. They were not more likely to accept risks to protest for reopening the economy.

Finding 2: Also shown in Table 1, people of color tended to report more acceptance of COVID-19 disinformation and less accurate knowledge about COVID-19.

This is consistent with the evidence that disinformation campaigns targeting minorities in 2020 included many themes reflecting false information about COVID-19. This also aligns with concerns that accurate information has been lacking and inconsistent (Kim & Kreps, 2020).

Table 1. t-tests comparing mean scores of white and nonwhite participants for key topics. NW=nonwhite; W=white. Statistical significance denoted by *p<.01; **p<.001; The only measures nonsignificant for Levene’s test for equality of variances were Media Literacy for Content and COVID-19 disinformation Beliefs; this affects the choice of t-test used and degrees of freedom reported.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

COVID-19 disinformation and political engagement among communities of color: The role of media literacy (2021) General and science-specific media literacy skills can be protective and empowering for communities of color. misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/covi...

Research Questions

Will there be a difference in the media literacy and political belief scores between nonwhite and white respondents?

Will there be a difference in the COVID-19 knowledge and COVID-19 disinformation belief scores between nonwhite and white respondents?

To what extent will the ways media literacy associates with political behavior beliefs, COVID-19 knowledge, and COVID-19 disinformation beliefs differ for nonwhite respondents as compared to associations for white respondents?

Essay Summary

Communities of color, disproportionately affected by COVID-19 and equity gaps, also are inordinately targeted by disinformation campaigns. This study explored how media literacy might help protect individuals, particularly people of color, from believing COVID-19 disinformation and how it might promote political engagement.

Results are drawn from a representative, national survey of U.S. adult residents (N=1264) fielded June 22-July 18, 2020, with demographic and regional quotas based on the 2019 U.S. census.
Compared to white respondents, nonwhite respondents reported less media literacy, less intent to vote, more willingness to take risks to protest for racial justice (but not to reopen the economy), less COVID-19 knowledge, and more acceptance of COVID-19 disinformation.

Respondents with more media literacy about news sources tended to support taking risks to protest, and those more literate about news sources and content had greater intentions to vote, but those with more science media literacy tended to express less support for taking risks to protest.

Respondents with more science media literacy focused on critical thinking to interpret and integrate messages about scientific studies were less likely to believe COVID-19 disinformation.
The results suggest that general and science-specific media literacy skills can be protective and empowering for communities of color.

400

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Does Third-Party Fact- Checking Increase Trust in News Stories? An Australian Case Study Using the “Sports Rorts” Affair A Cautionary Tail on Fact-checking: Independent fact-checking decreased readers’ trust in the original news story and outlet. www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

Figure 2 of 3
Figure 2. Trust in the fact checked and non-fact checked news story according to partisanship, outlet and other factors.

Notes: Source, Authors; n= 1138; Note: For example to interpret the figure on general trust in the media, 98 per cent of those that trust the media “a lot” have trust in the new story.

Figure 3 of 3
Figure 3. Trust in the third-party fact-checks according to partisanship, outlet and other factors.

Source: Authors, n = 1138.

Table 1 of 2
Table 1. Fact check experiment ordinal regression models – Trust.

Table 2 of 2
Table 2. Fact check experiment ordinal regression models - Credibility.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Differences in misinformation sharing can lead to politically asymmetric sanctions Partisan asymmetries in behaviour can lead to partisan asymmetries in treatment, even when the policy is politically neutral and unbiased. www.nature.com/articles/s41...

Table 1 Set of 60 news site quality scores generated by trustworthiness ratings from 8 professional fact-checkers and from averaging the trustworthiness ratings of Democrats and Republicans to create politically balanced trustworthiness ratings from 970 laypeople
From: Differences in misinformation sharing can lead to politically asymmetric sanctions

Mainstream

Hyper-partisan

Fake news

Domain

Fact-checker rating

Politically balanced layperson rating

Domain

Fact-checker rating

Politically balanced layperson rating

Domain

Fact-checker rating

Politically balanced layperson rating

abcnews.go.com

0.56

0.45

activepost.com

0

0.2

americannews.com

0

0.22

aol.com/news

0.41

0.35

antiwar.com

0

0.18

angrypatriotmovement.com

0

0.18

bbc.co.uk

0.81

0.38

blacklistednews.com

0

0.18

bb4sp.com

0

0.18

bostonglobe.com

0.75

0.33

breitbart.com

0.16

0.22

beforeitsnews.com

0

0.19

cbsnews.com

0.66

0.48

commondreams.org

0.03

0.18

channel24news.com

0.06

0.25

chicagotribune.com

0.53

0.38

conservativetribune.com

0.03

0.24

clashdaily.com

0

0.18

cnn.com

0.84

0.47

crooksandliars.com

0.13

0.18

conservativedailypost.com

0

0.23

dailymail.co.uk

0.44

0.3

dailycaller.com

0.13

0.21

dailybuzzlive.com

0

0.24

foxnews.com

0.44

0.45

dailykos.com

0.16

0.2

downtrend.com

0

0.19

huffingtonpost.com

0.47

0.41

dailysignal.com

0

0.2

freedomdaily.com

0.03

0.2

latimes.com

0.75

0.33

dailywire.com

0.16

0.25

newsbreakshere.com

0

0.19

msnbc.com

0.66

0.44

ijr.com

0.09

0.19

notallowedto.com

0

0.17

news.yahoo.com

0.59

0.4

infowars.com

0.03

0.21

now8news.com

0

0.2

nydailynews.com

0.34

0.33

newsmax.com

0.13

0.23

onepoliticalplaza.com

0

0.19

nypost.com

0.38

0.38

patriotpost.us

0

0.21

react365.com

0

0.17

nytimes.com

0.91

0.45

rawstory.com

0.09

0.19

realnewsrightnow.com

0

0.21

sfchronicle.com

0.59

0.26

redstate.com

0.06

0.2

socialeverythings.com

0

0.18

usatoday.com

0.6…

Fig. 1: Social media users who supported Trump and/or were conservative shared links to lower-quality news sites than users who supported Biden and/or were liberal.

