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Jonathan B. Baker

@jbbecon.bsky.social
948 followers 124 following 74 posts

Author, The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Competitive Economy Profile: www.american.edu/profiles/faculty/e…

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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 31/08/2026
My new paper on Trumpian authoritarianism & the future of antitrust is about a fundamental threat to the way antitrust supported inclusive economic growth for 8 decades. Rebuilding antitrust requires procedural & substantive reforms & restoration of liberal democracy. Paper: ssrn.com/abstract=736...
ssrn.com
Trumpian Authoritarianism and the Future of Antitrust
Trumpian authoritarianism harms antitrust and, consequently, national prosperity, in two ways. First, direct political influence in antitrust enforcement will i
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
The article explains why that counterfactual opinion was not written in 2001, and why all the decision's contributions, affirmative and negative, may be tested today. ssrn.com/abstract=735.... 11/11
ssrn.com
The 2001<i> Microsoft </i>Decision and Antitrust: Six Affirmative Contributions and a Dog that Didn't Bark
<p><span>     This article examines the contributions to antitrust law of the D.C. Circuit's unanimous 2001 en banc decision in <i>Microsoft</i>.
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
Such an opinion would likely have emboldened the Supreme Court to adopt rapidly a more minimalist, non-interventionist antitrust, as by carving out exceptions to antitrust liability for new product development or firm conduct in high-tech, innovative industries. 10/11
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
…antitrust law strongly presumes that competition and consumers benefit from unilateral conduct or vertical agreements entered into by firms in rapidly changing high-tech markets. 9/11
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
The negative contribution: Antitrust law would likely have evolved differently had the circuit court split, with a counterfactual dissenting opinion supporting the defendant by asserting that in order to avoid chilling innovation… 8/11
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
(6) establishing that whether a monopolist's conduct constitutes "competition on the merits" is a legal conclusion reached through the burden-shifting framework, not the product of an independent analytical step for classifying conduct undertaken prior to applying the burden-shifting approach. 7/11
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
(5) confirming that courts can rely on the basic economic proposition that competition is necessarily harmed when a firm excludes all its actual and potential rivals without need to specify the details of the "but-for" world in which the conduct did not take place; 6/11
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
4) reaffirming that the exercise of intellectual property rights does not insulate a firm from antitrust liability; 5/11
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
(3) cementing the role of economic analysis in antitrust law by making it clear that all plaintiffs, including the government, must lay out the mechanism by which they allege competition has been harmed; 4/11
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
(2) clarifying that the exclusion of nascent rivals satisfies the requirement that the defendant's conduct have a causal connection to the exercise or maintenance of market power; 3/11
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
Affirmative contributions to monopolization doctrine: (1) refining the "bad act" element of the offense by adopting a multi-step burden-shifting approach; 2/11
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/08/2026
Why is the D.C. Circuit’s 2001 Microsoft decision still important for antitrust law? It made 6 affirmative contributions and a negative one—a dog that didn’t bark. A thread and a link to the paper follow. 1/11
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Spencer Weber Waller @sweberwaller.bsky.social · 30/07/2026
On October 15th Methuen Drama will publish my book Power and Greed: Monopolies, Mergers, and Cartels on the American Stage. Learn more at my new web site. www.powerandgreed.com
powerandgreed.com
Power and Greed — Monopolies, Mergers, and Cartels on the American Stage
The official website for Power and Greed: Monopolies, Mergers, and Cartels on the American Stage by Spencer Weber Waller, published by Methuen Drama.
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 20/07/2026
It’s an informed and valuable reference book based on modern economics.
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 01/03/2026
The best books to read before—or after—you learn antitrust law Something fun I originally posted in 2023 bookdna.com/best-books/r...
bookdna.com
The best books to read before—or after—you learn antitrust law
Jonathan B. Baker shares the 5 best books on reads before—or after—you learn antitrust law. Have you read The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly?
