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the ability to integrate thousands of interdependent elements into a system that operates reliably and at scale.

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Our central argument is that imitating a complex system at the technological frontier means confronting countless potential points of failure, each with vanishingly small tolerances for error. Overcoming this challenge requires accumulated organizational capabilities—

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Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

- as well as foundational research on systems integration by Stefano Brusoni, Andrea Prencipe and the late Keith Pavitt whose subtitle still says it all "Why do firms know more than they make?" journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.2307/...

journals.sagepub.com

Subscription and open access journals from Sage, the world's leading independent academic publisher.

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The article builds on the work of many analysts and scholars. This includes the excellent books on ASML by René Raaijmakers and Marc Hijink - whose book contains a chapter on this very subject

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ASML's Extreme Ultraviolet Lithography and the Limits of Reverse Engineering in China

Recently, ASML has been a lot in the news. In a new article, we explain why concerns about industrial espionage, reverse engineering and talent poaching miss the critical challenge that the production of lithography machines poses: systems integration. tinyurl.com/3u79rj7e

tinyurl.com

In June, the U.S. Department of Commerce informed the Dutch company ASML that it suspects one of its extreme ultraviolet lithography machines has reached

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Reposted by Mauro Gilli

Joanna Bryson @j2bryson.bsky.social · 22/07/2026

"Vulnerability discovery is an orchestration problem: analysis, hypothesis generation, harness construction, execution, verification, and long-horizon memory. Block access to one model and the same workflow runs on another." should also apply to cybersecure #systemsEngineering #systemsAI?

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Joanna Bryson @j2bryson.bsky.social · 27/03/2026

“Clearview AI, which took advantage of a lack of regulations around biometrics and people's faces online to build a massive database,” really “took advantage of the BS GAFAM claims of self-governance” which @microsoft.com in particular trumpeted as demonstrating its #aiethics — indeed it did. 1/2

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Mauro Gilli @maurogilli.bsky.social · 09/03/2026

Don't forget that some (pro-Russian charlatans) have been accusing Bellingcat of being a CIA-psyop.

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Mauro Gilli @maurogilli.bsky.social · 08/03/2026

Eh chi lo sa. La loro bussola è rotta…

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Mauro Gilli @maurogilli.bsky.social · 08/03/2026

As I argue, the longer the war drags on and the more launchers Iran loses, the more intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike assets will be concentrated on each remaining launcher — making an already difficult task even harder.

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Mauro Gilli @maurogilli.bsky.social · 08/03/2026

Flattered to be included in this detailed Financial Times article on the cat-and-mouse game between Israeli/US interdiction assets and Iranian ballistic-missile launchers. www.ft.com/content/b2b3...

ft.com

The hunt for Iran’s ballistic missile crews

Tehran’s missiles are key to its retaliation against Israel and the US. But launching them brings an immediate risk of death

Mauro Gilli @maurogilli.bsky.social · 15/02/2026

With Andrea Gilli and Niccolò Petrelli, we discussed this and other problems in an article for Binding Hook last year: bindinghook.com/data-really-...

bindinghook.com

Data really is the new ammo

As Europe aims for defence sovereignty, access to US data remains a thorny topic.

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Mauro Gilli @maurogilli.bsky.social · 15/02/2026

The problem with the F-35 (or, for that matter, with many modern weapon systems) is not necessarily only with updating the software but also with updating the library of enemy targets and signals, for which European countries do not have the means.

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Mauro Gilli @maurogilli.bsky.social · 15/02/2026

The Dutch Defence Minister suggested on a radio interview that European countries can “jailbreak” an F-35 in case the US blocked software updates: “I'm going to say something I should never say, but I'll do it anyway. Just like your iPhone, you can jailbreak an F-35. I won't say more about it.”

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auonsson @auonsson.bsky.social · 01/02/2026

Shadow tanker PEACE lacks safety management, insurance. She is flying a false flag of Timor-Leste where Timor-Leste demands of other states to stop her. She is lawless. Sanctioned by EU and UK. She is on her fifth delivery of Russian crude to India last 12m. She is leaving Baltic Sea laden now.

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Mauro Gilli @maurogilli.bsky.social · 14/01/2026

Thanks Joanna! I didn't know this book. I will look for it!

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Reposted by Mauro Gilli

Eliot Higgins @eliothiggins.bsky.social · 08/01/2026

For those keeping score, Bellingcat, The New York Times Visual Investigation Team, & Washington Post's Visual Forensic team have all published analysis showing the ICE shooter wasn't in the path of Renee Nicole Good’s vehicle when he shot her, contradicting statements by the President & his cronies

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Mauro Gilli @maurogilli.bsky.social · 08/01/2026

Evidence coming up. Some of these systems however were in hangars. I assume we will know more soon.

