iiinova — where your digital self keeps evolving

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 08/10/2026

The last word of the first line is "cuidez" Of the second line is "foletez" t and c often look alike, t is slightly less rounded. Also, context. If you know that "folecez" doesn't mean anything and "foletez" does, you're on to something.

Et si eschaper nos cuidez
Ce sererit eu granz foletez

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 08/10/2026

Have just today discovered ms. 903 Tours is online for free. It contains the Chronique des Ducs de Normandie, completed by Benoît in c. 1180. The ms. itself is from c. 1180. arca.irht.cnrs.fr/ark:/63955/m...

13 lines of Old French from c. 1180 (would be time-consuming to type it out by hand)

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 07/10/2026

*opens Internet* *closes Internet*

Los Angeles Times

Trump suggests letting Iran
'take out' Los Angeles and San
Diego at campaign rally

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 04/10/2026

Adam Sutler from V for Vendetta in a scene that was supposed to invoke Hitler.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

I'm re-reading this. I can see it, now

(a)Except as provided in subsection (b), the Attorney General may appoint a United States attorney for the district in which the office of United States attorney is vacant.
(b)The Attorney General shall not appoint as United States attorney a person to whose appointment by the President to that office the Senate refused to give advice and consent.
(c)A person appointed as United States attorney under this section may serve until the earlier of—
(1)the qualification of a United States attorney for such district appointed by the President under section 541 of this title; or
(2)the expiration of 120 days after appointment by the Attorney General under this section.
(d)If an appointment expires under subsection (c)(2), the district court for such district may appoint a United States attorney to serve until the vacancy is filled. The order of appointment by the court shall be filed with the clerk of the court.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

How are we feeling about the analysis here, starting on p. 6? Will it stand up to appeal?

Can the President fire a court-appointed U.S. Attorney? No. The President
cannot unilaterally fire a U.S. Attorney appointed by the Court. A court-appointed
U.S. Attorney is not an acting U.S. Attorney nor are they an interim U.S. Attorney.
Section 546(d) provides that a court-appointed U.S. Attorney serves until “the
vacancy is filled,” which can only be done by the nomination/confirmation process

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

Meanwhile, in the corrected reply. storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

Conclusion
This Court should not gag or silence Dr. Byrne. He has every right to express his belief
that the press reports demonstrate that Dominion has committed crimes. All of Dr. Byrne’s public
statements refer to the press and its coverage of Dominion and criminal activity. Mor the only
person in America who cannot use the information which is public. Dr. Byrne respectfully requests
this Honorable Court to clarify its September 11, 2026 Order by ruling that the Court cannot
require censorship of Dr. Byrne speech related to his comments on press statements, press releases,
or his statements about Dominion’s past and ongoing crimes.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

There it is. Judge Edelman overtly says David Hearn is at risk of reprosecution in a meritless case because of political pressure from the President of the United States. www.democracydefendersfund.org/wp-content/u...

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

Not beating the "abuse of the court system" allegations.

This Court has failed to conduct any hearing or ask to see the basis to set aside the
protective order in camera. This was nothing short of an apparent dereliction of duty. When an
attorney informs the Court of serious national security breaches, criminal acts which are so serious
that they warrant the death penalty, and related litigation, a Court should act promptly. Just
yesterday, with no opportunity to oppose this Court’s presumptuous allegations Dr. Byrne’s

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

Tina Peters (oh, and it's "trusted build")

Dr. Byrne has requested six times to set aside the Protective Order. Dr. Byrne requested
the Protective Order be set aside to comply with subpoenas from the Arizona Legislature, the
Montana Legislature, and the Michigan Legislature. Dr. Byrne had requested the protective order
be set aside to timely provide exculpatory evidence to Tina Peters, on criminal trial, where Dr.
Byrne asserted Dominion was the impetus to request Mrs. Peters from being framed when it
learned she had a copy of the Mesa Dominion data that it believed was wiped by a “trust build.”

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

Threatening the court with prosecution is a strategy, man.

This Court is on notice. Orders that continue to silence, delay, disrupt, or interfere with
criminal investigations and national security operations are nothing less than the commission of
the crime of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1512, and Misprision of a Felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4.
This Court is not immune to prosecution, and it has no authority to immunize Dominion.
With this said, the undersigned is of the position that the last thing it ever wants to see is a
misguided judge go over a line from judgment to criminal activity. Yet, he is greatly concerned
that this Court will not take heed, and thereby find itself in jeopardy.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 01/10/2026

Patrick Byrne's counsel Peter Ticktin is having a normal one.

Introduction
This Court is well aware that its Protective Order is concealing evidence of criminal acts
of the highest degree, nothing less than treason by the Plaintiff against the United States. As such,
this Court has 2 choices: either follow legal precedent and dissolve the Protective Order or protect
the Plaintiff from exposure of its criminal acts and be a part of the effort to conceal evidence of its

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

This is quite a well-known case. Like, I've heard of it.

