Sign in

Mikhail Komin

@kominmo.bsky.social
99 followers 48 following 129 posts

Political analyst, Russia expert (elites, bureaucracy, government data, policy-making process). Editor at Novaya Gazeta Europe; Research Fellow at CEPA

PostsRepliesMedia
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 12h
The Kremlin wanted veterans’ victories to project unity behind the war. The election results suggest war is far from popular. New mobilisation will need more coercion, even without mass protests. West should factor in these costs, but can't count on them to prevent escalation 4/4
021
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 12h
Some other KPRF candidates offer further signs of a veteran penalty. Most of their veterans running in single-member constituencies polled below KPRF’s list there. Their shortfall averaged 3-5 pp more than for non-veterans, both in official results and within “clean” precincts 3/
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 12h
Komi Republic is a telling case: a war veteran was fielded to defeat a popular KPRF MP who even called for peace in campaign. “Clean” precinct coverage fell from 94% to 61% in 2021-26. The decline was nationwide, but averaged 6 pp more in districts with veterans than elsewhere 2/
111
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 12h
My two cents on Russia’s new State Duma for ECFR. I continue examining war veterans: 60 now hold seats. Coverage by precincts without detected anomalies fell faster where UR veterans ran, suggesting extra direct fraud to offset a “veteran penalty”. ecfr.eu/article/mar... 1/3
ecfr.eu
Marching into the Duma: The cost of Putin’s push for war veterans in parliament – European Council on Foreign Relations
Putin wants to make politicians out of Ukraine war veterans. After the recent election, 60 now sit in the Duma. But voters seem less keen than the official vote
130
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 18/09/2026
My new text for CEPA on how the Kremlin overreacts to recent anti-war dissent. Yabloko is likely to lose all its regional seats, ending its right to run without signatures, threatening its survival and pushing opposition inside Russia further underground. cepa.org/article/kre...
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
This recruitment pool could outlast Putin. As veterans rise, a group invested in the war’s legacy may make future rapprochement with Europe and the West harder. 12/ ecfr.eu/publication...
ecfr.eu
Booted, then suited: Veterans and the making of Putin’s new proto-elite – European Council on Foreign Relations
The Kremlin is promoting Ukraine war veterans--cultivating a proto-elite who could reinforce Russia’s militarised course.
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
But new Duma will mix real combatant with established politicians claiming veterans credentials. This is not a bug, it's a feature of the system. Embedding newcomers among experienced politicians should help Kremlin keep any veterans’ grouping dependent and limit its autonomy 11/
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
Elections are another route into the pool, most widely used at regional and municipal levels in 2024-2025. I project around 50 veterans in the next State Duma, far fewer than the Kremlin promissed a year ago. They would hold roughly 10% of seats. 10/
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
Andras @minczifra.bsky.social 's excellent research shows regions lack resources for reintegration. My findings suggest this will force the Kremlin to divide veterans into “good” ones rewarded with jobs and “bad” ones left out, whose protests may face repression. 9/ delphigrc.org/research/th...
delphigrc.org
The Burden of Return: Russia’s Veterans, Regional Strain, and the Politics of Reintegration
When it comes to veteran reintegration, the Kremlin centralizes political control and loyalty-building while decentralizing the costs and responsibility for actual service delivery.
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
But in the mean time regional governors more often create for veterans new, didn't exist before posts. 44% of all 400+ documented appointments involve working with veterans and their families, and 30% ideological work. Only 22% involve general management. 8/
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
TH regional versions show traditional for Russia bureaucratic competition. Governors compete over enrolment (~4500 people have been admitted in 2 years), appointments and even programme names, like the “The Call of Stalingrad”, “Valour of the Mountains” xn--90aebf3aqeqgk4i.xn--p1ai/ 7/
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
Veterans seem to be replacing technocrats as Putin’s preferred recruitment pool. I compared their training programmes: the shift is from “make competent people loyal” to “make loyal people competent”. Skills and practical work take up 68% of training, against 34%. 6/
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
By now veterans hold posts in the consituences from Roscosmos to the Central Election Commission. This breadth suggests a reserve for future vacancies: Putin can draw on people whose loyalty is tied to the war and who have begun gaining experience in the relevant institution. 5/
120
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
Veteran appointments are often assumed to be largely confined to ideological work or veteran support. Yet half of federal programme appointments involve real responsibility for managing organisations or sectors, often with little relevant prior training. 4/
130
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
The Kremlin’s repeated claims of many appointments for TH participants are borne out by the data: 110+ by September 2026. Since 2024, some have already had 2 or 3 appointments, advancing faster than other bureaucrats. For 10-12, a State Duma seat could also be the next step. 3/
121
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
The federal Time of Heroes programme is the main route into this pool. 84% of TH participants have exclusively military backgrounds. None has reached top national office; most senior posts went to the few with prior political careers. But itlooks like just the beginning of story.
