Now that Lancman's on Long Island, he's shed his opposition to cash bail & claims he "always supported" pretrial detention. He's spent the campaign complaining about Zohran Mamdani & the Park Slope Food Coop. Hopefully his GOP opponent wins: he'll be conservative, but irrelevant.
![PIGOTT, J. (dissenting in part).
While I concur with the majority's Confrontation Clause analysis, I part company with it on the reasonableness of the police officer's initial stop of defendant. The suppression court ruled that the police officer lacked probable cause to stop the defendant but for the fact that defendant had a Finger Lakes Community College sticker in the rear window (police officer: “I can't recall what side it was on, the left or the right”).
Prior to 2001, all four Departments of the Appellate Division uniformly held that evidence obtained as a result of pretext stops was inadmissible (see People v. Young, 241 A.D.2d 690, 660 N.Y.S.2d 165 [3d Dept.1997]; People v. Roundtree, 234 A.D.2d 612, 651 N.Y.S.2d 615 [2d Dept.1996]; People v. Laws, 213 A.D.2d 226, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860 [1st Dept.1995]; People v. Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223 [4th Dept.1991] ). Then, in People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 (2001), this Court adopted the rationale of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), which held that an investigatory stop is valid, regardless of the officer's motivation, so long as there is an objectively reasonable basis for it (see id. at 812–815, 116 S.Ct. 1769).
In my view, the stop in this case was not objectively reasonable, and was premised on what could only be deemed a “de minimis” violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(1)(b)(i). That section provides that “[t]he use or placing of posters or stickers on windshields or rear windows of motor vehicles other than those authorized by the commissioner, is hereby prohibited.” The ***599 concern, of course, as the commissioner notes in the regulations, is that the placement of such items not approved by *458 the commissioner will “interfere with visibility” (15 NYCRR 174.1).
Here, the suppression court concluded that an anonymous tip and the fact that defendant's car was weaving, but within its lane of traffic, were insuffi…](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:7yb5sbwnqqimcmex5ay3xgjb/bafkreib4qi6quuxv7okf2eieuhpvw4diak3wb6huw7iw6yzoisrc3dgaa4)
![enacted the final election-day statute. During the World
Wars, for instance, Congress and at least nine States allowed absentee ballots to arrive after election day in certain
situations. See, e.g., 1918 Md. Laws p. 130; 58 Stat. 146
(noting that “any extension of time for the receipt of absentee ballots permitted by State laws shall apply” to federal
“war ballot[s]” in World War II). Yet that practice returned
to the margins within a few decades. By 1977, a report from
the Department of Defense listed only two States as still
allowing ballots to arrive after election day. See Overseas
Absentee Voting: Hearing on S. 703 before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
33–34 (1977). These short-lived outlier rules thus shed little light on the original meaning of “election” in the electionday statutes.
Likewise, although post-election-day deadlines have become more widespread in the last five decades,5 these developments postdate the last election-day statute by over 50
years and the first statute by over a century. These late-intime practices therefore count for little when discerning the
timing restrictions that Congress imposed when it enacted
those statutes. See Pung v. Isabella County, 609 U. S. ___,
___ (2026) (slip op., at 6).
In sum, from this Nation’s founding until the last few decades of the 20th century—a period that spans the enactment of all three election-day statutes—having an “election” on a particular day meant completing ballot collection
on that day.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:7yb5sbwnqqimcmex5ay3xgjb/bafkreif672sdeuvt3kmg3afluo6gxinxw3jhetxnilblzm4vg4zdii7zwy)
![But since that time, research on adolescent brain development has significantly reshaped how courts, legislatures, and scholars view youth crime. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “children have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking” (Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 471 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “[T]he signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside” (Johnson v Texas, 509 US 350, 368 [1993]). Given these aspects of adolescent development, the](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:7yb5sbwnqqimcmex5ay3xgjb/bafkreicih4hnqza6klnnaqyesa5lpyul4c57oodu2p3bbpmypbdli5jtja)
![The defendants also cite several articles concluding that “[a]n overwhelming
amount of research indicates . . . that juvenile sex offenders are far less likely to reoffend
than adult sex offenders” (Nikolas Spilson, The Child That No State Wants: Challenging
Juvenile Sex Offender Regulations as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 2023 Mich St L
Rev 271, 271 [2023]; see also Brittney M. Bowater, Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006: Is There a Better Way to Tailor the Sentences of Juvenile Offenders?,
57 Cath U L Rev 817, 840 [2008] [“(M)any studies indicate that juvenile sex offenders
have a lower recidivism rate than adult sex offenders”]). Indeed, the United States
Department of Justice has concluded that “recidivism rates for juveniles who commit
sexual offenses are generally lower than those observed for adult sexual offenders” (US
Dept of Just, Sex Offender Management Assessment and Planning Initiative at 262 [2017]).