Several graphics illustrate this.

(A) a graph plots the low-qualtiy news sharing via fact-checker rating frequency by Biden hashtags vs. Trump hashtags

(B) a graph plots the low-quality news sharing via politically balanced layperson rating frequency by Biden hashtags vs Biden hashtags.

(C) a table is presented on those shared by people who used Trump hashtag vs shared by people who used Biden hashtag, each categorized by news site and number of shares.

Trump hashtag shares were greater for each site referenced than Biden hashtag shares.

(D) a whisker plot is presented on the correlation between conservatives and low-quality news sharing by different social media platforms

$Fig 2: Conservatives shared more false claims than liberals. [Several graphics shown] Figure 2 a,b, Distribution of the number of Twitter posts containing links to articles rated as false by professional fact-checkers (a), or rated as inaccurate by politically balanced groups of survey respondents (b), made by Twitter users estimated to be liberal versus conservative when analysing data from ref. 53. The y axis shows log10(count of primary posts containing the URL + 1). For details, see the Methods and Supplementary Information section 3.6. c,d, Analysis of sharing intentions for COVID-19 claims from a survey conducted in 16 countries, from ref. 37. Shown is the correlation between self-reported endorsement of conservative economic principles and fraction of shared content that was rated false by fact-checkers (c) or inaccurate by layperson crowds (d). Overall effect was calculated using random effects meta-analysis. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals (95% CI). For details, see the Methods and Supplementary Information section 3.7.$

Fig. 3: Political orientation is not a unique predictor of getting suspended, and politically neutral enforcement policies will lead to political asymmetries in suspension rates.

[Figure 3]
a, When considered separately, political orientation and sharing low-quality information are similarly predictive of suspension. Shown is AUC (a standard measure of predictive accuracy) when predicting whether a user was suspended using models that take different features as the independent variable.

Purple bars indicate AUC for measures of political orientation (partisanship on the basis of sharing of #VoteBidenHarris2020 versus #Trump2020 hashtags; ideology on the basis of accounts followed, estimated using the model of ref. 39; ideology on the basis of news sites shared, estimated using the model of ref. 40 or the model of ref. 12).

Green bars indicate AUC for measures of sharing links to low-quality news sites on the basis of ratings from Ad Fontes Media (AFM; http://adfontesmedia.com), Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC; http://mediabiasfactcheck.com), an aggregation of different fact-checkers and journalists33, 8 professional fact-checkers38 and 970 laypeople from the USA, weighting Democrats and Republicans equally38. Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.

See Extended Data Table 1 for results of regressions jointly considering political orientation, sharing low-quality news links and other controls. b, Simulating a politically neutral anti-misinformation policy—in which there is a constant probability of getting suspended each time a user shares a link to a low-quality news site, as judged by politically balanced groups of laypeople—leads to disparate impact against users on the political right.

Shown is the expected probability of suspension for policies that vary in their harshness (that is, in the probability of getting suspended each time a user shares a low-quality link); see the Methods for details. c, Simulating a politically neutral anti-bot …

020

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

What is lost in pointing the finger at online misinformation? Despite the evidence against social media or AI-driven misinformation being persuasive enough to swing an election, this doesn’t mean misinformation in general is not problematic in other ways.

Evidence shows that millions of Americans hold false beliefs, including in the arena of politics. Reporters have also proved that overseas actors are trying to influence what people believe and that AI has now become a major campaigning tool in elections. But the evidence from previous elections suggests such fears about the actual impact of online misinformation are largely unwarranted, at least for now.

Being interested in the pursuit of truth inevitably means journalists are concerned when they repeatedly see misinformation themselves and they may want to sound the alarm in their coverage. But it is in large part due to the work of journalists, fact-checkers and the dominance of mainstream news outlets that online misinformation does not gain as much of a foothold as we might think. The US election might be more immune to these false narratives than many outspoken pundits say.

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

How journalists unwittingly assist disinformation campaigns

Another case shows how the news media’s overemphasis of the scale or success of such campaigns may play into the hands of those running them.

The 2022 ‘Doppelganger’ campaign created a network of fake websites posing as real ones to push information in line with Russia’s war aims. Thomas Rid, an expert in information warfare who saw leaked campaign documents, wrote: “The biggest boost the campaigners got was from the West’s own anxious coverage of the project” and that “far more people likely read the secondary coverage of the exposed forgery campaigns than ever viewed the primary disinformation.”

One of the company’s stated achievements was “the publication of a number of journalistic and industry investigations into Russian disinformation campaigns,” including by Meta and the Washington Post. Mainstream media coverage of the operation was one of the goals the campaign pursued.

It’s much more difficult to understand the exposure to online misinformation today than even two years ago, says Allen, who stresses that Twitter removed its free API, Facebook replaced CrowdTangle with something less useful and TikTok “is not transparent” about the platform. Another concern is that much of the evidence on the spread and influence of misinformation comes from Western Europe and the US, so researchers are not able to draw strong conclusions about the influence of misleading content in the Global South.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Does AI pose a new misinformation risk? The 2024 presidential election will be the first where generative AI applications are available at scale prompting fears that it is “supercharging the threat of election disinformation".