120
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 15/09/2026
Putin’s call for a “new elite” of war veterans is often dismissed as mere PR. My brief for @ecfr shows a more complex picture. Kremlin builds a recruitment pool to gradually bring veterans into bureaucracy as a distinct group like technocrats or siloviki. ecfr.eu/publication... 1/
ecfr.eu
Booted, then suited: Veterans and the making of Putin’s new proto-elite – European Council on Foreign Relations
The Kremlin is promoting Ukraine war veterans--cultivating a proto-elite who could reinforce Russia’s militarised course.
163
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
DumaBingo is my favourite project: a map connecting MPs with the corporate, bureaucratic and regional interests group they appear to serve. Parliament rubber-stamps executive initiatives, yet elite groups use legislation to pursue their interests. dumabingo.org 9/
dumabingo.org
ДумаБинго
Интерактивная карта лоббистских возможностей депутатов Государственной Думы РФ 8 созыва: лоббистские группы, законопроекты и персоналии.
010
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
Another project, Gold of Parties is a database of 24,561 political donations from 2005-2025. Its latest report argues that the financing rationale used to remove Yabloko could threaten almost every party if applied consistently. www.zolotopartiy.org/data www.zolotopartiy.org/articles/9 8/
zolotopartiy.org
Практика обхода ограничений и запретов на финансирование политических партий в России в 2025 году
Аналитический доклад проекта “Золото партий”
100
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
The second source is the Elections in Detail tg-channel, usually used for shorter, faster updates and often catches developments Russian independent media miss, from obscure candidate-registration cases to voting at Russian polling stations abroad. t.me/detailselec... 7/
t.me
Выборы в деталях
«Выборы в деталях» — канал о выборах в России и не только. Новости, аналитика, разборы и результаты голосования. Сообщить нам информацию, предложить пост или просто поделиться сокровенным можно через наш бот: https://t.me/electiondetails_bot
100
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
The 2025 redrawing of Duma constituencies fits the pattern: new seats went mainly to loyal regions; several abolished seats had opposition incumbents. Changes to commissions, counting and boundaries add up to a sizeable administrative advantage. atlas.vyborov.org/articles/80 6/
atlas.vyborov.org
Выдвижение и регистрация кандидатов на выборах депутатов Государственной думы, назначенных на 20 сентября 2026 года | Атлас Выборов
Аналитический доклад
100
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
KOIB ballot scanners will be less used in the 2026 Duma election. Atlas finds that precincts using them in 2024 often reported more opposition-friendly results. Their removal means one less check on discreet manipulation during hand counts. atlas.vyborov.org/articles/100 5/
atlas.vyborov.org
КОИБ на выборах в Госдуму не будет: машинный подсчет в 2024 году показал более оппозиционные результаты | Атлас Выборов
Полное отсутствие КИОБ на избирательных участках лишь усиливает предположение, что результаты голосования здесь будут нужным образом корректироваться
100
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
Atlas’s reports often delve deeply into the workings of the Kremlin’s electoral machinery. I.e. its study of the composition of reg. election commissions finds that UR’s reach extends far beyond formal labels and soared significantly over the past 10 years atlas.vyborov.org/articles/71... 4/
atlas.vyborov.org
«А кто считать будет?» Часть 2: Имитация многопартийности | Атлас Выборов
Аналитический доклад о составах избирательных комиссий субъектов Российской Федерации на начало выборов в Государственную думу–2026 в четырех частях
100
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
Atlas publishes reports and weekly data-based monitoring of party coverage on TV and soc-media.The most recent example of the latter captured Yabloko’s sharp rise in engagement among young Ru after its party list was registered and before it was revoked atlas.vyborov.org/articles/81 3/
atlas.vyborov.org
Не справились с управлением: популярность «Яблока» и «Новых людей» в соцсетях стала выходить из-под контроля кураторов внутренней политики | Атлас Выборов
Отчёт о мониторинге социальных сетей на седьмой неделе избирательной кампании (28 июля–3 августа) по выборам депутатов Государственной думы Российской Федерации IX созыва, назначенным на 20 сентября 2026 года
100
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
Scepticism about Ru “elections” is warranted. Yet the campaigns still show how an electoral authocracies manages competition, filters candidates and engineers outcomes. My starting point is Atlas of Elections, the new project from the ex-Golos team: atlas.vyborov.org 2/
100
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 08/09/2026
A colleague from Western Academia recently asked me where to follow Russian electoral procedures after Golos was forced to close. I sent him a few links, then thought the list might be useful more widely, espessially in the light of the upcoming State Duma election. golosinfo.org/en/articles... 1/
golosinfo.org
Statement on the termination of activities of the movement “Golos”
The All-Russian Movement for the Defence of Voters' Rights “Golos” has stopped its activities
101
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 01/09/2026
For "Strana i Mir", a Sakharov Center project, I discuss three tensions shaping Russia’s new political season: civilian managers and siloviki, pressure on economic technocrats, and the growing difficulty of keeping wartime economic problems depoliticized. www.youtube.com/watch?v=c10...