And several other state high courts have embraced this finding (see In re A.J.M., 847 NW2d
601, 605-06 [Iowa 2014] [“Research has confirmed that juvenile sex offenders generally
are less likely to re-offend than adults, especially when they receive appropriate treatment”
(internal quotation marks omitted)]; State in Interest of C.K., 233 NJ 44, 74, 182 A3d 917,
934 [2018] [“generally, juvenile sex offenders are less likely to reoffend than adult sex offenders”]; In re J.B., 630 Pa at 435, 107 A3d at 17 [“While adult sexual offenders have a high likelihood of reoffense, juvenile sexual offenders exhibit low levels of recidivism”]).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:7yb5sbwnqqimcmex5ay3xgjb/bafkreieobqowjm76jghjf6zbkk7heuaoj6xhg6i5vywagajfzcvxyzz7ba)
![In furtherance of this goal, the key function
of the Guidelines is to yield “an accurate determination of the risk a sex offender poses to
the public” (People v Mingo, 12 NY3d 563, 574 [2009]). Inherent in this accurate
determination is not only what factors make an individual more likely to reoffend, but just
as importantly those factors which make an individual less likely to reoffend. But the
record before us, as well as a review of publicly available information about the Board’s
activities, gives no indication that the Board has revisited how a defendant’s young age at
the time of offense affects their risk of recidivism, despite the insights that have emerged about both adolescent brain development and recidivism among juvenile sex offenders over the last 30 years. In order to fulfill its statutory mandate, the Board may wish to revisit factor 8 in view of the substantial body of scientific literature that did not exist when the scoring for factor 8 was adopted.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:7yb5sbwnqqimcmex5ay3xgjb/bafkreig6xhnozed3vdyzsrzc6nycupxouijggoz4wzochakhtbmififxt4)
![In June 2024, after the mother was assigned counsel, she moved to vacate the January 3, 2024 order’s provision for ACS supervision. In her affidavit, she stated that she and the child had been subjected to over 15 announced and unannounced home visits by an ACS caseworker in a six-month period. During those visits, the caseworker
searched every room in the mother’s home, inspected the contents of her refrigerator, and closely inspected the child’s body.2 The mother described the searches as “traumatizing,” “intrusive and humiliating,” said they reminded her “of the fear and anxiety of being abused” by the father, and “brought [her] back to a dark place where [she] was forced to think about the abuse” by the father. She further stated that ACS supervision had a substantial negative impact on her ability to have friends and family visit her and her child, to control her schedule, and “to live freely.” In addition, she missed overtime opportunities at work in order for ACS to conduct home visits. The mother’s description in her affidavit of multiple announced and unannounced caseworker visits and surveillance of the intimate aspects of the family’s daily life3 is consistent with statements in the amicus brief of Sanctuary for Families that actions taken by ACS during ACS supervision sometimes mimic the coercive control exercised
2 This is consistent with Sanctuary for Families’ observation that home inspections can be deeply upsetting for children, as children can be expected to remove as much clothing, including underwear, as the worker deems necessary, and to allow total strangers to examine their bodies (Amicus Br. of Sanctuary for Families at 21 [citing Hum. Rts. Watch, “If I Wasn’t Poor, I Wouldn’t Be Unfit”: The Family Separation Crisis in the US Child Welfare System [Nov. 2022], available at:
https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/11/17/if-i-wasnt-poor-i-wouldnt-be-unfit/familyseparation-crisis-us-child-welfare [last accessed Apr. 15, 2025]).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:7yb5sbwnqqimcmex5ay3xgjb/bafkreibqtph2em4wq7z3pzfjcxnlofsas5lmokczjpvc5zsv3vkhlfhs3a)
![by an abusive partner, including by regulating the nonrespondent’s daily activities or intruding on the nonrespondent parent’s autonomy in other ways. For example, ACS may require the nonrespondent parent to seek shelter or an order of protection when these are not safe options under the circumstances (Amicus Br. of Sanctuary for Families at 10-11 [citing The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers With “Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 849, 855 (2000)]). In addition, as the mother in this case experienced and as Sanctuary for Families point out, compliance with ACS supervision can become “a full-time job,” and worsen economic harms typically caused by abuse (Amicus Br. of Sanctuary for Families at 12-13, citing Patricia Fersch, Why Doesn’t the Severe Harm and Costs of Domestic Violence Result in More Women Going to Court?, Forbes [Dec. 13, 2023] [citing research finding that domestic violence causes survivors to lose 8 million days of work each year and results in loss of jobs for 21%-60% of survivors], available at:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/patriciafersch/2023/12/13/why-doesnt-the-severeharm-and-costs-of-domestic-violence-result-in-more-women-going-to-court/ [last accessed Apr. 15, 2025]). The resulting economic hardship disproportionately affects people of color, members of other historically marginalized communities and those of low-income. As addressed by Sanctuary for Families, they are “more likely to already be living in difficult economic situations, and more likely to face additional economic hardship as a result of their being abused” (Amicus Br. of Sanctuary for Families at 16, citing New York City Mayor’s Office to End Domestic and Gender-Based Violence, Report on the Intersection of Domestic Violence, Race/Ethnicity and Sex [2020]).](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:7yb5sbwnqqimcmex5ay3xgjb/bafkreifrffd6ay6br2fqg4o6lz5plkvf6bq4soqgsrgl743rc7j5ehdfny)