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 31/12/2025
3. "Looking at Merger Review from Outside an Ivory Tower" reviewing Louis Kaplow's merger book ssrn.com/abstract=533... 4. "How Economists Influence Antitrust: The Contributions of Tim Bresnahan, Janusz Ordover, Steve Salop, and Bobby Willig" academic.oup.com/antitrust/ar... More to come in 2026!
ssrn.com
Looking at Merger Review from Outside an Ivory Tower
This article reviews Louis Kaplow, Rethinking Merger Analysis (MIT Press 2024). The review evaluates the book's discussion of five major topics:&
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 31/12/2025
In 2025 I published 4 articles 1. "Competition Policy" in a book on econ consequences of the new admin cepr.org/publications... 2. "Trumpian Populism and the Changing Intellectual Landscape in Antitrust: Century-Old Resonances, the New Right, and the Possible End of an Era" ssrn.com/abstract=562...
cepr.org
The Economic Consequences of The Second Trump Administration: A Preliminary Assessment
==> REVISED & EXPANDED EDITION The Economic Consequences of the Second Trump Administration: A Preliminary Assessment delivers a timely, expert analysis of the economic shifts unfolding following President Trump’s return to office. Amid sweeping tariffs, sharp breaks in global alliances, assertions of presidential supremacy, government downsizing, deregulation, and risks to the rule of law, this volume offers thoughtful, evidence-based insights into how these policies may affect growth, trade, investment, inflation, stability, and the role of the dollar.
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 17/12/2025
Excerpt from The Antitrust Paradigm (2019) that seems relevant today
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 02/12/2025
Includes an update to my chapter on Competition Policy. Free to download at cepr.org/publications/books-and-reports/economic-consequences-second-trump-administration-preliminary
cepr.org
The Economic Consequences of The Second Trump Administration: A Preliminary Assessment
==> REVISED & EXPANDED EDITION
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 05/11/2025
The article argues that Trumpian populism could presage the end of an 80-year era in antitrust enforcement and lead to long term instability in antitrust enforcement policy, which no longer seems settled and technocratic. Published in Antitrust LJ and also available at ssrn.com/abstract=562... 3/3
ssrn.com
Trumpian Populism and the Changing Intellectual Landscape in Antitrust: Century-Old Resonances, the New Right, and the Possible End of an Era
<div> Senior enforcement officials in the second Trump administration describe their approach to antitrust as "conservative," but their Trumpian popu
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 05/11/2025
They say their approach is “conservative” but it differs from that of the Chicagoans who have been the primary conservative voices since the Reagan admin. Instead, Trumpian populist rhetoric on antitrust reflects New Right thinking and recalls the Lochner era of constitutional interpretation. 2/3
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 05/11/2025
My new article “Trumpian Populism and the Changing Intellectual Landscape in Antitrust: Century-Old Resonances, the New Right, and the Possible End of an Era” looks at the views of current senior antitrust enforcement officials. 1/3
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/09/2025
The HMT refines the demand substitution focus in the caselaw (e.g., duPont (Cellophane)) by suggesting a conceptual metric to determine how much demand substitution is too much to define a market. Looking just to Brown Shoe doesn't tell you how to think about that.
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 26/09/2025
I see the HMT as differing from Brown Shoe for a different reason: The HMT looks only to evidence about a single economic force, demand (buyer) substitution, while some Brown Shoe factors are about other economic forces. As you say, both approaches integrate qualitative & qualitative evidence.
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Tim Bresnahan @timobres.bsky.social · 08/08/2025
New Working Paper! Lucky to work with Shane Greenstein @shanegreenstein.bsky.social and Pai-Ling Yin on "New Economic Forces Behind the Value Distribution of Innovation." Abstract and link follow. lnkd.in/ew6UHk3v
Abstract of "New Economic Forces Behind the Value Distribution of Innovation."  Advances in a general-purpose technology (GPT) enable many firms to invent complementary inventions, or co-inventions, making the GPT more valuable. This study examines the empirical implications of a straightforward model in which firms choose either incremental or novel co-invention. Incremental co-inventors aspire to small gains at low costs and with less uncertainty. Novel co-inventors introduce new products or services with the potential for large returns, but do so at high costs and with uncertain outcomes. Similar firms investing in incremental co-invention will create value proportional to their existing business, a benchmark we illustrate with the experiences at local radio and newspapers. The study then examines the value of co-inventions for the World Wide Web and mobile ecosystems, focusing on success in 2013, using data from many sources. This data supports analysis comparing the incremental and novel regimes. The latter should display a distinctly different up! per tail of the distribution of returns. We show that the value distributions for incremental and novel co-invention are far apart. Incremental co-invention is more widely distributed across regions, industries, and firms. Success from novel co-invention is rare, challenging, and the source of the largest value. In the aggregate, novel co-invention creates the most value, so the overall value distribution remains concentrated in a few industries, regions, and firms.
