Jess O'Thomson
@jessothomson.co.uk
20K followers 281 following 6.2K posts
Legal researcher, writer, journalist | Trans Rights Lead @ Good Law Project | PhD student @ University of Leeds Views my own. Not your lawyer; not legal advice. They/them hello@jessothomson.co.uk
![@DocPeatfield on X - 02/02/2024
The poor young kid Brianna Ghey killers are to be sentenced today. It was a horrific sustained attack so hopefully they get a sever [sic] sentence. No one deserves what happened to this poor kid no matter how confused he was or what issues he was going through](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:ey34srw7uoex672gmwebcnav/bafkreigzggliegco2kkfo3ydonzxc3f4wewblmrjhuiiqmalvg6xcf4e7i)
![249. It is now well-established that direct discrimination because of a protected characteristic (section 13 of the EA 2010) encompasses not only cases where the complainant affected by discrimination has the protected characteristic in question, but also where the discriminator perceives that the complainant has the characteristic, or in some other way associates the complainant with the protected characteristic. This can occur, for example, where the complainant is discriminated against because of caring responsibilities for a person with a protected characteristic, such as disability (as happened in Coleman v Attridge Law [2008] ICR 1128; EBR Attridge LLP v Coleman [2010] ICR 242) or where the complainant is treated detrimentally because it is thought that she or he has a particular protected characteristic even if they do not (English v Thomas Sanderson Blinds Ltd [2009] ICR 543, paras 37 to 40 per Sedley LJ, where the protected characteristic was sexual orientation). What is required is that the protected characteristic is a ground for the treatment in question. Terms such as "associative discrimination" and "discrimination by perception" are not a critical part of the analysis. What matters in the former is whether the treatment of the complainant was done because of the protected characteristic of the other person. In a case of perceived discrimination, the correct comparator is someone who is not perceived to have that protected characteristic: Chief Constable of Norfolk Constabulary v Coffey [2020] ICR 145. In Coffey the EAT (Judge David Richardson) held that where a claimant is treated less favourably on the basis of a mistaken perception that she was disabled, the correct hypothetical comparator was a person who was not perceived to be disabled and who had the same abilities as the claimant. On appeal, Underhill LJ (who gave a judgment with which the other members agreed) upheld the decision and expressly endorsed this comparator (see para 68 referring to…](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:ey34srw7uoex672gmwebcnav/bafkreidylm4zge4thd6udqalok63y2umjahwvb3ocip6lv7yjukjw5zluu)