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Is Russia preparing to mobilize more soldiers?
In this video I discuss the signs that another wave of mobilization is underway in Russia, and what it will mean for the war. Watch the video on the website or read the transcript below.
Best,
Anders
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### _Transcript:_
Right now, there's a lot of speculation about a new wave of mobilization in Russia that will take place in the fall. In this video, I want to discuss how likely it is and also what to expect if it actually happens. So let's talk about it.
A while back, I made a video about Putin's options now that the dynamics in the war have changed and Russia is struggling to make progress on the frontline. The essential argument in that video is that Putin has to do something because the status quo is unacceptable. I go through four options that Putin could pick, and one of them is a mobilization of more soldiers so Russia could re-energize their offensive. It now looks like Russia is probably heading down this path of mobilization, so that is likely the option that Putin has chosen. And what I want to do in this video is to unpack it a bit more and discuss the signs that we see that a mobilization might be underway, and also what a mobilization actually might entail.
Before we get into that conversation, I think it's important to also remind ourselves that there's been talk about an upcoming Russian mobilization for several years now. It's been one of those recurring predictions that just never materialized. But the reason people have been predicting a Russian mobilization for that long is that, from a military point of view, it actually would have made sense for them to do it a long time ago. Russia has been fighting with a manpower deficit for several years, and it's also been clear that the recruitment model that they have, where they get volunteers by giving out very high bonuses, is just very expensive and not sustainable in the long run.
But so far, it hasn't actually happened. And the reason for that is that Putin has been more concerned about the potential domestic backlash it could make if he takes this very unpopular step than he has been about solving the manpower issues. And that's not because it's less important for him to win in Ukraine, but more that he was just very convinced that time would be on Russia's side, and that the military and the people in the Russian bureaucracy would be able to find solutions to make things work, and that he would never need to actually take that step.
So now that there's talk about another wave of mobilization, it's important to remember that this is something that Putin really doesn't want to do. He would much prefer to find other solutions that would be less dangerous to him from a regime security point of view. And we also need to acknowledge that it's possible that there won't be a mobilization at all, because predictions about this have been wrong in the past.
However, it is a bit different this time. The discussions about an upcoming Russian mobilization are more substantiated. It's not just analysts pointing to how Russia's manning situation, in a more abstract sense, is unsustainable in the long term. We actually see concrete indicators that point in this direction.
The first one is the military situation. On the frontline, the dynamics have changed. That happened around six months ago, around February. Russia is no longer consistently advancing on the frontline. They still manage to make progress in areas where they focus their effort, but then they're losing territory in other sections of the frontline. And that means that overall it's pretty close to even in terms of what they gain and what they lose. But in addition to that, Ukraine's long-range strikes into Russia and the mid-range campaign that Ukraine is waging against Russian logistics in the occupied territories are very successful, and they're putting a lot of pressure on the Russian system. So the military imperative to do something is very strong.
But in addition to that, we also see that there is an active debate in the Russian elite about mobilization. Interestingly, in the public debate, we actually mostly see politicians arguing against a large mobilization. For example, we've seen Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin take this position. But this indicates that there is a debate going on behind closed doors, and that these people feel the need to get their position across publicly. And then they hope that Putin will take it into consideration when he makes his decision.
We also see a lot of discussion on Russian social media channels about how people expect that there will be another wave of mobilization after the Duma elections that will be happening in a few weeks. There is increasing talk about how the recruitment tactics among Russian officials are becoming more and more aggressive. There are more and more stories about how people feel that they're being coerced into signing contracts with the military, even though they don't want to.
And finally, we see indications that the Russian system is rehearsing mobilization procedures. They've been recruiting more people where it's clear in the job postings that it's related to mobilization preparedness. They are preparing the registers so that they can more efficiently call up the right people who have been chosen for military service. There have been examples of how they've conducted exercises on how to actually carry out a mobilization in practice. So where would the collection points be, for example? How would they organize everything logistically? We've seen new rules and regulations that have been introduced that are intended to streamline the process and clear out bureaucratic obstacles to mobilization. All this means that Russia is now in a much better position to actually execute a smooth mobilization if Putin gives the order.
