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These tradeoffs can only be effectively compared within a clear critical minerals strategy. The U.S. should develop such a strategy and seek out partnerships that best suit this strategy, not build a strategy around external offers.

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US officials must compare these costs and risks against several other factors, such as: - Mineral substitution and recycling efforts (supply) - Domestic production boosts (supply) - Alternative partners (supply) - Potential shift from green energy (consumption)

US officials will need to consider the potential risk to American service members, billions in risky and possibly short-term unprofitable investments, and the challenging political situation in the DRC that has made the DRC a difficult partner for decades.

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The DRC has several "critical" minerals used in smartphones & defense systems vital for national security. Still, the U.S. should minimize the risks of a partnership, clearly define American mineral needs, and explore possible alternatives to make sure a deal is worth the cost.

Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 07/04/2025

Check out my op-ed for @thehill.com on the "security-for-minerals" discussions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo & the United States. The potential risks & costs are high, and the extent of the benefits is unclear. Here's what US officials should consider: thehill.com/opinion/inte... 🧵

thehill.com

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The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas lashed out against China in their latest crackdown on allegedly exploitative international investment. This move marks an expansion of the juntas' pro-sovereignty economic campaign beyond Western mining companies. www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr... 🧵

criticalthreats.org

Africa File, April 3, 2025: Russia-Sahel Summit; Sahelian Juntas Target Chinese Mining; M23 Loses Walikale but Uganda Leaves Vacuum

Russia. The Kremlin is strengthening its strategic relationships with Sahelian juntas to entrench Russian influence in the region and sec...

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 04/04/2025

The Congolese army & allied militias recaptured the district capital Walikale town after M23 withdrew. The retreat reduces M23’s leverage entering Qatari-mediated negotiations with the DRC and could indicate the group is facing capacity and supply challenges.🧵 www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr...

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Liam Karr @liamkarr.bsky.social · 03/04/2025

It's worth keeping in mind the reports that Trump wants to scrap AFRICOM altogether: africa.businessinsider.com/local/leader... You can read Gen. Langley's last two posture reviews here. 2025: armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-... 2024: www.africom.mil/about-the-co...

africa.businessinsider.com

The Trump administration is considering downsizing the U.S. Africa Command in Pentagon

The Trump administration is considering downsizing U

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Liam Karr @liamkarr.bsky.social · 03/04/2025

Russia was mentioned (or alluded to) 14 times in Gen. Langley's 2024 posture statement. Zero in 2025. Langley mentioned China nine times in 2024, mostly discussing the Horn. The 2025 statement mentions China more than 20 times and covers Chinese activity across the continent.

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Liam Karr @liamkarr.bsky.social · 03/04/2025

Some notable takeaways from Gen. Langley's posture statement to the US Senate today that shed light on the Trump admin's priorities in Africa: - Russia is not mentioned. China got a whole section. - A paragraph is devoted to AFRICOM's efforts to support US investment in critical minerals. 🧵

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 03/04/2025

NEW | The Kremlin is strengthening its strategic relationship with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The AES helps the Kremlin supplant Western influence, pose as a great power, and possibly threaten NATO's southern flank. www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr... 🧵

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 27/03/2025

NEW | The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) fully retook central Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), marking a major military and political victory for the SAF. What it means for Sudan's civil war: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr...

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I would expect the current offensive to culminate in the next few weeks with the end of Ramadan and the onset of the Gu rainy season. It will be important to see what areas the group holds/continues operating in before forecasting future operations in the dry season (~June).

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They've tried to overturn the 2022 CT gains in central Somalia for years, and this offensive finally stuck. A full return to pre-2022 would cut the roadway linking Mogadishu to central Somalia and create a staging ground for an assault on Mog.

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In central Somalia, however, Shabaab successfully established themselves on the east bank of the Shabelle River, re-entered areas of central Somalia they haven't been since 2022, and temporarily overran some pretty big population centers.

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There also hasn't been a significant change in foreign personnel movements around Mog that would signal the international community expects an imminent collapse.