The US election is only one of the dozens of electoral processes taking place in 2024. During the Indian election, generative AI was used widely, often to inject an air of fun into campaigns, including by ‘resurrecting’ famous singers or cloning politicians’ voices to make personalised campaign calls.

Consistent with Indian politics, violent rhetoric, particularly against Muslims by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s campaign, was in force and generated using AI. However, say Harvard Kennedy School’s Vandinika Shukla and Bruce Schneier, “the harm can be traced back to the hateful rhetoric itself and not necessarily the AI tools used to spread it.”

This sentiment was recently echoed by Ritu Kapur, co-founder of Indian news outlet The Quint, who said: “We didn't need AI for misinformation in the Indian elections. We have plenty coming from politicians.”

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Are fears about online misinformation in the US election overblown? The evidence suggests they might be. reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/are-fea...

According to this year’s Digital News Report, 72% of online news users in the US said they were concerned about what is real and what is fake on the internet, up by 8 points from the year before. This percentage is much higher than the 59% average across the 47 markets covered by the report. Respondents across all countries said the platforms where they found it most difficult to discern trustworthy information were X and TikTok.

But concern is not the same as exposure. A review of evidence published in Nature earlier this year documents “a pattern of low exposure to false and inflammatory content that is concentrated among a narrow fringe with strong motivations to seek out such information.”

Most people only see very little misinformation online, and the ones seeing the most are those who are most amenable and go looking for it.

This phenomenon played out during the 2016 election. A 2019 study in Science looked at the spread of ‘fake news’ on Twitter (as it was known then) published by hundreds of websites which created deliberately misleading or editorially-flawed content. Scholars continue to debate whether such content should even be considered online misinformation, but the pattern here was clear: ‘fake news’ was highly concentrated among users, with 80% of all ‘exposures’ to it seen by just 1% of individual users. On the other side of the equation, around 0.1% of users were responsible for sharing 80% of ‘fake news’ sources.

For the average user scrolling through their feeds, these tweets comprised little over 1% of the total political content they were exposed to.

This doesn’t mean misinformation doesn’t circulate through more opaque platforms. Messaging apps such as Signal, Telegram or WhatsApp are much harder to study. But it’s likely that what is known about misinformation also plays out in these spaces as well, argues Sacha Altay, a French expert in the study of misinformation at the University of Zurich: exposure is fairly limited, is concentrated among partisans and is not particularly persuasive for those not inclined to believe it in the first place.

And what do they do when they are interested? They turn to mainstream news outlets, he says. So it’s not just that average users don’t see a tidal wave of political misinformation. It’s more that many don’t see that much political news online at all.

When you see people behaving in a way that you don't understand, it can be comforting to assume that it's because they were tricked.

Jennifer Allen, University of Pennsylvania
Just as journalists may misjudge the public’s appetite for political news, they may also incorrectly attribute some people’s false beliefs or misperceptions to the kind of lies they came across on social media rather than to a more complex set of issues.

According to a study published in Nature, 70% of Twitter users were exposed to content from foreign election interference campaigns by Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA), as well as smaller campaigns, including from China, Venezuela and Iran during the 2016 US election.

Malicious actors, even if they tried, could not have an impact at scale such that there would be a material effect on the outcome of the election

Jen Easterly, US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Despite this apparent foreign disinformation blitz, people actually saw nine times as many posts coming from politicians and 25 times as many posted by news organisations. Even the content that did reach people’s screens had little impact as far as electoral politics is concerned. It mostly reached partisan Republican voters – those “least likely to need influencing” – and there was “no evidence of a meaningful relationship between exposure (...) and changes in attitudes, polarisation, or voting behaviour.”

310

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Disinformation and the public We are all responsible for combating disinformation. Here's a guide on (1) how to spot disinformation and (2) steps you can take to protect yourself from it. www.ncsc.org/consulting-a...

How to Spot Disinformation [infographic]

1. Consider the Source - Click away from the story to investigate the source.Its missions in contact info

2. Check the Author - Do a quick search on the author are they real incredible

3. Check the Date - Reposting old news stories doesn't mean they are relevant to current events

4. Supporting Sources - Click on supporting sources to verify if they are accurate and relevant.

5. Read Beyond - Headlines can be outrageous to get clicks. What's the whole story?

6. Is it a joke? It's if it's too outlandish. It may be a satire research the site and author to be sure.

7. Ask the experts - Ask a subject matter expert or consult a fact-checking website.

We are all responsible for combating disinformation.

According to the Pew Research Center, one in five Americans receive their daily news intake from social media platforms. In that same survey, 64 percent of adults said “fake news” caused confusion on basic facts, and 23 percent said they had shared “fake news,” either knowingly or unknowingly.

“Fake news” and disinformation campaigns are dangerous in democratic systems as it has the ability to affect public opinion and electoral discourse. As a collective public, we all have the responsibility to stop the spread of disinformation.

Protect yourself from disinformation by:

*Following a diverse group of people and perspectives. Relying upon a small number of like-minded news sources limits the range of material available to you and increases the odds that you may fall victim to hoaxes or false rumors. This method is not entirely foolproof, but it increases your odds of hearing diverse and well-balanced viewpoints.

*Being skeptical about news sources. In the rush to encourage clicks, many online outlets resort to misleading or sensationalized headlines. These outlets emphasize the provocative or the attention-grabbing, even if that news hook is deceptive. You have to keep your guard up and understand that not everything you read is accurate and many digital sites specialize in false news. Learning how to judge news sites and protect yourself from inaccurate information is a high priority in this digital age.