We generally give district courts wide discretion in inter
preting their own orders. See e.g., Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colom., 120 F.4th 754, 766 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[W]hen an is
suing judge interprets alleged ambiguities in his or her own order,
we accord substantial deference to that interpretation.”) (quotation
omitted). Given this deference, the appellants have not persuaded
us to construe the sanction more broadly and have not made a
strong showing that they will prevail on their First Amendment
challenges. They do not cite any authorities suggesting that a
speech-related prohibition imposed as a penalty for conduct deter
mined to be sanctionable violates the First Amendment. Indeed,
in judicial proceedings, “whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney
has is extremely circumscribed.’” Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501
U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991). See also id. at 1072–73 (explaining that “the
speech of those participating before the courts c[an] be limited” and
that “although litigants do not surrender their First Amendment
rights at the courthouse door, those rights may be subordinated to
other interests that arise in this setting”) (quotation omitted).

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

But... simply the court having jurisdiction doesn't mean you win. Court concludes their appeal is unlikely to succeed.

IV
The appellants mount two main attacks on the district
court’s speech-related sanction. First, they argue that the court
lacked a sufficient basis to find that the lawsuit and the settlement
were collusive and that Messrs. Brito and Epstein acted in bad faith.
Second, they contend that the sanction is a broad and impermissi
ble gag order which constitutes a prior restraint and violates the
First Amendment. We conclude that the appellants have not made
a strong showing that they will succeed on either of these grounds.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

But... the speech-related sanction has the “practical effect of granting an injunction,” and, is thus appealable.

The speech-related sanction prevents the parties (i.e., the ap
pellants) from “referring to the . . . ‘settlement agreement,’ or us
ing, offering, admitting, or citing any of its provisions in any judi
cial, administrative, . . . or . . . other official proceeding as evidence
of a ‘settlement’ reached in this matter.” D.E. 106 at 47. The ap
pellants have made a strong showing that this sanction is likely ap
pealable.
First, the sanction has the necessary “practical effect of
granting an injunction.” North Brook, 176 F.4th at 1272 (quoting

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

First question is, quite reasonably, whether the court has jurisdiction. On their first argument, it's a no.

A “final decision” is a “decision that ‘ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute
the judgment.’” Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79,
86 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The sanctions
order that the appellants seek to stay is not a final decision under §
1291 because there is more substantive work for the district court
to do in the post-judgment proceedings initiated by the former
judges’ motion. The court has not yet ruled on the former judges’
request to reopen the case and has not yet decided the issue of at
torney’s fees under its inherent powers. Indeed, the court stated
that the order “should not be understood as a final determination
regarding any fraud perpetrated on the court and does not fore
close the possibility of future relief under [Rule 60].” D.E. 106 at

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 30/09/2026

If I'm reading this right, "the parties [...] moved for a stay" means both plaintiffs and defendants. Way to beat the collusive suit allegations.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Nichols also reluctantly grants a 48-hour extension, but points out it violates the court's standing order in at least two ways.

MINUTE ORDER. Upon consideration of Defendant's 210 Motion for Extension of Time, and in view of Plaintiffs' willingness to go along with it, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Defendant shall file his reply in support of his 207 Motion to Clarify on or before September 30, 2026. The Court notes that the 15 Standing Order requires parties to include the number of all previous extensions granted, not just extensions related to the specific deadline at issue. By the Court's count, this is at least the eighth extension granted to Defendant: see Defendant's requests at 22, 30, 35, 81, 115, 185, 200, and now 210 . Moreover, the present Motion violates the Standing Order's requirement that motions for extension of time "be filed at least four days prior to the deadline." So ORDERED by Judge Carl J. Nichols on 09/29/2026. (lccjn2)

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

The motion was from January(!) and contained basically no law. It accuses Dominion of illegally installing Joe Biden as President.

$Discussion The fact of the matter is that the crimes by the Plaintiff should not be protected. This Court should never be in a position where it is aiding and abetting a criminal by hiding the evidence of the criminal’s crimes. Now that the documents have been produced and it proves that the Plaintiff participated in implementing and concealing remote access, including foreign access to the US election equipment and data, and this Court must permit those documents to be made public. This is not a minor infraction which is involved. It is literally the fixing of a Presidential Election and the take-over of our country for 4 years by an illegal regime.$

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 29/09/2026

Judge Nichols seems to have finally woken up to the abuse of the court system going on right in front of him in Dominion v. Byrne.

MINUTE ORDER. Upon consideration of Defendant's 166 Motion to Set Aside, and the entire record in this case, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED as frivolous and an abuse of the court system. Both the 79 Amended Protective Order currently in force and the original 46 Protective Order -- which Defendant himself joined in moving for 45 -- explicitly contemplate the possibility of someone being served with an outside subpoena for the production of confidential discovery material from this case and require any person receiving such a subpoena to object to it (see para. 26 of either protective order). Consequently, the issuance of such a subpoena cannot constitute the "good cause" required to amend or set aside the protective order. The Court also notes that Plaintiff and his counsel have repeatedly and flagrantly violated the protective order throughout this litigation. See, e.g., 126 . So ORDERED by Judge Carl J. Nichols on 09/29/2026. (lccjn2)

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

Garland is being sued in his individual capacity for actions taken while the Attorney General of the United States.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 28/09/2026

"Major incident", but the suspected terrorists have been released on bail. What?

