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nabrug.bsky.social

@nabrug.bsky.social
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 14/10/2026
The Gramophone Model (GM) provides the final clarification of what J.J. Gibson started: www.researchgate.net/publication/...
researchgate.net
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/10/2026
available and couples with current auditory stimulation at the sensory surface. The brain follows, organizes, stabilizes, and adapts this coupling. More finely differentiated residue therefore allows finer distinctions between the current tone and previously encountered frequencies.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/10/2026
physiological residue around a given pitch, providing more material for comparison and enabling finer pitch discrimination. Within the GM, previous auditory interactions leave electrochemical physiological residue, rather than stored recordings of sounds. This residue becomes efferently
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/10/2026
“Computational modeling revealed that this enhancement was best explained by reduced internal noise rather than narrower frequency tuning…” No, the best explanation is provided by the Gramophone Model (GM): greater experience leaves experts with more finely differentiated
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
A hitjob? They wanted to show that Gibson had not actually eliminated internal representations and inferential processes from perception—and that a theory of perception could not do without them. And they were right!
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
@alfrednobel.bsky.social
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
@alfrednobel.bsky.social
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
researchgate.net
(PDF) Gaze is the Result of the Active Stacking of Two Perceptual Images During the Execution of the Initial Phase of a Free Throw - The complete explanation of The Quiet Eye (TQE) within basketball
PDF | This article investigates the fundamental difference between visual perception and gaze during throwing actions in basketball, with a specific... | Find, read and cite all the research you need ...
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
previous ball trajectories at the sensory surfaces. Are you able to do that—and, if not, what do you experience while preparing and executing the movement? www.researchgate.net/publication/...
researchgate.net
(PDF) Gaze and the visual perception of the basket are two totally separated phenomena within the free throw in basketball – The exact origin of gaze within all sports actions compels the stacking of ...
PDF | The explanatory model of all motoric movement actions also fully appoints all functional perception processes within the free throw in basketball.... | Find, read and cite all the research you n...
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
hole onto your sensory surfaces while mentally visualizing the latent initial phase of the outgoing ball trajectory shape that you must subsequently execute. Within the GM, this mental visualization constitutes efferent imagery: the targeted reactivation of physiological residue from
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
Derek Arnold @visnerd.bsky.social On a personal note regarding your aphantasia, I assume that you can grasp a cup normally. However, to execute a basketball free throw or a golf putt, you must gaze. This requires suppressing the actual projection of the basket or
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
researchgate.net
(PDF) Mental Imagery, Sleep and Dreaming Leave Neuroscience Only Two Choices: Efferent Projection to the Sensory Surface or a Homunculus in the Brain
PDF | Mental imagery and dreaming establish an unavoidable physiological fact: a phenomenologically present sensory image can arise without a... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on Rese...
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 13/09/2026
Derek Arnold @visnerd.bsky.social "Congenital aphantasia: what we (think we) know, what we thought we knew but were mistaken about, and what we don't know" That neuroscience still does not know how an imagined representation becomes a conscious sensory experience can be fully explained ......
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
become important to determine what was moving, enabling more precise judgments about its movement. Thus, movement detection evolutionarily preceded object recognition.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
For millions of years, organisms primarily needed to detect whether something was moving toward or away from them. Only relatively recently in evolution—alongside the development of more advanced cortical systems—did it
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
There are 2 major categories of affordances: 1. Object recognition, but, by far, the most important category is 2. The sec recognition of MOVEMENT, perfectly illustrated with this example. www.researchgate.net/publication/...
researchgate.net
(PDF) The Complete Description of Consciousness - All Attentional Functions Emerge from a Movement-Comparison Model
PDF | Current vision science still lacks a coherent mechanistic framework, largely because it is built on longstanding misconceptions and categorical... | Find, read and cite all the research you need...
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 03/09/2026
Before they could develop AD they died of stress? A sitting profession?
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 30/07/2026
Which is exactly identical irt the movement of the paddle within Pong.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 30/07/2026
But the pong ball will definitely deviate from that projection and must be mediated online by the ventral and dorsal stream (Goodale/Milner). So the prediction and the online processing is centred in the afforded sensory surface projection. www.researchgate.net/publication/...
researchgate.net
(PDF) How Visual Perception of the Pong Ball is Afforded and Online is Mediated by the Cortical Streams - Rethinking Visual Attention and the Foundations of Vision Science
PDF | The explanatory framework presented through Pong offers a universal model for all functional and behavioral perception processes within any... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ...
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 30/07/2026
Imo there is no internal model. The future movement of f.e. a pong ball is afforded by the first manifest positions of the ball as projected onto the (visual) sensory surface. From this manifest line a latent part emerges for it needs to sprout from this part.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 30/07/2026
online, within a mechanistic explanation that is fully consistent with all empirical scientific findings to date?