*Fact-checking before you share. When consuming your news online, make sure you know how trustworthy the source is—or whether it’s not trustworthy at all. Double-check stories from other sources with low biases and high fact ratings to find out who, and what, you can actually trust.

*Standing up against false information. If you see that someone has posted a story that is false, say something. When people chime in on a post that is false, it signals that sharing misinformation is frowned upon. By allowing misinformation to spread, you are condoning the false information.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Program is closed. www.canada.ca/en/immigrati...

230

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

What was this? You've now claimed you acknowledged that there is a threat and you also have now claimed to not be attacking. Maybe I'm not seeing what you think you were communicating. Can you explain?

110

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

The Authoritarian Playbook (2022) Authoritarian takeovers rarely happen overnight. Today’s authoritarian playbook is a process that happens piecemeal and is hard to distinguish from normal political jockeying. protectdemocracy.org/work/the-aut...

How to differentiate authoritarian threats?

Does this fit into the authoritarian playbook?

And does the actor have a pattern of following the other parts of the playbook?

*Scapegoating vulnerable communities
*Corrupting elections
*Stoking violence
*Politicizing independent institutions
*Spreading disinformation
*Aggrandizing executive power
*Quashing descent

*Is this something new?
*How significant is the deviation?
*How significant does this event deviate from modern precedent?

*With what frequency and degree is this happening?

*Does this present a systemic risk?
*Does this concentrate and consolidate power?
*Is the actor acting alone?
*How are their allies reacting?
*Is the system responding to constrain the actor?

According to these leading scholars of democracy, aspiring modern authoritarians tend to employ the same seven basic tactics in the pursuit of power.

Politicizing Independent Institutions — All democracies have functions that operate independently from partisan political actors, from law enforcement to central banking. Authoritarians attack and seek to capture those institutions.Politicizing Independent Institutions

Spreading Disinformation — Many politicians lie, but authoritarians propagate and amplify falsehoods deliberately and with abandon and ruthless efficiency.Spreading Disinformation

Aggrandizing Executive Power — Authoritarian projects cannot succeed without the cooperation or acquiescence of legislatures, courts, and other institutions.

Quashing Dissent — Strong democracies have strong oppositions and an independent press. Authoritarians seek to silence those sources of dissent.

Scapegoating Vulnerable Communities — Many authoritarians attack vulnerable groups intentionally, sowing division and attempting to turn the many against the few.Scapegoating Vulnerable Communities

Corrupting Elections — 21st-century authoritarians generally maintain the facade of elections while tilting the rules against their opponents, suppressing votes, and biasing or even overturning the results.Corrupting Elections

Stoking Violence — Most autocrats deliberately look the other way from political violence. Many actively inflame violence to stoke fear, division, and feelings of insecurity.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 15/02/2025

Where in this did you acknowledge that there's a possibility of a threat?

100

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 13/02/2025

Right-Wing Extremist Terrorism in the United States (2023) Detailed analysis of specific incidentsof extremist white-ring terrorism in the US across history and deaths related to such www.adl.org/resources/re...

Executive Summary
*Right-wing extremist terror incidents in the U.S. have been increasing since the mid-2000s, but the past six years have seen their sharpest rise yet. There were just seven right-wing terror incidents in the period 2005-2007, but by 2017-2019 there were 27, which increased to 40 in 2020-2022.

*The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) Center on Extremism (COE) has documented 67 domestic terror incidents by right-wing extremists in the United States from 2017 to 2022. These include successful terrorist attacks, failed terrorist attacks and foiled terrorist plots.

*White supremacists were responsible for more attacks than any other type of right-wing extremist in the past six years (30 of 67, or 45%), but anti-government extremists, anti-abortion extremists and other types of right-wing extremists have also plotted and carried out attacks.

*Right-wing terror attacks during this period also resulted in more deaths (58) from such attacks than any of the previous six-year periods since the time of the Oklahoma City bombing. All but five of those deaths occurred in white supremacist attacks—primarily mass shootings directed against minority targets.

*Most incidents (72%) involved only a single perpetrator, whether an arsonist targeting an abortion clinic or a white supremacist shooter targeting a synagogue.

*Single perpetrators were also far more likely to successfully carry out attacks; plots with multiple perpetrators were usually stopped by law enforcement.

*Most incidents were not committed by organized extremist groups

*Firearms were the most popular weapon chosen for attacks (27 of 67 incidents, or 40%, not counting two additional incidents where firearms were one of two weapon types). Incendiary devices (featured in 25% of incidents) were also popular, followed by explosive devices (18%).

*Right-wing terrorists considered a wide array of targets. Government targets were most frequently chosen by perpetrators (in 18 of 67, or 27% of incidents), cl…

Defining Domestic Terrorism
The Center on Extremism defines terrorism as a pre-planned act or attempted act of significant violence by one or more non-state actors to further an ideological, social or religious cause, or to harm perceived opponents of such causes. Significant violent acts traditionally associated with terrorism include bombings or use of other weapons of mass destruction, assassinations and targeted killings, shooting sprees, arsons and fire-bombings, kidnappings and hostage situations and, in some cases, armed robberies.

Domestic terrorism consists of acts or attempted acts of terrorism in which the perpetrators are citizens or long-time residents of the United States and are not members or agents of foreign or international terrorist organizations. In all but one of the incidents in this report, the attack also occurred or was intended to take place on U.S. soil. The sole exception involved an American servicemember who plotted an attack on other American servicemembers overseas.

These definitions exclude acts of spontaneous, unplanned violence — such as an anti-government sovereign citizen becoming angry and shooting a police officer who pulled him or her over for a traffic stop — as well as mere threats, such as someone posting an online threat to burn down a mosque or synagogue.