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The activity around Mog is notable for its brazenness, but it's not like Shabaab is operating in areas where it hasn't already been present. It would almost be more surprising if al Shabaab wasn't doing attention-grabby operations during Ramadan.

Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 20/03/2025

Lots of talk about the deteriorating situation in Somalia lately. I think the immediate threat to Mogadishu may be overstated, but the backsliding in central Somalia is setting conditions for AS to encircle Mog & generate an existential threat in the medium term. More below⬇️

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NEW | The Democratic Republic of the Congo & Rwanda agreed to a Qatari-mediated ceasefire, but fundamental disagreements and obstacles remain. Rwandan-backed M23 advanced westward & captured a key district capital on March 19 despite ceasefire efforts. www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr... 🧵

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 14/03/2025

Renewed conflict in Tigray or between Ethiopia and Eritrea would generate an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis that would have reverberations across Africa and even into Europe.🧵 Read the full update here: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr...

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 04/03/2025

NEW | Rwandan-backed M23 rebels continued their advance along the RN2 road southwest of Bukavu in central South Kivu and entered Mwenga district. M23 has advanced over 30 miles along the RN2 since March 1. Today's Congo War Security Review and maps: criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo... 🧵⬇️

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 03/03/2025

NEW | Pro-Congolese government militia fighters launched counterattacks against M23-aligned rebels that likely involved ethnically-motivated retaliatory violence against Banyamulenge civilians in South Kivu. Today's Congo War Security Review and maps: www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo...

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 03/03/2025

NEW | IS Sahel Province (ISSP) is conducting a campaign to establish attack capabilities in Morocco and potentially use Morocco as a bridge for attacks in Europe. More details below from the latest Africa File: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr... ⬇️🧵1/6

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Karolina Hird @karolinahird.bsky.social · 28/02/2025

Utterly shameful behavior from Trump + Vance. Belittling and humiliating an ALLY who has done everything to fight for the literal survival of his people (and the free world). Russia's daily atrocities against the Ukrainian people clearly mean nothing to this admin- and that's a bad precedent to set.

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Liam Karr @liamkarr.bsky.social · 28/02/2025

Don't cover Ukraine, but this is awful & embarrassing. This is the patronizing approach that people have criticized the US for using with African allies for years. We are bad partners to treat our allies, who are fighting for their existence, in this way.

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 07/02/2025

NEW | Rwandan-backed M23 rebels declared a unilateral “humanitarian” ceasefire in the eastern DRC ahead of peace talks scheduled for February 7 and 8. M23 already broke the ceasefire, however, and a long-term political solution remains unlikely. 1/6

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 07/02/2025

NEW | Algeria & the United States have tightened their relationship as Algeria seeks to diversify its partnerships beyond its traditional partner, Russia. Stronger Algerian-US ties will benefit US efforts to counter Russia, Iran, and Salafi-jihadi insurgents. 1/7 🧵

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 31/01/2025

NEW | The war in the eastern DRC will likely escalate further after Rwandan-backed M23 captured Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, continued to advance into South Kivu, and stated that it aims to take Kinshasa. The latest on the battlefield and what could be next⬇️🧵1/7

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 10/01/2025

The Islamic State continues to evolve and expand globally. @liamkarr.bsky.social and @briancarter.bsky.social review how recent shifts in the international counterterrorism posture in Syria and Africa risk creating security vacuums that IS can exploit to strengthen further.🧵

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Critical Threats Project @criticalthreats.bsky.social · 20/12/2024

As quoted in @nytimes.com, CTP assesses that Russia is setting conditions in Libya to replace its footprint in Syria. These efforts include likely upgrading Russian positions in Libya & working towards securing permission for a Russian naval base. More below🧵⬇️

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Liam Karr @liamkarr.bsky.social · 19/12/2024

- Russian flights from Syria to Libya may be going to al Jufra. Transponders are off, so it's hard to verify, but Russian cargo aircraft are popping up at al Jufra. Whereas we've been able to track flights going directly from Russia to al Khadim.