youtube.com
Михаил Комин. Кризисный сезон для Путина
В рамках программы «Ждите ответа» ведущая YouTube-канала «Страна и ...
030
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 20/08/2026
The recent Yabloko court queues were a reminder: young Russians remain far more anti-war than older cohorts. In the new CEPA piece, we look at how this dissent now survives online: in coded jokes, memes, and irony directed at an aging regime and its aging ruler. cepa.org/article/the...
cepa.org
The Coded Resistance of Russian Youth
Gen Z shuns Putin’s war and quietly mourns lost freedoms and vanished opportunities amid Russia's repressive authoritarian regime.
0106
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 10/08/2026
In the recent interview for @CEIP_Politika, I discuss Yabloko’s disqualification and a broader pattern behind it: the growing conflict between civilian political managers vs siloviki vertical over how tightly Russian wartime politics should be controlled. www.youtube.com/watch?v=ukN...
youtube.com
Что говорит ситуация с «Яблоком» о настроениях в обществе и элитах? Михаил Комин
Михаил Комин, политолог, исследователь в Центре анализа европейской...
100
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 20/07/2026
Recent arrests around the Rotenberg network look like a Shoigu-style attack on a once-untouchable elite group in Ru.It signals that failures in war-related tasks now raise risks even inside Putin’s inner circle.My new piece for Carnegie Politika on this new rules carnegieendowment.org/russia-eura...
carnegieendowment.org
Are Russia’s Influential Rotenberg Brothers Headed for a Fall?
The security forces are targeting Arkady and Boris Rotenberg’s patronage network—and in Putin’s Russia, it’s extremely hard to stop a purge once it’s under way.
194
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 02/07/2026
The policy conclusion is simple: support should focus on long-term resilience, not quick measurable wins. What matters is decentralized, domestic-facing infrastructure that can survive pressure and be useful when a real political opening appears. 6/
030
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 02/07/2026
The same logic appears in concrete fields. Lawyers slow the repressive machine and make abuse visible. Draft-evasion groups reduce the pool of deployable soldiers. Environmental groups still mobilize residents and sometimes win local battles. 5/
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 02/07/2026
Their role has also changed. Under wartime autocracy, usual rights defense is often impossible. The practical task is to preserve the min conditions for civic life: contacts, safer routines, and space for the collective action. Exactly like at the mentioned above events for political prisoners.
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 02/07/2026
The report pushes back against the thesis, that current Russia turned into a “civil desert” after the exodus of activists in 2022. The truth is that human rights groups have moved into a hybrid mode: resources and public work abroad, services and networks are still inside Russia.
120
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 02/07/2026
Together with Sam Greene, Evgeny Roshchin, and Alexandra Yatsyk we argue that Russian (semi-)exiled human rights organizations still help preserve society’s connective tissue by maintaining low-risk civic infrastructure inside Russia, even under wartime repression. 2/ cepa.org/comprehensi...
cepa.org
Dissent Across Borders: Russian Human Rights Organizations in Exile
Rather than suffering practical extinction, Russian human rights groups have transformed themselves under the Kremlin's repressive policies.