The Far-Right Threat Re-emerges
This one-two punch of a surge of right-wing anti-government extremism starting in 2008 followed by a surge of white supremacy beginning in 2015 helped create a steady rise of right-wing terrorism in the U.S. that has shown little sign of slowing down.

Significantly, the far right-surge of the 2010s did not fade away like the surges of the 1980s and 1990s; the number of terror incidents reflects this fact, consistently increasing from the late 2000s onward, reaching a high of 40 during the period 2020-2022.

[Graph pictured on Right Wing Domestic Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1993-2022 showing the number of incidents ultimately increasing over time]

Several factors have contributed to the high number of right-wing terror incidents over the course of the past dozen or so years, including:

*The staggered surges of anti-government extremism and white supremacy.

*The rise of new elements within both the anti-government extremist and white supremacist segments of the far right that each embraced violence as a tactic—specifically anti-government boogalooers and accelerationist white supremacists.

*The rise of other new forms of right-wing extremism, such as the incel subculture and the QAnon conspiracy movement,which have also produced significant violent plots and acts.

*Consistent anti-abortion terrorism throughout the period.

*The result of these developments is that the United States is currently in the throes of a significant upswing of far-right terrorism even larger than the surge in the mid-1990s that produced the Oklahoma

*City bombing. Indeed, the country is likely experiencing the highest numbers of right-wing extremist terror incidents since the white supremacist violence of the Civil Rights era. Moreover, the current elevated numbers of terror incidents show no likelihood of significantly decreasing soon.

[Figure pictured on Casualties & Dama in Right-Wing Domestic Terror Incidents, 2017-2022]

Deaths (58)^1
Wounded/Injured (52)^2
Property Destruction/Damage (16)

Notes:
1. All but one of the deaths were caused by firearms.
2. This figure should be considered a minimum, as accounts of the number of wounded people vary in some Incidents. Does not count Capitol storming injuries to law enforcement, which would at least 130 more to the total.

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 13/02/2025

Disinformation That Kills: The Expanding Battlefield of Digital Warfare Since 2016, the digital battlefield has become more sophisticated and widespread across the globe. Examines how modern warfare is waged on the internet, and the steps being taken to stop it. www.cbinsights.com/research/fut...

Since the revelations of Russia spreading false information via social media to interfere in the 2016 US election, the digital battlefield has expanded to include new players and more sophisticated techniques.

2020 has been a breakout year for information warfare, as indicated by the dramatic increase in news mentions of “disinformation” and “misinformation.”

First, the Covid-19 outbreak spawned an infodemic, with false information about virus treatments and conspiracy theories proliferating online.

Then, ahead of the 2020 US presidential election, National Counterintelligence and Security Center director William Evanina warned of nations — including Iran, China, and others — seeking to “use influence measures in social and traditional media in an effort to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, to shift U.S. policies, to increase discord and to undermine confidence in our democratic process.”

Future of Information Warfare [Graphic]

Citizens will find themselves in the digital crossfire of international conflicts that exploit online platforms can with convincing disinformation campaigns

1. Reconnaissance - An adversary identifies target attributes in monitors plot line platforms.

2. Weaponization - Realistic false content is created with AI-enabled software.

3. Attack - False content is planted in promising online venues (e.g., groups, hashtags, messages).

4. Infection - Bots and algorithms share and drive engagement with false content.

5. Impact - False narratives overcome factual ones and spur beliefs and actions favorable to the adversary.

3. Computational propaganda: digitizing the manipulation of public opinion
Nearly half of the world’s population is active on social media, spending an average of almost 2.5 hours on these platforms per day. Recent polls indicate Americans are more likely to receive political and election news from social media than cable television.

[Graph: Number of people using social media platforms, 2004 to 2018]
[Source: Statistics and TNW (2019), Source: Our World Data]
[Graph shows increases from 2004 to 2018 starting from 0 to 2 billion with platforms from largest to smallest being: Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Instagram, WeChat, Tumblr, TikTok, Reddit,Twitter, Pinterest, Snapchat, Myspace]

User engagement helps the corporate owners of these platforms — most notably Facebook and Google — generate sizable revenues from advertising.

To drive this engagement, companies employ continually changing algorithms with largely unknown mechanics. High-level details provided by TikTok and Facebook indicate that their algorithms surface the content most likely to appeal to a particular user to the top of their feed

Discussion of algorithmic-induced bias in the media has increased over the past 5 years, largely tracking artificial intelligence’s application in products ranging from facial recognition to social media.

[Graph pictured of News Coverage with the x-axis labeled 'bias and algorithm' and the y-axis as 'News coverage; the trend line increases from 2015 to 2025, especially since 2020]

The use of algorithms has caused concern about social media perpetuating bias and creating “filter bubbles” — meaning that users develop tunnel vision from engaging predominantly with content and opinions that reinforce their existing beliefs.

040

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 13/02/2025

8 Recommendations for Countering Misinformation (2024) Specific ways to meet the ongoing risk of misinformation to health, well-being, and civic life www.apa.org/topics/journ...

Although significant questions remain, psychological science yields important conclusions about the origins and spread of misinformation and how to counter it effectively. Based on these findings, here are eight specific recommendations for scientists, policymakers, media, and the public to meet the ongoing risk of misinformation to health, well-being, and civic life.

*Avoid repeating misinformation without including a correction
The repetition of false claims increases belief in those claims, a phenomenon known as the illusory truth effect. People of all ages are susceptible to illusory truth, even when they already have relevant prior knowledge about the topic. When media sources, political elites, or celebrities repeat misinformation, their influence and repetition can perpetuate false beliefs. Repeating misinformation is necessary only when actively correcting a falsehood. In these cases, the falsehood should be repeated briefly, with the correction featured more prominently than the falsehood itself.