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 30/07/2026
This is precisely the classical dichotomy between affordance and online control. In other words, how can a single system prospectively specify what is coming—and thereby afford the action—while also defining and resolving prediction errors
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 30/07/2026
Imo you want to express how the expected continuation of an unfolding event is made physically available to the nervous system in such a way that the very structure affording the action also provides the information required for its online control and for deviations to be defined as errors.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 30/07/2026
Exactly. Stage four of the “four stages of competence” is commonly mischaracterized as automation. Skilled action does not become automatic; it becomes increasingly informed by accumulated experience and therefore more finely attuned, flexible, and adaptive to the current task demands.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 28/07/2026
biological nervous systems, consciousness, perception, and cognition arise directly from the ongoing coupling between the organism and its environment at the sensory surface. Functional similarity therefore does not imply architectural equivalence.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 28/07/2026
The question isn't whether LLMs can produce human-like behavior, but whether they implement the same biological architecture. LLMs transform symbolic input into symbolic output through successive computational states that are temporally separated, however rapidly they occur. In
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 22/07/2026
projected directly onto the sensory surface and are directly stabilized by the brain on that sensory surface.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 22/07/2026
complete phenomenon that arises out of this explains how we can guide actions precisely. Only when a marble is connected to the whole marble run will provide definite answers. So this is direct perception as Gibson has meant it to be, but wasn't capable to explain. The affordances are
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 22/07/2026
Now the novum is that the still latent positions of the car need to arise from the manifest part, maintaining its shape and its tau-value. The brain stabilizes this image and adds this information based on the current action and former residu of former experiences. And solely the
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 22/07/2026
In this way all the manifest positions of the car become conscious to us. The brain stabilizes all the manifest positions, as projected onto the sensory surface, due to which we can construct the complete manifest trajectory till P(0).
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 22/07/2026
@adw.bsky.social Direct perception is the factual projection of the actual vista onto the sensory surface, like the car in this image.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
internal neural dynamics. The GM is unique in relocating the organizing principle to the sensory surface rather than the brain. Can you name a single exception?
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
All contemporary non-representational approaches ultimately return to the brain as the primary explanatory locus. While they begin with organism–environment dynamics, they eventually explain perception and cognition in terms of
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
organized from the sensory surface onward, neural activity is understood as the autonomous physiological continuation of an already established organism–environment coupling, rather than as the place where that coupling must be reconstructed through computation or representation.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
but at the sensory surface itself. From this perspective, the question is no longer whether the brain computes, represents, or resonates. Those questions arise only if the brain is assumed to be the organizing center of cognition. Once cognition is
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
surface—not the brain—as the primary organizing locus of cognition. At the sensory interface, continuous external physical dynamics terminate and autonomous physiological dynamics begin through sensory transduction. The organism–environment relation is therefore not completed in the brain,
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
as computation or representation. The Gramophone Model addresses precisely the aspect that remained conceptually unresolved in Gibson's ecological psychology: the physical organization of the organism–environment relation. It identifies the sensory
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
Blake Richards' criticism is compelling for most ecological, 4E, enactive, and resonance approaches because they ultimately retain the brain as the primary explanatory locus. As long as cognition is assumed to be organized by the brain, internal physiological dynamics can always be reinterpreted
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
autonomous physiological dynamics through sensory transduction.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
to the brain as the explanatory center, thereby allowing computational and representational interpretations to re-enter the debate. Within the Gramophone Model, cognition is organized from the sensory interface onward, where external physical dynamics are transformed into
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
The Gramophone Model extends Gibson's ecological psychology and Lee's Tau Theory by identifying the sensory surface—not the brain—as the primary organizing locus of cognition. This shift resolves the persistent tendency of ecological, 4E, enactive, and resonance approaches to return
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
explanation, internal processing can always be reinterpreted as computation or representation.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 21/07/2026
Blake Richards is difficult to refute because ecological psychology, 4E cognition, enactivism, and resonance theories ultimately tend to return to the brain as the primary explanatory locus. As long as the brain remains the center of
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 16/07/2026
projection is realized at a single location or distributed across the sensory system is an empirical question—not a theoretical obstacle.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 16/07/2026
Whatever the precise anatomical implementation may be, it seems undeniable that, at every moment, the organism has access to one continuously changing sensory projection that constitutes its current perceptual world. Whether this
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 15/07/2026
Gibson developed affordances predominantly from the visual modality, which, within a scientific framework that aims to explain perception and cognition across all sensory modalities, represents a significant limitation.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 15/07/2026
Besides (1) the fact that Gibson never specified the mechanistic coupling between ecological information and the nervous system, and (2) the absence of the tau-variable in his original theory—which Lee later introduced but never fully mechanistically grounded—there is a third major obstacle.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 15/07/2026
You keep saying the GM is "not great", but you haven't engaged with any of the mechanistic arguments themselves. I'd genuinely be interested in hearing which specific step in the proposed mechanism you think fails.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 15/07/2026
externally specified affordances become continuously coupled to the nervous system seems to be the obvious next step.
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nabrug.bsky.social @nabrug.bsky.social · 15/07/2026
olfaction, and taste. That common organism–brain interface remained largely unspecified within ecological psychology. If ecological psychology now aims to develop into a broader theory of cognition, then identifying how
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