I think it's pretty clear that nothing will happen before the Duma elections that take place from the 18th to the 20th of September. Because even though the elections in Russia are not free and fair, they still play an important role as a kind of ceremonial re-legitimization of the government. So Putin will want peace and quiet around the elections. But after the elections are over, it would be a good time for Putin to make the decision if he wants to limit the risk of public protests.
And that leads to the question of what a mobilization would look like and what impact it would have on the battlefield. Here, I think we should probably imagine something along the lines of what Russia did in 2022, when they mobilized around 300,000 people. When you follow the Russian debate, you will see people making arguments spanning everywhere from Russia should not have any mobilization at all to some people making crazy claims about huge numbers like Russia should mobilize a million people. But I think the most likely outcome is that we're going to end up somewhere between 200,000 and 400,000, something in that ballpark.
The thing to keep in mind is that mobilization costs money, and the Russian state budget is already suffering. When you mobilize soldiers, you need to give them equipment and food. You need to pay for the ammunition they use. You need to give them a salary. If they die, you probably need to pay some kind of compensation to their families. So there are many expenses related to having soldiers, and especially soldiers that are deployed to war. But in addition to that, you're also pulling them away from the workforce. Russia is already suffering from a labor shortage, so pulling more people out of the workforce is going to hurt the Russian economy even more. So there are many negative effects to the Russian economy from mobilizing a large number of people. So the simple reality is that Russia can't afford to mobilize a million men, and they're going to have to go for a much smaller number.
Another thing I think we can say about an upcoming mobilization is that it will probably not be announced publicly. Instead, it's more likely going to be a kind of hidden mobilization where people learn that it's happening because suddenly their neighbors start disappearing, and we will hear about it on social media. I also think it's likely that they are going to try to do it as quickly as possible, so that all the people who need to be mobilized are mobilized very quickly, and then everyone else can relax and just go on with their lives, and they can be happy that, well, it didn't affect me. Because these two things together would help reduce the anxiety in society. It would help reduce the risk of popular protests.
The last question I want to touch on is, what's Putin going to do with all the soldiers that he mobilizes? And here there are three basic ideas that I've seen mentioned quite often.
The first is that he's going to use these mobilized soldiers basically the same way that he uses the soldiers that are currently on the frontline. So Russia is going to maintain the approach that they have. They will just be able to intensify it because they have more men that they can attack with. So these attacks with very small groups of one or two or maybe three soldiers that try to advance through the Ukrainian drone wall without being detected, they will be able to do more of that. I think it's important not to underestimate what difference 300,000 more soldiers can do. Back in 2022, that was enough to stabilize the situation. It stopped the Ukrainian offensive that was taking place at the time, and ultimately, it turned the tide. I don't think this is going to be enough to fundamentally change the war, but it's still important to recognize that the frontline situation right now is on a knife's edge. And it wouldn't take all that much to tip it in either direction. And boosting the manpower on the Russian side is something that could give them some momentum for some time. And maybe then during 2027, we would see the situation revert to Russia making more regular advances.
The other idea that I've seen mentioned is that these mobilized soldiers would not be used immediately, but would instead go through some training and prepare for Russia to go back to a more maneuver-style warfare. So they would need to learn to operate armored vehicles and things like that. I don't think that's likely. I think that we are at a point where drones and unmanned technology mean that there is no way for Russia to go back to that style of warfare during this war. At least not in Ukraine.
And that brings me to the third idea that I've heard mentioned quite a bit, which is that these mobilized soldiers would not actually be used against Ukraine, but would instead be intended for a military challenge of NATO where Russia would test Article 5. And if you've seen my video about Putin's options, you'll know that another option that I mentioned there, in addition to mobilization, is that Putin can also try to change the dynamics of the war by challenging NATO in a way that will mean that the European powers will lose the determination to keep supporting Ukraine. I don't think Putin would use all 300,000 soldiers against NATO, but I think there is a significant risk that at least some of them would be intended for that purpose. Because as I pointed out in that video, if Putin wanted to actually address the root causes of why Russia is not winning over Ukraine, he would need to do something about Western Europe. And using all his soldiers in Ukraine will not solve that problem. So for that reason, if Russia actually goes through with this mobilization in the coming months, there is a big reason for NATO to take it seriously.