*Collaborate with social media companies to understand and reduce the spread of harmful misinformation
Most misinformation on social media is shared by very few users, even during public health emergencies. These “superspreaders” can play an outsized role in distributing misinformation. Social media “echo chambers” bind and isolate communities with similar beliefs, which aids the spread of falsehoods and impedes the spread of factual corrections. On social media, sensational, moral, emotional, and derogatory content about the “other side” can spread faster than neutral or positive content. Scientists, policymakers, and public health professionals should work with online platforms to understand and harness the incentive structures of social media to reduce the spread of dangerous misinformation.

*Use misinformation correction strategies with tools already proven to promote healthy behaviors
Psychological science research shows that the link between knowledge and behavior is imperfect. There is strong evidence that curbing misperceptions can change underlying health-related beliefs and attitudes, but it may not be sufficient to change real-world behavior and decision-making. Correcting misinformation with accurate health guidance is vital, but it must happen in concert with evidence-based strategies that promote healthy behaviors (e.g., counseling, skills training, incentives, social norms).

*Leverage trusted sources to counter misinformation and provide accurate health information
People believe and spread misinformation for many reasons: They may find it consistent with their social or political identity, they may fail to consider its accuracy, or they may find it entertaining or rewarding. These motivations are complex and often interrelated. Attempts to correct misinformation and reduce its spread are most successful when the information comes from trusted sources and representatives, including religious, political, and community leaders.

*Debunk misinformation often and repeatedly using evidence-based methods
Research shows that debunking misinformation is generally effective across ages and cultures. However, debunking doesn’t always eliminate misperceptions completely. Corrections should feature prominently with the misinformation so that accurate information is properly stored and retrieved from memory. Debunking is most effective when it comes from trusted sources, provides sufficient detail about why the claim is false, and offers guidance on what is true instead. Because the effectiveness of debunking fades over time, it should be repeated through trusted channels and evidence-based methods.

Prebunk misinformation to inoculate susceptible audiences by building skills and resilience from an early age
Instead of correcting misinformation after the fact, “prebunking” should be the first line of defense to build public resilience to misinformation in advance. Studies show that psychological inoculation interventions can help people identify individual examples of misinformation or the overarching techniques commonly used in misinformation campaigns. Prebunking can be scaled to reach millions on social media with short videos or messages, or it can be administered in the form of interactive tools involving games or quizzes. However, the effects of prebunking fade over time; regular “boosters” may be necessary to maintain resilience to misinformation, along with media and digital literacy training

*Demand data access and transparency from social media companies for scientific research on misinformation
Efforts to quantify and understand misinformation on social media are hampered by lack of access to user data from social media companies. Misinformation interventions are rarely tested in real-world settings due to a similar lack of industry cooperation. Publicly available data offer a limited snapshot of exposure, but they cannot explain population and network effects. Researchers need access to the full inventory of social media posts across platforms, along with data revealing how algorithms shape what individual users see. Responsible data sharing could use frameworks currently in use to manage sensitive medical data. Policymakers and health authorities should encourage research partnerships and demand greater oversight and transparency from social media companies to curb the spread of misinformation.

*Fund basic and translational research into the psychology of health misinformation, including effective ways to counter it
Several interventions have been developed to counter health misinformation, but researchers have yet to compare their outcomes, alo…

130

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 13/02/2025

Countering Disinformation Effectively: An Evidence-Based Policy Guide (2024) A high-level, evidence-informed guide to some of the major proposals for how democratic governments, platforms, and others can counter disinformation. carnegieendowment.org/research/202...

Case Study Summaries

Table 1: Overview of Case Studies

[10 x 5 Table is presented. Information organized here by intervention type]

1. Intervention: Supporting local journalism
*Type: Public information
*How much is known: Modest
*How effective does it seem: Significant
*How easily does it scale: Difficult

2. Intervention: Media literacy education
*Type: Public information
*How much is known: Significant
*How effective does it seem: Significant
*How easily does it scale: Difficult

3. Intervention: Fact-checking
*Type: Social media content
*How much is known: Significant
*How effective does it seem: Modest
*How easily does it scale: Modest

4. Intervention: Labeling social media content
*Type: Public information
*How much is known: Modest
*How effective does it seem: Modest
*How easily does it scale: Easy

5. Intervention: Counter-messaging strategies
*Type: Public information
*How much is known: Modest
*How effective does it seem: Modest
*How easily does it scale: Difficult

6. Intervention: Cybersecurity for elections and campaigns
*Type: Governent action
*How much is known: Modest
*How effective does it seem: Modest
*How easily does it scale: Modest

7. Intervention: Statecraft, deterrence, and disruption
*Type: Government action
*How much is known: Modest
*How effective does it seem: Limited
*How easily does it scale: Modest

8. Intervention: Platform Action
*Type: Removing inauthentic asset networks
*How much is known: Limited
*How effective does it seem: Modest
*How easily does it scale: Modest

9. Intervention: Reducing data collection and targeted ads
*Type: Platform Action
*How much is known: Modest
*How effective does it seem: Limited
*How easily does it scale: Difficult

10. Intervention: Changing recommendation algorithms
*Type: Platform action
*How much is known: Limited
*How effective does it seem: Significant
*How easily does it scale: Modest

021

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 13/02/2025

What Do Former Extremists and Their Families Say About Radicalization and Deradicalization in America? (2021) Analysis of how individuals become radicalized, how they leave extremist groups, and what communities can do to stop extremism there. www.rand.org/pubs/researc...