Releases at odds with major incident declared
published at 16:39
16:39

Frank Gardner
Security correspondent

Up and down the country the word "What?!" is probably being mouthed in incredulity.

The announcement this afternoon by the head of Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) that all five men arrested outside RAF Fairford airbase early on Sunday are to be released on bail sits at odds with our being told this was a "major incident" and talk of disaster averted.

The men, all young UK nationals from London, are still under investigation. But the fact they are no longer in custody dramatically reduces the scale of how big or how dangerous a plot this was alleged to be.

So what were they doing? Dressed in balaclavas and turning up in vans in the dead of night close to the perimeter of one of the most sensitive military sites in the country, then fleeing on being spotted by a vigilant member of the public, are actions bound to attract suspicion.

The fact that a Cobra national security meeting has been convened to discuss this incident shows it is being taken extremely seriously by the government.

And yet now, as it stands on Monday afternoon, it leaves us with more questions than answers.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

So they lost, lost, lost, lost, lost. End.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants J. Ann
Selzer and Selzer & Company and Defendants Des Moines Register and Tribune Company and
Gannett Co., Inc. are GRANTED. Counts I, II, and III of the Petition are dismissed with
prejudice.319 The Plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the publication of further polls is DENIED.320
Defendants J. Ann Selzer and Selzer & Company's motion for an order to show cause under
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413(1) is DENIED.
Costs of this action are assessed to the Plaintiffs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

Generously in my view, the court declines to impose sanctions. I suspect this will get crossed-appealed when Trump et al. inevitably appeal.

The Court nonetheless declines to find a violation because the Plaintiffs asked this Court
to extend existing law. Count I asked the Court to read chapter 714H to reach the contents of a
newspaper rather than a representation about merchandise offered for sale. Counts II and III
asked the Court to recognize claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation brought by
persons who never dealt with the Defendants. Each request required the law to move. The Court
has declined to move it, and has explained at length why. But the rule does not measure a filing
by whether its argument prevails. It asks whether the argument was advanced in good faith as a
request to extend, modify, or reverse the law.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

Back to reliance, as promised. Not only did they fail to plead that they relied on the polls, they pleaded the exact opposite. They pleaded that they knew the polls were false.

The Court takes those allegations at face value, but it does not help the Plaintiffs. Acting
to counteract a statement is not acting in reliance on its truth. It is the opposite. A candidate who
spends money to answer a poll because he believes the poll is wrong has acted on his disbelief.
Gibson requires reliance “on the truth of the representation.” Money spent to correct what a party
regards as a falsehood is not money spent in reliance on it. The only act the Petition alleges is
therefore the wrong kind of act to support a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

While a newspaper obviously can be merchandise, for the purposes of the petition, it wasn't. They weren't injured because the merchandise was faulty (like a washing machine that doesn't work, or a wardrobe that's half the size it's advertised).

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

Fraud isn't just lying. It's where you deceive someone with the intent of obtaining money, property. Something of some value. We have none of that here.

Second, as a basic premise and as previously noted, fraud is not the same as lying. Fraud
is the knowing misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act
to his or her detriment.105 As such, fraud is not just a false statement, but a statement made in the
course of persuading the plaintiff to part with money or property in reliance on it.106 A classic
example of fraud is a used car salesman rolling back an odometer.107 Because of this, a false
statement alone lacks an essential element of a claim. Specifically, a cause of action requires

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

Here we go again. None. Nada. Zip. Nothing.

None of that has been pleaded here. No Plaintiff pleads that J. Ann Selzer or Selzer &
Company communicated with him or her, solicited anything from him or her, or had any
relationship with any Plaintiff, arising out of contract or otherwise. No Plaintiff pleads that he or
she purchased the Iowa Poll, subscribed to the Register because of the Poll, or gave anything of
value to any Defendant because of the Poll. Plaintiffs merely plead that false statements were
published to the public and that bad things ensued. Whatever that may be, that is not fraud.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

This comes up again and again. The polls weren't aimed at plaintiffs, nor did plaintiffs plead that they relied on the polls (more on this point later).

2. No Representation Was Made to Plaintiffs, and No Plaintiff Parted with Anything in
Reliance.
The claims fail not only because a poll is not a statement of fact, but also because the
Petition does not allege any reliance. The constitutional fraud exception reaches lies told to
obtain money or property. The traditional statement of the tort says so: the misrepresentation

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 27/09/2026

This is the theme throughout this entire order. There are two elements they need to satisfy, they hit zero of them.

F. The Elements That Define the Fraud Exception Are Absent Here.
Applying that test to this Petition, the Court finds two elements absent, and each is absent
as a matter of law. The first is falsity of a kind that can be demonstrated. A statement must be
capable of being proved true or false before it can be said to be false at all. The second is
inducement. The representation must be made to the Plaintiff for the purpose of persuading the
Plaintiff to part with money or property of value in reliance upon it. The first is the subject of
subsection 1 below, and the second of subsection 2. Either would be enough, and their absence is
fatal to the claims. The Court considers both because the allegations raised by each are different,
and the Court's conclusions with respect to Counts I, II, and III depend on them.

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