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Tim Bresnahan @timobres.bsky.social · 04/08/2025
Looming problems from BLS statistics politicization. Social security benefits and many long term labor market contracts are indexed to the CPI. BLS makes the CPI. Recipients care about indexed cost of living increases, a lot. /1
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 03/08/2025
Agreed—market def in this case seems too fact-bound to be a good candidate for cert.
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 03/08/2025
Nested markets are fine if the facts support both. I could imagine, for example, markets for colas, all soft drinks, and all beverages. If all satisfy the hypothetical monopolist test, conduct that harms competition in any one of them (or more than one) would presumably violate the antitrust laws.
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 21/07/2025
I recently reviewed Louis Kaplow’s book "Rethinking Merger Analysis." The review evaluates the book’s discussion of market definition, coordinated effects, entry, efficiencies, and the welfare standard. Available in The Antitrust Source or at ssrn.com/abstract=533...
ssrn.com
Looking at Merger Review from Outside an Ivory Tower
This article reviews Louis Kaplow, Rethinking Merger Analysis (MIT Press 2024). The review evaluates the book's discussion of five major topics:&
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Reposted by Jonathan B. Baker
Fiona Scott Morton @proffionasm.bsky.social · 26/06/2025
Are you wondering how to make monopoly digital platforms more competitive? I have a new book with answers. Intro article here in ProMarket: www.promarket.org/2025/06/26/a...
promarket.org
A Pro-Competitive Handbook for Policymakers to Unlock Digital Competition - ProMarket
Fiona Scott Morton introduces her new book on how regulators and policymakers can promote competition and fairness in digital markets.
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 24/06/2025
Lunch with some DC area antitrust professors. With @profgavil.bsky.social @lancierifilippo.bsky.social Dale Collins and @stevesalop.bsky.social
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Centre for Economic Policy Research @cepr.org · 24/06/2025
While the second Trump administration's initial moves in #antitrust enforcement suggested continuity, more recent actions outside the realm of antitrust enforcement have the potential to change #competitionpolicy dramatically, explains @jbbecon.bsky.social. cepr.org/publications... #EconSky
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Centre for Economic Policy Research @cepr.org · 18/06/2025
📢 New CEPR #eBook out NOW! 📚 "The Economic Consequences of the Second Trump Administration: A Preliminary Assessment" Editors: Gary Gensler, @simonhrjohnson.bsky.social, @upanizza.bsky.social, @wederdim.bsky.social Free download: cepr.org/publications... #EconSky
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Fiona Scott Morton @proffionasm.bsky.social · 04/06/2025
I have a new book! Digital Platform Regulation. Fun analysis of what society should do to get some competition out of of our favorite gatekeeper platform. Relevant to the DMA and US antitrust remedies. And free! Download here: som.yale.edu/centers/thur...
som.yale.edu
Digital Platform Regulation
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 29/04/2025
Slater’s perspective favors strong antitrust. But it’s natural to wonder whether liberty protection—the intellectual basis for what she calls a new right realignment in antitrust—would, like Lochner era thinking, now justify non-antitrust policies to circumscribe social & economic regulation. 5/5
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 29/04/2025
Slater also recalls the 19th c in her populist framing of antitrust as supporting “forgotten men and women”—for her consumers, workers, and small businesses and innovators in Little Tech, manufacturing, and family farms—against private monopolies, particularly “online platforms” 4/5
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 29/04/2025
That view animated the Supreme Court’s 1899 Addyston Pipe decision, a leading antitrust precedent still read today written by Justice Rufus Peckham. Peckham famously supported expansive substantive due process protection for contract and property rights. 3/5
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 29/04/2025
Slater emphasizes that individual liberty is threatened by “corporate tyranny” just as it is threatened by government tyranny. Similarly, the Lochner era Supreme Court objected to all artificial interference with the market, public or private, as inconsistent with the “liberty of contract.” 2/5
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 29/04/2025
When AAG Slater roots her “America First Antitrust” (www.justice.gov/opa/speech/a...) in “conservative values,” she recalls judicial thinking from over a century ago. 1/5
justice.gov
Assistant Attorney General Gail Slater Delivers First Antitrust Address at University of Notre Dame Law School
Good afternoon. Thank you so much for having me. It is an honor to be here at Notre Dame to give my first formal address as Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division. I’ve had many offers
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 23/04/2025
Six years old…and still worth reading 🙂
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ProMarket @promarket.bsky.social · 11/04/2025
NEW: After the second Trump administration initially appeared to maintain significant continuity in antitrust enforcement, the president more recently thrust the agencies into turmoil. Those later actions create troubling risks to the economy and the rule of law, writes @jbbecon.bsky.social.