Key Findings

Negative life events are part of, but not the sole cause of, radicalization.
The enduring appeal of extremist groups seems to lie in attending to fundamental human needs.

Recruitment to radical groups deliberately leverages personal vulnerabilities.
Both radicalization and deradicalization can be triggered.

Heavy-handed attempts by formal institutions to deradicalize individuals often fail.

Stigmatization of groups seems mostly to push at-risk individuals further down the extremist path.

Media literacy and open access to diverse sources of information appear critical for deradicalization.

How Are Individuals Recruited into Extremist Groups?
Research shows that online propaganda and recruitment are key pathways to joining extremist groups. Interviewees participating in this project cited these and other paths that led them in.

"I always think that a lot of racism, and even discrimination not even from some white people but from other, other minority groups for being [South Asian], for being Muslim. Things that I didn't even choose but I was, you know, and things I didn't even like. But I was still hated for those things. - Former Islamic extremist"

"Reorienting" event (noted in 17 of the 32 cases)
Most interviewees described a dramatic or traumatic event that prompted them into reconsidering previously held views and considering alternative perspectives. These included a gun possession charge, rejection by the military, a friend's suicide, and an extended period of unemployment. Some white supremacists discussed events involving black individuals.

Direct and indirect recruitment (noted in 25 of the 32 cases)
The cases of four white supremacists and three Islamic extremists involved top-down recruitment—that is, recruiters from extremist organizations formally and proactively recruited them. The cases of 15 white supremacists and three Islamic extremists involved bottom-up entry, in which the individuals radicalized on their own and then sought membership in an extremist group.

Propaganda (noted in 22 of the 32 cases)
Individuals described consuming online materials, as well as music and books, during the time of their radicalization.

Social bonds (noted in 14 of the 32 cases)
Interviewees described how they were motivated to join a group by the social bonds they experienced with the group. Most noted feelings of family and friendship among group members, and some discussed how they felt a new sense of power as a member of a group. Some noted how they felt rewarded for contributions to the cause and group. Several cases were identified in which in…

"So they listened to me, and then he [a member of a radical group] says, "Well, if you want to change the world, you do it with this." And he picked up the AK-47. - Former Islamic extremist"

What Are Signs of Radicalization?
Many interviewees cited instances of an observable behavior change in the early stages of radicalization. Two Islamic extremists showed outward signs of religious conversion; two others did not convert, but one became "extremely quiet" and the other started "voicing more-extreme ideas to family." Among white supremacist cases, interviewees noted how the member began to create racist videos, use racial slurs, and display icons and symbols associated with white supremacy on their bedroom walls, clothing, and jewelry.

Why and How Do People Deradicalize and Leave Extremist Organizations?
To date, there is no standard model of how people turn away from or reject previously held extremist views or why they leave extremist groups. Interviewees cited many reasons and ways they turned away, but two in particular stood out in the study.

Disillusionment and burnout (noted in 14 of the 32 cases)
These feelings were noted in cases concerning 13 white supremacists and one Islamic extremist. All interviewees expressed that former members felt disappointment. Hypocrisy or other negative behaviors were cited as reasons for these feelings and, ultimately, for leaving.

Individual or group intervention (noted in 22 of the 32 cases)
Interventions were typically conducted intentionally in the study sample. Individuals who helped people exit extremist groups were acquaintances, life partners, other former radicals, friends, journalists, children, other family members, religious authorities, current radicals, therapists, and school officials. The interventions consisted of diverse cultural and demographic exposures, emotional support, and financial or domestic stability. Some cases highlighted noxious or negative impact from radical individuals, which could be desc…

Recommendations
This study offers findings that may be useful to community policymakers who continue to work toward reversing the dangerous trend of homegrown terrorism and ideologically inspired violence in the United States. The full report offers additional recommendations for researchers continuing to investigate the phenomenon.

Expand opportunities for mental health care. The findings in this and previous studies do not support a causal effect between mental illness and extremism. However, the plausible connection may provide incentives to buttress mental health services in locales at high risk of extremist recruitment and activity. Additionally, targeting mental health care toward active extremist populations may provide an opportunity to directly support disengagement.

Provide opportunities for expanding diversity exposure. Exposure to diverse populations played a critical role in helping to deradicalize and reorient a number of former extremists in the study. This suggests that diversity-exposure efforts could be more systematically exploited to limit the risk of radicalization or possibly deradicalize already-extremist members.

Help at-risk parents and families recognize and react to signs of extremist radicalization and engagement. Some signals, such as observing youth consuming extremist propaganda or wearing or showcasing extremist symbols and paraphernalia, serve as unambiguous signs of at least some interest in extremism.

Present deradicalization messages at the right time and place. Both radicalization and deradicalization can be triggered. An individual's experience of a dramatic, challenging life event, of being at a certain place at a certain time, can encourage both processes. Advertisements and public service announcements about existing resources for individuals who want to deradicalize can be delivered by the right person in ways and through multiple media that reach those at the cusp of changing or who are likely to change.

Consider the t…

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 13/02/2025

SpaceX list of contract awards - one of which is for $2,300,008,106.01. www.usaspending.gov/search/?hash...

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 13/02/2025

Tesla sure has a lot of federal LOANS. Here's a preview. www.usaspending.gov/search/?hash...

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 12/02/2025

EPA is still doing contracts. It's now led by a Trump sycophant though. They've been sending out solicitations nearly daily.