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 02/07/2026
This chart is based on public data of letter-writing evenings for Ru political prisoners. In 2022-2023 in-country events outnumbered those abroad; later many shifted into more discreet formats, resembling the dissident kitchen. The figure shows one of the finding from our @cepa report -- 1/
120
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 24/06/2026
The Kremlin is unlikely to abandon its sovereign internet project. The next battleground is VPNs, and recent developments suggest a much tougher crackdown is coming. But after four years of adaptation, it is far from clear that the state can still win this technological arms race. 5/
010
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 24/06/2026
Another data also suggest that censorship isn't producing the outcomes the Kremlin expected. After YouTube throttling began in 2024, independent media traffic eventually recovered to around pre-block levels. Early evidence from the Telegram ban points in a similar direction. 4/
100
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 24/06/2026
The scale of VPN usage in Russia is now difficult to ignore. Four different data sources show millions of people do it regularly. Every new restriction has produced another wave of installations, searches, and migration to alternative tools. 3/
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 24/06/2026
In early 2022, Moscow blocked almost every independent media and several social platforms, but left some of them open. That gave in-Russia users time to learn VPNs, share instructions, and build informal circumvention networks before the state came for YouTube and TG later 2/
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 24/06/2026
The Kremlin spent years building a sovereign internet. Yet today, 35-40% of Russians still bypass censorship and retain access to blocked media and platforms. This estimate is more robust than many assume,as I show in my new data-driven piece for CEPA 1/ cepa.org/article/put...
cepa.org
Putin Is Losing the Fight to Keep Russians Offline
Millions of Russians are bypassing Vladimir Putin’s attempts to block access to the internet, and his regime is struggling to keep up.
140
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 24/05/2026
Recently commented for the NYT on Putin’s push to promote war veterans into bureaucracy. This isn't yet a mass takeover: the Kremlin still worries about manageability. But veterans who pass test role,even drunkard Shuvayev, the new Belgorod governor, can get integrated www.nytimes.com/2026/05/22/...
nytimes.com
From General to Governor: Putin Pushes a ‘New Elite’ of War Veterans
The popular leader of a region bordering Ukraine is replaced by a military commander as President Vladimir V. Putin looks to reward those who fought in his war.
030
Reposted by Mikhail Komin
Brian Taylor @bdtaylor-su.bsky.social · 04/05/2026
A few thoughts on the @istories.bsky.social story about "a report by an intelligence service of a European Union country on the real situation in the Kremlin and the condition of Vladimir Putin." 🧵 1) The basic idea that Putin is more concerned about his personal security seems plausible. 1/10
storage.googleapis.com
Vladimir Putin fears an assassination attempt and a coup, tensions among security services are rising, an EU intelligence agency says
Независимое медиа. Расследования, репортажи, интервью и истории о том, что важно
26526
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 29/04/2026
My last comment for the NYT. The Kremlin pushes toward a sovereign internet, but the move against TG exposed unexpected public and intra-elite resistance. showing that many in society and bureaucracy are not ready to move as fast as Putin and siloviki want www.nytimes.com/2026/04/28/...
010
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 27/03/2026
7/ Taken together, the two pieces offer a more complete picture than either could alone: the structural constraints on Belousov's power on one side, and how a careful, long-game bureaucrat is working around them on the other.
010
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 27/03/2026
6/ Andrei Yakovlev's companion piece maps how Belousov compensates: aligns with Chemezov/Rostec on nationalization, blocking Kiriyenko's "paper svo-veterans" from Duma lists, and positioning Tsivileva as his gateway to real military networks. cepa.org/article/rus...
cepa.org
Russia’s Gray Man Makes His Move
Putin’s defense minister is confounding his critics and winning greater power in Russia’s murky despotism.
120
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 27/03/2026
5/ But this also limits Belousov's room to build his own clan. He placed one close ally among 10 deputies. The rest answer to Finance, Rostec, the FSB, or Putin's family. Not a clan, but a committee.
110
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 27/03/2026
4/ My read: the Kremlin isn't trying to end corruption in the MoD — it's restructuring which corruption survives. Logistics rents are being squeezed; armament spending is being protected and expanded.
120
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 27/03/2026
3/ This maps onto what @jakluge.de has tracked in his regularly-updated RU budget data: the classified share of military spending (where the most of armament spendings is located) rose from ~50% to nearly 70% by 2024-25. The purge and the budget shift point in the same direction.
120
Mikhail Komin @kominmo.bsky.social · 27/03/2026
2/ The purge of Shoigu's team has now lasted two years and swept up 70+ individuals. But the targets are not random: ~85% worked in logistics, supply, construction. Officials overseeing armaments are almost untouched. The purge has a shape, and that shape is deliberate.
130