promarket.org
Threats to Competition Policy in the Second Trump Administration: Is Antitrust Enforcement Following Alice Down the Rabbit Hole? - ProMarket
After the second Trump administration initially appeared to maintain significant continuity in antitrust enforcement, the president more recently thrust the agencies into turmoil. Those later actions ...
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 11/04/2025
Threats to Competition Policy in the Second Trump Administration: Is Antitrust Enforcement Following Alice Down the Rabbit Hole? My new blog post: www.promarket.org/2025/04/11/t...
promarket.org
Threats to Competition Policy in the Second Trump Administration: Is Antitrust Enforcement Following Alice Down the Rabbit Hole? - ProMarket
After the second Trump administration initially appeared to maintain significant continuity in antitrust enforcement, the president more recently thrust the agencies into turmoil. Those later actions ...
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 05/02/2025
I gave a list of examples such as unilateral effects of mergers and raising rivals' costs analysis, and said "Those developments often moved the law and enforcement in a direction counter to the distributional interest of big business." From ssrn.com/abstract=449... 4/4
ssrn.com
Not a Simple Story of Big Business Capture: An Essay on the Political Economy of Antitrust
This essay questions a political economy theory that views U.S. antitrust institutions as having been captured by big business around the late 1970s. It explain
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 05/02/2025
On the role of economics, I wrote in 2023 that "the big business capture theory cannot readily rationalize the not insubstantial influence ... of developments in economics since the 1970s that called into question non-interventionist perspectives" 3/4
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 05/02/2025
..."Trump has organized his political movement around cultural and identity issues, not economic issues.” Both quotes from ssrn.com/abstract=414... I also noted differences between the economic interests of Trumpian populists and big business. That's not saying big business favors democracy. 2/4
ssrn.com
Finding Common Ground Among Antitrust Reformers
This forthcoming article explains why antimonopolists (neoBrandeisians) and post-Chicagoans (centrist reformers) should work together to advance both groups’ go
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 05/02/2025
On democracy, here's what I wrote in 2022 (before Trump began to work with Musk): "[T]he imminent threat to democracy comes from authoritarians, not from the political power of large firm interests—at least so long as big business avoids making common cause with Trumpian populists." 1/4
ssrn.com
Finding Common Ground Among Antitrust Reformers
This forthcoming article explains why antimonopolists (neoBrandeisians) and post-Chicagoans (centrist reformers) should work together to advance both groups’ go
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 27/01/2025
Whether courts should extend Rambus to merger and agreement cases turns primarily on error cost considerations that may look different to courts today than they appeared when Rambus was decided. Paper: ssrn.com/abstract=511.... 9/9
ssrn.com
Conduct that Increases Market Power Without Lessening Competition: A Challenge for Antitrust Law
Conduct that violates the antitrust laws usually lessens competition and increases market power. But some conduct increases market power without lessening compe
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 27/01/2025
Policy issues: the practical ability of courts to deter harmful conduct, error cost considerations, and non-economic values. Legal issue: whether Rambus v. FTC, a unilateral conduct case requiring increased market power to flow from lessened competition, extends to merger and agreement cases. 8/9
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 27/01/2025
Lessened competition can generate increased market power, but it is not the only mechanism that can lead to that outcome. Whether the antitrust laws should reach conduct where increased market power does not flow from lessened competition turns on legal and policy considerations. 7/9
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Jonathan B. Baker @jbbecon.bsky.social · 27/01/2025
Definitions: a firm experiences lessened competition in serving buyers when buyer substitution opportunities become less attractive (relaxing a competitive constraint). A firm exercises increased market power when its terms of trade become less advantageous to its buyers. 6/9
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