This bit needs a whole book to address. Franken isn’t in jail, he wasn’t arrested, he was never in danger of the most severe sanctions. But it was established by multiple people that he had been told about his behavior. His staff knew, this wasn’t unknown.
Where’s the fact check on Katz? Who is
![[June 30, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I join JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR's opinion in full. I write briefly to address B. P. J's Title IX claim. As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR explains, the Court did not need to hold that Title IX protects against discrimination solely on the basis of "biological sex," even if only "in the sports context." See ante, at 10 (majority opinion); ante, at 31, n. 14 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). And it should not have. Instead, the Court should have assumed as much while leaving open the possibility that Title IX's definition of "sex" is more capacious.
As the majority notes, B. P. J. does not argue that "sex" in Title IX means anything but "biological sex," that is, sex assigned at birth. Ante, at 10. Accepting the concession for](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:5ksjylcd3zhoeorwxehwozzp/bafkreie5nnh3v3otjg4ipxc2si3y363w7rythkgqa4xba5oyusp4kx4nlm)
![purposes of this case, I agree with my colleagues that her Title IX claim fails. When B. P. J. is sorted onto a team by sex assigned at birth, she doubtless suffers discrimination on the basis of her sex assigned at birth. The same is true, however, of any other athlete sorted in the same manner, regardless of their gender identity. In the context of athlet-ics, the Javits Amendment and resulting regulations instruct that this brand of sex discrimination is permissible:
The sexes may generally be separated.
All this is true even though the holding of Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. 644 (2020), plainly applies to Title IX.
Accord, ante, at 2-4 (GORSUCH, J., concurring); ante, at 31-33 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Under Bostock's reasoning,
B. P. J. suffers discrimination on the basis of sex—yes, sex assigned at birth—when she is excluded from the girls' team because she was assigned male at birth (change her sex assigned at birth to female and her ability to play girls' sports changes too). But the same is true of a boy who was assigned male at birth. He too is excluded from the girls' team because he was assigned male at birth. All agree that the Javits Amendment and resulting regulations permit this type of (biological) sex discrimination.
But there is reason to doubt the soundness of the concession that Title IX's reference to "sex" means only sex assigned at birth. We have "construled] 'discrimination' under Title IX broadly," Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed.,
544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005), to ensure that the statute protects against denial of "opportunities on the basis of gen-der," Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U. S. 629, 650
(1999). Thus we have recognized that Congress's antidis-crimination statutes "intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing Title VII).…](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:5ksjylcd3zhoeorwxehwozzp/bafkreiazfuipbdklfv6xt7ahxqsbfigz2mt26q3vwchh2o7psu25gzahaa)