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Benjamin D Lane @slowtalking.bsky.social · 07/01/2026

Thanks Frank. I didn’t know it.

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Reposted by Mauro Gilli

Fascinating air defense neutralization thread:

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Ok, I will finish it here. I hope it helps. Apologies for typos/bad syntax.

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On top of all the information that the US has been able to retrieve thanks to Ukraine, whether because of the air defense assets that the Ukrainian military managed to take, or because of the electronic intelligence the US and the Ukrainian military has been able to collect.

RC-135 Accompanied By Fighters Off Venezuela Testing Maduro's Air Defenses: U.S. Official

Of course, to accomplish these tasks effectively, a country needs to possess information on the enemy radar - specifically, on their waveform, modulation, etc. Well, here we know the US has been collecting these information for quite some time www.twz.com/air/rc-135-a...

twz.com

The flights are part of a massive U.S. military presence in the Caribbean aimed at putting maximum pressure on Venezuela's Maduro.

For example, by generating a large amount of background returns (noise jamming), which impedes the ability to see an incoming aircraft; or by deceiving the system through the generation of false returns (spoofing); or through other means.

Such signals, in turn, can interfere with the capacity of adversary radar to detect threats (i.e., to capture radar returns and distinguish them from the background) in multiple ways.

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Instead of relying on a physical obstacle, jamming and spoofing accomplish their goal by emitting electromagnetic signals of a very specific type.

Whereas a tunnel or an elevator leads to an accidental loss of signal, jamming and spoofing are intentional means aimed at degrading the performance of an adversary’s system.

This occurs because a physical obstacle impedes the electromagnetic waves used for modern mobile communications from reaching the antenna of a smartphone. This example is helpful because radars also use electromagnetic waves, albeit at different frequencies and with different signal designs.

One way to think about it is to consider interferences that obstruct mobile communications, such as when we enter a tunnel or an elevator and our smartphones lose coverage and hence cannot make calls or receive messages.

This is why neutralizing enemy radars, and in particular any still active fire-control radars, is so important. And this is where electronic warfare comes into play.

Here a premise is needed. Radars are very effective for air defense because they allow long-range detection and ranging, they work day and night, (mostly) in all weather, they allow to discriminate between irrelevant objects and potential threats, and to identify the latter as such.

With regard to electronic attacks, this is once again something that has existed for very long time and it refers to the use of electromagnetic signals for degrading enemy radars.

You need to create a temporary "corridor" through which your aircraft (in this case: rotary-wing aircraft, or helicopters) could transit safely. More on this later.

Did The U.S. Use Kamikaze Drones To Strike Venezuela?

We know the US hit some targets in Venezuela with precision munitions, I haven't followed whether any of these was part of the air defense network, but I suspect at least some were. Important in this regard is that you don't need to strike the whole air defense network. www.twz.com/air/u-s-kami...

twz.com

An unmistakable banshee-like wail is heard before detonations in videos taken on the ground during Operation Absolute Resolve.

With regard to kinetic attacks, this is something that militaries have been doing since World War II: trying to either destroy enemy ground-based air defenses (radars, anti-air artillery, surface to air missile batteries, command and control centers, etc.).

I haven't read anything about other type of cyber attacks, but it would be surprising that the US hadn't also try to disable the air defense network itself - which the US has done since the 1999 war against Yugoslavia.

We don't know much about the cyber attacks, but again this is not a surprise, as the US allegedly used it for the first time in 1999 against Yugoslavia. Apparently, the US shut down electricity/power generation to degrade part of the Venezuelan air defense network.

According to available information, the US has used three main ways to disable Venezuelan air defenses: cyber attacks, kinetic attacks (precision missiles) and electronic (electromagnetic) attacks.

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In other words, air defense is a network, and the goal of suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses is to disable this network, ideally in multiple points. This is what Russia tried but failed to do in Ukraine. This is what the US succeeded in doing in Venezuela (and others).

As a result, air defenses generally keep fire-control radars switched off until they are ready for engagement. But this makes them dependent on early warning radars as well as on communication systems & command & control centers

Conversely, fire-control radars provide the necessary resolution for engagement. To this goal, they operate at much higher frequencies (shorter wavelength). Because they need smaller antennas, these radars can also be mobile.