000

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 12/02/2025

SMART campaigns SMART - campaigns successfully leverage social (S) influence processes, establish moral (M) imperative to act, inspire (positive) affective reactions (AR), & translate (T) & convert social momentum into sustained real-world contributions. www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-...

The SMART Social Cause
Viral altruism

SMART

[Figur arranged by a 2 X 4 table]

[Column 1] SMART

[Row 1]
*Social influence - The momentum driving many viral causes comes from the rapid emergence of a public consensus on what the socially desired course of action is.

[Row 2]
*Moral imperative - Establishing a strongly felt moral conviction that compels people to act on a (social) cause.

[Row 3]
*Effective reactions - content that evokes strong emotional reactions is more likely to go viral.

[Row 4]
*Translational impact - translating social momentum into sustained real world contributions.

[Column 2] Psychological factors

[Row 1]
*Descriptive norms - Social Information about how many influential others people care about, such as friends, family and role models are contributing to the cause

*Prescriptive norms - leveraging pyramid appear network influenced by encouraging others in one social network to follow suit facilitating social conformity

[Row 2]
*Identifiable victim effect - People relate better to a (single) victim who has suffered harm than to abstract statistics.

*Moral elevation - Being uplifted and inspired by witnessing others perform acts of kindness.

[Row 3]
*Empathy is an emotional contagion.
*Positive emotional content, containing affective imagery, is especially likely to go viral.
*Warm-glow giving - People derive positive emotional benefits from helping others.

[Row 4]
*Slacktivism - Token support with little behavioral follow-through.
**The half-life of viral altruism is generally very short.
**More meaningful engagement with a cause is required over time to make altruism stick.

020

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 12/02/2025

Jewish Delegate Assembly of Greater Pittsburgh Statement on Stereotypes, Prejudice and Discrimination If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am not for others, who am I? If not now, when? –Rabbi Hillel (circa 100 BCE). jewishpgh.org/jewish-deleg...

According to the Anti-Defamation League:

*A stereotype is an oversimplified generalization about a person or group of people without regard for individual differences. Even seemingly positive stereotypes that link a person or group to a specific positive trait can have negative consequences.

*Prejudice is prejudging or making a decision about a person or group of people without sufficient knowledge. Prejudicial thinking is frequently based on stereotypes.

*Discrimination is the denial of justice and fair treatment by individuals and/or institutions in many arenas, including employment, education, housing, banking and political rights. Discrimination is an action that can follow prejudicial thinking.

When diversity – differences in race, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, language and class – is not valued and respected, the resulting lack of understanding can fuel intergroup tension and create an inequitable community. Not only can this tension cause inequities, it also creates the potential for scapegoating, discrimination, intergroup conflict and violence.

Bullying, harassment, violence and hate crimes have a powerful negative impact on the entire community and underscore the importance of addressing issues of prejudice and discrimination.

The Anti-Defamation League’s “Pyramid of Hate” illustrates biased behaviors, growing in complexity from the bottom to the top. Like a pyramid, the levels above are supported by the lower levels. If people and/or institutions accept behaviors on the lower levels as “normal,” it is more likely that the behaviors will progress to the next level.

The Community Relations Council of the Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh should:

*Build strong alliances with racial, ethnic and other minority groups in Pittsburgh.

*Engage racial, ethnic and other minority groups in Pittsburgh to publicly and/or privately advocate on behalf of those communities.

*Pursue opportunities to help foster diversity among employers in Southwestern Pennsylvania.

*Promote diversity and inclusion in Southwestern Pennsylvania by hosting community-wide education programs.

*Connect the Jewish community to initiatives and learning opportunities within and beyond the Jewish community.

*Create opportunities for interfaith and intergroup interactions between Jews and other members of the Greater Pittsburgh community

010

Strategy Science @strategyscience.bsky.social · 12/02/2025

The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It by @rand.org New Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience. www.rand.org/pubs/perspec...

In some ways, the current Russian approach to propaganda builds on Soviet Cold War–era techniques, with an emphasis on obfuscation and on getting targets to act in the interests of the propagandist without realizing that they have done so.

In other ways, it is completely new and driven by the characteristics of the contemporary information environment. Russia has taken advantage of technology and available media in ways that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War. Its tools and channels now include the Internet, social media, and the evolving landscape of professional and amateur journalism and media outlets.

Distinctive Features of the Contemporary Model for Russian Propaganda
*High-volume and multichannel
*Rapid, continuous, and repetitive
*Lacks commitment to objective reality
*Lacks commitment to consistency.

We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as “the firehose of falsehood” because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions. In the words of one observer, “[N]ew Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience.”

Why Is Rapid, Continuous, and Repetitive Propaganda Successful?

First impressions are very resilient.

Repetition leads to familiarity, and familiarity leads to acceptance

Russian Propaganda Makes No Commitment to Objective Reality

It may come as little surprise that the psychology literature supports the persuasive potential of high-volume, diverse channels and sources, along with rapidity and repetition.

These aspects of Russian propaganda make intuitive sense. One would expect any influence effort to enjoy greater success if it is backed by a willingness to invest in additional volume and channels and if its architects find ways to increase the frequency and responsiveness of messages.

This next characteristic, however, flies in the face of intuition and conventional wisdom, which can be paraphrased as “The truth always wins.”

How Does Propaganda Undercut Perceptions of Reality?

*People are poor judges of true versus false information—and they do not necessarily remember that particular information was false.

*Information overload leads people to take shortcuts in determining the trustworthiness of messages.

*Familiar themes or messages can be appealing even if they are false.
Statements are more likely to be accepted if backed by evidence, even if that evidence is false.

*Peripheral cues—such as an appearance of objectivity—can increase the credibility of propaganda.

041